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THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

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THE AMERICAN

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THE NUMBER OF MEMBERS AS DETERMINING THE SOCIOLOGICAL FORM OF THE GROUP. I.[1]

THE following investigations constitute a chapter of a *Sociology* to be published by me in the future, the prolegomena to which have already appeared in this JOURNAL.[2]

In respect to the fundamental problem which appears to me solely to form the basis of a sociology as a distinct science, I refer to the introduction of these two monographs. I repeat here merely that this problem rests upon the distinction between the content or purpose of socializations, and the form of the same. The content is economic or religious, domestic or political, intellectual or volitional, pedagogic or convivial. That these purposes and interests, however, attain to realization in the form of a society, of the companionship and the reciprocity of individuals, is the subject-matter of special scientific consideration. That men build a society means that they live for the attainment of those purposes in definitely formed interactions. If there is to be a science of society as such, it must therefore abstract those forms from the complex phenomena of societary life, and it must make them the subject of determination and explanation. Those contents are already treated by special sciences, historical and systematic; the relationships, however, of men to each

[1] Translated by A. W. SMALL.

[2] "Superiority and Subordination as Subject-Matter of Sociology," Vol. II, Nos. 2 and 3; "The Persistence of Social Groups," Vol. III, Nos. 5 and 7.

other, which in the case of the most diverse purposes may be the same, and in the case of like purposes may be most various—these have not as yet been the subject-matter of a particular science; and yet such a science, when constituted, would for the first time make manifest what it is which makes the society—that is, the totality of historical life—into society.

I deny myself at this point all further explanation and justification of this program, since it is, after all, less important to propose a program than to show by carrying it out its significance and its fruitfulness; and I proceed at once to the special problem, namely, how the form and the inner life of a societary group are determined by the numerical relationships of the same.

It will be conceded at the first glance, without hesitation, that the sociological structure of a group is essentially modified by the number of the individuals that are united in it. It is an everyday experience—yes, it is almost to be construed from the most general social-psychological presuppositions—that a group of a certain extent and beyond a certain stage in its increase of numbers must develop for its maintenance certain forms and organization which it did not previously need; and that, on the other hand, more restricted groups manifest qualities and reciprocal activities which, in the case of their numerical extension, inevitably disappear. A double significance attaches itself to the quantitative determination: first, the negative significance that certain forms which are necessary or possible from the contents or the conditions of life can come to realization only before or after a certain numerical extension of the elements; the positive significance that other forms are promoted directly through definite and purely quantitative modifications of the group. As a matter of course, these do not emerge in every case, but they depend upon other social circumstances in the group. The decisive matter, however, is that the forms in question never spring from these latter conditions alone, but are produced from them only through the accompanying numerical factor. Thus it may be demonstrated that quite or nearly communistic formations have up to the present day been possible only in relatively small circles, while they have always failed in large groups.

The presumption of such socialistic groups—namely, justice in the distribution of effort and of enjoyment—can no doubt be established in a small group, and, what is at least quite as important, it can be observed and controlled by the individuals. What each does for the totality, and wherewith the totality rewards him, is in such cases close at hand, so that comparison and equalization easily occur. In a great group this practice is hindered, particularly by the unavoidable differentiation of persons within it, of their functions and of their claims. A very large number of people can constitute a unity only with decisive division of labor, not merely on the obvious grounds of economic technique, but because this alone produces that interpenetration and interdependence of persons which puts each through innumerable intermediaries in combination with each, and without which a widely extended group would break apart on every occasion. Consequently the more intimate the unity demanded in the same, the more exact must be the specialization of individuals, in order that the individuals may be the more immediately responsible to the whole, and the whole may be dependent upon the individuals. The communism of a great community would thus promote the sharpest differentiation of the personalities, which would naturally extend over and beyond their labor, to their feeling and desiring. Hence a comparison of services with each other, of rewards with each other, and equilibration of the two, is infinitely difficult; but upon this the feasibility of approximate communism for small, and therefore undifferentiated, circles rests. What limits such circles, under advanced culture, by a sort of logical necessity, so to speak, to restricted numerical extent, is their dependence upon goods which under their peculiar productive conditions can never be furnished. So far as my knowledge goes, there is in present Europe only a single approximately socialistic organization, namely, the Familistère de Guise, a great iron foundry, founded by a disciple of Fourier in 1888, according to the principle of complete guardianship for every workman and his family, security of a minimum standard of living, of gratuitous care and education of the children, of collective production of the income. This society gave work in

the last decade of the nineteenth century to 2,000 people, and has proved that it is capable of life. This is evidently the case, however, only because it is surrounded by a totality existing under entirely different conditions of life. From this environment the organization can cover the necessarily remaining gaps in the means of satisfaction which are left by its own production. For human needs cannot be so rationalized as is the case with production. A previously calculated, mechanically working life-system, in which every detail is regulated according to general principles, can be applied, to be sure, in a small circle which can draw from a greater one whatever it requires for the establishment of its internal equilibrium. But human needs appear to contain an accidental or incalculable element, and this fact permits their satisfaction only at the cost of carrying on parallel activities which produce countless irrational and unavailable by-products. A circle, therefore, which avoids this, and confines itself to complete responsibility and utility in its activities, must always remain minute, because it has need of a greater group in order to be reinforced with the requisite capacity for life.

Moreover, there are group-formations of the ecclesiastical sort which, from the very fact of their sociological structure, permit no application to large numbers; thus the sects of the Waldenses, Mennonites, and Herrnhuter. Where dogma forbids, for example, the oath, military service, occupation of civil offices; where quite personal matters, such as modes of earning a living and the division of the hours of the day, are subject to the regulation of the community; where a special type of dress separates the faithful from all others, and distinguishes them as belonging together; where the subjective experience of an immediate relationship to Jesus constitutes the principal solder of the community—in such cases, evidently, expansion into large circles would snap the bond of union, which consists largely in their exceptional and antithetical attitude toward larger bodies. At least in this sociological respect is the claim of these sects to represent primitive Christianity not unjustified; for precisely this early form of faith, manifesting a yet undifferentiated unity of dogma and form of life, was possible only in those small

communities within a greater one which served them at once for supplying their external necessities, and also as an antithesis, in contrast with which they were conscious of their peculiar nature. Consequently, the extension of Christianity to the whole state has necessarily changed completely its sociological character not less than its psychical content.

Moreover, that an aristocratic body can have but a relatively narrow compass is given in its very idea. But, besides this trivial consequence of the dominance over masses, there appears to be here also a numerical limitation, which, although in large extent variable, is yet in kind absolute. I mean by this that not only does a definite proportion exist, which would always permit that with increasing number of the ruled the ruling aristocracy would likewise increase *pro rata* and beyond any limit; but that there is an absolute limit beyond which the aristocratic group-form can no longer be maintained intact. This limit will be determined partly by external and partly by psychological conditions. An aristocratic group must be capable of survey by the individual member; each must be able to have a personal acquaintance with each; relationships of blood and marriage must ramify through the whole body, and must be traceable. If, therefore, the historical aristocracies, from Sparta to Venice, have a tendency to the utmost possible numerical limitation, this is not merely the egoistic disinclination to partition of control, but it is the instinct that the conditions of the life of an aristocracy can be fulfilled only with a not merely relative, but also absolute, restriction of the number of its elements. The unlimited right of primogeniture, which is of aristocratic nature, constitutes the means for such prevention of expansion; under its presumption alone was the ancient Theban law possible, that the number of landed estates should not be increased, and also the Corinthian, that the number of families must always remain the same. It is, therefore, entirely characteristic that Plato once, when he spoke of the ruling *ὀλίγοι*, designated the same directly as the *μὴ πολλοί*.

When an aristocratic body gives place to the democratic centrifugal tendencies, which constitute the unavoidable trend of

very large communities, it involves itself in such fatal contradictions of its own life-principle as, for example, the nobility of Poland before the division exemplified. In more fortunate cases such a contradiction resolves itself simply through transformation into the unified democratic social form; for example, the ancient free German community, with its complete personal equality of the members, was aristocratic throughout, and yet became in its continuation in the civic communities the source of democracy. If this is to be avoided, nothing remains except to draw, at a definite point of increase in numbers, a hard and fast line, and to oppose to all elements approaching from beyond this line, even though they were otherwise qualified for admission, the quantitative completeness of the structure. Frequently the aristocratic nature of the same appears only at this point; it becomes conscious for the first time in this closing up of itself against the demand for extension. Accordingly, the old constitution of the "gens" seems to have turned into a real aristocracy for the reason that a new population, alien to the members of the gens, pressed in upon them in too large numbers for gradual absorption into the associations of like strata. In opposition to this increase of the total group, the groups of gentes, which, by their very nature, were limited in numbers, could conduct themselves only as an aristocracy. In quite the same way the *Cölnische Schutzgilde Richerzeche* consisted originally of the totality of the free burghers. In the degree, however, in which the population increased, it became an aristocratic society which closed itself against all intruders. A group which constitutes a totality and, like the gens for instance, is in its whole nature quantitatively limited, will be able to preserve itself within a new and very extended totality only in the form of an aristocracy.

The tendency of political aristocracies leads, to be sure, as a rule, not to the maintenance of the existing status, but to decline in numbers and disappearance. Not merely on account of physiological causes, but small and narrowly exclusive groups are in general distinguished from greater ones in this that the very same destiny which strengthens and renews the latter

destroys the former. A disastrous war, which ruins a petty city-state, may regenerate a great state. This occurs not merely from the quite evident external reasons, but because the relation of the reserves of power to the active energies in the two cases is different. Small and centripetally organized groups usually call out and employ to their full extent the energies available within them; in greater groups, on the other hand, much more energy, not merely absolutely but also relatively, remains in a latent condition. The demand of the whole does not seize upon every member constantly and completely, and it permits much power to remain unused which then, in extreme cases, may be mobilized and actualized. The decisive thing in this case is, as indicated, the social centripetalism, that is, the ratio in which the energies present in the society are harnessed for its purposes. When it, therefore, occurs that a lower and smaller group allows its members much autonomy and independence, the latter then often develop energies which are not used socially, and, therefore, in case the appeal to the common interests occurs, they represent a considerable available recourse. This was for a long time the case, for example, with the nobility of the Scotch highlands. Likewise, on the other hand, where dangers, which demand an unused quantity of social energy, are excluded by the circumstances, means of numerical limitation, which extend even beyond endogamy, may be quite appropriate. In the highlands of Thibet polyandry prevails and, as even the missionaries recognize, to the advantage of society; for the soil is there so unfruitful that a rapid increase of the population would produce the greatest misery. To prevent this, polyandry is an efficient means. When we hear that among the Bushmen, on account of the sterility of the soil, very often even families must separate, the rule that the families must limit themselves to numbers corresponding with the possibilities of food production appears to be precisely in the interest of their unity, and highly appropriate when this and its social significance are considered. The dangers of the quantitative limitation are provided against by the external conditions of the life of the group, and their consequences for its inner structure.

Where the small group absorbs the personalities in considerable measure into its unity, especially in political groups, it strives, precisely for the sake of its unity, for definiteness of status toward persons, material tasks, and other societies. The large group, with the number and variety of its elements, demands or tolerates such definiteness much less. The history of the Greek and of the Italian cities, as of the Swiss cantons, shows that small communities, in case they do not proceed to federation, habitually live in open or latent hostility to each other. Moreover, warfare and martial law are between them much more bitter and sharp, and especially more radical, than between great states. It is precisely that absence of organs, of reserves, of undefined and transitional elements, which makes modification and adaptation difficult for them, and, apart from their external conditions, forces them, on account of their fundamental sociological configuration, much oftener to confront the question, "To be or not to be?"

By the side of such tendencies in smaller circles I cite, with the same unavoidable arbitrary selection from innumerable cases, the following for the sociological characterization of greater circles. I start from the fact that these, compared with smaller circles, seem to show an inferior degree of radicalism and obstinacy of attitude. This, however, requires a limitation. Precisely where great masses must be set in motion in political, social, and religious movements, they show a ruthless radicalism, a victory of the extreme parties over the mediating. This is primarily for the reason that great masses are always filled merely with simple ideas, and can be led by such only. What is common to many must for that reason be of a sort which the lowest, most primitive minds among them can entertain. And even higher and more differentiated personalities will approach each other in great numbers, not in the more complicated and highly elaborated, but only in the relatively simple universal human conceptions and impulses. Since, however, the actualities in which the ideas of the mass strive to become practical are always articulated in a very multifold way, and are composed of a great assemblage of very divergent elements, it follows that simple

ideas can work only in an entirely one-sided, ruthless, and radical fashion. This fact is accentuated in case the behavior of a crowd in actual physical contact is in question. Under such circumstances, the innumerable suggestions working back and forth produce an extraordinarily intense nervous excitement, which often deprives the individual of his senses, and drags him along as though he were unconscious. It inflates every impulse, often in a freakish manner, and makes the mob the prey of the most passionate personality in its number. This melting of masses into *one* feeling, in which all peculiarity and reserves of personalities are suspended, is naturally in its content so thoroughgoing, so radical, so alien to all mediation and consideration, that it would lead to sheer impracticabilities and destructions, if it did not usually find its end at an earlier stage from inner wearinesses and reactions, the consequence of this one-sided exaggeration. More than that, the masses, in the sense now in mind, have little to lose. On the contrary, they believe, so to speak, that they have everything to gain. This is the situation in which most of the restraints of radicalism habitually fall away; in this unorganized mass which consists of human beings with their immediate reciprocities, without a super-individual unity and form, those indefinitenesses, many-sidednesses, and mediatorial phenomena are lacking through which the great community ordinarily is distinguished from the small one. In order to form themselves upon the periphery of a community, they need precisely a stable center of the same, an objective social form and interest, in excess of the merely subjective and momentary unification of the elements.

Thus it is to be observed in general that small parties are more radical than large ones, of course within the limits which the ideas constituting the party prescribe. The radicalism here meant is immediately sociological; that is, it is marked by the unreserved dedication of the individual to the tendency of the group, by the sharp delimitation of the same against neighboring structures which is necessary to the self-preservation of the group, by the impossibility of taking up into the externally narrow frame a multitude of far-reaching endeavors and thoughts.

The radicalism which is peculiarly such in its content is to a considerable degree independent of the sort here in mind. It has been observed that the conservative-reactionary elements in Germany at the present time are compelled by the very fact of their numerical strength to restrain the ruthlessness of their endeavors. They are composed of so many and so different strata of society that they cannot follow any of their programs straight to the end without giving offense to some portion of their constituency. In the same way the Social-Democratic party is forced by its quantitative extent to dilute its qualitative radicalism, to allow dogmatic deviations a certain scope, to permit, if not expressly, nevertheless in fact here and there, a certain compromise with their intolerance. The unqualified coherence of the elements, upon which the possibility of radicalism rests sociologically, loses power to maintain itself as more and more varied individual elements are introduced with numerical accretion. For that reason professional labor coalitions, whose purpose is the improvement of the conditions of labor in detail, know very well that they lose in actual coherence with increase of extent. In this case, however, numerical extension has, on the other hand, the tremendous significance that every added member frees the coalition from a competitor, perhaps underbidding and thereby threatening it in its existence. There occur evidently quite special life-conditions for a group which constitutes itself inside of a larger group, and subordinate to its idea, and when its idea realizes its purpose only in so far as it unites in itself all elements which fall under its presuppositions. In such cases the rule usually holds: "He that is not for me is against me;" the personality outside of the group to which it, in accordance with the claims of the latter, so to speak, ideally belongs, does the group a very positive injury, through the mere indifference of non-attachment. This is the case whether, as among labor coalitions, through competition, or when it reveals to those standing outside of the group the boundaries of its power, or when the group only comes to real existence by the inclusion of all the elements concerned, as in the case of many industrial syndicates. In case, therefore, the question of com-

pleteness, which is by no means always in point, confronts a group — that is, the question whether all elements to which its principle extends are also actually included in it — then the consequences of this *completeness* must be carefully distinguished from those consequences which follow from its size alone. To be sure, the group will also be larger if it is complete than if it is incomplete; but not this association as a quantity, but the problem dependent immediately upon that, viz., whether with that quantity the group fills out therewith a prescribed scheme, may be so important for the group that, as in the case of labor coalitions, the disadvantages in cohesion and unity, following from mere increase of numbers, may stand in direct antagonism and counterpoise with the advantages of increasing completeness.

In general we may, in a very essential degree, explain the structures which are peculiar to large communities, as such, from the fact that they produce with these structures a substitute for the personal and immediate cohesion which is peculiar to the smaller circles. In the case of the large group, the question is one of correlating centers which are channels and mediators of the reciprocal action of the elements, and which thus operate as independent bearers of the societary unity, after this is no longer produced by immediate relationship of person to person. For this purpose magistracies and representatives grow up, laws and symbols of the group-life, organizations and social generalizations. At this point I have only to emphasize their connection with the numerical point of view. They all occur purely and maturely, so far as the main point is concerned, only in large circles, *i. e.*, as the abstract form of group-dependence, whose concrete form can no longer exist after a certain extension of the community has been reached. Their utility, ramifying into a thousand social qualities, rests in the last analysis upon numerical presuppositions. The character of the superpersonal and objective with which such incorporations of the group-energies face the individual is derived directly from the *multiplicity* of the variously operative individual elements; for only through their multiplicity is the individual element in them paralyzed, and from the same cause the universal mounts to such a distance

from the individual that it appears as something existing entirely by itself, not needing the individual, and possibly even antagonistic to the individual—somewhat as the *concept*, which, composed of singular and various phenomena of the common, is the higher above every one of these details, the more it includes; so that precisely the universal ideas which rule the greatest circumference of particulars—the abstractions with which metaphysics reckons—attain a life apart, whose norms and developments are often alien, or hostile, to those of the tangible particulars. The great group thus gains its unity—as it expresses itself in its organs and in its law, in its political ideas and in its ideals—only at the price of a wide distance of all those structures from the individual, his views and needs, which find immediate activity and consideration in the social life of a small circle. From this relation there arises the typical difficulty of organizations in which a series of minor combinations are included within a larger one; viz., the fact is that the situations can be readily seen, and treated with interest and care, only close at hand; while, on the contrary, only from the distance which the central position holds can a just and regular relation of all the details to each other be established. This is a discrepancy which, for example, always emerges in the treatment of poverty, in the organization of labor, and in educational administration. The relationships of person to person, which constitute the life-principle of smaller circles, are not easily compatible with the distance and coolness of the objective-abstract norms without which the great group cannot exist.

The unity and the correlating form of the great group, as contrasted with its elements and their primary socializations, come into existence only through negations. Social actions and regulations evolve in many ways the character of negativity in the degree of their numerical inclusiveness. In the case of mass actions, the motives of individuals are often so different that their unification is possible in the degree in which their content is merely negative and destructive. The unrest which leads to great revolutions is always nursed from so many, and often directly opposing, sources that their focalization upon a positive

aim would be impossible. The erection of the latter is usually the task then of the smaller circles, and of the energy of individuals who separate from each other in countless private undertakings, while these individuals united in a mass have worked in sweeping and destructive fashion. The same trend appears in the results of wide appeals to popular suffrage, which are so often, and almost incomprehensively, negative. For example, in Switzerland in the year 1900 a law with reference to sickness and accident insurance within the federation was summarily rejected by the referendum, after it had been unanimously adopted by both *representative* bodies, the Nationalrat and the Ständerat. The same has usually been the fate of most measures subject to the referendum. Rejection is the simplest action, and consequently great masses can combine in it. The positive standpoints of the separate groups from which this law was rejected were extremely various; they were particularistic and ultramontane, agrarian and capitalistic, technical and partisan; and consequently nothing could be common to them but negation. On that account, to be sure, in case many small circles agree at least in negative provisions, this may, on the contrary, indicate or prepare their unity. It has been observed that, while the Greeks exhibited wide culture-differences among themselves, yet even when we compare the Arcadian and the Athenian with the contemporary Carthaginians or Egyptians, Persians or Thracians, they still had many sorts of negative characteristics in common. Nowhere in historic Greece were there human sacrifices, or intentional mutilations; nowhere polygamy, or the sale of children into slavery; nowhere unlimited subjection to a single person. With all the positive differences, this common possession of the merely negative must necessarily have made the persons contained in such a community conscious that they belonged together, in a culture area extending beyond the boundaries of the single state.

The negative character of the bond which unites the great area into a unit appears primarily in its norms. This is prepared for by the phenomenon that, other things being equal, combining determinations of every sort must be the more simple and

the less comprehensive, the larger the circumference of their application. Illustrations might extend from the rules of "international courtesy," which are much fewer in number than those to be observed in every narrower circle; to the fact that the individual states of the German empire have, as a rule, a less comprehensive constitution the larger they are. Expressed in the form of a theorem: With increasing extent of the circle, the common elements which bind each with each into the social unity are decreasingly circumstantial. It is consequently (although at first paradoxical) possible to hold a great circle together with a smaller minimum of norms than would be required for a small circle. Of course, the aggregate of norms will be greater in the former than in the latter, but it consists of the special norms of the subdivisions of the circle, whereas the circle as a totality makes up for its size by deficit of many generally applicable norms. In qualitative respects, moreover, the modes of conduct which a community, in order to exist as such, must demand of its members are usually the more prohibitive and limiting in nature as extension increases. The positive combinations which, proceeding from element to element, give the group-life its proper content must at last be left to the individuals. The manifoldness of the persons, the interests, the occurrences, becomes too great to be regulated from one center. To this center, therefore, there is left only the prohibitive function, the determination of those things which *under no circumstances* may be done; the bounding of freedom rather than the direction of it—wherewith, of course, is meant only the trend of a development which is perpetually crossed and turned aside by other tendencies. Thus, where a great number of divergent circles of religious feeling or interest are to be composed into a unity. For example, from the decline of Arabian polytheism Allah arose as the universal concept, so to speak, of God in general. Polytheism produces necessarily a cleavage of the area included within the faith, because the components of the same will in different ways, according to the variety of their subjective and practical tendencies, turn to the various divinities. The abstract and unifying character of Allah is consequently in

the first instance of a negative sort. It is his original nature "to restrain from the evil," not, however, to incite to the good. He is only the "restrainer." The Hebrew God, who, in contrast with separatistic polytheism, and quite unsocial monism, like that of India, brought into being or expressed a unification of the religio-social synthesis unknown to antiquity, gives his most sharply emphasized practical norms in the form, "Thou shalt not." In the German empire the positive relations of life which are subject to the civil law did not find their unifying form in the civil statute book until about thirty years after the founding of the empire. On the other hand, the penal statute book, with its prohibitive regulations, was brought together, and to that extent made the empire a unity, in 1872. That which especially fits prohibitions to generalize smaller circles into a larger one is the circumstances that the counterpart of the forbidden is by no means always the forbidden, but often only the allowed. Thus, if in the circle A no α may occur, but β, γ, δ; in B no β, but α, γ, δ; in C no γ, but α, β, δ, etc., the unified structure may be formed from A, B, and C, upon the prohibition of α, β, γ. The unity is only possible if in A β and γ are not forbidden, but merely allowed, so that it also may be omitted. If, instead of that, β and γ are as positively forbidden as is α, and correspondingly in B and C, the consequence would be that no unit could be created which included all the positive group-limitations, because then there would always be on the one side direct prescription of that which on the other side is directly forbidden. The same is the case in the following example: From ancient times the eating of a given species of animal was forbidden to every Egyptian, namely, that species which was sacred to his own village. The doctrine that holiness demands abstinence from *all* animal food arose then as the result of the amalgamation of a collection of local cults into a national religion, at the head of which stood a priesthood ruling as a unit. This unification could occur only through the synthesis or universalization of all those prohibitions; for, if the eating of all animals, which was allowed in every village (that is, which also could be abstained from), had been positively commanded,

there would evidently have been no possibility of bringing together the special regulations of the parts into a higher whole.

Perhaps the connection between the enlargement of the circle and the negative character of its determinations shows itself most decisively in the following: The more generally, that is, for the greater circle, the norm is applicable, the less is its observance characterizing and significant for the individual; while the failure to observe it is usually accompanied by especially severe and notable consequences. This is particularly the case, in the first place, in the intellectual realm. The theoretical understanding, without which there could be no human society, rests upon a small number of generally recognized, although of course not abstractly conscious, norms which we designate as logical principles. They constitute the minimum of that which must be recognized by all who want to hold commerce with each other. Upon this basis rests the most fleeting consensus of individuals least acquainted with each other, as well as the daily association of the most intimate. Intellectual observance of these simplest norms, without which there could be no reckoning with experienced reality, is the most inexorable and most universal condition of all sociological life; for with all variety of the subjective and objective world-view, logic produces a certain common ground, departure from which must destroy all intellectual community in the broadest sense of the term. But logic, however, strictly speaking, neither means nor produces any positive possession whatever. It is only the norm against which we may not sin, while at the same time obedience to it does not afford any distinction, any specific good or quality. All attempts to win a specific cognition with the help of mere logic fail, and their sociological significance is consequently quite as negative as that of the criminal statute book. On the other hand, only failure to observe produces a special and classified situation, while remaining within the norm affords to the individual nothing else than the possibility of remaining, theoretically or practically, in the generality. To be sure, from thousandfold divergence of content, the intellectual nexus itself may fail, even with strict obser-

vance of logic; but with disregard of logic it *must* fail — precisely as the moral-social community, even with the most exact avoidance of everything criminally forbidden, may go to pieces; while with disobedience of these norms it *must* go to pieces. The case is not different with the societary forms in the more restricted sense, so far as they are actually general in a community. Although their observance is distinctive for nobody, transgression of them is in the highest degree distinctive, for the most universal laws of a community are merely not to be transgressed, while the special norms which hold together restricted circles, in the degree of their specialization, lend to the individual a positive shading and difference. The disobedience of these latter norms may destroy such a circle, but the larger comprehending group, in which the elements of the smaller belong in addition, remains still intact, and does not dissolve until its elements transgress that minimum of norms the essence of which is, in the ratio of their generality, merely prohibitive. Upon this relationship rests also the great practical utility of the quite empty societary forms of courtesy. Upon the positive existence of respect and loyalty of which they testify to us we may not count, even from their most accurate observance; on the other hand, the slightest failure to observe them proves that those feelings are *not* present. The salute upon the street by no means demonstrates respect; the omission of the same, however, gives very decided evidence of the contrary. As symbols of positive subjective attitude, these forms completely fail to be of service. The negative, however, they advertise in a most useful way, since a quite easy negligence may radically and definitely determine the relation to a given person — and indeed in the degree in which the form of courtesy is quite universal and conventional, that is, a part of the essential nature of a relatively large circle.

This form-difference of the life-conditions which attaches itself to the social quantity-difference is, in the large, denoted also by the antithesis between custom and law. It appears as though in the case of the Aryan peoples the first attachments of the individual to a superindividual life-order proceeded from a quite general instinct or concept, which signified the categorical,

the appropriate, the should-be in general. The particular regulations in the realms of religion, morality, conventions, law, are not details in the sense that from them that concept could have proceeded as that which was common to them all, but they are the ramifications which rest undifferentiated in it. The concept is the original, not the later abstracted unity. In contrast now to the opinion in accordance with which morality, custom, and law have developed, so to speak, as pendants from that germ-condition, the germ seems to me rather to persist still in that which we call custom, and to represent the indifference-condition which puts forth from itself from different sides the form of law and of morality. Custom as a form of sociological combination seems to me scarcely to be capable of positive definition, but it can properly be defined only through the antithesis to those two forms which develop themselves from it—here also betraying its quite primary and general character. All three forms serve to assure the demeanor of the individual in accordance with the demands of social utility. Law has in statute and in its executive agencies the differentiated organs through which it can first precisely circumscribe its contents and, second, control them externally. Hence, however, it limits itself for utilitarian purposes to the quite essential conditions of the group-life. The free morality of the individual, on the other hand, possesses no other law than that which it gives itself autonomously from within, and no other executive than conscience. Hence its scope embraces, to be sure, in principle, the totality of action; it has, however, visibly, in its external practice, in every individual case, special accidental and varying boundaries.[1]

[1] That law and morality thus alike spring *pari passu* from *one* variation of societary development appears in the teleological significance of the two, which, more than the first appearance betrays, connote each other. If the restricted leading of the individual, which includes a life regulated altogether by custom, gives place to the universal legal norm, which has a much wider distance from everything individual, yet in the social interest the therewith attained freedom may still not remain responsible to itself alone. Through the moral imperative the juristic demands are enlarged, and the gaps in the regulations of life are filled, which are produced by defect of universally regulating custom. Regulation is now at the same time transferred much higher above the individual and much deeper within him, for whatever personal and metaphysical

Through custom, then, a community assures to itself the appropriate conduct of its members, where the pressure of the law is inadequate, and the superindividual morality is not to be relied upon. Thus custom works today as complement of these two institutions, as it was the sole regulator of life at a time when these differentiated forms of norm existed either not at all or merely in the germ. Therewith is the sociological place of custom sufficiently indicated. It stands between the largest circle, as a member of which the individual is subordinate to the law, and absolute individuality, which is the sole bearer of free morality. Custom belongs, therefore, to the narrower circles, the intermediate structures between the individual and the greater community. Almost all custom is that of a rank or class; its manners of expression, such as external behavior, fashion, honor, control always only a subordinate division of the largest circle to which the law applies, and they have in the contiguous subdivisions a different content. Against failures to observe good customs reaction is produced on the part of the narrower circle of those who are in some way affected by it, or are witnesses of it, while a violation of the legal order calls out the reaction of the totality. Since custom has as its executive only public opinion, and certain reactions of individuals immediately attached to it, it is evident that a great circle, as such, is excluded from administering it. There is no need of expanding the observation

values conscience and the autonomous morality may represent, their social value, which concerns us here alone, lies in their enormous prophylactic utility. Law and custom seize upon the activities of the will in their external manifestation and their realization; they operate, purely as such, in a compulsory way, at the utmost through fear. Morality, however, stands at the roots of the deed; it thus reconstructs the subjectivity of the agent until, of his own accord, he permits only the right action to proceed from himself, without needing the support of those relatively external forces. But society has no interest in the purely subjective moral perfecting of the agent. This is important to society only, and is only cultivated by society, in so far as it results in the utmost guarantee for the socially useful actions of precisely this agent. In the morality of the individual, society creates for itself an organ which is not only more fundamentally operative than law and custom, but which also spares society the different sorts of cost involved in these institutions. Hence the tendency of society to satisfy its demands as cheaply as possible results in appeals to "good conscience," through which the individual pays to himself the wages for his righteousness, which otherwise would probably have to be assured to him in some way through law or custom.

that the customs of trade, as such, permit or command something different from those of the aristocracy; those of a religious circle, again, something different from those of a literary body; etc. In this connection it is obvious that the content of custom consists of the special limitations which a narrower circle needs, which circle has at its disposal for the guarantee of the limitations neither the power of civic law nor entirely trustworthy autonomous moral impulses. What is common to these circles and the most primitive, with which for us social history begins, is nothing else than numerical paucity. The life-forms which earlier sufficed for the entire community-circle have, with the growth of the latter, withdrawn themselves to its subordinate divisions, for these contain now the possibilities of personal relationships, the approximate equality of level of the members, the common interests and ideals, in the presence of which one may confide social regulation to so precarious and ambiguous a species of norm as customary morality is. With increasing quantity of the elements, and of the therewith unavoidable independence of the same, these limitations disappear for the circle as a whole. The peculiar constraining power of custom becomes for the state too little, and for the individual too much. The former demands greater guarantees, the latter greater freedom; and only with those sides with which each element belongs to intermediate circles is it still socially controlled through custom.

To this correlation which attaches the difference of the social form of custom from that law, to the quantitative variation of the communities, there are obvious exceptions. The original popular unities of the Teutonic stocks, upon which the great realms, the Frankish, the English, the Swedish, raised themselves, were often able to protect themselves a long time against loss of the privilege of enacting their own laws. Such laws as they had were often made enactments of the state comparatively late; and, on the other hand, in modern international intercourse many customs prevail which have not yet received the force of law. Within the particular state many modes of action are established as law which in external relationships, that is, within the largest circle, must be consigned to the looser form of custom. The

resolution of the contradiction is very simple: The size of the circle demands the legal form naturally only in that relation in which the manifoldness of its elements *is composed into a unity.* The social unity is a graduated idea; the spirit and purpose of various circles demand various degrees in the closeness and strength of their unity; so that the social form of regulation which is demanded by a certain quantity of the circle, with respect to the degree of the unity which it is to achieve may still be the same with different quantities. The significance of the numerical conditions is thus not impaired if a greater circle, on account of its special tasks, may or must content itself without giving legal forms to its rules, just as in other cases is possible only to a smaller circle. Those undisciplined civic structures of Teutonic antiquity did not yet possess the cohesion of the elements which, existing in the case of great groups, is both cause and effect of their legal constitutions. Likewise in both the collective and the individual relationships between modern states there arise certain norms in the mere form of custom, because there is lacking here a unity of the parties necessary to be the vehicle of a legal order, and such a unity is in part supplied in a smaller, just as in a looser, circle by the immediate reactions of element with element. This, however, corresponds precisely with the function of custom as a form of regulation. Consequently the apparent exceptions really confirm the correlation which appeared between custom and law on the one side, and the quantities of the circles on the other side.

It is evident that the concepts "greater and smaller circle" are of a very crude scientific order, entirely indefinite and fluctuating, and properly applicable in general only in order to point out the dependence of the sociological form-character of a group upon its quantitative limitations. It cannot serve in any way to show more exactly the actual proportion which exists between the former and the latter. Nevertheless it is perhaps not in all cases impossible to make out this proportion more exactly. In the thus far observed formations and relationships any attempt to assign precise numerical values would evidently be, for any stage of our knowledge that can be foreseen, a completely

fantastic undertaking. But within certain limits even now traits of those socializations may be cited which exist between a limited number of persons, and which are characterized by this limitation. As transitions out of the most complete numerical indefiniteness to complete numerical definiteness, I mention certain cases in which the latter in principle is already of some sociological significance, but still without a determination of the same in particulars; namely:

1. The number works as a principle of division of the group; that is, there are portions of the same which are formed by enumeration, and are treated as relative unities. The special significance of separate numbers in this connection will be discussed later, and at this point I merely emphasize the principle. That a total group which feels itself in any way as *one* divides itself at all, and that it divides itself not merely from top to bottom, according to the ratio of the rulers and the ruled, but according to co-ordinated members, is one of the most tremendous advances of humanity; it is, to be sure, not yet the proper organic life instead of the mechanical coexistence of society, but, so to speak, the anatomical structure which constitutes the basis of the life-process. The division may proceed merely from the hereditary principle, or from associations formed by voluntary pledges, or from similarity of occupations, or from classification by local districts. To these principles there attaches itself the numerical variant which divides the mass of the existing men or families by a definite number, and so produces similar subdivision on the purely quantitative basis. The whole has toward each of these approximately the same relation which the subdivisions themselves bear toward their individuals. This principle is now so schematic, to be sure, that for its realization a more concrete one must be associated with it. The numerically equal divisions were composed of units in some way near to each other: relatives, friends, neighbors, or units which otherwise reinforced each other through likeness or unlikeness. The decisive factor is, however, that numerical equality constitutes the form-principle of the division—although it never decides *alone*, but merely plays a rôle varying from the

greatest to the least importance. This size is highly significant for the group. Nomadic stocks, for example, often have, in default of otherwise stable life-content, scarcely any other possibility of organizing themselves except in accordance with the number-principle. Its significance for a crowd upon the march controls even today the structure of armies. It persists naturally in the circumstance that often in the subdivision of a conquered or colonized or newly discovered land, where in the first instance there is a lack of real standards of organization, the principle of correlation, according to numerically equal divisions, has the first place ; for example, the oldest constitution of Iceland is controlled in this way.

2. While we have up to this point been concerned with the numerical equality of different divisions, the number may be used further in order to characterize a single, and indeed leading, circle of persons from within a total group. For example, it was in many cases the custom to designate the administrative group of the craft-organizations by their number : In Frankfort the heads of the wool-weavers were known as "The Six ;" among the bakers it was "The Eight ;" in mediæval Barcelona the senate was called "The One Hundred," etc. It is extremely noteworthy how precisely the *most eminent* personalities are designated by that which is in itself least distinguishing, which is completely indifferent to every qualification, namely, mere number. The presumption behind this fact seems to me to be that with a number, say with six, not six individual, isolated elements, simply standing side by side, are meant, but a synthesis of these. Six is not 1 and 1 and 1, etc., but a new concept, which is realized by the *concurrence* of these elements, and not *pro rata* in each of them for himself. In other connections we must designate the vital functional reciprocity of elements as their unity, which rises *above* their mere sum and in sociological antithesis with it. Here, however, in giving a name to a body of administrators, a committee, etc., by means of the mere sum, in reality that functional togetherness is in mind, and it is, as a name, possible only for the reason that the number in itself signifies a unity formed of unities. In the case cited, The Six are

not scattered through a homogeneous circle, but they signify a definite and firm *articulation of the circle*, through which six persons from its number are made eminent, and then they grow together to a guiding unity. The characterless impersonality of the naming by means of the number is just here highly characteristic ; for it denotes more decisively than any less formal idea could that herewith no individuals, as persons, are meant, but that it is a purely social structure ; the structure of the circle demands a definite quota of its units as a guiding body. In the purely numerical concept resides the pure objectivity of the formation, which is indifferent to everything personal in the separate member, and only demands that he shall be merely one of The Six. There is, perhaps, no more effective expression with which to emphasize, along with the social eminence of individuals, at the same time the complete irrelevance of everything which they stand for as persons outside of this function.

The unity of grouping which reveals itself in the composing of elements into a higher number is brought to light with special clearness by means of an apparent instance to the contrary. That senate of Barcelona which was called the One Hundred had at last in reality more, up to the number of two hundred, without on that account changing its name. The same phenomenon appears when the number operates, not as a distinguishing, but as a dividing, principle. Where the division of the population according to hundreds occurred, which we shall discuss later, there was never exact preservation of this precise number of members in the subdivision. This is expressly stated of the old German Hundreds. The number is in this case, therefore, immediately the synonym of the social member, which at first included, or was supposed to have included, precisely such a circle of individuals. This apparently insignificant fact shows the immense significance of numerical definiteness for the structure of the group. The number becomes indeed independent of its arithmetical content ; it shows that the relation of the members to the whole is a numerical one ; or, the number having become stable, represents this relation. There remains at the same time the idea of the subdivision, to consist of one hundred

elements, only that the empirical relations actualize this division with greater or less exactness. If it has been said of the German Hundreds that they were intended to express merely an indefinitely large number between the individual and the totality of members, this designates precisely the asserted sociological type. The life of the group demands a middle resort between the One and the All, a bearer of definite functions which neither the One nor the All can discharge, and the structure devoted to these tasks is thus named in accordance with its *numerical* composition. The functions do not give the name, because they are manifold and variable. What remains is merely the consolidation of an aliquot part of the totality into a unity. How *great* this part is in each case may be uncertain. The permanent numerical designation shows that the numerical relation in general was felt to be the essential thing. Therewith appears in the social realm an occurrence whose psychological form is elsewhere observed. The Russian types of coin are said to have been derived from an old system of weights, and it was of such sort that every higher type contained tenfold the amount of the lower. As a matter of fact, however, not merely the absolute but also the relative amount of metal in the coins often varied, but at the same time their values, after they were once brought into the numerical order, remained constant. While, therefore, the real proportions of metal value are shifting, the service which they have to render to commerce through the constancy of these nominal relations is marked by the fact that the historically first weight relations give permanent name and symbol for these later relations. In other ways, also, the number becomes the representative of the thing which it enumerates, and then the essential matter, namely, that the real affair in question is a relation between the whole and the part, is denoted by the fact that the numerical concept of the earlier relation covers all later changes. Thus the tax upon the miners in Spain in the sixteenth century was called the Quinto because it amounted to a fifth of the value, and it retained its name later when the proportion was quite different. In the same way the word "tithe" came to have, among the old Israelites and in many other places, the significance of

tribute in general—just as the term "hundred" came to have the meaning of subdivision in general. That the quantitative relation, which is quite as much the essence of a tax as of the social division, has obtained dominance psychologically over its peculiarity of content, appears most decisively in the circumstance that the original numerical limitation crystallizes into a designation of all modifications of the relation.

3. The numerical definiteness as form of organization assumes within the social development a typical function. The numerical method of division appears historically as a substitute for the class principle. It appears that in many places the groups consisted at first of subgroups held together by ties of blood, each of which constituted a unity in economic, penal, political, and other respects. That this internally very well-grounded organization was displaced by the melting together of ten or a hundred men for corresponding undertakings in common, must at first appear as a miraculous externalization, a schematization utterly lacking in essential life. We should look in vain in the immanent cohesive principles of this group for a justification of a change from the form with organic roots to this mechanical and formalistic order. The ground for it is rather to be found only in the *whole* which is composed of such subdivisions, and which makes demands that are independent in contrast with the life-principles of its parts. In the degree in which the whole as a unity is richer in content and more energetic, do the parts lose, at least at the outset and below the highest stage of development, their peculiar significance. They surrender the sense which they possess in and for themselves to the whole, and they are now the more useful the less a self-sufficient idea lives in each of them, and the more they as characterless parts receive back a position and significance only through their contribution to the whole. This is a universal tendency of social development, which makes itself manifest in the case of the modern soldier as contrasted with the knight of the Middle Ages, the factory laborer contrasted with the hand-worker, and every member of the present national and international organization as contrasted with the more or less autonomous domestic and natural

industry. With a certain complexity and centripetality of the whole, it permits none of its elements any longer to bring a thought to expression, so to speak, but this member acquires an external and merely mechanical character—that of a mere means, which must be as much as possible colorless and schematic in order to be in the highest degree yielding and constructive with reference to the purpose of the whole. In the case of certain highly perfected types of development this is not the case. There are certain social structures which precisely with the largest size and most complete organization permit to individual elements the greatest freedom to live out their individuality according to special norms and in the most peculiar form. On the other hand, there are social structures which reach the highest total energy only under the condition of the most intensified and differentiated peculiar life of their elements. The transition from the clan to the Hundred, however, seems to mark that middle stadium in which absence of special spirit and character in the members denotes an advance for the whole; for only under such organization were they, in the given circumstances, easily surveyed, responsive to guidance according to simple norms, and without that opposition against the central power which, with strong internal cohesion of each subordinate group, too easily appears.

Where the constitution or action of the group is numerically determined—from the old Hundred to the modern dominance of majorities—there is in evidence an ascendency over the individuality. It is a point at which the profound internal discrepancy between the democratic and the liberal-individualistic social ideas comes very clearly into view. That a "round number" is produced out of personalities, and that with this artificial creation operations are carried on without any regard to the peculiarities of the individuals included within it; that the votes are counted, not weighed; that arrangements, precepts, and prohibitions are simply conditioned upon the existence of a definite number of persons—that is, either despotically or democratically; in either case, however, a degradation of the real and total content of the separate personality to the formal fact that it is simply

one; inasmuch as the personality takes a place in an organization determined by number alone, its character as a member of the group has assumed complete mastery over its individually differentiated character. Whether the division into numerically equal subgroups is rough and in practice continually modified, as in the Hundreds of the Germans, the Peruvians, the Chinese; or so refined, purposeful, and exact as in a modern army, in either case it betrays most clearly and pitilessly the existence for its own sake of the law of formation for the group, in one case as a newly emerging tendency which is in perpetual conflict and compromise with other tendencies, in another case an absolutely thoroughgoing application. That which is super-individual in the grouping, the complete assertion of the independence of its form, in contrast with every content of the individual life, exists nowhere in more absolute and emphatic shape than in the reduction of the organizing principles to purely arithmetical relationships; and the degree of approach to this, as it in various ways appears in the most diverse groups, is at the same time the degree in which the group-idea, in its most abstract form, has absorbed the individuality of its factors.

4. Finally, in the following respect important sociological consequences attach themselves to numerical definiteness, although the effective quantities of the elements may be, according to the circumstances, quite varied. "Society," in the modern polite sense, furnishes a typical case. How many persons must be invited in order that a "society" may exist?[1] The qualitative relationships between host and guests manifestly do not decide the question. The invitation of two or three persons, who have a completely formal and essentially unrelated attitude toward us, does not bring a "society" into existence. On the other hand, the opposite is the case if we call together, say, the fifteen persons of our most intimate acquaintance. The number remains ever the decisive factor, although its *size* is naturally dependent, in special cases, upon the type and the

[1] [With our somewhat generous vocabulary of specific terms for social functions of all degrees we lack a generic term for the concept "assemblage involving formality." We venture to press the symbol "society" into service. The author's meaning is plain from the context.—Tr.]

closeness of the relations between the elements. The three circumstances—namely, the relationships of the host to each of the guests for himself, that of the guests to each other, the manner in which each participant subjectively reacts with all these relationships—these constitute the basis upon which now the number of participants determines whether a "society," or a mere existence together of a friendly or of a materially utilitarian sort, is present. In this case, consequently, a numerical modification always produces a very surely perceived transformation into a quite special sociological category, however imperfectly the degree of this modification may be determined by our available psychological means. At least, however, the qualitatively sociological consequences of the quantitative occasions are in a certain measure describable.

In the first place, the "society" demands a quite specific external apparatus. If one invites from a circle of acquaintances of, say, thirty persons only one or two, he need "put himself to no trouble." If, however, he invites the whole thirty at once, there at once emerge quite new requirements in respect to food, drink, toilet, forms of behavior, and extraordinarily enhanced expenditure on the side of the sensibly stimulating and enjoyable. This is a very clear example of how considerably the mere mass-construction depresses the level of the personality. In a meeting of a very few, such a reciprocal adaptation is possible. The things in common, which constitute the content of their sociability, may include so comprehensive or so eminent portions of their individuality that the meeting bears the character of intellectuality, of differentiated and highly developed psychic energy. The greater the number of persons who come together, however, the smaller will be the probability that they can coincide in those more worthy and intimate sides of their nature, and, accordingly, the point must be sought lower down which is common to their impulses and interests.[1] In the

[1] Complaint about banality in the intercourse of general society betrays, consequently, complete sociological unintelligence. The relative depression of the level upon which a company of large numbers actually finds itself is, in principle, unavoidable. For all higher and finer cultures are of an individual sort, and consequently do not adapt themselves to the contents of the general mind. They may, to be sure,

same degree, however, in which the quantity of the elements affords to the higher, more individual psychic factors no more room, the effort must be made to atone for this lack of the former sort of charm by enhancement of the external and the sensible. Between multiplicity of persons meeting together for festive purposes, and the luxury, the mere sensuous satisfaction of their meeting, there has always been the closest connection. At the end of the Middle Ages, for example, luxury at weddings increased so much, merely in the matter of the number of attendants who accompanied the bridal pair to the baths taken on these occasions, that the authorities often precisely ordained, in their sumptuary laws, what might be the maximum number of persons constituting this escort. If eating and drinking have always been the combining agencies of great companies, for which otherwise a unifying interest and consensus would have been difficult to reach, so must now a "society," purely on account of its quantitative factor, which excludes community and reciprocity of the finer and more spiritual concords, the more strongly emphasize these pleasures which are sensual, and on that account with greater certainty to be shared in by all.

A further characteristic of the "society," on the ground of its numerical difference, in contrast with the congregation of a few, consists in the fact that a complete unification of tone, which in the latter case is possible, neither can nor should be possible in the former; that, on the other hand, for a further difference, the construction of partial groups is easily possible. The life-principle of a friendly coexistence of a few persons abruptly opposes division into two separate mental attitudes, and even separate conversations. The "society" is at that moment present in which, instead of its absolutely *single* center, a duality emerges: on the one hand, a general, but only quite loose, centrality, which in essence is only externally and even spatially founded, whence, therefore, societies of like social

operate in the direction of socialization, if a unity is to be attained through division of labor — something which, however, is evidently only in a slight degree possible within a "society." It is, therefore, sociologically, a perfectly correct instinct which causes us to regard the thrusting into prominence of the personal individuality in a "society," even if the personality be in itself significant and pleasing, as tactlessness.

stratum resemble each other the more as totalities the larger they are, however manifold their personal variations may be; on the other hand, special minor centers of common conversation, temper, interest, which, however, incessantly interchange their members. There thus occurs that incessant variation of attachment and detachment in the large society which, according to the nature of the persons concerned, affects one now as the most intolerable superficiality and again as a rhythmic play of the highest æsthetic charm. The ball, with the modern form of dance, exhibits this formal sociological type in a quite distinct example: a momentary and quite wonderfully close relationship of each single pair, modified into a quite new formation through constant changes among the pairs; this physical contiguity between persons quite strange to each other, on the one side, made possible by the fact that they are all guests of a *single* host who, however loose the relationship to himself may be, affords a certain reciprocal security and legitimation; on the other hand, through the unpersonal and, so to speak, anonymous character of the relationship which the size of the society and the formality of behavior joined with it, produce. Evidently these traits of the large "society" which the ball presents at once in a sublimated form and perhaps in caricature, are attached to a definite minimum number of participants; and we may often make the most interesting observation that an intimate circle of a few persons attains the character of a "society" through the appearance of a single additional person.

In a case which, to be sure, concerns a much less complicated quality, the number which produces a definite sociological unitary structure is somewhat more firmly fixed. The patriarchal domestic family numbers, in the most various regions, always twenty to thirty heads, and that, too, under quite dissimilar economic conditions, so that these cannot, or at least cannot exclusively, occasion the numerical equality. It is rather probable that the inner reciprocities which constitute the special structure of the domestic family produce the proportions of closeness and extension demanded for this structure only within just these boundaries. The patriarchal family has been every-

where characterized by great intimacy and solidarity, which had its center in the *paterfamilias*, through the guardianship which the latter exercised, both in the interest of the whole and in his own egoistic interest, over the concerns of each individual. Hence the upper boundary was determined: this sort of dependence and of control appears able to comprehend, at the corresponding stage of psychological development, no greater collection of elements. The lower boundary, on the other hand, is determined by the fact that a group thus dependent upon itself for its self-satisfaction and its maintenance must develop certain collective psychical facts, which in turn usually arise only above a certain numerical limit. Such facts are, for example, resolution for offense and defense, confidence on the part of each that he will at every moment find the necessary support and reinforcement; more than all religious consensus, whose exaltation and spirituality can raise itself above the individual and the individual above himself only from the commingling of many contributions, with reciprocal effacement of their individual peculiar character. The number mentioned has perhaps indicated the scope approximately established by experience above and below which the group could not go if it were to develop the traits of the patriarchal house family. It appears as though, with increasing individualization, before this stage of culture, those intimacies were possible only within a smaller number of persons; the phenomena, on the other hand, which looked to the *size* of the family at once demanded an ever-growing circle. The needs from above and below which in that stage of culture realized themselves with this numerical material have become differentiated; one portion demands a smaller, another a larger number, so that later no structure is any longer in existence which can satisfy both sides of the demand in the same unified way as was the case with the patriarchal family.

Apart from such singular cases, all questions of the sort whose type is the numerical requirements for a "society" have a sophistical tone — how many soldiers make an army, how many members are necessary to constitute a political party, how many participants make an outbreak. They appear to rehearse the

classical riddle: How many grains of wheat make a heap? For since one, two, three, four grains do not do it, but a thousand certainly, there must accordingly be between these two numbers a boundary, at which the addition of a single grain makes those previously present into a "heap." If one, however, makes the trial of further enumeration, it appears that no one can announce discovery of this boundary. The logical ground of these difficulties is found in the fact that a quantitative series is given which, on account of the relative insignificance of each single element, seems to be a continuous and uniformly ascending series, and that this from a certain point on must permit the application of a qualitatively new idea, sharply set off from the idea previously applied. This is obviously a contradictory demand: by virtue of its very idea, the continuous cannot justify purely of itself a sudden break and change. The sociological difficulty has now a further complication aside from that in the ancient sophistry, for by the "heap" of grains we understand either a piling-up, and then one is logically justified in this use of terms so soon as only one layer appears above the lowest layer; or, only a quantity is designated by the term. In this case it is quite unjustifiable to demand of an idea like "heap," which in its very essence is quite variable and undetermined, that it should lend itself to application to perfectly defined and unequivocally bounded realities.[1]

In those sociological cases, however, specifically new aggregate phenomena appear, when quantity increases, which are not present *pro rata* in the case of smaller numbers. A political party has qualitatively another significance from that of a small clique. A few curious persons standing together betray different traits from those of a mob (*Auflauf*), etc. The indeterminateness which attaches to these ideas from the impossibility of fixing numerically the corresponding quantities may perhaps be

[1] Still more evident is this mistake in the negative direction, in the case of the question: How many hairs must one lose before one may be called bald? If we take this latter idea seriously, it applies only to him who has no hair at all. If we apply it, however, to any case in which there is possession of hair, we thereby surrender the unequivocal severity of the idea, and we may not wonder that we possess no objectively precise criterion of its application, since we have put such application out of our power.

emphasized in the following way. This variation affects evidently only certain intermediate quantities. Certain lower numbers surely do not yet constitute the collectivities in question. Certain quite higher numbers constitute them without doubt. But even those numerically small structures have, however, sociological qualities which are characteristic: the meeting which falls short of being the "society," the troop of soldiers which does not constitute an army, the co-operating vagabonds who are not yet a "band." Since the other qualities, which are quite as little doubtful in the case of the great society, are in contrast with these, we may indicate the character of those that are numerically intermediate as composed of both, so that each makes itself in a rudimentary way perceptible in particular characteristics—now appears, now disappears or becomes latent. Since, then, such structures, lying in the intermediate numerical zone, have also a share objectively in the decided character of the structure below and above, or at least have such share partially and intermittently, the subjective uncertainty in determining to which of them they belong is to be explained accordingly. The point, then, is not that in a sociologically qualityless structure suddenly, like the crystal in the solution, a quite definite sociological constellation forms, without our being able to designate the precise moment of this transformation; but rather that two diverse formations, each consisting of a collection of traits and capable of being arranged in a qualitative scale, under certain quantitative conditions meet in a social structure, and in various degrees divide it between themselves; so that the question to which of the two they belong is not essentially one that suffers from the inherent epistemological difficulties of continuous series, but it is simply a question whose content is fallaciously proposed.[1]

[1] More precisely, however, the situation is rather this: To every definite number of elements there corresponds, in accordance with the purpose and spirit of their combination, a sociological form, an organization, firmness of texture, relation of the whole to the parts, etc., which experiences a modification, however immeasurably small and indeterminate, with every added or subtracted element. Since, however, we do not possess a special expression for each of these endlessly numerous sociological conditions, even in those cases in which their distinctive character is observable, there

These explanations have thus had to do with social formations which, to be sure, depended upon the number of the co-working elements, while at the same time our knowledge was insufficient so to formulate this dependence that we could draw from distinct numbers their sociological consequences. Meanwhile this latter is not absolutely excluded, if we turn our attention by preference to sufficiently simple structures. If we begin with the lower boundary of the numerical series, arithmetically defined magnitudes appear as unequivocal preconditions of characteristic sociological formations.

The numerically simplest formations which can at all be designated as social reciprocities appear to occur in the case of reactions between two elements. Yet there is a structure still simpler in external appearance, which belongs in sociological categories, namely, however paradoxical and essentially contradictory it seems, the isolated individual man. As a matter of fact, the processes which produce formations in the case of a duality of elements are often simpler than those necessary for the sociological characterization of the integer. In the case of these latter we have to do chiefly with two here pertinent

often remains no alternative but to think the situation as composed of two conditions; the one more and the other less conspicuous. At all events we have to do in such a case as little with a composition as, for example, in the case of the so-called mixed feelings of friendship and love, or hate and contempt, or pleasure and pain. In these cases, at least in numberless instances, a quite unified condition of feeling exists, for which we merely have no immediate concept, and which we consequently, by means of the synthesis and reciprocal limitation of two other concepts, rather circumscribe than describe; here, as in other instances, the proper unity of the existing is not within our comprehension, but we must resolve it into a duality of elements, neither of which quite covers it, in order to think it as proceeding from the interweaving of the two. This is, however, merely a conceptual analysis, possible only after the fact, which does not trace the actual genetic process, the proper being of that unity. Where therefore the stereotyped concepts for social unities — meeting and society, troop and army, clique and party, a few and a band, personal following and school, crowd and popular uprising, etc., etc.— do not find an exact application, because the human material seems to be insufficient for the one, and more than enough for the other, there yet exists a sociological mold, precisely as unified and just as specifically corresponding to the numerical limitation as in those more definite cases. The fact merely is that the lack of a special concept for these innumerable shadings compels us to denote their qualities as a mixture of those forms which correspond to the numerically inferior and to the numerically higher structures.

phenomena: isolation and freedom. The mere fact that an individual is in no sort of reciprocal relationship with other individuals is, of course, not sociological, but it also does not fill out the entire concept of isolation. This concept rather, in so far as it is emphasized and is essentially significant, signifies by no means merely the absence of all society, but rather the existence of society in some way represented and afterward inhibited. Isolation receives its unequivocal positive meaning as long-distance effect of society—whether as echo of past or anticipation of future relationships; whether as longing after society or as voluntary turning away from it. The isolated man has not the same characteristics as if he had been from the beginning the only inhabitant of the world; but socialization, even if it is only that with the negative coefficient, determines *his* condition also. The whole joy and the whole bitterness of isolation are merely various reactions upon socially experienced influences. Either is a reciprocal effect from which the one member, after production of definite consequences, is really excluded and further lives and further works only ideally in the mind of the other member. In this connection there is decided significance in the well-known psychological fact that the feeling of loneliness seldom occurs so decidedly and importunately in actual physical isolation as when one is conscious of being a stranger and without attachments among many physically quite adjacent people—for instance in a "society,"[1] in the crowded streets of a great town. For the configuration of a group much depends upon whether it favors or even renders possible such loneliness within its limits. Close and intimate communities do not permit such intercellular vacuums in their structure. As we speak, however, of a social deficit, which is produced in fixed proportions to the societary conditions—the anti-social phenomena of the miserable, the criminal, the suicides—in like manner a given quantity and quality of societary life produces a certain number of temporarily or chronically solitary existences, which, to be sure, the statistician cannot so exactly as in these other cases express in arithmetical terms. In another way isolation becomes sociologically

[1] [With the connotations above indicated.—Tr.]

significant, so soon as it ceases to consist in a relationship which is a play within an individual between himself and another definite group, or group-life in general; but is rather a pause or a periodic differentiation within one and the same relationship. This is important in relationships which from their fundamental idea are aimed at permanent negation of isolation, as in the chief instance of monogamous marriage. So far as in the structure of this relation the finest subjective shadings express themselves, there is an essential difference whether man and wife, with the complete happiness of life in common, have still preserved for themselves the pleasure in isolation, or whether their relation is never interrupted by devotion to solitude—either because the habit of being together has taken from solitude its charm, or because an absence of essential assurance of love makes such interruptions feared as dangers or as infidelities. Thus isolation, apparently confined to a single person, consisting in the negation of sociality, is really a phenomenon of very positive sociological significance; not merely from the side of the agent, in whom it presents, as a conscious affection, an entirely determinate relation to society, but also through the decisive characteristic which its occurrence, both as cause and as effect, lends to large groups as well as to the most intimate relationships.

Freedom, too, has among its many sociological meanings a phase which belongs in this connection. Freedom, too, appears in the first place as a mere negation of societary constraint, for every constraint is a restraint. The free man does not constitute a unity in connection with others, but he is such a unity of himself. Now, there may be a freedom which consists in this mere absence of relationships, in the mere absence of every limitation through other beings: a Christian or an Indian eremite, a solitary settler in the German or the American forests, may enjoy a freedom in the sense that his existence is entirely filled out with other than social contents; in the same way a collective structure, a house-community or a civic body, which exists in a completely insular way, without neighbors and without correlation with other structures. For a being, however, that is in correlation with others, freedom has a much more positive significance. It is a

definite sort of relationship to the environment; a being in correlations, which loses its meaning if there is no correlated party. In juxtaposition with this latter, however, freedom has for the deeper structure of society two highly important meanings.

1. For the social man freedom is neither an aboriginally given matter-of-course condition, nor a property gained once for all and of constantly equal texture. Rather has every single principal claim, which ever engages the energy of the individual in a definite direction, properly the tendency to go on indefinitely; almost all relationships—civic, partisan, domestic, friendly, erotic—exist, as it were, by themselves upon an inclined plane, and weave their demands, if we leave them to themselves, over the whole man. They are surrounded, in a way which often has an uncanny effect upon the feelings, by an ideal sphere, from which we must expressly set off a reserve of energies, devotions, and interests to be withheld from their claims. It is, however, not merely the extensiveness of the claims through which the social egoism of every societary formation threatens the freedom of its elements, but the relentlessness with which the quite one-sided and unlimited claim of once existing correlations asserts itself. Every such correlation is wont to press its rights with pitilessness and indifference against other interests and duties, whether they are harmonious or completely incompatible with it; and by this character of its behavior it limits the freedom of the individual not less than by its quantitative extension. In contrast with this form of our relationships, freedom appears as a continuous process of emancipation, as a struggle not merely for the independence of the *ego*, but also for the right to enter *voluntarily* at any moment even into dependence, as a struggle which must be renewed after every victory. Unrestraint as a negatively social attitude is thus in reality almost never a permanent possession, but an incessant self-detachment from constraints, which continually either limit in reality or attempt ideally to limit the living-unto-himself of the individual. Freedom is no solipsistic being, but a sociological doing; not a condition limited to the integrity of the agent, but a relation, even if always to be contemplated from the standpoint of the agent.

2. As on its functional side, so also on the side of its content, is freedom something quite different from the putting-off of relationships, or from immunity of the individual's sphere from the impact of contiguous spheres. This follows from the very simple thought that man not merely wants to be free, but wants to use his freedom for some purpose. This use, however, is in large measure nothing else than the control and use of other men. For the social individual, that is, for the individual who lives in regular reciprocal relationships with others, freedom would in countless cases be entirely without content and purpose, if it did not make possible, or did not consist in, the extension of his will over those others. Our idiom quite correctly characterizes certain brusquenesses and arbitrarinesses when it says that one "takes liberties with another" (*sich eine Freiheit gegen iemanden herausnimmt*), and in the same way many languages have used their word for freedom in the sense of "right" or "privilege." The negatively social character of freedom as a relationship of the agent to himself is thus enlarged in both directions to a very positive character. Freedom consists in great measure in a process of liberation, it raises itself above and beyond a constraint, and gets meaning, consciousness, and value only as reaction against the same; and it consists not less of a power-relation to others, of the possibility of making oneself count within this relation, of making others tributary or subject, in all of which relations to others freedom begins to find its value and its application. The meaning of freedom, which is confined to the agent in and of himself, is thus only like the watershed between these two social meanings of the term, namely that the agent is bound by others and binds others. This meaning, so to speak, shrinks to nothing for the sake of disclosing the real meaning of freedom, viz., even where it is represented as a quality of the individual, still as this two-sided sociological relationship.

Since, however, it is so often complex and indirect connections through which such apparently individual realities, seemingly belonging so far from society, as isolation and freedom, actually exist as forms of sociological relationship, yet the

sociological formation which is *methodologically* simplest is that between *two* elements. It furnishes the scheme, the germ, and the material for countless more complex formations; although its sociological significance by no means rests merely upon its extensions and its multiplications. It is rather itself a socialization, in which not only many forms of socialization realize themselves, purely and characteristically, but the limitation to a duality of the elements is, indeed, the condition under which alone a certain series of forms of relationship can emerge. The typically sociological nature of the same appears then not only in the fact that the greatest manifoldness of the individualities and of the combining motives does not alter the similarity of these formations, but rather that these sometimes occur quite as typically between pairs of groups—families, states, combinations of various sorts—as between pairs of single persons.

The peculiar conferring of characteristics upon a relationship through the duality of persons concerned in it is exhibited by everyday experiences. For instance, how differently a common lot, an undertaking, an agreement, a shared secret binds each of two sharers, from the case when even only three participate. The specific character of this difference is determined by the fact that the relationship, as a unity composed of its individuals, as a special structure beyond these, has a different bearing upon each of its participants from that of a more complicated structure to each of its members. However it may appear to third parties as an independent, superindividual unity, yet, as a rule, that is not the case for its participants, but each regards himself in antithesis only with the other, but not with a collectivity extending beyond him. The social structure rests immediately upon the one and the other. The departure of each single individual would destroy the whole, so that it does not come to such a superpersonal life of the whole that the individual feels himself independent; whereas, even in the case of an association of only three, if one individual departs, a *group* may still continue to exist.

There are, nevertheless, exceptions to this character of the dual groupings, the most decisive of which seems to appear in

the case of that relationship which depends most definitely upon the dyad type, that is, monogamous marriage. The by no means rare fact that among thoroughly worthy persons decidedly unfortunate marriages occur, and very fortunate ones between defective persons, points at once to the fact that this structure, however *dependent* it is upon each of the members, still may have a character which coincides with that of neither associate. If, for example, each of the wedded pair suffers from vagaries, difficulties, and unavailabilities, but at the same time understands how to localize these upon himself, while he invests in the marital relationship only his best and purest, and thus holds the relationship free from all the discounts which affect himself as a person, this may immediately be to the credit merely of the partner in marriage as a person, but there nevertheless arises from it the feeling that marriage is something superpersonal, something in itself worthy and sacred, which stands over and above the unsanctity of each of its elements. Since within a relationship the one is sensitive only on the side toward the other, and behaves only with regard to him, his qualities, although they are, of course, always his own, nevertheless attain a quite different shading, status, and meaning from that which they have when, referring only to the proper *ego*, they weave themselves into the total complexity of the *ego*. Hence for the consciousness of each of the two the relationship may crystallize to an entity outside of himself, which is more and better — under certain circumstances also worse — than himself; something toward which he has obligations, and from which there come to him, as from an objective existence, benefits and injuries. With respect to marriage, this tracing of the group-unity to something more than its construction upon the mere I and thou is facilitated by the two sorts of circumstances. In the first place, by its incomparable intimacy. That two such fundamentally different natures as man and woman constitute such a close union; that the egoism of the individual is suspended so fundamentally, not merely in favor of the one, but in favor of the total relationship which includes the family interests, the family honor, and more than all the children, is really

a miracle which goes back to foundations beyond the conscious *ego*, in circumstances not rationalistically explicable. This very fact expresses itself in the distinction between this unity and its individual elements. That each of these is sensible of the relation as something which leads a peculiar life, with peculiar energies, is merely a statement of its incommensurability with that which we are accustomed to represent as the personal and of-itself-conceivable *ego*. This is furthermore promoted by the superindividuality of the marriage forms in the spirit of their historical tradition. Immeasurably different as the character and worth of the forms of marriage may be—indeed, one would be rash to say whether they are more or less different than separate individuals—yet in the last analysis no pair has invented the form of marriage for itself, but this form prevailed within each culture area as a relatively fixed one, safe from arbitrariness, and untouched in its formal nature by individual shadings and vicissitudes. This projection of traditional elements into the matrimonial relationship, which puts it in significant contrast with the individual freedom that is possible, for instance, in molding the friendly relationship, and which permits only acceptance or rejection, but no modification, obviously favors the feeling of an objective constitution and superpersonal unity in marriage; although each of the two partners has only the single other in juxtaposition with himself, yet he feels himself at least partially so situated as one feels only when in correlation with a collectivity—*i. e.*, as the mere bearer of a superindividual structure, which in its essence and its norms is independent of himself, although, to be sure, he is an organic member of it. Something sociologically similar might be pointed out, furthermore, in the duality of partners in a business. Although the formation and operation of the partnership rest, perhaps, exclusively upon the co-operation of these two personalities, yet the subject-matter of this co-operation, the business or the firm, is an objective structure, toward which each of its components has rights and duties—in many respects not otherwise than any third party. Yet this has a sociological meaning different from that in the case of marriage; for the business is some-

thing from the beginning separated from the persons of those who carry it on, and indeed in the case of a duality of such persons this is not otherwise true than in the case of one alone or many. The reciprocal relationship of the business associates has its purpose outside of itself; whereas in the case of marriage it is within itself. In the former instance the relationship is the means for the gaining of certain objective results; in the latter everything objective appears really only as a means for the subjective relationship. It is the more observable that in marriage, nevertheless, the objectivity and self-reliance of the group-structure, which are otherwise more foreign to groups of two, psychologically increase in contrast with immediate subjectivity.

One constellation, however, of extreme sociological importance is wanting in every grouping of two, while it is in principle open to every group of larger numbers, namely, the *shifting* of duties and responsibilities upon the impersonal structure, which so often, and not to its advantage, characterizes social life. This occurs in two directions. Every totality which is more than a mere juxtaposition of given individuals has an indefiniteness of its boundaries and of its power which easily tempts us to expect from it all sorts of achievements that really belong to the separate members. We turn them over to the society, as we very often, in pursuance of the same psychological tendency, postpone them to our own future, whose nebulous possibilities give room for everything, or will accomplish, by spontaneously growing strength, everything which the present moment is not willing to take upon itself. In the precise circumstances in question, the power of the individual is transparent, but for that very reason it is also clearly limited, while in contrast with it is always the somewhat mystical power of the totality, of which we therefore easily expect, not only what the individual cannot perform, but also what he would not care to perform, and, moreover, with the feeling of the full legitimacy of this transfer. Quite as dangerous, however, as on the side of omission is membership in a totality also on the side of commission. Here the point is not merely the increase of impulsiveness and the exclusion of moral restraint, as they appear in the case of the individual in a crowd,

and lead to those mass-crimes in which even the legal responsibility of the participants is debatable, but the point is that the true or the ostensible interest of a community justifies or constrains the individual in undertakings for which he would not be willing to bear the responsibility as an individual. Economic combinations make demands of such shameless egoism, colleagues in office wink at such crying malfeasances, corporations of political or of scientific nature exercise such monstrous suppressions of individual rights, as would be impossible in the case of an individual if he were responsible for them as a person, or at least they would put him to shame. As a member of a corporation, however, he does all this with untroubled conscience, because in that case he is anonymous and feels himself covered and, as it were, concealed by the totality. There are few cases in which the distance of the social unity from the elements which constitute it is so great. It is perceptible and operative to a degree which descends almost to caricature.

It was necessary to indicate this reduction of the practical worth of personality, which inclusion in a group often occasions for the individual, in order that, by exclusion of this factor, we might characterize the dyad-group. Since in this case each element has only another individual by its side, but not a multiplicity which ultimately constitutes a higher unity, the dependence of the whole upon himself, and consequently his co-responsibility for all collective action, is made perfectly visible. He can, to be sure, as happens frequently enough, shift responsibility upon his associate, but the latter will be able to decline the same much more immediately and decisively than can often be done by an anonymous whole, which lacks the energy of personal interest or the legitimate representation requisite for such cases. Moreover, just as the one of two constituting a group cannot hide himself behind the group in cases of positive action, no more can he claim the group for his excuse in cases of culpable inaction. The energies with which the group very indefinitely and very partially, to be sure, but still very perceptibly, overtops the individual cannot in this instance reinforce the individual inadequacy, as in the case of larger combinations; for, however

manifoldly two combined individuals accomplish more than two that are isolated, yet the decisive factor in this case is that each must actually perform something, and that, when he refuses to do this, only the other remains, without any superindividual energy such as, even in the case of a combination of only three, is in some measure present. The significance of this detail resides, however, by no means merely in the negative, in that which it excludes; from it grows rather a close and special modulation of the union of two. Precisely the fact that each knows he can depend only upon the other, and upon nobody else, gives to such a combination — for example, marriage, friendship, and even more external combinations up to political adjustment of two groups — a special consecration; each element in them is, in respect to its sociological destiny and everything dependent upon this, much more frequently made to confront the alternative of all or nothing than in other associations. This peculiar intimacy appears most simply in the contrast between it and combinations of three. In such a case each individual element operates as a court of appeal between the two others, and exhibits the double function of such an organ. It operates both in combining and separating. Where three elements, A, B, C, constitute a community, there is added to the immediate relationship which exists, for example, between A and B, the immediate relationship which they gain by their common relation to C. This is unquestionably a sociological enrichment, apart from the bond by the straight and shortest line; each pair of elements are now joined by a broken line. Points upon which the pair could find no immediate contact are put in reciprocal relationship by the third element, which offers to each another side, and joins these, nevertheless, in the unity of its personality. Separations which the parties could not of themselves reconcile are accommodated by the third, or by their being included in a comprehensive whole. On the other hand, the direct union is not merely strengthened by the indirect, but it may also be destroyed. There is no relationship so complete between three that each individual may not, under certain circumstances, be regarded by the other two as an intruder, even if it is only to the extent of

sharing in certain moods, which can develop their concentration and timid tenderness only with undisturbed glance from eye to eye. It may also be observed how extraordinarily rare and difficult it is for three people, even in the case of a visit to a museum or in the presence of a landscape, to come into a really united state of feeling, which, however, may occur with relative ease between two. A and B may emphasize the μ which they have in common and may feel it undisturbed, because the ν which A does not share with B and the ξ which B does not share with A are felt immediately as an individual reserve, and as located in another story of one's being. If, however, a C joins the company, who shares the ν with A and the ξ with B, the result is that even under this scheme, which is still favorable to the unity of the whole, the unification of feeling is in principle arrested. While two may actually be *one* party, or may stand quite beyond the party question, it is usual in precisely such finely tuned combinations for three to constitute at the same time three parties, and consequently to terminate the unified relation of each to every other. The sociological structure of the combination in twos is consequently distinguished by the fact that both phenomena are lacking: both the strengthened attachment through a third, or, it may be, through a social frame reaching out over both, and also the interruption and distraction of pure and immediate reciprocation. But in many cases this lack makes the relationship more intensive and strong, for in the feeling of being thrown exclusively upon each other, and of having no hope of recourse to cohesive forces which do not spring from immediate reciprocity, many otherwise undeveloped energies, which have their source in remoter psychical reservoirs, will become vital in the community, and many disturbances and threatenings into which there might be betrayal, under confidence in the third party and in a totality, are carefully avoided. This intimacy, to which the circumstances existing between *two* people incline them, furnishes the reason why precisely these constitute the chief seat of jealousy.

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[*To be continued.*]

THE FINANCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK OF ITALY.

It is an undeniable fact that foreigners in general and English-speaking peoples in particular are too often prone to overlook the real aspect and the true tendencies of modern Italian life. The highly cultured foreigner of superior taste finds it almost impossible to think of Italy in any other light than as the home of Dante, Michelangelo, Raphael, and the other great masters of art and literature who, by their everlasting work, have enlightened even the darkest pages of Italian history. On the other hand, to the average middle-class foreigner, who has probably only traveled through Italy on a Cook excursion ticket, the name of Italy is most likely to suggest the familiar figure of the bootblack or the organ-grinder seen in his own country, or the romantic silhouette of the brigante or the lazzarone, a creation of cheap literature. To both these types of foreigners a discussion of the financial and industrial outlook of Italy might seem, for various reasons, devoid of practical bearing. The truth is that they both have a false and incorrect notion of Italy. There is something else in Italy besides the art galleries, the ruins of Pompeii, and the prolific though somewhat primitive peasantry from which our emigration is chiefly derived. This something is "the real nation"—a growing community of active, enterprising, high-spirited citizens, who are fully alive to the exigencies of our time and are not lost in a Buddhistic contemplation of the past, however glorious. They are the true representatives of the country in its younger energies. In spite of obstacles arising from scantiness of natural resources and from social conditions created by centuries of misgovernment, oppression, and political disruption, they are striving to build up a modern Italy on the lines of industrial and commercial activity which have made other nations successful in the world's competition.

I.

The ups and downs of Italian finance, since the proclamation of the kingdom in 1861, are the outward token of the hard struggle fought by the nation for building up a great power out of the ruins of seven tiny states. Think of the magnitude of the task! When the kingdom was formed, in 1861, Italy was indeed in the most discouraging condition of immaturity. Europe regarded her with mistrust and suspicion, the foreigner still held a large area of her territory, while the Pope still ruled at Rome. There was no army, no navy, no civil service; there were, practically, no railroads and no schools. The rate of illiteracy was as high as 74 per cent. Industry and commerce were almost nil. Agriculture was in a primitive condition. The public debt, resulting from the aggregated debt of the seven states, was more than 2,000,000,000 francs. It is no wonder that in 1862, that is, one year after the proclamation of the kingdom, the deficit between receipts and expenditures should have reached 446,000,000 francs. In 1866, the war with Austria adding to the tremendous difficulties of the situation, the deficit rose to 721,000,000. In 1871, after the occupation of Rome, and in spite of the most drastic measures, it was still 215,000,000. But, even at the darkest moments of this tempestuous period, Italian finance has been fundamentally honest, and Italy has made it a point to meet her financial engagements at all costs. She has never sunk to the condition of bankruptcy that has disgraced other countries.

After the occupation of Rome, in 1871, the financial situation of Italy began to show signs of positive improvement. It was not, however, until 1876 that Premier Minghetti was able to announce to the Parliament a surplus of 21,000,000. This most gratifying result was due not only to wise statesmanship, but also to the unflinching patriotism of the taxpayers, which alone made it possible to adopt the most vigorous measures in order to save the good name of the country from the blot of insolvency.

With the year 1876 ends what we might call the first period in the history of Italian finance. The deficit had been wiped

out, and the beginning of better times for the country at large seemed to be in sight.

But we were a young nation, with all the exuberance of life and the nonchalance of a reckless youth. Having got out of the woods safely, having succeeded in overcoming the tremendous difficulty of facing a disastrous deficit without going into bankruptcy, we began to think that we could do almost anything. We set out at once to build new railroads, to improve our civil service, to develop our educational system, to strengthen our army and navy, while, at the same time, we were trying to relieve the burden imposed upon the taxpayers by abolishing some of the heaviest taxes. The result of this policy could not fail to be disastrous. After various ominous oscillations, the surplus reached in 1876 disappeared in 1885, when we found ourselves again confronted by a deficit of 23,000,000 francs.

From 1885–86 to 1896–97 the deficit was constant. Owing to the general economic depression, to the increase in the military expenses, and to the colonial enterprises, it reached as high as 234,000,000 francs in 1888–89. But here again, by dint of sacrifices and through rigid economy, we found a way of re-establishing the financial equilibrium without becoming bankrupt. The men of the younger generation were as equal to the task as those great leaders who had faced the previous crisis. The most stringent measures were adopted in 1894, until we arrived at a surplus of 9,000,000 in 1897–98. Had it not been for the Abyssinian war, a surplus would have been reached a year earlier.

II.

This second financial crisis, which lasted for over ten years and greatly hampered our movements, had at least the merit of teaching us a valuable lesson. We learned through it that the corner-stone of a sound financial policy is that no expenditure be permitted, even for the purpose of creating instruments of production or of increasing the value of the government's property, as by the building of railroads, without a corresponding receipt due to a real source of revenue and not to debt. It is because we did not observe this golden rule of financial wisdom

that we lost the good results achieved in 1876, and were thrown into a condition of financial instability. Our motive was a high and noble one. We wanted to make up for lost time in the great race for progress: we were anxious to become in fact, not in word only, a great power, taking our part in the work of civilization; but we were hasty and impulsive, we lost sight of reality, and did not think of proportioning our efforts to our actual possibilities. Hence we built railroads and rebuilt cities, and threw the burden of the expense upon the labile structure of public debt.

Since the latest crisis, the watchword of our financial policy has been the most rigid enforcement of the rule: no more debts. We have come out of the struggle with a clearer head and a keener sense of reality.

The good results of such a change of methods were not slow in manifesting themselves. Since 1897 the surplus has not only been constant, but it has shown a steady increase. We had:

	1897–1898.	1898–1899.	1899–1900.	1900–1901.
Receipts (million francs)...	1,629.4	1,658.8	1,671.5	1,751.8
Expenditures " ...	1,620.0	1,626.1	1,633.1	1,710.6
	+9.4	+32.6	+38.4	+41.2

So far we have been considering only the actual receipts and expenditures of the kingdom, as the basis for our discussion of its financial situation. It is a fact that the kernel or soul, as it were, of every public budget lies in the relation that expenditure bears to receipt. But in order to get a comprehensive view of all the factors involved in the question, we have also to take into account the remarkable rise in the market quotation of government bonds—a striking feature of the present financial situation of Italy. This may be due in part to the great popularity enjoyed of late years by state bonds at large as a safer investment than industrial bonds. But the increase would have been neither so rapid nor so high, had it not been for the healthy condition of the budget shown above. The price of the Italian 5 per cent. consols on the Paris market had dropped to 72 in

1894, the crucial year of the period of depression. Now they are quoted at par and even above. A remarkable fact, in connection with the rise in the price of our state bonds, is the progressive concentration of our debt in Italian hands. The number of bonds placed abroad is continuously diminishing. This evidently adds to the encouraging character of the situation, since the possession of a large share of the national debt by foreigners is always to be looked upon as an element of weakness and a possible source of danger. The gradual nationalization of our foreign debt, however, could not be regarded as an expression of reluctance on the part of foreign capital to consider our bonds as a safe investment. This is disproved by the remarkable decrease in the rate of exchange—a fact that can only mean confidence in the soundness of our circulation. The exchange had reached as high a rate as 15.95 per cent. in 1893. It has now fallen to about 2 per cent. and is bound to drop still further, since the condition of the circulation is constantly improving. We have, first, a continuous reduction of the state currency. The silver coin (1 and 2 francs), which had been replaced by paper in 1894, is now again in circulation. We have also a progressive increase in the metallic reserve of the treasury; while, on the other hand, there is a steady improvement in the condition of the three national banks controlling the circulation, namely, the Bank of Italy, the Bank of Naples, and the Bank of Sicily. The reserve held by these banks a few years ago was equal only to one-third of their circulating paper. It is now as high as 50 per cent. Hand in hand with the increase in the reserve goes the liquidation of the heavy loans on real estate, which had so badly crippled the action of our banks, and were due to hasty and immature plans of city improvements. In 1894 these assets of difficult realization, known as "bills of stone" (*cambiali di pietra*), amounted to 637,000,000 francs. In October, 1901, the dead load had been reduced to 367,000,000. This work of purification of the portfolios of our great banks still actively continues.

Thus, to sum up, the characteristic features of the financial situation of Italy, at the present moment, are:

1. A sound budget—probably one of the most solid of Europe—showing a constant and increasing surplus of receipts, due to revenue and not to debts.

2. A steady improvement of the currency, due chiefly to an increase in the metallic reserve held by both the state and the banks in guarantee of their circulating paper.

As a result of these two facts we have:

3. A continuous rise in the value of the state bonds on the foreign markets.

4. A constant diminution in the rate of exchange, Italian paper having a greater buying power than heretofore and gradually approaching par.

III.

Encouraging as they may seem, the facts just mentioned can acquire a deep significance only when viewed in the light of the economic condition of the country. The public budget is not a dead arithmetical expression. Behind its figures there is the whirl of national life, and finance is, in reality, the outcome of national economy. Now, what are the economic conditions of Italy?

The esteemed foreigner, to whom reference has already been made, will probably shrug his shoulders at the question. He considers Italy an insignificant quantity in the economic life of the world. There seems to be, in his mind, a dissonance between the two words: Italy and industry. At best, the only concession that he is willing to make is that Italy might be an agricultural country, nothing else. Let us at the very outset do away with this oft-repeated assertion. To maintain that Italy can never be other than an agricultural country, and that she has to draw her resources exclusively from agriculture, is paramount to the assumption that the country is incapable of taking its share in the industrial movement of our time, and that, by a sort of miracle, Italy can escape the crises, the diseases, the vicissitudes of weather, the competition that so seriously disturb agricultural conditions in western Europe. It is a well-ascertained fact that, in spite of the most energetic action of capital and fertilizers, and in spite of all the improved methods and processes of modern

agricultural technique, the old countries of western Europe cannot compete with the younger countries which are exploiting an almost virgin soil. In Italy, American and Australian competition has resulted in diminishing the production of wheat, with the consequence of rendering possible a duty on imported wheat, through which the price of bread has been raised, greatly to the detriment of the consumer—in this case the people at large. On the other hand, foreign competition has had the beneficial result of stimulating agricultural production in other directions. Thus, if wheat production has decreased, we find a remarkable increase in the exportation of fruits, flowers, vegetables, wine, and oil. The exportation of citrus fruits grew from 994,918 quintals in 1879 to more than two millions in 1899. During the same period the exportation of butter has increased as 1 to 3; that of cheese has quintupled; that of poultry and eggs has shown an increase of about 50 per cent. Cattle-raising has also progressed, the exportation of the different varieties, excepting horse, largely exceeding the importation. But, in spite of these rapid strides along the various lines of agricultural production, the net revenue from the cultivation of the soil has remained stationary during the last quarter of a century in Italy as in neighboring agricultural countries. In order not to fall below this average standard of production, Italy has been compelled to abandon obsolete methods and to adopt the processes of modern agricultural technique, to study the wants and needs of foreign markets, to pass, in short, from the stage of agricultural production to that of agricultural industry and trade. The success achieved in this direction goes far to prove the falseness of the assumption, already referred to, concerning the incapacity of the Italian nation to become a factor in the industrial movement of our time. But there is more. With a population increasing at a terrific rate, Italy could never have lived on agriculture alone, in spite of the most vigorous intensification of culture. She was therefore compelled, *nolens volens*, to transform herself into an industrial power.

How far Italy has progressed in this direction may conclusively be shown by one single figure. The coal imported for

industrial purposes in 1871 amounted to 791,389 tons; in 1899 it had risen to almost 5,000,000 tons. Metallurgy, the basis of modern industry, was in a primitive condition in Italy some thirty years ago. Today it has developed to such a degree as to emancipate the country entirely from foreign production in the two typical lines of naval and railway construction. We have the splendid dockyards of Ansaldo at Sestri Levante, of Orlando at Leghorn, of Armstrong at Pozzuoli. They not only supply the material for our navy, but do a large exportation business. Their armor plates and artillery supplies have won quite a reputation abroad. As for the railroad industry, Terni and Savona furnish the rails, while the great factories of Meda in Milan, Diotto in Turin, and those belonging to the Mediterranean Railroad Co. furnish the locomotives and the cars. The wonderful development of these two great industries has acted as a powerful ferment of activity in other directions. We cannot mention in detail the different industries that have grown up during the last twenty years. Among the most important we might recall the chemical industries, the manufacture of paper, that of sugar. The growth of the textile industries has been altogether remarkable. There is a steady increase in the importation of raw material, while, at the same time, the exportation of the manufactured article has greatly exceeded the importation. The surplus of exportation of silk dress and piece goods was 141,000 kilos in 1894; it had reached 746,000 in 1900. Together with the growth of the various industries goes the development of the merchant marine. In 1890 the tonnage of steam vessels of our marine was 186,000; in 1899 it had risen to 315,000. The tonnage of Italian vessels entered and cleared at Italian ports in 1896 was over 6,000,000; in 1900 it had risen to 20,000,000. In the same year the tonnage of Italian vessels entered and cleared at American ports was 864,483, which exceeds the French tonnage for the same period by 89,088.[1]

[1] There are, of course, other signs of the economic development of Italy, such as the increase in the number of steam engines employed in industry, the increase in the number of hydraulic and hydro-electric plants, the increase in the importation of machineries, the increase in the number of commercial corporations, etc. We cannot give a detailed statement of figures. The reader desirous of obtaining fuller informa-

These facts unmistakably prove that the healthy condition of the budget pointed out above is simply the expression of the growing economic activity of the country. They are the exponent of the work done by the people, a work which, as a distinguished French writer remarks,[1] is the most eloquent refutation of those summary judgments by which the Italians are denied any spirit of enterprise or any business aptitude. If we think of the obstacles that stood in our way at the very start: natural obstacles—scarcity of coal and mineral resources; historical—the widely different social conditions prevailing in the various sections of the country and hampering unification; political—the tendency of a young nation to devote more time to politics than to business; financial—heavy debt, scarcity of money, lack of credit; if we think of these many obstacles, the work achieved acquires a higher significance as a test of the potentialities of the race.

IV.

Striking as it may seem, the work accomplished sinks into insignificance beside that which lies in store for the Italian nation.

An Italian, Francesco Nitti, certainly one of the most brilliant minds of the younger generation, has recently outlined in a masterful way the program by which Italy might become a great industrial power.[2]

In her industrial growth Italy has been greatly hampered by her natural poverty in coal and iron. Modern industry so far has depended upon coal for the supply of motor power. It is clear that, if this condition should continue, Italy could never hope to take a prominent position in the industrial movement of the world, and would be outstripped by other nations having a

tion on the subject should consult the *Annuario Statistico Italiano* ("Statistical Yearbook of Italy"), issued by the Italian Bureau of Statistics, containing exhaustive data on the various aspects of Italian life.

[1] M. A. Loiseau, "La renaissance économique de l'Italie," *Revue de Paris*, January 19 and February 1, 1901; one of the most important studies on modern Italy.

[2] F. Nitti, professor of finance in the University of Naples, *L' Italia all' alba del secolo XX* (Turin, 1901), a series of lectures that created quite a sensation both in scientific and political circles.

naturally more abundant supply of coal. There are, however, signs of an approaching transformation in the conditions of industrial production.

Within the last twenty years science has disclosed the possibility of utilizing electricity as a source of energy for industrial purposes. Italy, the home of Volta and Galvani, has left indelible traces in this most recent development of electric science. Pacinotti and Ferraris have made startling discoveries in this field. It is as though the genius of the race had, through these two men, shown the way by which the economic renaissance of the country was to be accomplished. It is indeed from electricity that Italy has to expect the fullest development of her potentialities as an industrial power. The problem, the great national problem of Italy, as Nitti puts it, is the substitution for coal of another source of energy, electricity, or the so-called "white coal."

Nature, while making Italy poor in coal, has greatly favored her in point of waterfalls and waterways. The great coal mines of the world will certainly be exhausted some day; those of England within the next sixty years, according to the calculations of Sir W. Armstrong, of Stanley Jevons, of the parliamentary committees of 1866 and 1873, and, most recently of all, of Lozé.[1] Water, however, will always continue to flow from the perennial source of the mountains. This very fact will radically change the conditions of industrial supremacy. The coal-producing countries which so far have been in control will see the end of their primacy through the exhaustion of their coal-beds, while the countries which, like Italy, have a wealth of potential energy stored up in their waterfalls will come to the front as the new centers of industrial production.

From calculations made by such an authority as Senator Colombo, the well-known engineer, it is estimated that the amount of energy available from this source would be about three million horse-power, while a committee of the Italian Senate in 1894 raised this estimate to five millions. Now, if we consider that the great industrial countries like England, Ger-

[1] E. Lozé, *Les charbons britanniques et leur épuisement* (Paris, 1900), 2 vols.

many, France, and the United States do not employ more than from three to four million horse-power in all their industries, it becomes apparent that a great future is open to Italy by the substitution of electricity for steam as a source of energy for manufacturing purposes.

Iron has shared with coal the privilege of being a great factor in modern industry, but aluminium is rapidly coming to the front as a possible substitute for it. Light as glass, resistant as iron, aluminium has all the requisites to insure its final triumph. Since aluminium is almost exclusively obtained electrolytically from alumina, the establishment of a vast system of hydro-electric plants in the way suggested by Nitti would greatly facilitate the production of the new metal. Thus, another cause of industrial inferiority — lack of iron — would be eliminated.

In conclusion, the vital issue for Italy is her transformation into a great industrial power. The work already accomplished in this direction gives evidence of the untiring energy and the complex aptitudes of the race. If only the efforts of both government and nation were strenuously bent toward the practical solution of the technical problems involved in the proposed substitution of electricity for coal, Italy, with her immense reservoir of water power, with her ever-increasing population, with her healthy current of emigration destined to open up new markets and outlets for her production, would soon be in a position to become a prominent factor in the industrial movement of the world. The twentieth century would thus see the most striking instance yet witnessed of Latin vitality.

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THE TRUST PROBLEM RESTUDIED.

RECENT events seem to call for a reconsideration of the trust question. The Sherman anti-monopoly act, a dead letter for some years, has been revived with considerable vigor and evidence of good faith. President Roosevelt is doing what, almost on the eve of his succession to his present office, he had declared to be necessary—"shackling cunning as force has been shackled." He has, indeed, been severely criticised for his action in the railway "merger" case and in that of the meat packers, and "high financial interests" have manifested deep displeasure at his disturbance of business. But the generality of intelligent citizens have commended his course, even while questioning the value of the net results of the anti-trust crusade.

This is not the place to dwell on elementary propositions or expose the miserable fallacies of plutocratic organs. But it is proper to premise the discussion now entered upon by stating that matters of policy and expediency are not within the discretion of the executive department of the national government so far as it is concerned with enacted legislation. Powerful as the president is, he cannot set aside the most trivial or most objectionable law of the United States. "He shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed," says the constitution, and his oath of office leaves no doubt as to his duty with respect to the enforcement of the will of the people and of Congress. To say or imply that the president is entitled to disregard any statute whatever is to advocate usurpation, official anarchy, and the destruction of the government established by the founders of the republic.

That the president has no right to repeal or suspend any law in favor of particular interests or classes is another thing that would need no saying, did not gentlemen friendly to him assume to say, by way of apology or reassurance, that he has no intention of extending his anti-trust crusade and carrying it, for example, into the anthracite coal region. Such statements

impute to the president designs flagrantly illegal and intolerable. Discrimination in legislation is denounced as unjust; discrimination in applying or enforcing law is far more vicious and inexcusable. The president cannot be expected to prosecute alleged trusts where the evidence is insufficient, but he is expected to investigate and make honest effort to obtain evidence in any case where there is reasonable ground for suspecting monopolistic abuse or oppression.

So much in reply to counsel-darkening sophistry and Bedlamite reasoning. But the question arises: What is likely to be the effect of the renewed agitation? The president has nothing to do with possible, probable, or certain effects of a law, but Congress has to do with all that, for it determines the policy of the government. And as Congress is supposed to carry out the will of the people, it is important to inquire whether the popular notions as regards trusts and monopolies have undergone any material modification since the enactment of the Sherman law. If they have, then what settlement of the question do the people now favor? If they are at sea, perplexed, dubious, and anxious for light and guidance, what do the "schools," the thinkers and reformers, have to offer them?

The fact is that the average man and the average "practical politician" are helpless and hopeless in the presence of the complex and difficult trust question. Ten years ago the solution seemed exceedingly simple: abolish trusts by law. Radically restrictive acts were the order of the day. All combinations, contracts, and agreements in restraint of trade or competition were made illegal. Construing the federal anti-trust law, the Supreme Court held that even *reasonable* restraint of commerce was contrary to public policy. A number of combinations and pools have been dissolved by the federal and state authorities, but have these successful prosecutions had any discouraging effect on the trust movement? The answer is familiar to all.

In 1898 a relatively harmless traffic association was declared to be unlawful. A year or so later another railroad association was ordered by the Supreme Court to go out of existence. But did greater competition follow in the railway sphere? The

annual jeremiads of the Interstate Commerce Commission set forth the actual results. The "community of interest" device was soon invented, and this has since developed into community of ownership. Consolidation has been steady and continuous, and the organization of the Northern Securities Co. was neither an exceptional occurrence nor a climax. The commission does not hesitate to say that railway combination cannot and ought not to be obstructed, and that the only way to prevent abuse and oppression of the public is to recognize the futility of legislation designed to secure competition in transportation and legalize pooling under certain restrictions. The chairman of the commission, Mr. Knapp, is beginning to discuss government ownership and operation of the railways as a feasible alternative.

What is called "municipal socialism" has almost become orthodox and practical politics, for even conservative councils and mayors are now insisting, if not upon immediate assumption by municipalities of the functions now discharged by public-service corporations, then upon explicit reservation in all grants or contracts with such corporations of the privilege of taking over their properties after a certain limited term. The leading Republican newspaper of the country, the New York *Tribune*, objects to the application of the term "socialism" to municipal ownership and operation, and states sententiously that "public ownership of public utilities is not socialism." In view of these illustrative facts, Mr. Knapp is amply warranted in predicting the early appearance of definite demands for government operation of railroads in political platforms. Telegraphs, telephones, and all other "public utilities" (what a vague and elastic term!) will follow or accompany the railroads. Can there be any reasonable doubt as to the origin of this remarkable change in public sentiment with regard to natural monopoly? If competition is to disappear, and combination is to become general, the argument for state control and management can hardly fail to appear overwhelming to the general mind.

But it must be recognized that, philosophically as well as popularly, the problem of natural monopoly is distinct from the broader question of industrial combination. Few now advocate

a *laissez-faire* policy toward corporations enjoying special franchises or privileges. Increased regulation and strict supervision, including the fixing of rates at certain intervals, will undoubtedly be the early outcome of the present tendencies in the sphere of public utilities. But how are the "capitalistic trusts and combinations" to be treated? What is to supersede the legislation that has proved so ineffective? The United States Steel Corporation has not been attacked under the anti-trust law of any state within which it operates. It is not a trust in the technical sense of the word; it is a corporation of corporations, and is organized under the laws of New Jersey. The meat-packing companies, harassed by the federal government, might secure immunity and freedom of action by organizing a similar corporation. Legally that would alter the situation materially; economically there would be no improvement. The people would continue to demand protection against the misuse of monopolistic power, and what would the state and national governments do to meet that demand?

Nothing, it is boldly said in certain quarters. For the first time since the rise of industrial combinations, the repeal of all anti-trust laws of the negative sort is now openly recommended. The fact is of peculiar significance. In political platforms and stump or convention speeches the declarations against trusts are as uncompromising as ever, and no public man has yet ventured to suggest the repeal or liberalization of the anti-monopoly laws. On the contrary, the politicians are advocating more rigid regulation of combinations. A Republican House of Representatives passed a radical bill vesting in Congress power to regulate trusts, and between Mr. W. J. Bryan's position on the trust question and that taken in President Roosevelt's first message to Congress in relation to the same subject there is no perceptible difference. Nevertheless the sentiment for a *laissez-faire* policy is no negligible quantity, and before long it will be necessary to reckon with it.

We have the following situation with reference to trusts: Some favor non-interference, the reversal of the policy of centuries, the repeal of all anti-monopoly laws and of the common

law against restraint of trade. The average man, and his representative in political life, wants more legislation against monopoly rather than less or none at all. Many earnest, scholarly, and thoughtful men are suggesting publicity and other conventional remedies. The socialists regard the trusts as unconscious but powerful allies, and predict the early "expropriation of the expropriators" by the government. Finally, the individualists —unterrified or thoroughgoing, as well as those who are not severely logical—what is their solution?

Let us examine these several positions.

Repeal would indeed relieve the governments of crushing burdens and bewildering complications. There would be no litigation, no danger of "disturbing business," no doubtful injunction proceedings, no possibility of discrimination, no occasion for conspiracies, evasions, trickery, and subterfuge on the part of the combined corporations. But what would become of the interests of the consumers? How would extortion and oppression be discouraged? No one will contend that the consumers are not entitled to the care and solicitude of the legislature, or that monopoly is intrinsically good, so that consumers have no need of safeguards and protective laws. It is tacitly admitted on all hands that the rights and claims of the consumers are paramount. In fact, the theory of the law is that even ordinary corporations for competitive business are created by the state to subserve the convenience of the public, and not to increase private opportunity for profitable employment of capital.

But two answers are possible to the question as to the consumers' interest under a *laissez-faire* trust policy. One of them is perhaps as well framed by Mr. Andrew Carnegie in his new volume, *The Empire of Business*, as it has ever been or can be put, and it may be quoted as typical. To Mr. Carnegie, trusts are a mere bugaboo. He tells the consumer that he can smile at all efforts of manufacturers and industrial "barons" to defeat economic law by combination. Mr. Carnegie writes (p. 168):

> There can be no permanent extortion of profit beyond the average return from capital, nor any monopoly, either in transportation or manufacturing.

Any attempt to maintain either must end in failure. . . . . The fashion of trusts has but a short season longer to run, and then some other equally vain device may be expected to appear when the next period of depression arrives; but there is not the slightest danger that serious injury can result to the sound principles of business from any or all of these movements. The only people who have reason to fear trusts are those foolish enough to enter into them. The consumer and the transporter, not the manufacturer and the railway owner, are to reap the harvest.

This is a plea for a let-alone policy. If the consumer not only suffers no injury, but is positively benefited by the "folly" of trust organizers, it clearly follows that, so far as *his* interests are concerned, anti-trust legislation is entirely superfluous. But Mr. Carnegie qualifies his statement by adding that trusts are harmless to consumers "so long as all are free to compete." This, construed in a certain way, might be very material, but Mr. Carnegie evidently attaches no special meaning to the phrase. He advises the American people "to hold firmly to the doctrine of free competition," and to "keep the field open;" but as he, in the same breath, expresses the conviction that this freedom of competition the American people are not likely to surrender, the implication is that we have now all the freedom, all the competition that we need by way of protection against monopoly and its abuses—in other words, that there is nothing to do, or to undo, with reference to the trust phenomena. If this be true, the statutes for the prevention or dissolution or punishment of combinations are without utility or *raison d'être*.

Now, on what facts is Mr. Carnegie's optimism based? He, and those who agree with him, cannot be charged with taking too short a view upon the subject, but it is possible to take too long a view. To say that certain things will happen in the long run is not to say that the *meantime* will be entirely free from hardship, confusion, and injustice. Grant that, even with the amount of competition now existing, monopoly is impossible as a *permanent* evil, does it follow that the temporary success of monopoly is a trivial matter, deserving of no attention from the legislature? By no means. And this is a fallacy of which Mr. Carnegie, Mr. James J. Hill, and other irrepressible optimists are easily convicted. They see that certain mismanaged

trusts have gone to pieces. They see that in some cases inflation, Napoleonic financiering, and reckless capitalization of extravagant hopes have brought failure and disaster to the promoters and partners of wildcat enterprises, and they exclaim: "Behold the triumph of natural law, your best protector and guardian! Trust this automatic regulator, and have no fear of oppression or injustice!"

But there are other facts which are not so comforting, and which cause the consumer to pause and hesitate about consenting to the repeal of all anti-trust legislation. In the first place, not all overcapitalized and inflated trusts collapse after a short and troubled career. There is a suspicion abroad that many of the most powerful combinations now in existence are not as "economic" and sound as their representatives pretend. President Schwab of the United States Steel Corporation observed some time ago in a public address that "the original trust was a dead business proposition," because it was founded on the idea of restricting production and arbitrarily raising prices, and that the new, the vital trust was strong and beneficial because it was founded on the opposite idea—of increasing production, lowering prices, improving quality, and eliminating waste. The difference is radical, but how many of the surviving combinations answer Mr. Schwab's description of the sound, the safe, the use ful trust? A competent writer has argued that the steel combination itself is really insolvent—its liabilities exceeding its assets, owing to the overvaluation of its constituent companies. Is there any touchstone to enable us to determine which of the trusts are "dead business propositions," and doomed to a speedy collapse, and which are stable, conservatively conducted, and "economic"?[1]

[1] Here is what an English "business-man" writes to the London *Standard* concerning our trusts: "We all know the general principles of an American trust. There are, I think, nearly two hundred trusts in America, and I believe about thirty of them pay dividends. An American 'trust' might be fairly described as a process of 'making money by force.' In America a trust is usually formed by a number of companies which, in their individual capacity, cannot pay dividends, and the directors of which hope by combination, and by increasing prices to figures which are not in accordance with the natural law of supply and demand, to control the particular trade they are interested in. The companies interested sell their business to the

In the second place, the wreck of a trust does not deter the "promoters" from continuing their efforts to "organize" the industry. Indeed, the beautiful theory that trusts are created to economize, cheapen production, and foster trade, cannot easily be reconciled with the notorious fact that financiers, who know nothing about manufactures or trade, are primarily responsible for the greater number of the existing trusts. The outside promoter cares nothing for the industry he "organizes." His interest ceases when he has received his fat commission and has "unloaded" his shares of stock on the public. He is then ready for further adventures in fields and pastures new. There are, undoubtedly, captains of industry among us who create opportunities and wealth, find new outlets, and benefit both capital and labor. But there are also buccaneers of industry, and there is a general impression that the latter have had too much to do with this business of trust formation.[1] Had it been left to the manufacturers themselves, to the play of no other motive than economy or superior efficiency, the process of industrial trans-

trust usually at double its value, taking half cash (subscribed by a confident public) and the balance in shares; the cash portion of the purchase price representing more than the value of the business sold, so that the value of the shares is, in fact, immaterial."

[1] President James J. Hill said in a recent speech that many combinations had been created "not for the purpose of manufacturing any public commodity in the first place, but for the purpose of selling sheaves of printed securities, which represent nothing more than good will and prospective profits to the promoters." Commenting on this remark, the New York *Journal of Commerce*, a conservative, intelligent trade newspaper, wrote: "A recent computation of the securities of a score of industrials showed that what purported on their face to be worth nearly a billion and a quarter dollars were not worth half a billion dollars according to the quotations of the market. It is impossible to say how much loss is represented here; many of these securities were floated at much below their face. But there have been very considerable losses in the shrinkage of these securities which represent pure inflation, and there must be much greater losses when there comes a period of bad business. The decline of stocks acts sympathetically in depressing other stocks, and losses in dealings in stocks affect the means of investment and confidence in even the best of securities. For these reasons we have from the first greatly regretted the creation of these securities, *but for which most of the combinations would probably not have been formed*, as nearly every effort to form a combination on the basis of the existing capitalization of the concerns to be combined was abandoned." In view of such testimony as this we are entitled to ask for a bill of particulars from anyone who talks glibly about the wonderful "economies" of the trusts.

formation would have been much slower and healthier. The collapse of a trust, through inherent weakness or rottenness, is not regarded by the people as an argument for *laissez-faire;* on the contrary, it is taken as additional evidence of the need of regulation and prevention. The people do not say: "Monopoly is impossible in the long run; therefore let us ignore these vain efforts to squeeze trade and victimize us." They say: "These trusts are conceived in wildcatism and born in economic iniquity; they benefit none but the speculative financiers and stock-jobbers, and the government should suppress them and discourage the formation of new ones."

Here, however, a real difficulty must be faced. Discrimination, class legislation in any form, is profoundly repugnant to the American mind. "The equal protection of the law," construed by the highest courts to be equivalent to the phrase "the protection of equal laws," is generally insisted on as a bulwark of social order and harmony. Anti-trust laws from which farmers, stock raisers, and wage-workers were expressly exempted have been pronounced null and void, obnoxious to the fourteenth amendment, and contrary to public policy. If manufacturers and merchants must compete, and are forbidden to agree upon prices or methods, is it just to allow farmers and workmen to combine for similar purposes? Is not a trade union a trust? Collective bargaining is the *raison d'être* of the trade union, and what is this but restraint of competition in labor?

Not many decades ago the common law prohibited unions of wage-workers and punished them as conspiracies in restraint of trade. Gradually the right of workmen to combine, to determine the price of their services, to act in concert even in suspending work, was recognized by society, legislation, and the courts. There were good and sound reasons for this change of attitude, and they are still operative. But the anti-trust movement puts a new face on the matter. If, as we have seen, the law prohibits even reasonable restraint of trade, how will unions escape the manifest application of this principle to their own particular attempts to eliminate competition? There are those who perceive valid grounds for making an exception of labor

and agricultural combinations, but will the courts admit the discrimination? The United States Supreme Court has declined to approve it.

Yet who believes that any legislature will outlaw trade unions and agricultural combinations for the regulation of production and prices? "Politics," reinforced by sentiment, will continue to prompt evasion of the requirements of equality and uniformity, and this evasion will excite complaint and protest—a sense of injustice and wrong that will render the strict enforcement of anti-trust laws extremely hard and unpleasant in these days of strikes, sympathetic and general, picketing, boycotting, and the assertion of the right to deprive non-union men of their means of livelihood by threats of industrial warfare.

At the same time it is absolutely certain that there will be no repeal of anti-monopoly statutes, no general acquiescence in the claims of the trust apologists. Will there be a change in the *character* of the legislation aimed at trusts? Able and judicious men have been advocating such a change, in view of the acknowledged futility of the kind of remedies thus far applied. As stated above, publicity is one of the most popular prescriptions, and it is plausibly argued that the conservative and good trusts will cheerfully aid in securing publicity, as they have nothing to conceal and are but too anxious to convince the public of their utility. But, as Governor Cummins of Iowa (an independent and progressive official) has pointed out, publicity is at best only a safeguard against certain abuses affecting trust shareholders; it is not a "remedy" at all. The sort of publicity that is proposed is no bar to limitation of production or undue raising of prices. It would not even prevent overcapitalization and disregard by the majority of the interests of the minority stockholders. It did not interfere with operations which have been the subject of wide animadversion lately. In one flagrant New York case a queer merger was effected, not only against the consent of the protesting minority, but with cynical violation of the right of discussion. "Vote first, and debate afterward," was the arrogant remark of the president of the corporation in response to the minority's complaint that the transaction sought to be

foisted on them was mysterious, suspicious, and peculiar. Publicity did not prevent the United States Steel Corporation from voting to convert $200,000,000 preferred shares into bonds and from voting a $10,000,000 commission to a syndicate for the service of guaranteeing the operation, without a word of explanation to the minority, which did not see any necessity for, and questioned the wisdom of, this heavy increase of the corporation's debt and fixed charges. Other facts might be cited, but it is really quite plain that publicity of accounts, while desirable for other reasons, would not protect consumers against the aggressive tendencies of monopoly. It is interesting to note that Professor Richard T. Ely, in his valuable little book on *Monopolies and Trusts*, sets no store by publicity. Faith in that alleged remedy has declined greatly since the national trust conference held in Chicago in the fall of 1899. The right of the state to impose publicity as one of the conditions of incorporation is questioned by few, but the inadequacy of this remedy is now widely recognized.

Such suggestions as taxation of trusts, government regulation of prices and output, may be passed over as too radical for the conservatives and insufficient from the radical point of view. They fall between two stools, and are not compromises. On the other hand, general reforms like just taxation of general property, the acquisition by the government of patents that are made the basis of monopoly, the prohibition of "stock-watering," etc., may likewise be left on one side as measures whose effect on trusts would be indirect and uncertain. These proposals must be judged on their own merits; they would be advanced and urged if trusts had never made their appearance.

The socialist view of trusts need not detain us long. It is really summed up in the old phrase, "the worse, the better." This idea is implicit in the position of the "orthodox" Marxites, the "catastrophic" socialists, who believe in revolution and class struggle for political supremacy. Contemporary socialism, not only in Great Britain, but also in France and Germany, is parliamentary and opportunist. It is Fabian, though many of the continental leaders would warmly repudiate the characteri-

zation. Modern socialism has abandoned the doctrine that "small reforms are the enemies of great ones," and is quite ready to accept concessions from the *bourgeoisie*. But with reference to trusts and monopolies even the self-styled Fabian socialists proceed upon the old idea that it is futile, unwise, and reactionary to resist the industrial tendency of the day. Competition, they say, is bankrupt, self-condemned. It has become economically "impossible," and industry is reorganizing itself on the basis of monopoly. The only question is: Shall this monopolized industry remain under private control, substantially if not formally so, or shall the state take charge of it and conduct it in the interest of the whole people?

Says Mr. Henry W. Macrosty, Fabian socialist, in his *Trusts and the State* (pp. 317, 318):

> Competition came into the world to free trade from feudalism, and, having done that work, played havoc with the lives of men. It called into existence the great opposing principle of association, by which a series of bulwarks against individualism has been built up in the trade union, the co-operative society, the municipality, and the central government. Finally, competition, turning against itself, has ended in combination, and private monopoly threatens to overwhelm the state by economic and political oppression. We cannot turn back the march of economic progress; for good or for evil we must now face the concentration of industry. . . . . In the collectivization of industry lies the future hope of society, and it will be obtained by the gradual transfer of one branch of production after another under the control of the municipality or the government. . . . .
>
> Industrial society is now in course of providing itself with a new organization which will exclude competition and yet be motived by the desire for private gain. Will the community consent to become the serf of a small class of shareholders, or will it take the new organization into its own hands, and by scientific management make both the system and the workers capable of responding to the complex needs of a higher form of civilization? That is the problem of the trust.

It will be seen that this statement of the case admits everything that has been asserted in behalf of the trust on its industrial side. It admits that trusts effect great saving; that they introduce efficiency and scientific management into industry, and that they subserve a pressing economic need. We know that these admissions are by no means reluctant or forced; they are

made with the cheerfulness characteristic of those who have a foregone conclusion to support. It is more significant to find non-socialists so far in agreement with the socialists as to affirm plainly that the trusts will drive society to collectivization of all industry *unless* "we can draw the fangs of the monster and tame him to good uses," in the words of Professor John B. Clark. In his essay on *The Control of Trusts*, Professor Clark says:

> Momentous beyond the power of language to measure is the question whether centralization may be allowed to go to the utmost lengths without fastening on the people the intolerable burden of monopoly. Answer this question in one way, and you will probably be a socialist; *and certainly you ought to be one.* [Italics mine.] Answer it in another way, and you will be an "individualist," though that is an inexact term for indicating the development for which you hope. In the latter case, you will believe in freedom of individual action, in competition, in the right of contract—in short, in the things that have made our civilization what it is.

Professor Clark, it is true, answers the question in the way which permits him to remain an individualist. He believes it to be possible to "blend efficiency in production with equity in distribution," insuring the utilization of the trust's power for good while curbing its power for evil, but his solution of the problem is not convincing. He holds that the ability of the trusts to suppress competition and oppress the public is dependent upon three kinds of unfair dealing—discriminations in prices between different localities, discriminations between different grades of goods, and discriminations between persons. He believes that the law can suppress these practices, and that, too, without violating the principle of industrial freedom.

But the consistent individualist will demur to this. No doubt certain discriminations are wrong and immoral, and there would be no violence to the principle of *laissez-faire* in making them illegal. But to prohibit local cutting of prices is to suppress competition. It is not wrong, if we accept the principle of industrial freedom, for a corporation to invade the special territory of a rival company and drive it out of existence by underbidding. The law cannot assume that the object of the successful corporation is monopoly in the offensive sense of the term. A monopolist may or may not abuse his power. If he

does not abuse it, and deals fairly with the consumers, there was nothing illegitimate, nothing exceptional even, in his preliminary destruction of a competitor. If he does abuse his power, the offense lies in that abuse, not in the acts which have made the abuse possible.

At all events, theory aside, Professor Clark's remedy is practically unavailable. The most astute lawyer will give up as hopeless the task of framing an act to suppress the local cutting of prices or the reduction of prices in certain varieties of merchandise. If nothing stood between society and socialism except Professor Clark's anti-discrimination policy, then socialism would indeed be inevitable.

But Professor Clark, like Mr. Macrosty, assumes too much in saying that trusts are born of the necessity of eliminating waste and securing greater efficiency. This is one of the things to be demonstrated. Not all business-men are ready to credit trusts with the "economy" claimed by them. Mr. Carnegie, we saw, a captain of industry if ever there was one, does not allow the plea of economy. In fact, if economy and efficiency were the basis and justification of trusts, smaller and independent manufacturers could not possibly compete with them. Even the steel combination has *stimulated* competition. The demand for commodities has been extraordinary in the past few years, it will be said, and there has been work for all, great as well as small. A series of lean years may come—must come, if we are to judge by the history of crises and industrial depressions. Which will go to the wall, the colossal trust or the small corporation? The answer is not at all certain. The talk regarding the efficiency and superiority of the trust is, as a rule, superficial, not to say ignorant. There can be no efficiency, no economy, no superiority, without conservatism in management, and this conservatism is a rare quality. The number of trusts overtaken by disaster or doomed to disaster furnishes an argument more weighty than the question-begging of the current catch phrases. The trust has not passed its experimental stage. We are too ready to assume, because of the truism that a large corporation is more economical than a small one, that a corporation of cor-

porations is more efficient than a single corporation. But it ought to be patent that a corporation may be too big as well as too small.

However, let it be granted, for the sake of the argument, that trusts and combinations are "inevitable" and that it is idle, and worse than idle, to seek to prevent their formation. How is the public to be protected from extortion and oppression under a policy of industrial freedom? Socialism would of course abolish trusts, but it would abolish some other things along with them. Certainly the American people are not prepared to adopt the heroic remedy of collectivization of all industry. They are still "individualistic," in Professor Clark's confessedly vague sense of the term, and therefore they may be supposed to prefer measures in consonance with private enterprise, free competition, and free contract. What has been suggested, what may be suggested, along those lines?

Several years ago the head of the sugar trust declared that the tariff was the mother of trusts. That was an exaggeration, but *only* an exaggeration. It contained a great deal of truth, as even protectionists now admit. Governor Cummins, a Republican, vigorously supports the demand for the removal of protective duties from trust-controlled industries. There is no inconsistency between this position and a general belief in protection for new or weak industries. Who has ever known of a trust in an "infant industry"? The industry which invites consolidation has graduated from the infant school, and there is no reason for a vestige of protection in its interest. Those independent firms which are strong enough to withstand the trust would be strong enough to hold their own under a low tariff or free trade. At any rate, as Governor Cummins has said, the interests of the consumers are paramount. When we are compelled to choose between high duties for the benefit of a few manufacturers and their employees, and reasonable prices for the public, hesitation is scarcely possible.

But the protective tariff is not the only breeder of monopoly. Perhaps enough has been said of late about secret rebates and illicit favors to trusts on the part of common carriers.

These illegal privileges confer advantages different in degree, but not in kind, from those enjoyed by the coal-carrying railroads in the anthracite region, whose monopoly of transportation made it impossible for mine-owners to retain their properties. There is, fortunately, no difference of opinion as to the necessity of breaking up the alliance between industrial combinations and railroad companies. The problem, however, is becoming much more complicated under the extension of the community-of-interest plan. The Atlantic shipping combination will have a sort of lien on the freight of certain powerful railroads, and it will not be easy for non-trust ship-owners to compete with the great combination.

The dependence of trusts upon monopoly of natural resources is less obvious, except in such cases as the anthracite coal combination or the steel combination. This is not the place to raise the question of private *vs.* public ownership of land and natural resources generally, but it may be pointed out that the principle of private property in land does not justify the appropriation of nature's gifts by the few, and the exclusion of the many from the enjoyment of those gifts. There are no agricultural trusts in America, because of the beneficent operation of the homestead acts and the virtual application of the occupancy-and-use principle. Have the right principles been followed in the disposition of other parts of the general inheritance — mines, for example? Voices have been raised for the acquisition by the public of the anthracite coal mines, and whatever we may think of the merit of the plan, it involves a recognition of a fundamental fact. If it can be shown that trusts derive their power, not from the possession of capital, but from special privileges related to natural opportunity, will not the remedy have to be sought in establishment of equality of opportunity?

Finally, since there is so general an agreement as to the necessity of preserving *potential* competition as a check upon actual monopoly, has not the question of credit, the supply of capital to the business community by the banks, been unduly neglected so far as it bears on the possibilities of competition? A rigid, inadequate, crude currency and banking system favors

concentration and monopoly. It discourages limited enterprises by prohibitory interest rates. Branch banking and asset currency would constitute anti-trust agents of no mean influence, though they are fiercely opposed by the average man on account of their supposed tendency to monopoly in credit and banking.

To each of these remedial proposals objections are offered, but is not this true of any anti-trust suggestion? None meets with universal acceptance, and reform by unanimous consent is someting unknown in politico-social history. The individualists have nothing better to propose; they believe that the indicated remedies would be adequate. But it is impossible to blink the fact that society is disposed to try restrictive and prohibitive measures first. Monopoly is making conscious and unconscious socialists at an amazing rate.

VICTOR S. YARROS.

CHICAGO.

THE BASIS OF SOCIALITY.

To JOIN the hue and cry against Spencer's analogical comparison of society with an organism, though popular in certain sociological circles, is paying but scant respect to the real value of one of the pioneer attempts to secure a scientific basis for that foundling science—sociology. As a *heuristisches Princip* its most perdurable value lies in the fact that it has materially aided in the consideration of the sociological as a continuation of the biological. Strictly speaking, the biological probably includes human interaction or the social phenomena of human life, but for the purposes of a division of labor in the scientific world there has been a strong unconscious, though some unkind critic will say all too conscious, current in favor of founding a new discipline and department of human knowledge. Certainly the problems are ample enough to justify the division, and despite the similarity of laws the differences are sufficient to mark the boundaries of a new province of scientific research. Darwin's *Origin of Species* was really a description of organic technology, and the extra-organic sense and motor organs of social evolution are but the extensions of the tools and instruments which were so successful in the organic conflict. Organic heredity is continued in social heredity, the instinctive giving way, as second in importance, to oral and written tradition and the transmission of institutional life. The organic gains of the individual become objectified and perpetuated for all time in the environment, and an attainable object of possession for all socially minded people. The language of gestures of organic biology becomes the language of symbols with its priceless economy of time and labor. These laws and many others provide ample scope for the most untiring laborer and the most brilliant genius in the field of research. Spencer's analogy, therefore, is insufficient, and the attempt to base sociology on the specifications laid down for an organism is but little superior to the attempts of certain other sociologists who find all sociology bound up in the consciousness

of kind or in the psychological process of imitation. Spencer, however, did point to the continuity of law as is evidenced in the biological and sociological worlds. Instead of an organism he could have used a species with much greater effect, for in a species are found, although in a crude and rudimentary stage, the first beginnings of social life.

One of the most striking, and yet at the same time one of the least observed, facts about specific action is the pre-eminence of the specific as such. The individual is secondary to the species. Instincts, which are characteristically the grand trunk line of transmission and continuity in the lower orders of the zoölogical series, are peculiar and very important in this, that they are always in their origin and bloom for the benefit of the *species* to which the animal may belong which possesses the instinct. They are of benefit to the individual only secondarily, in so far as that individual may be of benefit to the species. The mother gives up her life for the child. She dies, but the child, and through it the species, lives. The salmon struggles up the Columbia river for a thousand miles, is torn and battered by the rocks and waterfalls on the long and weary journey, lays its eggs, and dies; but the race lives on, although at the loss and sacrifice of one of its best members. The long history of the mammalia or *mothers* is a record of innumerable such examples. Of course, it is not necessarily true that the individual performs an instinctive act *in order that* the species may be benefited, but the persistent fact remains that in the long run only those species and individuals survive which act in such a way that the species may be further propagated. Instincts are always for species or race preservation. They are specific, altruistic, other-regarding, profoundly social. They may not be all consciously such, but in their origin and bloom they are in their final import intensely social. It is a question of survival. It is a question of propagation and of the safety and welfare of the propagated. The individuals of a species which do not propagate obviously nullify the probability of like descendants. That which militates against the species thereby militates against the survival of the members of that species. The species that survives is characterized by the

fact that its members act in such a manner that descendants are provided, and also provided *for* in some way or other. The goal of their activities is the young and their welfare. The young are heirs of all efforts directly or indirectly (*Erziehung, eine Fortsetzung der Erzeugung*). In the highest mammalian species, man, art, religion, and science are, in the long run, directly or indirectly, means for more certain perpetuation of the species and the more certain welfare of the same. The rank of a species is determined by the degree of such care for the young. The survival of the fittest means the survival of the parental, and all efforts are to be judged according to a parental standard. The greatest good to the greatest number must also be interpreted in a similar manner, not as the greatest happiness of the greatest number, but as such parental conduct, direct or indirect, as will be most conducive to the propagation and welfare of the species. As Herbert Spencer says, the continued life of the species is in every case the end to which all other ends are secondary (*Principles of Sociology*, Vol. I, p. 591). Through many stages of provincial patriotism and group-exclusiveness we have forged on until on the not far distant sky-line we see a state outlined where all humanity is our fatherland. All conduct is judged by nature according to the standard of survival.

In an organism, to recur to the Spencerian analogy, the conduct of the parts is determined by the welfare of the whole. That part which is detrimental to the whole organism is suicidal in tendency either immediately or mediately through the destruction of the whole organism. The safety of the parts lies in their general social efficiency. Their existence and perpetuation lie in their service to the general organization of which they form a part. To this extent an organism is similar to society, and to this extent is Spencer's analogy pertinent. Neither the science of sociology nor the science of ethical conduct, it is evident, can be drawn from the individual as such. Plato, it seems, saw this when he endeavored to derive the true significance of justice and righteousness from the state, and not from the individual.

It seems plain, then, that the individual as such has no

rights. The rights he may possess are attained by him through social service. It is through society that he acquires whatever rights he may claim. There was more sociological truth than cynicism in the reply of the French judge to a prisoner who excused his crime on the plea that "a man must live." "Pardon me," came the rejoinder, "but I don't see the necessity." The inalienable rights of the individual are *nil* excepting in so far as society may grant them. The individual pure and simple, *der Mensch überhaupt*, is a fiction. All which tends to survive is an organized whole of interacting parts.

The basis of sociality and the material of the science of sociology are therefore found in the interaction of parts which constitute a more or less organized whole. The organized whole, or society, is not something different from the interacting parts; the interacting parts *are* the society. The social is not the product of the interaction; it *is* the interaction. Each part is a partner or *socius* or *Theilnehmer*, the service or sociality of one part being complementary to the service of the other parts. Thus the social is reciprocal service. The social arises when the *Nebeneinander* becomes the *Miteinander*, when the anatomical becomes the physiological. The sociality consists in the correlated, co-ordinated activity of the integrated parts. Sociality is conduct, service rendered, not a consciousness of kind nor a feeling of sympathy, excepting in so far as they may be useful for the conduct of the parts.

Pitting the individual against society is an instance of crude sociological thought. Its ambiguity is at once manifest when one remembers that society does not exist as something separate from the integrated functions of the parts. It may be said that in the long run only those parts are allowed to exist which contribute to the social or organic welfare. The case in which possibly an individual may be pitted against the society is when the function of a part is prejudicial to organic survival. Such conduct is manifestly suicidal and, comparatively speaking, non-transmissible. It is, however, still a matter of sociality in that it is the service rendered by a part in an organized whole. It is, however, to be classed in what may be termed pathological as

opposed to normal sociology. The truest part of man, the best and most righteous, is that which is most specific and most altruistic, that which contributes most to social organic welfare, which again must be defined in terms of survival of well-provided-for progeny. True selfishness or sin is that service rendered the whole which is for the individual's own immediate benefit and which is harmful to the body politic of which it forms a part. It may be incidentally mentioned at this point that on this basis a standard of values can be established in ethical matters — an impossible matter if the ethical standard is one of motives or happiness. The action of an educated man who can foresee future results is of more value than that of an ignorant man ruled by a few unbending motives.

The struggle for existence is a secondary law, being subordinate and subservient to the law of social service. The social service of the parts is improved by the betterment of the parts. Hence the worth of personality and individuality; hence the struggle for freedom in history. Self-preservation, self-control, and the perfection of one's own personality are duties, and imperative duties at that, but not categorical imperatives. "The perfection of one's powers" is, after all, only a means of obeying the categorical imperative of social service. It is here that we find the supreme court of appeal, from which there is no recourse. It may also be well to point out that from the biological and sociological standpoint it is not so much a question of the survival of individuals as a question of the survival of the best combination of parts — a much wider view.

This grounding of the social in the universal phenomena of the division of labor throws a strong light on certain prevalent theories as to the nature of sociology. One of the most prominent characteristics of this division of labor is the *differentiation of parts*. Integration of parts means the connected play of these parts, so that if one functions the others are affected. Differentiation from other organs means individuality and difference; integration is not necessarily an interaction of similar parts, but rather an interaction of the different parts. The phenomena of integration or sociality are therefore inadequately described as

"a consciousness of kind, a knowledge of resemblances, or a knowledge of like-mindedness" (Giddings).

Social life is mirrored in a football game. Each player has his function; each player thinks and acts his separate part. The signal given, the ball is snapped, each man leaps to his place, the fake pass is made, the proper interference aids the man who makes the run down the side lines, and the touch-down is made to the cheering of enthusiastic partisans. *Each man acts, I say, his part, and the element they have in common is the goal.* The common aim—the success of the team and the winning of the game—does not necessarily mean a common or similar method of action. Solidarity does not of necessity mean similarity, nor does community life mean common thoughts and actions. Nor in adult society, the training for which is the rational ground for play, do we find the process materially different. The material of social organization is not consciousness of kind, nor is it mainly such. The action of the mob, to which reference is so lovingly made by certain sociologists, is generally an instance in which the welfare of the whole is lost sight of, in which the single person becomes a unit in an *aggregation*, and in which there is a general return to the homogeneity of primitive conditions. The striking thing about a mob is not its social but its unsocial character. With the dispersion of the mob there begins again the process of differentiation and integration—true sociality. Of certain pigeons it is reported that they become extraordinarily stupid and incautious as soon as they become a part of great numbers in flight, but that they become wary, intelligent, and cautious when they are alone. Identification of the individual with the collective mass reduces it to the average level and causes temporary atrophy of certain more highly specialized qualities. The same phenomena are often observable in men and women who take refuge from their doubts and uncertainties in the infallible doctrines of the Roman Catholic church.

Consciousness of kind is characteristic of the lowest stages of society, and indicates a low level in a more highly evolved society. The struggle for existence implies a struggle of conflicting interests, different schools of thought and action. It is

also a biological truth that the struggle is greatest between the members of the same species. It is also not necessary that each individual partner should be conscious of the common goal, provided his conduct tends that way. His motives may be wrong, but his conduct must be right. Correct motives provide, however, some guarantee of persistency of conduct. The individual lives for himself, but in so doing must serve others. Selfishness necessarily generates altruism. The chalk cliffs of the infusoria are the result of the individualistic action of each of the infusoria, the infusorium being typical of egoism.[1] Baldwin discriminates between the substance, content, stuff, or material of society, and the functional method or process of organization of the social material. He describes the social substance or content as follows: "The matter of social organization consists of thoughts; by which is meant all sorts of intellectual states, such as imagination, knowledge, and informations." This "matter," he thinks, is found only in social groups, which alone, therefore, can be called societies. Animal communities he would call "companies." The functional method or process of organization of the social material he finds in the process of imitation which is subjectively contained in the "dialectic of personal growth."

It is evident that the "substance, content, stuff, or material" of society is not the consciousness of kind, as Giddings affirms; neither can it be said that the functional method or process of organization of the social material is mainly a process of imitation, as Baldwin asserts. The process is rather that of division of labor, using that term to indicate both the process of differentiation and integration. The transmission of the social heritage, the introduction of the young into adult social ways, may and does involve a large amount of imitation, but even there, again, it should be remarked that imitation is but one subdivision of the larger process of suggestion. Suggestion may be one of the methods by which the young acquire social ways, but it does not therefore rise to the supreme rank and importance of the social way itself. Again, imitation, and in a still larger way suggestion in all its forms, is one method of social service, as, for instance, in

[1] IHERING, *Der Zweck im Recht*, 3d ed. (Leipzig, 1893), p. 467.

the influence exerted by leaders, reformers, and their likes. It is, however, not to be confounded with the larger and more fundamental process of division of labor. It is brilliant, but wholly inadequate, to say with Tarde, "Socialité, c'est l'imitativité."[1]

The most useful *variation* tends to survive, and hence Bailey's term, "the survival of the unlike." Variation is one of the most important processes in nature, for on this process are built the innumerable possibilities of the division of labor. Darwin's problem was, of course, the origin of differences. Linnæus, if he were still to pursue his plan of an inventory of nature as a species of natural bookkeeping, would be appalled at the number of species. Instead of the very modest forty thousand species comprising the sum total of all living species as computed by Biberg, writing in 1749 in Linnæus's *Amoenitates Academicae*, Riley concludes that "to say that there are ten million species of insects in the world would be, in my judgment, a moderate estimate." The differentiation process is proceeding as rapidly as at any period in time past; in fact, the strong probability is that it is increasing more rapidly. That organism is likely to spread most rapidly which differs most widely from all its fellows, because the field is free of competitors and there is the least impediment to its progress. This principle has been called by Darwin the divergence of character. A new character, or a new combination of characters, in any organism may tend to give such an organism an immense advantage because of the monopoly-privileges it enjoys. Freedom and liberty is the toleration of differences, affording a chance for natural or acquired aptitudes. A variation is generally useful because it accomplishes something new, something which the homogeneous mass could not do before the variation occurred. Progress is generally such differential interstitial growth.

Differentiation, however, is not invariably the open sesame to success. The secret of success lies in the degree of adaptation, and success, it may again be repeated, must be interpreted in terms of survival. We commonly say that when certain plants are transferred northward they tend to degenerate by

[1] TARDE, *Les lois de l'imitation*, p. 75.

becoming dwarfed and by losing some of their highly developed specialities. They have a tendency, like old varieties of plants, to assume some primitive or inferior type. Degeneracy or deterioration is, however, a relative term, return to a simpler form, *i. e.*, a decrease in the differentiation of the plant, being often the successful means employed to secure a further lease of life. In the same way with human beings, poverty often places an embargo on differentiation. The highly developed individual, stricken with poverty, must needs forego the satisfaction of many tastes, and revert to a more common and primitive type.

The utility of differentiation is, however, manifest on all sides. Death entered into the world with all its blessings, the old undying types giving place to the possibility of an ever-increasing variation. Sex entered, according to Weissmann, and increased the number of combinations and variations. Plants become annuals and biennials from a perennial condition. Changes in the plant and animal world meet the changes of the seasons, the temperature, the food supply, and the changing demands of the rest of the plant and animal world. Bailey suggestively remarks that the development of life took two divergent lines—that of the circular arrangement of parts and that of bilateralism. The first line, developing in obedience to a peripheral or rotate type of organization, ends in the echinoderms and some of the mollusks. This type reached its zenith and, according to Cope, has left no line of descent. The progressive and regnant type of animal life appeared in the vermes, or true worms, forms which are characterized by a two-sided or bilateral, and therefore more or less longitudinal, structure. By this means greater differentiation was made possible. A cephalic or head-forming evolution resulted from the bilateralism, and a specialization of the senses and central nervous system without parallel ensued. The extensive specialization of the sense and motor organs of the body, although marvelous, is carried to still greater limits by means of extra-organic instruments. The evolution of organs is continued in technic.[1]

The differentiation being given, integration or organization

[1] OTTO WIENER, *Die Erweiterung unserer Sinne*, Leipzig, 1900.

becomes possible. The more absolutely alike the parts may be, the less likelihood there will be of a superior organization. The Quakers, for instance, possess little capacity for political organization, because of the uniformity of the individuals of that persuasion. The benefits accruing from division of labor are lost, viz., the avoidance of waste effort, the increase in amount of work performed, the improvement in quality, the adaptation of the work to the natural aptitude of the workers, the greater security of the species or society, etc. Thus integration may not necessarily mean the introduction of a caste or military system; it may not follow as a logical consequence that there is an *Ueber-* and *Untereinander*, but it does imply a *Miteinander*. It may not necessitate equality or similarity of parts, but it does imply efficiency of service of the parts, which efficiency is generally in proportion to the difference in the parts.[1] The survival of the unlike defines the fittest to be the unlike, and if, as Roux says, there is a *Kampf der Theile*, it is, we may add, *im Interesse des Ganzen*. Every man is his brother's keeper in the sense that each specialist must needs be supported by other specialists. Organizations, institutions, culture, and civilization must be defined, not as products of interaction, but as such and such interactions of different parts.

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[1] Hegel's statement that he who pursues a special occupation or profession does not lower himself, but only thus becomes *ein rechter Mensch*, has much truth in it.

THE STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY IN INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING IN THE UNITED STATES. II.

SUMMING up the results on the present study of sociology, we find that 169 different men's colleges give some attention to sociology, while 150 of these give the equivalent of one course or more in the subject. In the women's colleges, 16 treat sociology. A total of 45 colleges and universities give fairly adequate treatment of the subject, offering three or more different courses covering various subdivisions of the sociological field. There is, however, no university in the United States in which the whole field of sociology is adequately covered. The nearest approach to such treatment is at the University of Chicago, Yale University, and Columbia University. Besides the institutions mentioned above, sociology is gradually making its way into technological institutions, normal schools, and theological institutions. The growth of such study in normal schools is most marked, while theological institutions are not making as rapid progress as seemed probable a few years ago. The technical colleges are just awakening to the advisability of treating a subject apparently so remote from a purely technical curriculum.

Our only basis of comparison, in determining the growth of sociological study, is Mr. Folkmar's report of 1894. He found "29 colleges having regular courses in sociology, using the term in the looser sense to include charities and corrections, while 24 have sociology proper, defining the term as the study of society. These figures do not include the institutions that give instruction in charities and correction, or the science of society, incidentally to ethics, economics, etc. Of this sort there are 6 more in sociology, and 20 in charities and correction, some of which give quite extended instruction in these subjects. Five of the 8 women's colleges reporting give courses in sociology, some of them being well equipped, while 4 have courses in charities and correction. Eleven colleges give the number of students, which ranges from 8 to 250 in each course, or an average of 50. The

number of students in courses in charities and correction ranges from 8 to 119, with an average of 43."

The growth shown by a comparison of these figures is so evident that no comment is necessary. Since 1890 the field of sociology has differentiated, until the division into sociology proper, and charities and corrections, has no longer any significance. Consequences of this differentiation are that the classes are notably smaller; that dilettanteism and superficiality in sociological study are beginning to be things of the past; that a single course in the study is seen to be inadequate to cover the sociological field; and that a postgraduate school of sociology is coming to be recognized as the only adequate institution for such study.

While the growth of sociology is obvious, it would be idle to deny that certain tendencies are at work which tend to challenge its right to an important position in the field of the sciences, or in educational institutions. The action of certain of our most important universities, as noticed in the first part of this paper, is evidence enough of this movement. The arguments of such critics may, perhaps, be stated somewhat as follows: Sociology must define itself either as a body of doctrine, as a point of view, or as a method of research. It has tried to define itself as a body of doctrine, and it has failed in the attempt. If it is merely a point of view, it cannot be separated from the matter in discussion and must subordinate itself to the various social sciences. It has as yet made no serious attempt to develop itself as a method of research, and must develop itself on these lines and show its fruitfulness before it can demand consideration at the bar of science. It is no part of the business of this paper to answer these charges theoretically. If an examination of the classified list of sociological courses shows them to be well founded, then there is nothing to say, unless, indeed, it be to advise the sociologist to develop sociology as a method of research as rapidly as possible. My purpose in calling attention to this tendency is merely to give a true representation of the present status of sociology in the academic world. No treatment of this subject would be complete which minimized this attitude.

It seems evident, then, that the position of sociology in education is in dispute. In this connection a few of the answers to the question as to the position of sociology in general education may be of interest:

I do not believe that sociology is at present far enough advanced to warrant much specialization apart for the actual workings of social institutions, and such general courses as enable the student to appreciate current problems as he comes upon them.

Seems to the writer too vast a field for a mere course in college. Should be a postgraduate course, with little else in it.

Has not yet attained sufficient definiteness as a "body of doctrine" to be insisted upon as part of a general education. But every teacher should appreciate the sociological point of view.

A better knowledge of what it is will create a demand equal with political economy.

There is a growing demand to know the civilization in which one has to live. Perhaps no branch has a higher importance.

We find deep interest in it, and believe it should be put in curriculum for B.L., B.Ph., and B.A. Let student select it as alternate to any one of several studies, as higher mathematics, Greek, philosophy, etc.

I think an elementary study of the subject almost indispensable to right understanding of a number of other subjects.

Sociology organizes and furnishes point of view for all human sciences.

A general survey is well-nigh essential.

It seems to me it should be applied rather than theoretical, and has the utmost importance — nothing is more important.

Because of the paramount importance of the social life, I would cut down the studies of the classics, and of physical science if necessary, in order to make room for it.

The study of sociology is invaluable. Demand is general and urgent. No subject is of greater importance.

Sociology has the importance Plato and Aristotle gave it. It connects other studies with life.

We note an imperative and increasing demand for teaching of sociology.

The following table is an attempt at a classification of the various sociological courses offered by colleges and universities. It is designed to indicate the relative development and comparative importance of the various divisions of the sociological field, as well as to show the comparative amount of attention given to each of these subjects in the academic world. It is hoped that it may also serve as an index to the first part of the larger descriptive catalogue to follow. This descriptive catalogue will consist of all the announcements and descriptions of courses in sociology that it has been possible to collect. They will be

arranged in the usual way under the heads of (1) colleges for men and coeducational institutions, (2) colleges for women, (3) schools of technology, (4) divinity schools, and (5) normal schools. Of these various classes, the last two do not pretend to anything like completeness. It is hoped, however, that enough is given to be representative of the best treatment of sociology in these institutions.

CLASSIFIED LIST OF COURSES IN SOCIOLOGY, 1901.

I. SOCIAL GEOGRAPHY.

I*a*. *Physico-Social; the Environment.*

Environmental influence on man	Yale University, Conn.
Physical basis of industrial organization	University of Michigan.
Economic antecedents of society	Bryn Mawr College, Pa.

I*b*. *Racial Demography.*

(See also under II, "Social Statistics.")

Bio-geography	Lombard College, Ill.
Anthropological geography	Dartmouth College, N. H.
Racial demography	Columbia University, N. Y.
Race traits and distribution	University of Pennsylvania.
Demography, dispersion of races	Brown University, R. I.

Incidental treatment in Willamette University, Ore.

II. SOCIAL STATISTICS AND DEMOGRAPHY.

(See also I*b*, "Racial Demography.")

Statistics and sociology	Leland Stanford University, Calif.
Elementary statistics	Yale University, Conn.
Statistical study of the evolution of man	"
Special topics in social economics	Catholic University of Am., D. C.
Comparative statistics	Columbia University, D. C.
Moral and culture statistics	University of Chicago, Ill.
Social statistics	State University of Iowa.
Social statistics	University of Kansas.
Theory and practice of statistics	University of Michigan.
Social statistics	Dartmouth College, N. H.
Elementary statistics	Cornell University, N. Y.
Advanced statistics	"
Statistics and sociology	Columbia University, N. Y.
Theory of statistics	"
Laboratory work in statistics	"
Statistics, economic and sociological	Western Reserve University, O.
Sociology and statistics	Ohio State University.
Social statistics	Brown University, R. I.
Government statistics	University of Wisconsin.
Social statistics	"
Laboratory work	"

Incidental treatment in University of Indiana; Iowa College; Western College, Ia.; Harvard University, Mass.; University of Nebraska; Syracuse University, N. Y.; University of Wooster, O.; University of Oregon; University of Pennsylvania; Wells College, Mass.

II*a*. *Problems of Population, Race Problem, etc.*

Race problem	Leland Stanford University, Calif.
Race problem in the United States	Atlanta University, Ga.
Social problem in the South	"
Race problem	Roger Williams University, Tenn.
Negro and Indian problem	Hampden-Sidney College, Va.

II*b*. *Sociology of Colonization.*

Colonization, economic and social	Yale University, Conn.
Social conditions of the United States island populations	State University of Iowa.
Seminary on colonies and colonization	University of Nebraska.

III. SOCIOLOGY OF THE DOMESTIC GROUP.

Sociology of the family	Leland Stanford Univ., Calif.
Self-perpetuation of society	Yale University, Conn.
Sex in social organization	University of Chicago, Ill.
The family	"
Reproductive association	Lombard University, Ill.

Incidental treatment in University of Colorado; Trinity College, Wesleyan University, Conn.; Carthage College, Northwestern University, Ill.; Butler College, Ind.; Baker University, Kan.; Bates College, Me.; Woodstock College, Md.; Harvard University, Clark University, Mass.; University of Michigan; University of Minnesota; University of the State of Missouri; Alfred University, Cornell University, Columbia University, Union University, Syracuse University, N. Y.; University of North Dakota; Oberlin College, University of Wooster, O.; Williamette University, Ore.; University of Pennsylvania, Swarthmore College, Pa.; Brown University, R. I.; Rockford College, Ill.; Woman's College of Baltimore, Md.; Wellesley College, Wells College, Mass.

IV. SOCIOLOGY OF THE MUNICIPAL GROUP.

Municipal politics	Yale University, Conn.
Municipal economy	Columbian University, D. C.
American cities	University of Chicago, Ill.
Urban communities	"
Municipal sociology	"
Applied sociology	State University of Iowa.
History of English cities and towns	Tufts College, Mass.
Municipal government	Williams College, Mass.
Seminary on cities	University of Nebraska.
City and its problems	Heidelberg College, O.

Incidental treatment in University of California; University of Colorado, University of Denver, Col.; Wesleyan University, Conn.; Delaware College; Carthage College, Northwestern University, Ill.; University of Indiana, Butler College, Ind.;

Western College, Ia.; Johns Hopkins University, Md.; University of Michigan; University of the State of Missouri; Alfred University, Cornell University, Union University, N. Y.; Oberlin College, University of Wooster, O.; Willamette University, Ore.; University of Pennsylvania, Swarthmore College, Pa; Vanderbilt University, Tenn.; University of Washington; University of Wisconsin; Wells College, Mass.

V. SOCIOLOGY OF THE RURAL GROUP.

Rural communities - - - - - -	University of Chicago, Ill.

Incidental treatment in Trinity College, Conn.; University of Illinois; Iowa College; University of Michigan; Columbia University, N. Y.; University of Wooster, O.; University of Wisconsin.

VI. SOCIOLOGY OF THE NATIONAL GROUP.

VI*a*. *General Descriptive Treatment.*

Sociological conception of state and government - - - - - - - -	University of Chicago, Ill.
Contemporary society in the United States -	"
Structure of English society - - - -	"
Primitive social control - - - - -	"
American social life - - - - - -	Iowa College.
English social life - - - - - -	Tufts College, Mass.
Jewish social life - - - - - - -	Alma College, Mich.
Democracy in the United States - - -	Vanderbilt University, Tenn.
Modern state and its social function - -	Wilson College, O.

VI*b*. *Sphere of State Activity; the State and Industry; Socialism.*

NOTE.—Only those treatments of socialism are included in this schedule in which the point of view seems to be predominantly social, not economic.

Industrial policy - - - - - - -	Yale University, Conn.
Anarchism, socialism, and communism - -	"
Individualism, socialism, and practical social problems - - - - - - -	Columbian University, D. C.
American experience with state control - -	University of Chicago, Ill.
Sociology - - - - - - - -	Wheaton College, Ill.
Socialism and communism - - - -	University of Indiana.
Socialism, history and philosophy - - -	DePauw University, Ind.
Socialism - - - - - - - -	Butler College, Ind.
Modern socialism - - - - - - -	Boston University, Mass.
Socialism and social reform - - - - -	"
Private property rights - - - - - -	Princeton University, N. J.
Socialistic movements - - - - - -	Manhattan College, N. Y.
Socialism and social reform - - - - -	Syracuse University, N. Y.
History and theory of socialism - - -	Ohio State University.
Socialism and social reform - - - - -	Oberlin College, O.
Socialism - - - - - - - -	Otterbein University, O.
Socialism - - - - - - - -	Swarthmore College, Pa.
Socialism - - - - - - - -	Brown University, R. I.
Limit of state activity - - - - - -	Washington and Lee Univ., Va.

Socialism and social reform - - - -	Smith College, Mass.
Communistic and socialistic theories - -	Barnard College, N. Y.
Economic functions of the state - - -	University of Rochester, N. Y.

Incidental treatment in Leland Stanford University, Calif.; University of Colorado; John B. Stetson University, Fla.; Wabash College, DePauw University, Hanover College, Ind.; Coe College, Ia.; Baker University, Kan.; Johns Hopkins University, Md.; Harvard University, Mass.; University of Minnesota; University of the State of Missouri; University of Nebraska; Dartmouth College, N. H.; Princeton University, N. J.; Adelphi College, Syracuse University, N. Y.; Trinity College, Conn.; University of North Dakota; University of Cincinnati, O.; Wesleyan University; University of Oregon; University of Pennsylvania; Lehigh University, Pa.; Southwestern University, Tex.; Brigham Young College, Utah; University of Wisconsin; Woman's College of Baltimore, Md.; Wellesley College, Mass.

VI*c*. *Social Legislation.*

Social legislation - - - - - -	Leland Stanford University, Calif.
Social politics - - - - - -	Yale University, Conn.
Socialism and contemporary social legislation -	State University of Iowa.
Economic legislation - - - - -	West Virginia University.

Incidental treatment in the University of Pennsylvania and the University of Wisconsin.

VI*d*. *Democracy, Social Philosophy of.*

Modern democratic movement in United States and England - - - - - -	University of Chicago, Ill.
Modern democratic movement in France and Germany - - - - - -	"
Progress and democracy - - - -	Columbia University, N. Y.
Democracy - - - - - - - -	University of Oregon.
Democracy in the United States - - -	Vanderbilt University, Tenn.

For colonization see II*b* above.

VII. SOCIOLOGY OF THE DEPENDENT CLASSES; CHARITIES.

Charities - - - - - - - -	Leland Stanford University, Calif.
Causes of poverty - - - - - -	"
Charities and crime - - - - -	Colorado College
Social therapeutics - - - - -	Columbian University, D. C.
Problems of pauperism and crime - - -	University of Illinois.
Contemporary charities - - - - -	University of Chicago, Ill.
Philanthropy in its historical development -	"
Abnormal variations of the associative process	Lombard University, Ill.
Social pathology - - - - - -	University of Indiana.
Defectives, dependents, and delinquents - -	DePauw University, Ind.
Organized philanthropy - - - - -	Butler College, Ind.
Charities and corrections - - - - -	Coe College, Ia.
Charities and penology - - - - -	Iowa College.
American and European charities - - -	University of Kansas.
Social pathology - - - - - -	"

Public aid, charities, and corrections - -	Johns Hopkins University, Md.
Social pathology - - - - - -	University of Minnesota.
American charities - - - - -	University of State of Missouri.
Pauperism and charities - - - -	William Jewell College, Mo.
Charities - - - - - - - -	University of Nebraska.
Modern philanthropy - - - - -	Cornell University, N. Y.
Pauperism, poor laws, and charities - -	Columbia University, N. Y.
Degenerate social classes - - - -	Syracuse University, N. Y.
Dependent and defective classes - - -	University of Cincinnati, O.
Sociology (charities and philanthropy) - -	Ohio State University.
Social debtor class - - - - - -	University of Oregon.
Charities and reform - - - - -	Bucknell College, Pa.
Charities and corrections - - - -	University of Pennsylvania.
Social problems and conditions - - -	Brown University, R. I.
Contemporary charities - - - - -	West Virginia University.
Charities and corrections - - - -	University of Wisconsin.
Public and private charities - - - -	"
Charities organization - - - - -	"
Problems of poverty and crime - - -	Rockford College, Ill.
Economics and charities - - - -	Woman's College of Baltimore, Md.
Social pathology - - - - - -	"
Some problems of poverty - - - -	Smith College, Mass.
Dependent and delinquent classes - - -	Wellesley College, Mass.
Charities and corrections - - - -	Vassar College, N. Y.
Social economics (defective, dependent, and delinquent classes) - - - -	Converse College, O.

Incidental treatment in University of Colorado; Trinity College, Wesleyan University, Yale University Conn.; Carthage College, Northwestern University, Ill.; Cornell College, Tabor College, Ia.; Baker University, Kan.; Bates College, Colby College, Me.; University of Michigan; Nebraska Wesleyan University; Dartmouth College, N. H.; Union University, N. Y.; University of Wooster, O.; Pacific University, Ore.; Swarthmore College, Pa.; Southwestern University, Tex.; Wells College, Mass.

VIII. SOCIOLOGY OF THE DELINQUENT CLASSES; CRIMINOLOGY.

Criminology - - - - - - - -	Leland Stanford University, Calif.
Penology - - - - - - - -	"
Charities and crime - - - - -	Colorado College.
Problems of pauperism and crime - - -	University of Illinois.
Social treatment of crime - - - -	University of Chicago, Ill.
Abnormal variations in the associative process	Lombard University, Ill.
Social pathology - - - - - -	University of Indiana.
Defectives, dependents, and delinquents - -	DePauw University, Ind.
Charities and corrections - - - -	Coe College, Ia.
Charities and penology - - - - -	Iowa College.
Criminology and penology - - - -	University of Kansas.
Social pathology - - - - - -	"
Public aid, charities, and corrections - -	Johns Hopkins University, Md.

Social pathology	University of Minnesota.
Criminal sociology	University of State of Missouri.
Criminology	University of Nebraska.
Crime and penology	Columbia University, N. Y.
Degenerate social classes	Syracuse University, N. Y.
Criminology	University of Cincinnati, O.
Criminology	Ohio Wesleyan University.
Criminology	Oberlin College, O.
Social debtor class	University of Oregon.
Criminology and penology	Bucknell College, Pa.
Charities and corrections	University of Pennsylvania.
Criminal sociology	University of South Dakota.
Treatment of delinquents	West Virginia University.
Problems of poverty and crime	Rockford College, Ill.
Social pathology	Woman's College of Baltimore, Md.
Defective and delinquent classes	Wellesley College, Mass.
Charities and corrections	Vassar College, N. Y.

Incidental treatment in University of Colorado; Trinity College, Wesleyan University, Yale University, Conn.; Carthage College, Ill.; Tabor College, Ia.; Baker University, Kan.; Bates College, Colby College, Me.; Clark University, Mass.; University of Michigan; Dartmouth College, N. H.; Union University, N. Y.; Trinity College, N. C.; University of Wooster, O.; Pacific University, Willamette University, Ore.; Swarthmore College, Pa.

IX. SOCIOLOGY OF THE INDUSTRIAL GROUP; SOCIAL ECONOMICS.

(See also under VI.)

Economic condition of laborers	University of California.
Introduction to economics	"
Economic and social history	Pomona College, Calif.
Comparative condition of workingmen	Leland Stanford University, Calif.
Practical economic and sociological problems	Trinity College, Conn.
General labor problem	Wesleyan University, Conn.
Economic seminary	"
Beginnings of industrial organization	Yale University, Conn.
Labor systems	"
Economic systems of classical antiquity	"
Industrial combinations	"
Industrial policy	"
Special topics in social economics	Catholic Univ. of America, D. C.
Sociological aspects of mediæval guilds	Catholic Univ. of America, D. C.
Labor problem	University of Illinois.
The group of industrials	University of Chicago, Ill.
Economics of workingmen	"
Economic factor in civilization	"
Labor question in Europe and the United States	Northwestern University, Ill.
Economics	Wabash College, Ill.
Problems of labor and capital	Butler College, Ind.
Application of economic theory to social problems	Simpson College, Ia.

Industrial history and problems of labor - -	Iowa College.
Industrial revolution in its social aspects -	State University of Iowa.
Development of modern industry - - -	Bowdoin College, Me.
Social history of the United States - . - -	"
Labor problems - - - - - -	Johns Hopkins University, Md.
Social aspects of the labor question - -	Boston University, Mass.
Labor question - - - - - -	Harvard University, Mass.
Problems of industrial organization - -	"
Problems in political economy - - -	University of Michigan.
Social and industrial reform - - - -	"
Genesis of the industrial order - - -	Princeton University, N. J.
Development of industrialism - - -	"
Private property rights - - - - -	"
Practical economics - - - - -	Adelphi College, N. Y.
Elementary social economics - - - -	Cornell University, N. Y.
The modern régime - - - - -	"
Problems of modern industry - - - -	Columbia University, N. Y.
Special economic topics - - - - -	University of Rochester, N. Y.
Socialism and social reform - - - -	Syracuse University, N. Y.
Remedial measures - - - - -	University of Cincinnati, O.
History of industrial society - - - -	Ohio State University.
Practical problems - - - - - -	"
Economic problems - - - - -	University of Oregon.
Economic problems - - - - -	Haverford College, Pa.
Social economics - - - - - -	Central High School, Pa.
Elements of economics - - - - -	Swarthmore College, Pa.
Social economics - - - - - -	U. S. Grant University, Tenn.
Industrial problems - - - - -	University of Utah.
The industrial era - - - - - -	University of Vermont.
Industrial problems - - - - -	University of Washington.
Practical economic problems - - - -	West Virginia University,
Economic problems - - - - -	University of Wisconsin.
Economics and charities - - - -	Woman's College of Baltimore, Md.
Social and economic condition of workingmen	Radcliffe College, Mass.
Social economics - - - - - -	Wellesley College, Mass.
Modern labor problem - - - - -	"
Labor problem - - - - - -	Vassar College, N. Y.
Labor question in Europe and America - -	Oxford College, O.

Incidental treatment in University of Arizona; University of Southern California; University of Denver, Col.; Delaware College, Gallaudet College, Georgetown University, D. C.; John B. Stetson University, Fla.; University of Indiana; Coe College, Western College, Ia.; University of Kansas; Bates College, Colby College, Me.; Williams College, Mass.; Hope College, Mich.; University of Mississippi; William Jewell College, Mo.; University of Nebraska; Dartmouth College, N. H.; St. Lawrence University, New York University, University of Rochester, N. Y.; Davidson College, Trinity College, N. C.; University of North Dakota; University of Wooster, Antioch College, O.; Willamette University, Ore.; Dickinson College, University of Penn-

sylvania, Lehigh University, Pa.; Erskine College, S. C.; University of Tennessee, Vanderbilt University, Tenn.; Southwestern University, Tex.; Milton College, Wis.

X. SOCIAL REFORM. PRACTICAL SOCIOLOGY; SOCIAL PROBLEMS.

Modern social and sociological problems	Colorado College.
Practical economic and social problems	Trinity College, Conn.
Social science	Wesleyan University, Conn.
Practical sociology	Yale University, Conn.
American social conditions	"
Study of sociological problems	Illinois Wesleyan University.
Sociology	Carthage College, Ill.
Methods of social amelioration	University of Chicago, Ill.
Practical problems	Northwestern University, Ill.
Social questions	University of Indiana.
Practical sociology	DePauw University, Ind.
Questions of the day	Hanover College, Ind.
Sociology	Drake University, Ia.
Sociology	Parsons College, Ia.
Social reform (half-term)	Iowa College, Ia.
Applied sociology	State University of Iowa.
Sociology	Tabor College, Iowa.
Social problems	Kansas City University, Mo.
Sociology	Berea College, Ky.
Social history of the United States	Bowdoin College, Me.
Social science	Bates College, Me.
Sociology	Colby College, Me.
Methods of social reform	Boston University, Mass.
Socialism and social reform	"
Practical sociology	Tufts College, Mass.
Social and industrial reforms	University of Michigan.
Problems of sociology	"
Introduction to the study of sociology	Hillsdale College, Mich.
General sociology	Hamline University, Minn.
Sociology	Alfred University, N. Y.
Sociology	Adelphi College, N. Y.
Sociology	Saint Lawrence University, N. Y.
The modern régime	Cornell University, N. Y.
Theories of social reform	Columbia University, N. Y.
Practical sociology	Syracuse University, N. Y.
Current questions	University of North Carolina.
Practical sociology	Trinity College, N. C.
Remedial measures	University of Cincinnati, O.
Introduction to sociology	Hiram College, O.
Practical sociology	Oberlin College, O.
Socialism and social reform	"
Introduction to sociology	Pacific University, Ore.
Economic problems	Haverford College, Pa.
Sociology	Allegheny College, Pa.

Social reform in the nineteenth century	University of Pennsylvania.
Practical sociology	Susquehanna University, Pa.
Elements of sociology	Swarthmore College, Pa.
Methods of social reform	West Virginia University.
Social movements in the nineteenth century	"
Seminar in social problems	Lawrence University, Wis.
Sociology and social problems	Beloit College, Wis.
Social problems	University of Wyoming.
Some sociological problems	Smith College, Mass.
Socialism and social reform	"
Sociology	Wells College, Mass.
Theories of social reform	Barnard College, N. Y.
Elements of sociology	Randolph-Macon Wom. Col., Va.

Incidental treatment in Blackburn University, Ill.; Cornell College, Western College, Ia.; Midland College, University of Kansas, Kan.; University of Wooster, O.; Willamette University, Ore.; Roger Williams University, Tenn.; Southwestern University, Tex.; Converse College, O.

XI. GENETIC SOCIOLOGY; COMPARATIVE SOCIOLOGY.

(NOTE.—A genetic treatment of any special subject is put under that subject.)

Sociology	Pomona College, Calif.
Evolution of society	University of Colorado.
Evolution of society	Iowa College.
Development of society	Missouri Valley College, Mo.
Social history	Adelphi College, N. Y.
Evolution of society (seminar)	Cornell University, N. Y.
Theory of evolution	"
Social evolution	Columbia University, N. Y.
Sociology	Manhattan College, N. Y.
Introduction to sociology	New York University.
Principles of sociology	"
Sociology	Union University, N. Y.
Social institutions	Brown University, R. I.
Social science	Baylor University, Tex.
Social institutions	University of Vermont.
Theoretical sociology	Bryn Mawr College, Pa.

XI*a*. *Animal and Primitive Human Society*; *Anthropo-Sociology*.

Science of society	Yale University, Conn.
Social origins	University of Chicago, Ill.
Comparative study of association	Lombard University, Ill.
Development of association	"
Anthropology	Butler College, Ind.
Ethnology	Clark University, Mass.
Race psychology	University of the State of Missouri.
Race psychology	University of Nebraska.
Sociology in the light of anthropology	Western Reserve University, O.
Primitive society	Ohio State University.

Anthropology in relation to social science -	University of Oregon.
Sociology - - - - - - - -	Dickinson College, Pa.
Sociology - - - - - - - -	University of Pennsylvania.
American primitive society - - - -	Bryn Mawr College, Pa.

Incidental treatment in Trinity College, Wesleyan University, Conn.; University of Illinois, Northwestern University, Ill.; University of Indiana; University of Kansas; University of Michigan; University of Minnesota; Syracuse University, N. Y.; University of North Dakota; Oberlin College, O.; Willamette University, Ore.; West Virginia University.

XI*b*. *Development of Society in Historic Times*; *Social History.*

Social history of Greece - - - -	University of California.
Economic and social history of the English colonies in America - - - - - -	"
(Social history of) France under the Bourbons	"
Homeric society - - - - - - -	Yale University, Conn.
Sociological aspects of mediæval guilds - -	Catholic Univ. of America, D. C.
Development of association, continued -	Lombard University, Ill.
Social history - - - - - - -	Butler College, Ind.
Sociological interpretation of history - -	Washburn College, Kan.
English social history - - - - -	Manhattan College, N. Y.
Growth and development of social thought and institutions - - - - - -	Ohio State University.
Historic sociology - - - - - -	Central High School, Pa.
Social history of England - - - -	University of Pennsylvania.
Development of English civilization - -	"
Oriental social life - - - - - -	"
Social history (4 courses) - - - -	Wells College, Mass.

Incidental treatment in University of Southern California; University of Chicago, Ill.; University of Michigan; Saint Lawrence University, University of Rochester, N. Y.; University of North Dakota; University of Cincinnati, O.; University of Oregon; Central Pennsylvania College; University of Wisconsin.

XII. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY.

(See also under XX below, "General Sociology.")

Psychology in relation to sociology - -	University of Denver, Col.
The mental reactions - - - - - -	Yale University, Conn.
Public opinion - - - - - - -	University of Chicago, Ill.
Problems of social dynamics, seminar - -	"
Development of mind in the race - - -	"
Primitive social control - - - - -	"
Origin and psychology of the occupations -	"
Social psychology - - - - - - -	Northwestern University, Ill.
Social psychology - - - - - - -	University of Indiana.
Socialization and social control - - -	University of Kansas.
Psychological sociology - - - - -	University of Michigan.
Social psychology - - - - - - -	University of the State of Missouri.
Social psychology - - - - - - -	University of Nebraska.

Psychology of society	University of Nebraska.
Social psychology	Cornell University, N. Y.
Seminar in sociology (the social mind)	Columbia University, N. Y.
Social psychology	Western Reserve University, O.
Sociology	Dickinson College, Pa.
The psychological sociologist	University of Wisconsin.

Incidental treatment in University of Colorado; Butler College, Ind.; Iowa College, Tabor College, Ia.; Tufts College, Clark University, Mass.; Dartmouth College, N. H.; Princeton University, N. J.; Syracuse University, N. Y.; Ohio Wesleyan University; Ursinus College, University of Pennsylvania, Swarthmore College, Pa.; Brown University, R. I.; University of Utah.

XIII. SOCIAL ETHICS.

Applied ethics	University of Colorado.
Seminary in social ethics	Colorado College.
Ethical and social ideals in English poetry	Yale University, Conn.
Practical ethics	University of Illinois.
Political ethics	"
Sociology of ethics	University of Chicago, Ill.
History of political ethics	"
Ethics of sociology	"
Problems of social teleology	"
Practical ethics	Northwestern University, Ill.
Social duties	University of Notre Dame, Ind.
Ethics and sociology	Amherst College, Mass.
Special ethics	Boston College, Mass.
Science of social relationships	Boston University, Mass.
Ethics of the social question	Harvard University, Mass.
Practical ethics	Tufts College, Mass.
Special ethics	College of Holy Cross, Mass.
Applied ethics	Cornell University, N. Y.
Social welfare (in seminar)	Columbia University, N. Y.
Practical ethics	"
Ethics	Haverford College, Pa.
Social ethics	Central High School, Pa.
Applied ethics	West Virginia University.
Problems in applied ethics	University of Wisconsin.
Social ethics	"
Applied ethics	Rockford College, Ill.

Incidental treatment in University of California, Leland Stanford University, Calif.; University of Denver, Col.; Gallaudet College, Georgetown University, D. C.; Rollins College, Fla.; St. Viateur's College, Carthage College, Ill.; Butler College, Ind.; Iowa College; Campbell University, Kan.; Johns Hopkins University, Woodstock College, Md.; University of Michigan; Carlton College, Minn.; University of Mississippi; Dartmouth College, N. H.; Alfred University, Manhattan College, Union College, N. Y.; Trinity College, N. C.; Buchtel College, University of Cincinnati, Western Reserve University, Denison University, University of Wooster, O.; Moraivan College, Franklin and Marshall College, Allegheny College, Central Pennsyl-

vania College, University of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State College, Villanova College, Pa.; Brown University, R. I.; Southwestern University, Tex.; Brigham Young College, Utah; University of Utah; University of Washington; Milton College, Wis.

XIV. SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY.

Theories of social progress	University of California.
Social philosophy	Yale University, Conn.
Philosophical anthropology	"
Sociology	Wesleyan University, Conn.
The social sciences	Catholic Univ. of America, D. C.
Sociological conception of society	University of Chicago, Ill.
Outline of general sociology	"
Premises of general sociology	"
Synopsis of sociological theory	"
Elements of social dynamics	"
Social philosophy	Northwestern University, Ill.
Types of sociological theory	Lombard University, Ill.
General sociology	University of Indiana.
Sociology, principles and theories	DePauw University, Ind.
Sociology	University of Notre Dame, Ind.
Sociology and political philosophy	State University of Iowa.
Social theories and social problems	University of Kansas.
Theories of social progress	Bowdoin College, Me.
Social philosophy	Boston University, Mass.
Theories of social progress	Harvard University, Mass.
Political philosophy	University of Michigan.
Social theory	University of Minnesota.
Constructive sociology	Dartmouth College, N. H.
Principles of sociology	Columbia University, N. Y.
Introduction to social theory	Syracuse University, N. Y.
Literature of sociology	"
Philosophy of society	Western Reserve University, O.
Growth and development of social thought	Ohio State University.
Sociology	Ohio Wesleyan University.
Principles of sociology and theory of social forces	University of Oregon.
Sociology	University of Pennsylvania.
Social philosophy	Brown University, R. I.
Social theories	University of Vermont.
Elements of sociology	Washington and Lee Univ., Va.
Elements of sociology	West Virginia University.
Social philosophy	University of Wyoming.
Sociology	Woman's Coll. of Baltimore, Md.
Theories of social progress	Radcliffe College, Mass.
Social philosophy	Wellesley College, Mass.
Sociology	Wells College, Mass.

Incidental treatment in Kansas City University; Colby College, Me.; Woodstock College, Md.; College of Holy Cross, Mass.; University of the State of Missouri;

Williams Jewell College, Mo.; University of Wooster, O.; Willamette University, Ore.; Susquehanna University, Pa.; U. S. Grant University, Tenn.

XIV*a*. *History of Social Theory.*

History of sociology	John B. Stetson University, Fla.
Introduction to sociology	University of Chicago, Ill.
Social philosophy of English people in Victorian era	"
Pre-Comtean sociology	Lombard University, Ill.
"	"
Modern sociological theory	"
Development of social philosophy	Butler College, Ind.
Contemporary social philosophy	"
Sociology (½ course)	Iowa College.
Historical development of sociological thought	University of Michigan.
History of social philosophy	University of State of Missouri.
History of social theory	Princeton University, N. J.
Development of social theory	Brown University, R. I.
Current social theory	"
Historical survey of sociological thought	West Virginia University.
Modern sociological thought	University of Wisconsin.

Incidental treatment in Johns Hopkins University, Md.

XV. METHODOLOGY AND CLASSIFICATION.

The social sciences	Catholic University of America.
Seminar, sociological method	"
Methodology of the social problem	University of Chicago, Ill.
Problems in methodology (seminar)	"
Development of sociological method	"

Incidental treatment in Baker University, Kan.; University of Michigan; Columbia University, N. Y.; University of Pennsylvania.

XVI. SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION.

Psychology and pedagogy of religion	Leland Stanford University, Calif.
Social teaching and influence of Christianity	Yale University, Conn.
Social institutions of organized Christianity	University of Chicago, Ill.
Sociology of religion	Lombard University, Ill.
Social mission of the church	Boston University, Mass.
Seminary; Christian doctrine of the social order	Harvard University, Mass.
Applied Christianity	Tufts College, Mass.
The psychology of Jesus	Clark University, Mass.
Sociology of religion	University of the State of Missouri.
Civil aspects of ecclesiastical organization	Columbia University, N. Y.
Christian sociology	Heidelberg University, O.
Christian sociology	Franklin and Marshall College, Pa.
Christian ethics	"
Sociology from Christian point of view	Bucknell College, Pa.
Christian sociology	Vanderbilt University, Tenn.

Christian sociology - - - - - -	University of the South, Tenn.
Parochial organization and the institutional church - - - - - - - -	"
Social influences of Christianity - - -	Wells College, Mass.
Sociology - - - - - - - - -	Wilson College, Pa.

Incidental treatment in University of California; Butler College, Ind.; Iowa College; College of the Holy Cross, Mass.; University of Michigan; Davidson College, N. C.; University of Wooster, O.; University of Pennsylvania, Swarthmore College, Villanova College, Pa.; University of Tennessee; Southwestern University, Tex.; Milton College, Wis.

XVII. SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION.

Education and society - - - - - -	Leland Stanford University, Calif.
Education as a social function - - -	University of Chicago, Ill.
Principles of education - - - - - -	Clark University, Mass.
Social phases of education - - - -	University of Michigan.
Sociology in relation to education - - -	New York University.
Social phases of education - - - -	Syracuse University, N. Y.

Incidental treatment in University of Arizona; University of Denver, Col.; Wesleyan University, Conn.; University of Illinois, Northwestern University, Ill.; Iowa College; University of Nebraska; Dartmouth College, N. H.; Alfred University, Cornell University, Columbia University, N. Y.; University of Oregon; University of Wooster, O.; University of Pennsylvania; Brown University, R. I.; Southwestern University, Tex.; University of Washington; Woman's College of Baltimore, Md.; Mount Holyoke College, Wellesley College, Mass.

XVIII. SOCIOLOGY OF ART AND AMUSEMENT.

Art and the artist class - - - - - -	University of Chicago, Ill.
Social forces in English romanticism - -	Butler College, Ind.
Social interpretation of art - - - - -	Cornell University, N. Y.
Industrial and artistic evolution of society -	Ohio State University.

Incidental treatment in Columbian University, D. C.; University of Michigan; University of Minnesota; Dartmouth College, N. H.; Trinity College, N. C.; University of Pennsylvania.

XIX. FIELD WORK.

Field work in connection with seminar on social amelioration - - - - -	University of Chicago, Ill.
Field work in the study of social problems -	Simpson College, Ia.
Laboratory work in statistics - - - - -	Cornell University, N. Y.
Laboratory work in statistics - - - - -	Columbia University, N. Y.
Field work - - - - - - - - -	University of Wisconsin.
Field work - - - - - - - - -	Barnard College, N. Y.

Incidental field work required in Leland Stanford University, Calif.; Wesleyan University, Conn.; Butler College, Ind.; Iowa College; Tufts College, Mass; Hamline University, Minn.; Union University, N. Y.; Swarthmore College, Pa.; Brown University, R. I.; West Virginia University.

XX. GENERAL SOCIOLOGY; DESCRIPTIVE SOCIOLOGY.

XX*a*. *General Elementary Courses.*

Introduction to sociology - - - - -	Ouachita College, Ark.
Introduction to sociology - - - - -	Hendrix College, Ark.

Outlines of sociology	University of Colorado.
Sociology	Trinity College, Conn.
Elements of sociology	Catholic. Univ. of America, D. C.
Principles of sociology	Columbian University, D. C.
Introduction to the study of society	John B. Stetson University, Fla.
Social elements	"
Sociology	Rollins College, Fla.
Electives (subjects not specified)	"
Principles of sociology	Atlanta University, Ga.
Elementary study of social principles	Illinois Wesleyan University.
Principles of sociology	"
General sociology	Blackburn University, Ill.
Elementary sociology	University of Illinois.
Introduction to the study of society	University of Chicago, Ill.
Elements and structure of society	"
Sociology	Eureka College, Ill.
Sociology	Illinois College.
Genesis and structure of society	Northwestern College, Ill.
Elementary sociology	Shurtleff College, Ill.
Sociology	Wheaton College, Ill.
General sociology	University of Indiana.
Sociology	Hanover College, Ind.
General sociology	Butler College, Ind.
Elements of sociology	University of Notre Dame, Ind.
Social science	Coe College, Ia.
Sociology	Cornell College, Ia.
Sociology	Western College, Ia.
Sociology	Baker University, Kan.
Social science	"
Sociology	Campbell University, Kan.
Elements of sociology	University of Kansas.
Sociology	Washburn College, Kan.
Sociology	Center College of Kentucky.
Sociology	Woodstock College, Md.
Elements of social science	Boston University, Mass.
Sociology	Williams College, Mass.
Principles of sociology	Alma College, Mich.
Principles of sociology	University of Michigan.
Sociology	Kalamazoo College, Mich.
Elements of sociology	University of Minnesota.
Sociology	Carleton College, Minn.
Lectures on sociology (12)	Christian University, Mo.
Elementary sociology	University of State of Missouri.
Sociology	LaGrange College, Mo.
Descriptive sociology	Missouri Valley College.
Sociology	Grand Island College, Neb.
Sociology	University of Nebraska.
Elements of sociology	Nebraska Wesleyan University.

Sociology	Polytechnic In. of Brooklyn, N. Y.
Sociology	St. Lawrence University, N. Y.
Principles of sociology	New York University.
History and principles of political economy and sociology	University of North Carolina.
Principles of sociology	Trinity College, N. C.
Sociology	University of North Dakota.
Sociology	Buchtel College, O.
Sociology	Ohio University.
Introduction to sociology	Cedarville College, O.
Sociology	Ohio State University.
Introduction to sociology	Marietta College, O.
Sociology	Oberlin College, O.
Sociology	Wittenberg College, O.
Sociology	Heidelberg University, O.
Sociology	Wilmington College, O.
Sociology	University of Wooster, O.
Sociology	Antioch College, O.
Elements of sociology	University of Oregon.
Sociology	McMinnville College, Ore.
Sociology	Dickinson College, Pa.
General sociology	Franklin and Marshall College, Pa.
Sociology, principles and theories	Bucknell College, Pa.
Sociology	Central Pennsylvania College.
Elementary sociology	Brown University, R. I.
Principles of sociology	"
General sociology	College of Charleston, S. C.
Theory of sociology	University of South Dakota.
Elements of sociology	Yankton College, S. D.
Principles of sociology	University of Tennessee.
Elements of sociology	Cumberland University, Tenn.
Sociology	Roger Williams University, Tenn.
Introduction to sociology	Vanderbilt University, Tenn.
Principles of sociology	University of the South.
Sociology	Roanoke College, Va.
Elements of sociology	West Virginia University.
Sociology	Lawrence University, Wis.
Sociology and social problems	Beloit College, Wis.
Elements of sociology	University of Wisconsin.
Principles of sociology	University of Wyoming.
Principles of sociology	Smith College, Mass.
Principles of sociology	Mount Holyoke College, Mass.
Introduction to general sociology	Wellesley College, Mass.
Outlines of sociology	Elmira College, N. Y.
Principles of sociology	Barnard College, N. Y.
Outlines of sociology	Albert Lea College, Minn.
Sociology	Oxford College, O.

XX*b*. *Advanced Courses in General Sociology.*

Thesis and seminary work - - - -	Leland Stanford University, Calif.
Seminary - - - - - - - -	Wesleyan University, Conn.
Premises of general sociology - - -	University of Chicago, Ill.
Outline of general sociology - - - -	"
Seminary - - - - - - - -	Northwestern University, Ill.
Chief types of association - - - -	Lombard University, Ill.
Seminar in general sociology - - - -	University of Indiana.
Seminar in economics and sociology - -	Tufts College, Mass.
Special work with graduate students - -	University of Michigan.
Advanced sociology - - - - - -	University of the State of Missouri.
Seminary - - - - - - - -	"
Research - - - - - - - -	Syracuse University, N. Y.
Advanced sociology, theoretical or practical -	Ohio State University.
Thesis work - - - - - - - -	"
Seminary in sociology - - - - -	University of Wisconsin.

CATALOGUE OF COURSES IN SOCIOLOGY.

ARIZONA— UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA.

Sociology is taught incidentally in connection with the work in history, political science, and pedagogy. It is probable that courses in sociology will be offered as soon as the number of students demands it. Professor Adams.

ARKANSAS— OUACHITA MALE AND FEMALE COLLEGE.

No sociology taught until 1901. Nothing taught now except Small and Vincent's *Introduction to the Study of Society*. Three hours a week for five months. Twenty-five students. Professor Carter.

HENDRIX COLLEGE.

Just an introductory course of three months, three times a week. Professor Reynolds.

CALIFORNIA— UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.

HISTORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE.

51. Introduction to economics. Assistant Professor Page and Mr. Hutchinson. A study of the elementary laws of economics as illustrated in the growth of industry and commerce; the influence of economic conditions on social and political development. Three hours, either half-year.

61. Social and constitutional history of Greece. Dr. Ferguson. A consideration of the Greek intelligence as it is manifested in institutions, with special relation to its contributions to western civilization. Three hours, first half-year.

73. The United States under the constitution, 1783–1850. Dr. Wakeman. With special emphasis on the constitutional and social development. Three hours, second half-year.

74. Local government and administration, with special reference to municipal problems. Assistant Professor Babcock. Three hours, first half-year.

75. Economic and social history of the English colonies in America, 1607–1776. Assistant Professor Page. Two hours, first half-year.

85. France under the Bourbons. Professor Bacon. A study of the social and

political condition of France from the accession of Henry IV. to the fall of the monarchy. Two hours, second half-year.

88. Theories of social progress. Professor Moses. A critical examination of the theories hitherto offered to explain the forces, methods, and aims of social progress. Two hours, first half-year.

94. History of eastern Christendom. Professor Bacon. A critical study of the political, social, and religious institutions of the eastern Christian nations. Two hours, throughout the year.

98. Economic condition of laborers in England. Professor Moses. A historical and critical view of trade unions, economic legislation, and industrial progress, and their effects on the welfare of laborers. Two hours, first half-year.

POMONA COLLEGE.

ECONOMICS.

2. Sociology. The development of society, its functions, institutions, and forces at work. Forty-eight hours.

3. Economic and social history. A study of a few of the economic and social problems of the day, an attempt to trace their history, and a discussion of their treatment. Forty-eight hours.

LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY.

ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY.

6. Socialism. Readings from the socialists and critical examinations of their proposals. Meaning and limits of the modern extension of the state activities. Two hours, second semester. Professor Aldrich.

8. Comparative condition of workingmen. Descriptive and statistical study of the social condition of workingmen in England, France, Germany, Australia, and more especially in the United States. Critical examination, in the light of experience and of economic theory, of the various attempts to improve the condition of workingmen. Workingmen's insurance and the trade-union movement in the United States receive special attention. Three hours, both semesters. Professor Aldrich.

14. The sociology of the family. The historical development and conditions of the modern family. Lectures, one required paper, and assigned reading. Two hours, first semester. Professor M. R. Smith.

15. Race problems. A historical, sociological, and statistical study of the negro, Indian, and Chinese elements in the population. Lectures, assigned reading, and reports. Two hours, second semester. Professor M. R. Smith.

16. Statistics and sociology. Vital and social statistics, with special reference to method. Lectures, demonstrations, charting, and handling of statistics by students. Not open to first-year students. Two hours, second semester. Professor M. R. Smith.

17. Causes of poverty. A study of abnormal conditions, the social causes and effects of degeneration, vice, and pauperism. Lectures, assigned reading, and reports. Open to students who have had nine hours' work in the department. (Alternate with Course 19.) Three hours, first semester. Professor M. R. Smith.

18. Charities. Supplementary to Course 17. Lectures and assigned reading. Visits to the charitable institutions of the state by the class, and a detailed study of one institution by each student. Open to students who have had twelve hours in the

department, including Course 17. (Alternate with Course 20.) Three hours, second semester. Professor M. R. Smith.

19. Criminology. The anthropology of the criminal, and the causes and conditions of crime. Lectures and assigned reading. Open to students who have had nine hours' work in the department. (Alternate with Course 17.) Three hours, first semester. Professor M. R. Smith.

30. Penology. Supplementary to Course 19. Methods of treating criminals; police, police stations and courts, county jails, state prisons, penitentiaries, and reformatories. Lectures, reading, visitation and study of penal institutions. Open to students who have had twelve hours in the department, including Course 19. (Alternate with Course 18.) Three hours, second semester. Professor M. R. Smith.

Social legislation.

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA.

HISTORY AND ECONOMICS.

DR. HOOSE.

Point of view of the courses in history: History is an account of ideas and institutions in movement, rather than an account of personalities and events. Ideas are thoughtful experience embodied in definitions or in documents; they change in form and content as experience varies under different conditions. Personalities are the agents who exploit ideas. Events are reactions among ideas and personalities. Institutions are ideas formulated in practice to serve the purposes of human being. Civilization is the sum total of ideas and institutions which exist at any given period of time upon any given portion of the earth—*i. e.*, civilization is the evolution of ideas and institutions.

Point of view of the course in economics: The science of economics inquires into the sources and nature of wealth, and the relations which it sustains to individual, social, civil, and national well-being. This science investigates the principles and laws that are evolved by industrial, commercial, and social conditions. Political economy discusses the inventions and forms which human energies put forth to subordinate and utilize the forces of nature in order that they may see the needs, comforts, and luxuries of society.

VI. Seminary of political and social science. (Round table.) This course purposes to discuss special problems that measure civil, political, and sociological conditions—problems which arise out of movements and reactions among the elements of civilization. Elective for those college students who are prepared to enter upon the course. One hour, throughout the year.

COLORADO— UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO.

DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION.

PROFESSOR DR. CHARLES E. CHADSEY.

16. Evolution of society. One semester, two hours. Application of theory of evolution to society. A study of the conditions that have made modern institutions possible. The causal idea in history. The family. Primitive law. Evolution of political institutions.

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY.

PROFESSOR DR. JAMES M. WILSON.

7, 8. Applied ethics. One year, one hour.

Discussions and supplementary lectures. Two courses given in alternate year.

I. Kidd, *Social Evolution;* Lecky, *History of European Morals;* Warner, *American Charities.*

II. Wright, *Practical Sociology;* Hoffmann, *American Negro;* Wine, *Punishment and Reformation.*

The problems of social morality, charities, criminology, good citizenship, socialism, etc.

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE.

Outlines of sociology. One semester, three hours. Lectures, reading, discussion. The course aims to present a brief outline of sociological thought; a discussion of the elements of association underlying social relations and institutions; the results of race, group, and individual competition; the conditions of progress; some of the chief problems of sociology — population, degeneration, pauperism, dependent classes, crime, immigration, divorce, great cities, education. Elective, senior year.

COLORADO COLLEGE.

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY.

PRESIDENT SLOCUM.

Ethical seminary, one hour. (*a*) Modern social and sociological problems.

Seminary in social ethics. The labor question, temperance, pauperism, and other social problems considered from the ethical standpoint. Second half-year, one hour.

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS.

PROFESSOR URDAHL.

B. Charities and crime. The theory and history of charity and reformatory work. Students are encouraged to study the charitable and correctional institutions in the vicinity of their own homes. If possible, additional lectures by men who have devoted special attention to some phase of these subjects. (Warner, *American Charities.*)

D. Socialism.

E. Economic colonial policy.

UNIVERSITY OF DENVER.

DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY.

B. Psychology in relation to sociology, ethics, and the sciences. This course treats instinct, impulse, pain and pleasure, and the social mind as factors in social and ethical development; also the biological foundation of psychology. Thirty-six hours.

ILIFF SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY.

(1900) Church polity and sociology. Forty-eight hours.

CONNECTICUT— TRINITY COLLEGE.

ECONOMICS.

PROFESSOR FERGUSON AND MR. WATKINS.

Ec. 3 (VI). Elective for seniors in 1900–1901. Practical economic and social problems: immigration; legislative treatment of certain moral problems; relation between labor and capital; control of natural and capitalistic monopolies; crime and pauperism; discussion of criticisms of the present economic and social order. The work will be based upon Wright's *Outline of Practical Sociology,* but will include much supplementary reading. Reports upon reading and two written theses will be required.

Ec. 3a (VI). Elective for seniors in 1901–2. Sociology: The purpose and scope of the study. The nature of society. The races of men. The Lamarckian and Weismann theories of heredity. Social effects of charity and modern sanitation. Progress by selection and by imitation. History of institutions. Some notable individual theories of social evolution. Four written theses will be required.

WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY.

ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCE.

PROFESSOR FISHER.

V. The general labor problem. A course of lectures on the nature, causes, and justification of the present social discontent, and on such suggested remedies as moral elevation, charity, education, provident institutions, labor organizations, strikes, conciliation and arbitration, labor legislation, improved wage systems, profit-sharing, co-operation, nationalization of the land, socialism, communism, anarchism.

Course V is elective for those who have taken Course I. Courses IV and V are given in alternate years, Course IV being omitted the present year.

VI. Sociology. A discussion of the fundamental principles of social organization, and the conditions and forms of social progress.

Course VI is elective for those who take, or have taken, Course I.

[VII. Social science. An examination of certain concrete social problems of the present: pauperism and charity; the defective and criminal classes. The classroom work is supplemented by visits to several of the charitable, penal, and reformatory institutions in and about Middletown. Twice a week.]

Course VII is elective for those who take, or have taken, Course I. Courses VI and VII are given in alternate years, Course VII being omitted the present year.

*VIII. Economic seminary. Each member of the seminary takes for private individual investigation, under the direction of the instructor, some problem in economics, finance, statistics, or social science, and week by week reports in class on progress made and obstacles met. At the close of the year the work is brought together in a final report or thesis.

Course VIII is elective, with the permission of the instructor, for those who, having received first or second grade in Course I, take any three of the Courses III–VII.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

THE SOCIAL SCIENCES.

PROFESSOR SUMNER.

2. The self-perpetuation of society (sec. 2 of systematic societology). A historical and ethnological study of the evolution of the marriage institution; *mores*, taboo, idealization. The family; its forms, parenthood, kinship, status of woman. Comparative legislation on domestic relations. Population. The history, law, and policy of population. Seventy-two hours.

The mental reactions (sec. 4a of systematic societology). An ethnological study of the development of the mental processes and of the mental outfit of the human race in the earlier stages. Ghost-fear, daimonism, otherworldliness, knowledge and pseudo-knowledge, the aleatory element, world-philosophy, *mores*, codes, taboo, therapeutics, etc. Seventy-two hours.

4. The beginnings of the industrial organization. An ethnological study of the industrial organization from its earliest beginnings. Division of labor between the

sexes, and the special functions of each; regulation of industry; slavery; formation of capital; discoveries and inventions; domestication of animals and plants; money, etc. Seventy-two hours.

5. The science of society. An elementary course, with text-book lessons and examination in anthropology and ethnology, with the origin of civilization, and the development of institutions. In connection with this there will be a course of lectures on systematic sociology (societology). Topics are: the organization of society; the individual and the social; social forces; militarism and industrialism; property; family and the status of women; primitive notions in religion and philosophy; civil government; law and rights; slavery and classes; economic interests and their collisions; conditions of welfare; origin of moral standards; reaction of reason on experience. These topics are treated exclusively in the light of historical anthropology and ethnology.

6. The science of society. A course based on Lippert's *Kulturgeschichte.* Seventy-two hours.

DR. NORTON.

6a. Statistical study of the evolution of man. Statistical methods for handling the data of the somatic evolution of man. Special references will be made to the problems under variation, heredity, panmixia, regression, selection, and prepotency, with some passing notice of the practical applications in life insurance. Concrete cases will be studied at every point to illustrate the general principles. The methods of Pierson and Yale, and to a less extent of Galton, will be discussed. Seventy-two hours.

PROFESSOR FARNAM.

8. Social politics. A critical and historical study of legislation designed to better the conditions of the weaker members of society, considered in its relation to self-help and voluntary activity. Seventy-two hours.

9. The modern organization of labor. These lectures treat of the historical antecedents and the development during the nineteenth century of associations of the wage-receivers. They therefore include an account of the structure, aims, and methods of such societies in different countries, together with a discussion of their relations to socialism, the factory system, labor disputes, labor legislation, workingmen's insurance, provision for the unemployed, and other features of the industrial world. Forty-six hours.

DR. W. B. BAILEY.

23. Elementary statistics. The sources and reliability of statistical data are discussed and the methods of distinguishing true and false inferences are pointed out. Index numbers are studied, and the lectures treat of the statistics of population, crime, suicide, property, etc. The attempt is made to determine the laws which govern the group-actions of men. Seventy-two hours.

24. American social conditions. A critical study of the principal phenomena which are characteristic of American society. The course will deal with the problems connected with the negro, concentration of population in cities, with the attendant dangers, immigration, poor-relief, labor organizations, liquor question, etc. Seventy-two hours.

25. Labor systems. The various theories concerning the payment of labor, the conflicts between capital and labor, strikes, lock-outs, co-operation, compulsory insurance, and the various plans for the amelioration of the workingman. Each

member of the class will make a special investigation of an assigned topic. Thirty-six hours.

26. The economic systems of classical antiquity. A critical study is made of the political and social institutions of Greece and Rome. The lectures treat of the income land expenditure of the state, the currency, credit instruments, poor-relief, slavery and tenure, commerce, trade regulations, marriage institutions, etc. Thirty-six hours.,

MR. ROBINSON.

28. Municipal politics. A study of the organization of the modern municipality its practical workings and its problems; its relation to the state, to the individual, and to industrial activity. In connection with the general treatment of the subject a special study will be made of the organization, administration, and working of typical municipalities, both American and European. Seventy-two hours.

29. Industrial combinations. A study of the modern tendency toward the concentration of interests in trade, transportation, and industry; the forms of industrial organization; the relation of aggregated capital to investors, wage-earners, competitors, and consumers; the various plans for regulating and controlling capitalistic monopolies. Lectures, readings, and the preparation of theses on the development of characteristic combinations. Seventy-two hours.

29a. Industrial policy. A historical and critical study of the state in its relation to industrial activity. The experience of modern states in the regulation, control, and operation of industry, together with an investigation of the results of municipal ownership of public utilities. Seventy-two hours.

DR. BLACKMAN.

30. Social philosophy. The principal sociological writers are classified in "schools," and their points of view and methods are compared and contrasted; (*a*) contractual (Rousseau); (*b*) positivist (Comte); (*c*) evolutionary (Herbert Spencer, Drummond); (*d*) biological (Schäffle, Worms); (*e*) psychological (Tarde, Le Bon, Simmel, Giddings, Baldwin, Izoulet); (*f*) group-wise, observational statistical (Gumplowicz, Le Play, Quetelet); (*g*) theocratic (Old Testament); (*h*) Christian. Thirty-six hours.

30a. Practical sociology. This course includes the following topics: the four fundamental and perduring social institutions — family, church, state, and property; the negro; the immigrant; the city; the wage and factory system; and the defective, dependentvivious, and criminal classes (charities and corrections). The lectures are supplemented, and book reviews by the students. A visit of two or three days to the charity and correctional institutions of New York, for which careful preparation is made in advance, and which furnishes topics and illustrations for subsequent discussions in the class-room, will probably be made, as heretofore. Seventy-two hours.

30b. Anarchism, socialism, and communism. This course is a study of definitions, historical developments, principles, and programs. Books, pamphlets, manifestoes, and party platforms are read, as far as possible in the original language, and reported upon for the discussion before the class. Special attention will be paid to anarchism this year. Thirty-six hours.

30c. Social ideals in modern English poetry. Dowden's *French Revolution and English Literature* and Scudder's *Social Ideals in English Letters* will be read as text-books, and portions of Coleridge, Wordsworth, Shelley, Byron, Burns, Tennyson, Browning, Lowell, and Whitman will be read and discussed. Thirty-six hours.

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR GREGORY AND DR. KELLOR.

31. Environmental influence on man. First term (Dr. Gregory): the relation of man to nature; a study of topography, climate, distribution and character of fauna, flora, building material, etc., as factors which influence man's physical development and manner of life. Second term (Dr. Kellor): social environment, including the interrelation of primitive and early societies, and of societies unequally advanced in civilization. Especial attention will be given to the contact of civilized with uncivilized races consequent to national expansion and colonization. Seventy-two hours.

33. Colonization (economic and social). The economic and social questions of colonization. A preliminary sketch of ancient and mediæval expansion and colonization, followed by a close study of the experiences of the various modern colonizing states. Investigation based on German and French sources is required, and ability to read Spanish or Dutch will be of advantage. Seventy-two hours.

YALE DIVINITY SCHOOL.

DEPARTMENT OF CHRISTIAN SOCIOLOGY.

DR. BAILEY.

Practical sociology. A critical study of the principal social phenomena that are characteristic of American society. The problems connected with the negro, the concentration of population in cities, with the attendant dangers, immigration, organizations for charity and the relief of the poor, the liquor question, and kindred themes will be presented in lectures. Considerable attention will be given to the institutions for the punishment of crime and the reformation of criminals. Wright's *Practical Sociology* and additional books of reference. Seventy-two hours.

ALL CLASSES.

"The Lyman Beecher Course for 1901," by Rev. Dr. Gladden, will discuss special problems connected with the relation of the pulpit to present social conditions.

Further needs of students in this department are met by the courses of the Graduate School.

PRACTICAL WORK.

A number of general scholarships, averaging $100 a year, are given to students engaged in practical religious and social work in the city. The supervision of this work is in charge of the director of religious work, a recent graduate employed solely for this purpose.

New Haven, with its population of 120,000, offers a large and varied clinical field. It contains seventeen Congregational churches and strong churches of all denominations. The mission field includes the well-organized city missions, Wellcome Hall Mission, with its institutional features; Lowell House Settlement, in the midst of a large foreign population; the New Haven Hospital, where six students are used as chaplains; the jail, where work is done for discharged men in connection with the Calvary Industrial Home; the almshouse, clubs for street boys and workingmen, and the large city Y. M. C. A. This system affords excellent opportunity for actual experience in dealing with social problems, and is supplemented by a visit of two or three days to the charitable and correctional institutions of New York under Dr. Bailey's direction.

YALE LAW SCHOOL.

Group 1¼. The organization and working of human society.

1¼. Sociology: the self-perpetuation of society; evolution of domestic relations. Professor Sumner.

2. Systematic sociology. Professor Sumner.
3. Physical geography in its relation to history. Professor Brewer.
4. Mediæval institutions. Professor G. B. Adams.
5. Social politics. Professor Farnam.
6. Commercial policy. Professor Emery.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA—
THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA—SCHOOL OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES.

In the university the departments of sociology, economics, and politics have been grouped into the School of Social Sciences, the better to enable the candidates for the doctorate to grasp the general principles underlying all social phenomena, and to form thereby a juster appreciation of the laws of the particular science to which he devotes himself. This end is obtained by such an arrangement of the courses as will enable the student to make the best possible co-ordination of the sciences taught in this school with each other and with the allied science of law as taught in the School of Law.

This grouping renders it easier to make such a co-ordination of courses as will offer the greatest advantages to students taking work in the other schools of the university, and who desire, at the same time, to secure a good grasp of the general principles of the social sciences.

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY.

REV. DR. WILLIAM J. KERBY.

At present the work in sociology is largely introductory. While the science is in the formative stage, and is the occasion of much controversy, it seems best to give to the student clear fundamental ideas and exact preparatory knowledge. It is hoped that this method will develop powers of accurate observation and classification, and that it will generate a correct sociological sense. Sociological theory is studied historically rather than critically. The lectures and research work are conducted in a way to reach questions of social organization and life, social history and social problems. To preserve the useful character of the work, principles will not be studied without careful and detailed application to social conditions, normal and abnormal; and to preserve the scientific character of the courses, no sociological research, no study of social problems, will be undertaken, without the constant guidance of the principles involved.

COURSES OF INSTRUCTION.

I. Elements of sociology. The purpose of this course is to acquaint the student thoroughly with the terminology of the science, its fundamental concepts, the nature of society, of social phenomena, of social laws, and of social institutions, classes, etc. Two hours.

II. The social sciences. (*a*) Analytical study of their problems and relations to sociology. (*b*) Review of attempts to construct a complete theory of sociology. Two hours per week till completed.

III. The sociological aspects of mediæval guilds. Two hours per week after the completion of Course II.

IV. Seminar. Hints on methods of sociological study and observation; papers by students on selected subjects; current periodical literature and current events reviewed; exercise in bibliography. Two hours.

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS.

DR. CARROLL D. WRIGHT AND DR. CHARLES P. NEILL.

V. Lectures on special topics in social economics. This course, conducted by Hon. Carroll D. Wright, United States Commissioner of Labor, treats of the use and method of statistics in the study of industrial and social questions, and discusses problems of present importance in the field of social economics. One hour. Second half-year.

The resignation of Professor Carroll D. Wright, on account of the present financial difficulties of the university, has just been announced in the press.

COLUMBIAN UNIVERSITY—THE CORCORAN SCIENTIFIC SCHOOL.

POLITICS AND ECONOMICS.

PROFESSOR CRAVEN, HEAD OF DEPARTMENT; DR. WRIGHT, LECTURER ON STATISTICS; MR. MCNABB, INSTRUCTOR IN BUSINESS LAW.

VI. Comparative statistics. A numerical study of social relations, with particular regard to the population, industries, and commerce of the United States and other leading nations. Two hours, 1901–1902.

SOCIOLOGY.

XI. The principles of sociology. Two hours, 1900–1901.

XII. A study of individualism, socialism, and of the practical social problems of state and municipal administration in respect to sanitation, charities, crime, etc. Two hours, 1901–1902.

COLUMBIAN UNIVERSITY—THE SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES.

ECONOMICS.

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR WEST.

III. Municipal economy. A study of municipal functions in various countries and of the corresponding forms of municipal government. The actual experiences of cities in dealing with the problems growing out of the concentration of population will be compared, with a view to determining how far and in what directions the modern tendency toward the extension of municipal activities is advantageous.

IV. Social therapeutics. A study of voluntary agencies for promoting social welfare.

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY.

PHILOSOPHY.

Course 3. Special ethics. Duties and rights. Individual law. Revelation. Public worship. Self-culture and station in life. Suicide. Private ownership. Dueling. Lying. Social law. Domestic society. Divorce. Celibacy. Education. Civil society. Authority.

Politics. Forms of government. Essential functions: legislative, judiciary, executive. Armed force. Civil administration. Penal code. Church and state. Ecclesiastical society. International law. Intervention. War and peace.

Course 4. Distribution. The social problem. Socialist solution. Rights of property. Classes of sharers: autonomous producer, master, wage-earner, man living on his income, the indigent.

FLORIDA— JOHN B. STETSON UNIVERSITY.

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY AND ECONOMICS.

I. Introduction to the study of society. Small and Vincent's *Introduction to the Study of Society* forms the basis of instruction, and the course is designed to afford a synthetic view of social phenomena. It is a fitting introduction to the special social sciences.

II. Social elements — lecture course. The attempt is to direct attention to the phenomena of human associations, to show how to interpret social and economic tendencies and movements, to stimulate interest in methods of social betterment approved by experience, and to disclose the principles of social progress.

III. The history of sociology. This consists of a general survey of sociological thought from Comte to the present time by means of lectures, and reports by the students.

ROLLINS COLLEGE.

ECONOMICS AND LAW.

Course V. Sociology. An introductory course, dealing with the history of sociology as a science. Some of the subjects treated are anthropology, ethnology, the philosophy of social life, applied sociology, statistics, and present social problems. Second semester, three times a week. Required of all candidates for the degree.

GEORGIA— ATLANTA UNIVERSITY.

W. E. Burghart DuBois, Ph.D.

Social reforms. Three terms of the senior year are given to sociology; the first term to a general study of principles, the second term to a general survey of social conditions, and a third term to a study of the social and economic condition of the American negro, and to methods of reform. Mayo-Smith's *Statistics and Sociology* is the text-book in use, and special library and thesis work is required.

In addition to this, graduate study of the social problems in the South by the most approved scientific methods is carried on by the Atlanta Conference, composed of graduates of Atlanta, Fisk, and other institutions. The aim is to make Atlanta University the center of an intelligent and thoroughgoing study of the negro problems. Five reports of the conference have been published, and a sixth is in preparation.

HAWAII— OAHU COLLEGE.

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS.

II. Principles of sociology; sociological problems. Sixty hours.

ILLINOIS— ILLINOIS WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY.

GROUP H. ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY.

Dr. Lyon.

General history, civics, logic. Economics. Spring term.
Course 1. Economics. Fall term.
General history, civics, logic. Sociology. Spring term.
Course 1, 3. Sociology. Fall term.
Courses 1, 3, 4. Sociology, seminary. Winter term.

II. SOCIOLOGY.

The purpose in sociology is to trace the evolution of society from its primitive forms to its present state of complexity, to note the reciprocal adjustment of life and

environment, to see how forces both subjective and objective have operated to bring about a normal state of society, and to examine the forces which are now tending to change its structure.

An elementary study of social principles and phenomena (1). Origin and scope of sociology. Origin and nature of social structures. Social functions. Mental and physical basis of society. Constant observation and classification of local social phenomena. By this method and historical data social theory is tested.

The principles of sociology (2). Relation of sociology to correlated sciences. An examination of the nature and application of all the principles constituting society. These principles are traced in the evolution, not only of the social mind, but also of the objective structures of society. Theses on various phases of the subject.

Seminary (3). A study of such sociological problems as organized charity, socialism, communism, crime, urban life and social selection, negro, immigrant, sociological study of the family, social teaching and the influence of Christianity.

BLACKBURN UNIVERSITY.

POLITICAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT.

WALTER H. BRADLEY, A.M.

SOCIOLOGY—GENERAL.

Discussion of the phenomena of society and present social problems. Thirty-six hours.

CARTHAGE COLLEGE.

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY, ECONOMICS, AND SOCIAL SCIENCE.

Sociology. Wright's *Practical Sociology*. Theses and supplementary reading. Three months, three hours.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS.

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS.

12. The labor problem. This course is a study of the labor movement and its social significance. The conditions of workingmen, their legal and economic relations to their employers, wages, strikes, arbitration, labor organizations, and similar topics are studied, and serve to show the general character of the course. Readings, lectures, and quizzes. Professor Kinley.

15. Problems of pauperism and crime. This course begins with the history of poor-relief in Europe and the United States. As full a discussion of the various methods of reform and prevention is given as the time will permit. Assistant Professor Hammond.

17. Sociology. This course comprises an elementary presentation of social principles and phenomena, and a brief discussion of some of the recent theories advanced to explain the growth and structure of society. Assistant Professor Hammond.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY.

GENERAL SOCIOLOGY.

Prevalent misconceptions make it necessary to advise students that sociology is neither the sum of modern experiments in beneficence, nor the formulation of benevolent sentiments, nor a dogmatic short-cut to the solution of problems which baffle political and economic science.

Sociology is, first, a philosophy, that is, a correlation of the methods and results of the special social sciences; second, an application of social philosophy to concrete problems. Social philosophy is invalid, unless it is chiefly constructed from data authenticated by the antecedent sciences. Social programs, whether for society in general or for minor social endeavor, are without scientific credentials unless they are indorsed by social philosophy thus derived.

The Department of Sociology has, accordingly, the following special aims: (1) to furnish such expositions of social relations and theories as will serve the general purposes of educated citizens; (2) to train teachers for similar work of general exposition in colleges; (3) to furnish professional equipment for other vocations devoted to social service, including the offices of public instruction through pulpit, platform, press, and the work of organizing enterprises for social improvement; (4) to unite in the seminars companies of advanced students capable of the most comprehensive thought upon social philosophy, and to enlist them in co-operation for first-rate contribution to social doctrine. To this end fellowships are assigned to specially competent students of sociology.

FACILITIES FOR STUDY.

The facilities for sociological study at the University of Chicago are unsurpassed. The differentiation of departments devoted to social phenomena and the division of labor within the departments is nowhere more distinct and minute. The city of Chicago is one of the most complete social laboratories in the world. While the elements of sociology may be studied in smaller communities, and while it may be an advantage to beginners in the method of positive sociology to deal at first with more simple social combinations, the most serious problems of modern society are presented by the great cities, and must be studied as they are encountered in concrete form in large populations. No city in the world presents a wider variety of typical social problems than Chicago.

The instructors in the Department of Sociology aim to use the scientific material thus afforded both for didactic and constructive purposes. They find a large proportion of their opportunities for research in co-operation with the public-spirited men and women of the city. They are active members of many organizations of citizens for the purpose of investigating and shaping the life of Chicago. Graduate students in the department are taught to work among social facts, and to test and form theory by experience.

Thus the organized charities of the city afford graduate students of the university both employment and training. The church enterprises of the city enlist students in a similar manner. Several students of sociology have been residents and workers at Hull House. A social settlement upon the plan of Hull House has been founded and maintained by students and instructors in the university. Social organizations of every description, from trades unions to the Civic Federation, afford illustrations of every type of modern social experiment and opportunity for the largest variety of observation and experience. Representatives of all these phases of social effort cordially co-operate with the Department of Sociology in making these social endeavors tributary to the training of sociological students. It is the purpose of this department to appropriate to the utmost every advantage afforded by the vast social laboratory within which the university is located. This purpose will be especially prominent in connection with the work of the social settlements. While the primary aim of these enterprises is improvement of the district in which they are undertaken,

the settlements are social observing stations where invaluable supplementary experience should be sought by students, and where material is to be gathered by mature investigators. In so far as the work of the settlements is guided by the university, it will not stop with exhibitions of altruistic sentiments. It will attempt to test general hypotheses and to establish scientific conclusions by use of the evidence which actual experiment affords.

On the other hand, the breadth of the university itself makes empirical and provincial study of sociology impossible. The differentiation of departments does not imply isolation of thought. Scientific work in sociology largely depends upon logically antecedent sciences, not only for material, but for method. This dependence is recognized in the requirements specified below. More than this, it frequently occurs that the kind of research which is decisive in a particular sociological investigation is the more appropriate work of another department. Graduate work in sociology accordingly involves frequent resort to cognate departments.

SPECIAL REGULATIONS.

The subjects in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology fall into the following groups: *A*, social philosophy; *C*, social psychology; *D*, social technology.

Candidates for the higher degrees, if otherwise qualified, may choose either of these groups as principal or secondary subject. The minimum amount of work accepted for the degree of A.M. is six majors, or for the secondary subject leading to the degree of Ph.D., nine majors.

If either of the above groups be chosen as the principal subject for the degree of Ph.D., the equivalent of eighteen majors within or under the direction of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology will be required.

The following table exhibits correlations of courses to be included in the work on which candidates for the higher degrees will be examined. Certain substitutions of equivalent work may be made by previous arrangement with the department.

	GROUP *A*.	GROUP *C*.	GROUP *D*.
For A.M.	Course 72 " 26 " 73 " 53	Course 72 " 26 " 30 " 53	Course 72 " 53 " 56 " 26
For Ph.D. (secondary)	Course 72 " 26 " 53 " 74 (or 94) " 78 (or 95)	Course 72 " 26 " 53 " 74 (or 94) " 30 (or 27)	Course 72 " 26 " 53 " 74 (or 94) " 56
For Ph.D. (primary)	Course 72 " 26 " 53 " 73 (or 98) " 74 " 75 " 78 " 30 " 56	Course 72 " 26 " 53 " 73 (or 98) " 74 (or 94) " 27 " 30 " 24 (or 28) " 56	Course 72 " 26 " 53 " 74 (or 94) " 56 " 61 " 57 " 64 " 65

24. Art and the artist class. The relation of æsthetic activities to other forms of race activity and consciousness. Animal play and rudimentary expressions of art in animal

societies. Mutilation, artificial deformation, stimulants, ornament, dress, tattooing, the dance, music, poetry, painting, sculpture, technology, ceremonial, humor, and play among the natural races. The relation of art to work. Art and gaming in Chicago. From the standpoint of origins. For graduate students. Major. Associate Professor Thomas.

26. Social origins. Association and culture in early times and in tribal life. Early food conditions, migrations, and race-crossings. Origins and relations of invention, trade, warfare, art, marriage, class distinctions, the professions, legal, political, and ecclesiastical institutions. Ethnological reading. An introductory. For Senior College and graduate students. Major. Associate Professor Thomas.

27. Development of mind in the race. Formation of habit in the tribal stage. Relation of the psychic life of the group to the group activities. Instruction and discipline of children by the parents and by the group. Educational meaning of initiation, secret societies, and tapu. Animistic beliefs and practices, and the influence of analogy, suggestion, and hypnotism in the formation of mind. Language and number. Imitation, invention, and genius. Comparison of the mental traits of different races, epochs, and social classes, and an estimate of the nature of the psychic interval between the natural and the culture races. For graduate students. Major. Associate Professor Thomas.

28. Sex in social organization. The influence of the fact of sex in the development of forms of association and of social activity and structure. Based principally on data from the natural races, and from the population of the city of Chicago, with a preliminary consideration of sex in the lower life-forms. For graduate students. Major. Associate Professor Thomas.

30. Primitive social control. A study of primitive juridical and political systems and of social conventions. Family, clan, tribal, and military organization, totemism, tribal and property marks, tapu, personal property and property in land, periodical tribal assemblies and ceremonies, secret societies, medicine men and priests, caste, blood vengeance, salutations, gifts, tribute, oaths, and forms of offense and punishment, among typical tribes of Australia and Oceanica, Africa, Asia, and America. Major. Associate Professor Thomas.

31. Race development of mind. Research course. Major. Associate Professor Thomas.

51. Contemporary society in the United States. A concrete study of natural conditions, the population and its distribution, institutions, economics, political, educational, and ecclesiastical, together with an examination of conventional ideas as to national characteristics. The course is designed to afford a general survey, and to correlate geography with social and economic history and political science. Major. Associate Professor Vincent.

52. American cities. A study of the location, growth, population groupings, arrangements, architecture, and typical institutions of American cities. The aim of the course is to put the problems of the modern city into their proper relations, to exhibit urban life as a whole. Visits to certain city institutions constitute a part of the course. Major. Associate Professor Vincent.

53. The family. The development of the domestic institutions in lower and higher civilizations; social ethics of the family; legal, industrial, educational, and religious problems of the family. Major. Professor Henderson.

56. The group of industrials. The labor movement from the viewpoint of sociology.

The influence of habitat, race, inheritance, migration, division of labor, towns, institutions, and conventions on the differentiation and opportunities of the so-called operative class, the actual condition of this group, and their participation in the goods of civilization; the essentials of a truly human existence; the modes by which improved ideals of welfare originate and are diffused; the social system of economic, political, and cultural organization through which the group must enjoy the social inheritance; description, criticism, program of amelioration. Major. Professor Henderson.

57. Rural communities. Conditions of social existence in the country; organization for improvement. Minor. Professor Henderson.

58, 59, 60. Seminar: methods of social technology. Discussions, reports, and thesis work on contemporary movements for social betterment, chiefly on the basis of studies of Chicago life. Three majors. Professor Henderson.

61. Urban communities. Method of analytic study of social organization; comparisons of ancient and modern cities; the system of community bonds and interests; functions of political, economic, and cultural organizations as determined by social interests; the modes of quickening higher wants and the co-operation of public and private agencies in their satisfaction. Major. Professor Henderson.

62. Moral and culture statistics, methods and results.

63. Social institutions of organized Christianity. Methods by which the church and its societies minister to the welfare of communities. Major. Professor Henderson.

64. Contemporary charities. Studies of the nature and origin of depressed and defective classes; principles and methods of relief; organization of benevolence. Major. Professor Henderson.

65. Social treatment of crime. Causes of crime; principles of criminal anthropology; prison systems; legal factors, juvenile offenders; preventive methods. For graduate students. Minor. Professor Henderson.

67. The structure of English society. A study of the economic, physiological, social, æsthetic, intellectual, and ethical elements in a typical society. Major. Associate Professor Zueblin.

68. Philanthropy in its historical development. Major. Professor Henderson.

69. The elements and structure of society. A study of the economic, physiological, social, æsthetic, intellectual, and moral elements in American society. The interrelation of the individual and the group. The problem of social progress in a democratic society. Major. Associate Professor Zueblin.

70. Municipal sociology. An examination of the means of satisfying communal wants through public activity, with special reference to British and American cities. Lectures and reports. Visits to municipal institutions. Major. Associate Professor Zueblin.

71. An introduction to the study of society. This course is designed to serve as an introduction to the special social sciences of economics, political sciences, etc. For Junior and Senior College students. Major. Professor Small.

72. An introduction to sociology. Designed to orient the student in the current theories of social interpretation by tracing briefly their development. A rapid historical survey, including Machiavelli, Vico, Montesquieu, Turgot, Comte, Spencer, Lilienfeld, Schäffle, *et al.* The organic concept of society will be presented, illustrated, and criticised, and the current psychological theories of imitation, invention, opposition, will be briefly outlined. For Senior College and graduate students. Major. Associate Professor Vincent.

73. Public opinion. This course will include (*a*) an analysis of the concept of the public or general mind, (*b*) a study of the mechanism of public opinion, (*c*) its growth and guidance, (*d*) the social psychology of fashion, (*e*) mob or crowd psychology, and (*f*) the function of public opinion in a democracy. For graduate students primarily. Senior College students admitted by permission of the instructor. Major. Associate Professor Vincent.

74. The methodology of the social problem. Based upon Course 78. A definition of the task of sociology, and of its relations to the specific social sciences. Professor Small.

74A. A synopsis of sociological theory. Designed to furnish a conspectus of general sociology. Minor. Professor Small.

75. The ethics of sociology. Major. Professor Small.

It is recommended that Professor Dewey's courses, the logic, the psychology, and the sociology of ethics, be taken either before or with Course 75.

76. The elements of social dynamics. A study of the permanent forces that shape human society. Courses 71, 72, 73, 26, and 74 are presupposed. Major. Professor Small.

77. The social philosophy of the English people in the Victorian era. Major. Associate Professor Zueblin.

78. The development of sociological method. From Comte to the present time. The object of this course is to discover the successive statements of the sociological problem, with the premises, methods, and results in the most influential writings, as an introduction to the necessary formulation of the sociological problem. Professor Small.

79. The sociological conception of society. For Senior College and graduate students. Major. Professor Small.

80. The sociological conception of the state and of government. (See Course 96.) For Senior College and graduate students. Major. Professor Small.

82, 83, 84. Seminar. Problems of social teleology. Three majors. Professor Small.

85, 86, 87. Seminar. Problems of social dynamics. In this course the facts of social psychology are studied with reference to the possibilities of telic progress. Three majors. Professor Small.

88, 89, 90. Seminar. Problems in methodology and classification. Three majors. Professor Small.

91. American experience with state control of social action. Major.

94. The premises of general sociology. Major. Professor Small.

95. An outline of general sociology. Major. Professor Small.

96. The sociological conception of the problems of modern democracy. Continues, but does not necessarily presuppose Courses 79 and 80. Major. Professor Small.

96A. Democracy and the social movement in the nineteenth century. Minor. Professor Small.

98. Education as a social function. Major. Associate Professor Vincent.

THE SOCIOLOGY CLUB.

The members of the Sociology Club are the instructors and graduate students in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology. By a vote of two-thirds of the mem-

bers of the club other persons, whether connected with the university or not, may be admitted to membership.

The purposes of the club are: "(*a*) co-operation in the study of current sociological literature, especially the periodicals of Europe and America; (*b*) exchange of information about books upon sociology; (*c*) formation of acquaintance with workers in the various kinds of social endeavor, whether theoretical or practical; (*d*) mutual assistance, through criticism of studies upon sociological subjects presented by the members; (*e*) support, whenever practicable, of social efforts organized either by members of the university or by citizens of Chicago." Meetings are held every fortnight.

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY.

42, 43. Sociology of ethics. This course will approach the problems of ethics from the standpoint of social organization. In the autumn the ethical problems relating to the various institutions of society will be discussed; in the winter the ethical problems relating to the connection of the individual and society. For graduate students. Two majors. Professor Dewey.

44. The psychology of ethics. This course will include particularly the ethics of self-control and self-realization, and the significance of psychological analysis for ethical theory. For graduate students. Major. Professor Dewey.

45, 46. The evolution of morality. This course will give a general review of the typical facts in the growth of moral customs and ideals. In the autumn quarter primitive human morality will be discussed, considering three or four types of tribal life, and the ethical development of institutions and the individual in these types. The method pursued is that of social psychology. In the winter quarter the Hebrew, Greek, and Roman civilizations will be discussed as regards their contributions to present moral practices and ideas. For graduate students. Two majors. Professor Dewey.

19. Contemporary social psychology. The development of social psychology from individual psychology will be traced, and its justification and methods discussed. Major. Associate Professor Mead.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL ECONOMY.

3. Economic and social history. The object of this course is to trace for students of history and political science, as well as of economics, the development of the economic organization of society down to the time of the so-called industrial revolution in the latter part of the eighteenth century. Preparation is thus afforded for the detailed examination of special phases of the more recent economic evolution provided for in the courses upon railways, banking, agriculture, industrial combinations, etc. Major. Dr. Mitchell.

14. Economics of workingmen. The purpose is to treat of efforts made to improve the condition of workingmen, and the effects of co-operation, profit-sharing, building associations, manual training, trades unions, and the like. Major. Assistant Professor Veblen.

FRANK L. TOLMAN.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

[*To be continued.*]

REVIEWS.

The Theory of Prosperity. By SIMON N. PATTEN, PH.D. New York: The Macmillan Co.; London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd.

DR. PATTEN is always virile, interesting, though at times eccentric, and the book before us is no exception. We are not surprised to find him following his favorite process of reasoning—deduction, but the patience of the reader is taxed more, perhaps, here than in any previous work. Assertions are made and laws are formulated with utmost complacency, yet where are the historical illustrations, the facts from experience on which they must be based to be of value? In the whole volume but five footnotes are given—but four authorities cited. The time for such speculative work in science is past. Truths can be established only on the basis of fact. In this respect Dr. Patten's book seems almost mediæval. Thus we are told that "wants grow more rapidly than productive power. This is an elementary law to which there are no exceptions" (p. 22). Perhaps this is true. It may be due to imitation. Yet Dr. Patten makes no mention of this or any other reason, but leaves us to accept the law on the ground of his authority alone.

The book is by no means free from fallacies. In his discussion of the conservation of the social surplus (p. 141), Dr. Patten makes function, rather than feeling, the mainspring for conscious effort, thus blurring the distinction so carefully drawn by Dr. Ward. Again he makes labor a purely physiological process—expenditure of energy and reproduction of energy—while it really is a psychological process—effort and satisfactions. To him work is normally a pleasurable activity and becomes irksome wholly because of the social stigma attaching to it. Here Dr. Patten makes the element of pleasure which undoubtedly accompanies the first hours of work the only factor in the process.

Throughout the work the method used is that of contrast. From the title itself, through the designations given Parts I and II—"Income as Determined by Existing Conditions: A Study of Effort and Satisfactions," and "Income as Determined by Heredity: A Study of Discontent and its Remedy"—to the last page of the book Dr.

Patten uses this method of antithesis. The subject lends itself readily to this treatment, and the result is a style abounding in short, packed sentences full of well-chosen contrasts and happy distinctions — at times epigrammatic. As for instance: "Misery is not a product of nature; it is man-made" (p. 41); "Rent is a costless income, not a seized income" (p. 133); "Monopoly is bad, but the confusion of ignorance is worse" (p. 74); "The laws of heredity are mental and social; those of the environment are physical and economic" (p. 9). But Dr. Patten does not always escape the danger which lurks in this use of contrast and condensation. Clearness of thought is at times sacrificed to fitness of phrase, and many of the generalizations are too vague or too sweeping.

The thesis of Part I is that economic prosperity depends upon the power of substitution; the thesis of Part II is that social progress depends upon the power and control of impulse. It is the latter half of the book that is of first interest to the sociologist, for it is here that the idea is worked out that impulse, a product of the social surplus, is the dynamic principle in society and produces progress. This is a contribution to the field of sociology. It is only to be regretted that the subject is not developed with more of the acumen and enthusiasm which Dr. Patten used in an oral discussion of the same, which it was the privilege of the reviewer to hear shortly before the book appeared. From the book alone one can scarcely gather that by *impulse* Dr. Patten means the same thing that Tarde expresses by the word *invention*, or so much of it as is due to pure surplus energy resulting from a satisfied state of the primary physical wants and as distinguished from invention as an intellectual process. This part at least, if not all, of Tarde's *invention* has been more correctly designated *innovation* by Dr. Ward. Dr. Patten's idea would have been much clearer had he used this or a similar term in place of *impulse*. But Dr. Patten seems practically to ignore the large movement that Tarde's works have started. As a whole, however, this last contribution of Dr. Patten's is a work of keen analysis; one that will make a definite impression.

The introduction is no mere formal part of the treatise. It is an introduction in the true sense — *necessary*, not merely *preliminary*, to the book itself. Here is discovered the purpose of the work, which is to show that the assumption made by many social reformers, that "so-called social evils are economic in their origin," has no foundation in fact; but that social evils are due rather to non-adjustment to the environment. It is here that Dr. Patten strikes the keynote to his

theory of prosperity in the characteristically keen distinction which he draws between *poverty* and *misery*, the panacea for the one being treated in Part I, and the remedy for the other suggested in Part II. The introduction also contains the author's justification for the division of the book and the definition of the word *income* as used in the sub-titles.

A careful reading of the introduction thus prepares us for what is to follow. Part I is a study of effort and satisfactions, and is treated in three chapters, each of which is outlined by marginal topics and illustrated by diagrams. It is highly technical, crowded with definitions and distinctions, many of them too abstruse or too finely spun to interest the general reader. The economist, however, will follow the discussion eagerly, for Dr. Patten's new point of departure in many cases leads to interesting, if sometimes startling, conclusions.

Dr. Patten's analysis of the social surplus and the origin of values in chap. i is based on his theory of pain-and-pleasure economy. It leads to the very remarkable statement that the only time in life when the sum of values does not exceed costs is when one has decided to make his own "quietus" with "a bare bodkin" or some more up-to-date weapon! The large view sees the result of the economic process to be, not "goods," but vital energy making future production possible and pleasurable. The social surplus, which is defined as the difference between total utility and total costs (p. 19), is thus seen to be an enduring fund disappearing only to reappear in some new form (p. 42). The waste of surplus is reduced by each step in the adaptation of men to external conditions.

In promulgating his own theory of wages Dr. Patten does not hesitate utterly to cast aside the cost theory. His theory might be called the "option theory," for he makes the option of the best worker in each industrial group to withdraw into the next higher group, if his wages are reduced, the factor in setting the standard of wages. "The monopoly power of each group, gained through the options of its strongest members, is the sole determinant of wages, and is the one thing for which laborers should seek. New options can do what no amount of effort in other directions can accomplish" (p. 50). This discussion brings chap. i to a close, and leads up to Dr. Patten's theory of substitution, which is developed in the two following chapters.

The point of view is now shifted from the traditional one of producer to that of consumer. Hence the conclusions are new. According to this new view, substitution is the power determining the regulation of prices. The consumer can control prices by his power

of substitution, says Dr. Patten. If beef goes up, he can use more mutton. But the price of mutton will then go up, unless *more mutton is produced.* Dr. Patten fails to see that his new theory of price movement involves alertness and mobility of *producer* as well as consumer. Yet he has shown that the freedom of the consumer is as important in low prices as the freedom of the producer. Advocates of the old theory of competition among producers as regulating prices, however, probably will not give up all claims to competition as a factor in the operation, as Dr. Patten seems to demand.

His analysis of monopoly rests on the same potent factor of substitution:

> If he [the consumer] had a complete power of substitution, that is, if several commodities could supply each want, or if several groups of producers could supply all his wants, there would be no monopoly. If he had no power of substitution, there being only one commodity that could supply each want, each commodity would be an independent monopoly (p. 86).

A new and certainly very broad view of the subject is taken when Dr. Patten declares that "the growth of one monopoly is always at the expense of other monopolies, never at the expense of the public" (p. 92). According to this view, farmers as owners of land are monopolists and the trades union is a monopoly, for he says "the rent of land held by small farmers and the gains of trades unions . . . . are not different in kind from those of other monopolies" (p. 94). In fact, every group or class of which "the public" is composed constitutes a monopoly from a certain point of view; hence the living units of a certain monopoly suffer at the growth of some other monopoly, not as members of "the public," but as "monopolists." The distinction seems verbal rather than essential.

In chap. iii a most interesting discussion of the subject of "Investments" is given. Dr. Patten's treatment of labor and capital is also original and suggestive:

> The true contrast with capital is labor force, using the latter term in so broad a sense that it will include every natural or human agency making capital productive (p. 120).
>
> Labor force is made up of a number of concrete days' work and of a group of substitutes for labor. Wherever a natural force is utilized as a substitute for labor, or a new utilization of laborers is made not involving an increase in their number, the additions to the productivity of capital made in this way go to the persons controlling these forces. This increased productivity of capital is valued at the price of the labor for which they are sub-

stituted. From this point of view rent is the price of labor substitutes (p. 121).

Dr. Patten reaches the climax of his philosophy of substitution when he says: "An increased power of substitution is the only remedy for an unequal distribution of wealth" (p. 140).

In the discussion of economic freedom with which Part II opens, Dr. Patten applies his philosophy of substitution, making the power of substitution the great factor in freedom, both of production and consumption.

> Labor is free where there is a complete power of substitution. It is the doing or not doing, consuming or not consuming, being active or passive at will, being social or not social, that constitutes freedom (p. 152).

In his explanation of how the exploited in a society consent to the exploitation, Dr. Patten has recourse to the theory put forth in *The Development of English Thought*, that environments change rapidly, while codes of morality—that is, customs, traditions, habits, laws, and institutions—persist. Hence, motor reactions developed in one environment continue after the situation is so changed that other forms of activity would be more advantageous (p. 159).

> The real source of exploitation lies, not in political causes nor in competition, but in old traditions, habits, and prejudices. Had not antecedent conditions created contentment in bad environments, exploitation would be impossible in better situations (p. 162).

Exploitation, we are told, is, however, merely a necessary stage in social progress, rather than an enduring part of national life. This interpretation of the subject is certainly unique, but will hardly be universally accepted.

The next chapter, "Income as Increased by Adjustment," is perhaps the hardest reading in the book, while it is at the same time the most important to the sociologist in the discussion of the subject of *impulse*. The treatment is psychological and must be followed with the closest attention, or its fine points will escape the reader's notice. Dr. Patten himself tells us, on the fifth page of the chapter, after the word *impulse* has been used several times, that he has heretofore used the word in a way that suggests a variety of meanings, among which a common thought is apparently absent (p. 185). But the confusion is more apparent than real, he continues, and the thread of the argument, with a little care, can be followed. But without doubt more than "a little care" must be used to follow the discussion. Basing his argument on Dr. Ward's philosophy of desire, which he does not seem to

understand wholly, he develops his theory of impulse through contrasting the rôle of the two in society. The following can be gleaned from the discussion :

Activity is prompted either by desires or by impulses (p. 195). The aim of desire is *satisfaction ;* that of impulse, *ends.* Impulse is the psychic feeling accompanying the outgo of energy. Desire is the feeling accompanying the *consumption* of goods (p. 185). (Here it is clear that Dr. Patten confounds desire with its satisfaction.) Surplus energy stimulates impulse. Impulses are the motives that prompt complete adjustment. Thus, according to Dr. Patten, impulse is the progressive principle in human society. His impulse denotes the usual case in which the satisfaction of desire is not immediate, but where prolonged efforts are necessary for the attainment of the end, and it is in these efforts that the progressive principle resides. Through desire and its satisfaction which is immediate, society remains static. Impulse, which causes men to strive upward and onward toward the ideal, is the dynamic agent that transforms the type of the social structure. Desires are the outcome of past conditions and local situations, and as they become prominent they isolate men into the elementary groups out of which society came. Impulses spring from the new situations acquired through surplus energy. They blend the isolating elements, and give prominence to the new and the general toward which society is moving (p. 206). Society thus disintegrates on the side of desire and integrates on that of impulse (p. 206). Hence the only way to make a complex society continue progressive is to instil into all members of all classes the same impulses and ideals. If desire alone were observed in each of these classes of the heterogeneous society, the past, different for each class, would be accented and the disrupting forces alone set free. Hence the means of union in a mixed society are similar impulses and ideals tending toward a future common to all. This brings us to Dr. Patten's discussion of the origin and evolution of the group-ideal. The importance which he attaches to the function of the ideal is seen in the following :

> The belief in a better-than-self is the binding element on whose ascendency the continuance of each social group and institution depends (p. 190).

Self-repression is group-exaltation ; it makes clubs, unions, clans, parties, and churches, and these in turn pave the way for the feeling of nationality. A simple impulse thus produces great effects. Men with a large social surplus cannot remain normal except through changes that impute to the social type a higher personality than that found in

the self. Society is the better-than-self (p. 194). "Once started the process cannot stop until energy is idealized as God and society is considered the mother of all" (p. 194). Emphasis is laid on the power of the ideal in nationalizing the group, and application is made to our own country. Says Dr. Patten:

> Men should reason where they are alike, but where they differ they must have impulses to move them toward some common goal (p. 209).
>
> For individuals and for single classes reasoning may become a guide to action, but it cannot arbitrate between classes (p. 203).

In a heterogeneous group, therefore, reason only tends to tear men asunder, for it accents the past and local environments. Only common ideals of a common future can draw men of different races and classes together. Hence "social harmony lies in what the race has before it and not in that through which its component elements have individually passed" (p. 204). There is no doubt but that, if this point of view were adhered to in political and social action, assimilation of the heterogeneous elements in the group would be much more rapid than at present. The fact that a nation like the United States has no rational basis for unity is again accented in the last chapter. While each class has its own needs, each section its own peculiarities evoking particular desires, and each race its own heredity, the new impulses that prosperity brings are common to all, and from them will come the forces creating national unity (p. 212).

The aim of the concluding chapter is to show that

> Freedom consists not merely of political rights, but is dependent upon the possession of economic rights freely recognized and universally granted to each man by his fellow-citizens (p. 215).

An enumeration of these rights which "must be incorporated in the national thought and become as clearly defined as are political rights," is here given. For Dr. Patten tells us that

> It is not from a theory of distribution that a solution of present difficulties will come, but from a better formulation of the moral code and from a clearer perception of the common rights that new impulses and ideals evoke (p. 214).

The rights are grouped as: (1) public or market rights; (2) social rights; (3) rights of leisure; (4) exceptional rights. Under public or market rights are discussed the right to publicity, the right to security, and the right to co-operate. Under social rights are treated the right to a home, the right to develop or the right of contact with all the elevating forces in a civilization as long as life lasts, the right to wholesome standards, the right to homogeneity of population, and the

right to decision by public opinion. Under the rights of leisure are classed the right to comfort, the right to leisure, the right to recreation, the right to cleanliness, and the right to scenery. As exceptional rights are classed the right to relief and the right of women to income. This whole discussion is most sane and clear, and deserves the attention of every thinker on social subjects.

SARAH E. SIMONS.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Principles of Western Civilization. By BENJAMIN KIDD. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1902.

THE main concept of this book is that we are at the present time passing into a stage of social evolution in which the interests of the present will be consciously subordinated to the demands of a greater future. In the historical philosophy of the author, the ancient world is taken as the characteristic age of the ascendency of the present, as in it all thought and effort were concentrated upon immediate efficiency. The doctrines of early Christianity, on the other hand, heralded the reign of the future, which has, however, not as yet established itself, because the militarism and other absolutistic tendencies of the earlier era have not been completely superseded. The liberalism of the Manchestrian type is described as a particularly marked recrudescence of the reign of the present—a philosophy in which the welfare of existing individuals alone determines the content of the ethical system. A truer liberalism has, however, dawned: one in which free competition, carried on with the greatest intensity, will continue to reign; where truth will be conceived of as the resultant of conflicting forces; and where the interests of the future are to be clearly recognized as the cardinal element in the ethical system, as the sole factor by which the meaning of present existence can be determined.

The author's cause for action is the same as in his earlier work; namely, the narrowness of the ideals of classical liberalism, and the evident impulse of the thinking and working world to conceive ideals of wider reach and deeper meaning. But the solution which is here attempted invites at the outset the criticism that it is altogether too vague, and has not been reduced to that exactness which even an idealistic philosophy demands. The author confuses the universal, the ethical, and the future; and he assumes that whatever transcends the narrow interests of the individual may be classed as belonging to the system of the ascendency of the future. The assumption that the uni-

versal, which gives all existences their meaning, is being worked out in the future, and hence that the future is superior to the present, is at first sight very plausible, and opens up an inviting vista of thought; but, in the form which it has been given by the author, it is totally devoid of content, confused, and unilluminating. In order that the future may be actually ascendant in the consciousness of living individuals, it must, of course, be assumed that future development can be predetermined with sufficient accuracy to form a basis of ethical judgments and of motives; otherwise the entire system of ethics would vanish into the air. In other words, if the future is to control, it must control through becoming part of consciousness. In every other sense it has controlled long ago, both because the forces of evolution have always been active, and because men at all times have peered into the future, and have, as far as possible, directed their actions toward the end of the most permanent efficiency. If more is to happen, it can come about only by a clearer conception of the actual contents of the future, which would virtually be rendering the future a part of the present. This metaphysical puzzle of placing the controlling center of human action beyond consciousness the author has done nothing to solve. Apparently the only way out of it is to take refuge in the idea of the subconscious or of the unconscious, in the mystic forces of human nature, or in the creation of a religion of the future; of course, if this were done, the philosophical meaning of the author's contention would be destroyed. So we cannot avoid the conclusion that, beyond the general idea that in forming our ethical judgments we must look toward the future, the author's theory is devoid of positive content. It points the way rather to an evolutionary religion, or an evolutionary poetry, than to an evolutionary philosophy, because the first object of the latter should be to explain the actual processes of evolution; and that the author's theory absolutely fails to do.

The sharp division which the author introduces between systems of civilization in which the present is ascendant, and those which presage an ascendency of the future, does not correspond with the facts which have been scientifically ascertained by history, and, we may almost say, which are matter of current knowledge. While the ancient world lacked the theory of evolution, it certainly, in the conduct of life, was by no means devoid of the feeling that the future development of the state is of the highest importance. Nor is it necessary to point out that, when Christian doctrine took the place of ancient philosophy, it was not the future, in the sense of the general

theory of the author, that formed the objective point of the Christian system of ethics. Nowhere is it clearer that the author confuses the universal, the ethical, and the future. The Christian religion certainly does not distinctively hold that the existence which transcends the individual is necessarily in the future; it is rather the perfect nature of God, in which the insufficiency of man finds its complement. On p. 385 the author says: "Our economic progress represents the steps in a slowly ascending development, in which the winning systems are those within which the economic process is tending to reach the highest intensity as the result of the gradual subordination of the particular to the universal." It is this subordination of the particular to the universal that the author nowhere clearly distinguishes from the subordination of the existing to the future.

In the first stage of social evolution, according to the author, nations demonstrate their right to survival by military prowess, and it is only in those nations which at present have demonstrated their power "that there can be developed that principle of social efficiency which in the second epoch of social evolution must ultimately subordinate organized society itself to its own future." The author does not, however, show why it is to be expected that the nations which represent the highest potentialities in civilization may soon be able to do without the power of defending their ideals. While western civilization is still confronted with countless millions who are inspired by alien and hostile ideals, it is difficult to see, upon the basis provided by the author, how his theory that the ascendency of the present will before long cease can be true. Moreover, the sharp division introduced by the author between ancient and modern civilization in no way accounts for the actual process of social development, and entirely overlooks the fact of a gradually widening social consciousness, embracing successively the family, the clan, the tribe, the city, the nation, and perhaps destined finally to embrace the world.

When the author applies his theory to individual institutions, the result is no more luminous than is the general theory itself. His treatment of slavery is characteristic of his *a priori* methods. In the gradual disappearance of slavery in the ancient world, economic causes are declared to have been merely secondary. The deeper principles of civilization which express themselves in manumissions *pro remedia animae* constitute the real motive power. No serious writer has ever dared to deal with a subject of so great complexity in such an off-hand manner. Ancestral worship is declared a distinctive element of the

ascendency of the present. The reason for this is not apparent, and it seems that this institution with equal truth might be explained by the ascendency of the past, or even, as embodying some general ideal, by the ascendency of the future. In a similar manner, and with more apparent reason, infanticide is numbered among the institutions of the reign of the present. His treatment of these practices indicates that the author has given very little thought to oriental civilization, which it would certainly be very difficult for him to compress into the formula of the ascendency of the present.

According to the author, tolerance can be explained only as a conviction of the religious consciousness. Here, too, while the general view is plausible, it fails utterly to explain the actual historical growth of religious toleration, unless atheism or agnosticism be considered expressions of religious feeling. It could certainly be argued, with greater reason, that the methods of scientific investigation are the true basis of toleration, notwithstanding the ultimate intolerance of Comte's positivism. The author's method is well illustrated by his treatment of the theory of social evolution held by Schmoller and Schäffle, which traces the gradually expanding social and political consciousness from the family and clan through the city-state to the nation. The author says that Schmoller gives us no real answer as to the controlling force in this evolution, and he then proceeds to supply the deficiency in the following manner: "It is no mere expansion of a race or of a nationality. It is the conquering march of principles becoming conscious. . . . . It represents the slow convergence toward each other in a majestic process of natural development of the forces and factors with which the ultimate meaning of our civilization is identified, and under the control of which the world is destined to pass in the future toward which we continue to move." It is pleasant to imagine the inward embarrassment of Professor Schmoller when he sees this simple and illuminating explanation.

In the latter part of the work the author attempts to outline the elements of the future civilization. He insists that, in the social state toward which we are moving, free competition, upheld by a tolerance based upon deep religious feeling, will be a cardinal element. He does not, however, make the least contribution toward the solution of the question how competition can be preserved against the absolutisms which are "closing down" on all sides. Nor does he show how competition in the future stage will differ from competition at present, nor how far the principle of *laissez faire* must be superseded by an exten-

sion of social control. The futility of this general theory is nowhere more apparent than when the author stands helpless before these fundamental problems of the present time.

It is to be lamented that, instead of working out clearly some of his ideas and their application to institutions, the author has consumed so much of his time in useless repetition, and in exclamatory rhetoric about the cosmic process and the overwhelming significance of projected efficiency. Indeed, the author's style may be called myopic. Possibilities loom grandly before him, but the outlines are not clearly and distinctly seen. He is constantly surprised at his own thought, and the idea of "the world-process trembling on the brink of consciousness" disturbs his peace of mind and calmness of judgment. So much of a mannerism has his constant surprise become that he is "profoundly impressed" even by the *superficiality* of other writers. Mr. Kidd has indeed produced a significant work, or rather a symptomatic work. One of the most discouraging characteristics of the present time is the growing adverseness of large numbers of people to the patient processes of research by which alone progress can be made in the sciences. Rapid generalizations and bold theories which cast the experience of a century to the winds are much easier to produce and much more "striking;" but such systems and theories, though they may contain attractive and even significant thoughts, can hope to be of permanent influence and usefulness only when they themselves rest upon a sound foundation of scientific knowledge, and do not utterly disregard the accepted results of the scientific work of the civilized world.

PAUL S. REINSCH.

THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.

The American Federal State: A Text-Book in Civics for High Schools and Academies. By ROSCOE LEWIS ASHLEY, A.M. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1902. Pp. xlv+599.

THIS text-book in civics departs somewhat from the old-fashioned text-book treatment of the subject, in that it attempts to combine in one volume an exposition of political theory, American political history, and a discussion of the form and working of the American federal government. Mr. Ashley opens his book with an introductory chapter of some forty pages on "The Elements of Politics," and then devotes 156 pages to the historical development of our form of govern-

ment, from its inception on Saxon-English soil down to the close of the Spanish war. The organization and working of the federal government is treated in the following 225 pages; and the third and last part of the book, consisting of 108 pages, considers the "Policies and Problems" of the country. A series of seven appendices closes the work.

The introductory chapter, on "The Elements of Politics," undertakes to give an idea of the nature of the state, to define its sphere of activity and its purposes, to distinguish the various forms of states, to distinguish the state from the government and the nation, and to enumerate the characteristics of sovereignty.

The part devoted to "Historical Development" traces the growth of representative government in England and discusses the political system of the American colonies, setting forth the well-known differences between the social and political systems of the different colonies. The Revolution and the political changes, internal and external, which it produced, are treated in a separate chapter, followed by a short account of the development of the constitution between 1787 and 1789. The succeeding chapter is devoted to explaining the influences that led to the growth of our nationality, to the development of the spirit of democracy, the influence of slavery on our nationality, and the "new nation" which was born of the Civil War and attained its majority at the time of the Spanish war.

The political evolution accounted for, the author turns his attention to a discussion of the existing government. This part of the book covers the ground more commonly delimited under the title of civics. The general character of American federalism, the Senate, the House, the powers of Congress and of the executive, the duties of the executive departments, the relations of the central to the state governments, and other familiar topics, form the bulk of the description and discussion.

A miscellaneous group of topics is discussed under the title of present "Policies and Problems." Suffrage, proportional representation, direct legislation, the history and organization of political parties, civil rights, taxation, money, the tariff, labor legislation, the government of colonies, and the duties of citizenship are among the subjects presented.

A just criticism of the book must keep in view the purpose of its author. The work is a text-book for high schools and academies, not a treatise. It is not intended to be a contribution to the science of

politics, or to American history. The book is a compilation, a systematic presentation of accepted doctrine. In his exposition of the theory of politics Mr. Ashley, in the main, follows Professor Burgess—certainly a safe guide. The author is, however, more than a mere copyist or epitomizer. He sifts evidence, balances opinions, and has views of his own. For example, he differs with some eminent authorities in thinking that "cabinet government" would not do for us; he expresses the opinion that "a society changing as rapidly as ours in the United States is unlikely to have the same kind of government in different periods of its national history;" that, if "the United States cannot hold in check the forces of centralization, we may well come to the conclusion that federalism is after all but a transitory phase in the development of centralized states with powerful central governments;" that "the president . . . . in time of war must be a sort of dictator, even though he may not receive the full support of Congress, as Lincoln did;" that "international success may depend on great centralization of power in unfettered officials, chosen not because they represent the people, but because of unquestioned capacity;" that "liberty and equality cannot live together." One wonders as he reads such opinions whether "imperialism" has not distorted the writer's sight.

The historical presentation is vivacious and interesting. So, too, the account of the development of our nationality will doubtless prove of great interest to high-school pupils. The combination of history and politics is, in a measure, a good thing, for it gives the pupil a better perspective and arouses greater interest. A text-book on this plan is far superior to those old schoolbooks on civics which killed enthusiasm with long descriptions of the anatomy of the government, without a word about the workings of political life.

It is a question, however, whether we do not find too much history and economics in the book. A good deal of the historical account presupposes a deeper knowledge of English history than a high-school pupil ordinarily will have, and more than is necessary for a proper knowledge of his country's government. The multiplicity of detail is likely, moreover, to be confusing, and it is a question whether much of the advantage of historical perspective is not lost in this confusion. It seems, on the whole, that it would have been better to assume a familiarity with our political history and to have shown briefly the bearing of its main points upon the form of government finally adopted, and then to have passed to a discussion of the existing institutions.

A more serious criticism, however, must be made on the book from a pedagogical point of view. Its arrangement cuts across the best ideas as to the proper method of approach to the subject. Ordinarily it is assumed that a student should first become familiar with the forms of government with which he is in close touch, and enlarge his circle of knowledge from the local to the general. The best pedagogy would presuppose a knowledge of the existing system of government, and its working, for the best results in a further study of the history and growth of the system. To open up with a description of the general theory of the state, and to follow this with a long historical account of the growth of a system whose main features are not yet presented to the pupil, is likely to result in mere memorizing and in a confusion of ideas.

The "Topics of the Day," which are discussed in the last part of the book, are subjects which high-school pupils ought to discuss and to know something about, but they are out of place in a text-book on civics. The political economy is fragmentary and superficial.

The questions and references at the end of each chapter are excellent and will prove helpful both to teacher and pupil. There are some typographical errors that catch the reader's eye; they are so few, however, that they would not be worth mentioning were they not so important in character. As examples we may instance "Nicholay" for Nicolay, p. 157; "Wanbaugh" for Wambaugh, p. 19; "Giffin" for Giffen, p. 484.

In the hands of a thoroughly qualified teacher the book may be used to good advantage, but it will prove embarrassing in its riches to any other.

DAVID KINLEY.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS.

Democracy and Social Ethics. By JANE ADDAMS. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1902. Pp. 277.

THE ripest expression of the long experience, brooding thought, creative sympathy, daily contact with all sorts and conditions of men, and varied service comes to us in these chapters on democracy and social ethics. Here is made articulate the unconscious movement of the educated American toward a social standard of moral obligations. "Thus the identification with the common lot which is the essential idea of democracy becomes the source and expression of social ethics."

Individualistic ideals in industry, politics, and religion have been so over-emphasized, as in Benjamin Franklin's gospel of salvation by savings banks, and the popular revivalist's method of salvation by individual escape from future torments, that the ideals of social ethics find us unprepared and perplexed in face of the peremptory claims of solidarity.

This perplexity is finely illustrated in the chapters on charitable effort, domestic relations, industrial amelioration, educational and political reforms. The careless reader is likely to miss the point of view in this delicate and indirect treatment of our egoism. Out of a multitude of personal observations made upon a heterogeneous population and upon a host of philanthropists who have crossed her path, Miss Addams selects her illustrations of our mental distress and fumbling in the dark. Readers who do not already know the author and her work may be inclined to conclude that she is too much in sympathy with the socialistic tendencies of her neighbors; that, instead of lifting them up, she has fallen to their level of social philosophy. The rarely sympathetic interpretation of the support of a corrupt ward politician by her neighbors at times almost reads as if she were condoning a crime. But if the "bourgeois" reader penetrates the chapter, he will, perhaps to his dismay and confusion, discern that the "upper classes" are doing precisely what the Italian laborers are doing, and with far less excuse.

The chapter on "Education" is full of illustrations of the fact that the employing and successful classes have hardly a suspicion of the real needs of a working population; and that the public-school system itself is held down because it is regarded as a tool of trade and manufactures, and a means of making efficient instruments of employers. The demands of social ethics are slowly and grudgingly accepted. A critic of this book says: "What are those who have the requisite sentiment to strive for in industrial, political, social, and other relations? Social ethics must answer these questions. Miss Addams ignores them and—renders no conclusion." To which Miss Addams might well reply that she has made many suggestions of a positive character as to things which a community ought to do; and, further, that we already have many volumes on social policies which go wide of the mark because they lack insight into the ideals and aspirations of the people and their real needs. One who writes a book of less than one hundred pages can assume that the works of program-makers are already acces-

sible, and that it is legitimate to place beside them the fresh and original results of personal study.

CHARLES RICHMOND HENDERSON.

Chapters in the History of the Arts and Crafts Movement. By OSCAR LOVELL TRIGGS. Chicago: Published by the Bohemia Guild of the Industrial Art League, 1902. Pp. 198.

IN sumptuous form comes from the Lakeside Press a plea for the union of daily labor with the happiness of the workman, the beauty of the product, and the satisfaction of the buyer. The treatment is that of a literary critic throughout. Carlyle, Ruskin, and Morris are the heroes of the story, and the author summarizes his social and artistic creed in the closing pages, in a direct statement of the immediate objects of the Industrial Art League.

There is no pretense of offering a complete and final social philosophy. In a general way "socialism" is represented as the goal of modern thinking and striving; but what is "socialism"? It is at this point the student of social science, and especially of economics, feels the contrast between the poetry of the literary man and the requirements of accurate scientific reasoning. Yet, if there seems to be a conflict between the author's praise of guilds and handicraft and his appreciation of machinery, the conflict may after all lie in social experience itself; for the process of adjustment is not yet worked out in life.

In any case it is refreshing to have our American Philistines, adorers of exports of raw products and steam-driven machinery, stung through thick and leathery skins by the satire of the artist; to hear them told that we may sell watches and engines in Europe and yet fall short of being quite civilized. And it is wholly sane and inspiring to remind us that it is not the material output of a factory or mill which gives glory to a nation; but that the decisive factor is the kind of men and women who get their living in the factory and mill, and whose blood and flesh are ground up to make "profits."

If the author has left out of sight nearly all the serious economic difficulties of the problem, as the pressure of population, the burden of inheritance, the slowness with which managerial ability is produced, the exact way by which his fine ideals are to be put into effect on a

large scale, we must not blame him overmuch; for one cannot bestow all his wisdom in the compass of two hundred pages with wide margins, and the publication of all extant wisdom must ever remain a task for division of labor and co-operative enterprise. Enough for us that the arts and crafts movement is shown to have its place and its task in the world of social experiment, and that men are found ready to make sacrifices for it.

CHARLES RICHMOND HENDERSON.

The Science of Penology. Collated and systematized by HENRY M. BOIES. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1901. Pp. 459.

THERE are two points of merit in this publication: the book is a record of the observations and meditations of a man of experience, and the conclusions reached are summarized in a working program at the end. The limits of the claim are frankly stated on the title page, "collated and systematized." The materials have apparently all been published in earlier works; but the opinions expressed have the weight of a careful witness who has acted for years as a member of the Board of Public Charities in Pennsylvania.

The author thinks (p. 4) that penology is "the main trunk of sociology," because "protection from violence and crime was the origin of all law."

The failure of all penal law is affirmed in terms too strong; for the author himself (p. 16) tells us that, whereas, in former ages, all men were what we should describe as criminal, now only 2 per cent. of the population has this anti-social character.

Most of us may agree with Mr. Boies in favoring the indeterminate or "indefinite" sentence, if carefully guarded; but it is not certain that this principle is approved abroad by most penologists (p. 143). His plan of control for persons conditionally released is worthy of consideration, because it introduces the German idea of judicial supervision, removes the power from the purely administrative officers, and thus breaks the force of many objections urged by lawyers and judges.

The statement that the "crank" and "treadmill" have "long" been abandoned (p. 264) is not correct; for the present writer saw both of them in use in London in 1895.

The treatment of the prison labor question is sane and careful, although many will object to his recommendation of machinery in penitentiaries.

The suggestion of having an "orphanage" in a female reformatory (p. 297) is startling in the form presented, and it should be more carefully limited.

While there are some repetition and prolixity, the style, on the whole, is clear and strong; and not many careful students will reach decisions on the topics discussed without consulting these chapters.

CHARLES RICHMOND HENDERSON.

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS.

The Increase of Railroad Disasters.—The railroads of America, with the ablest men that money can buy making up the personnel of their management, men who are giving their time and brains to solving the great problems of transportation, have, after years of study, experience, and theories applied to facts, put in operation a code of laws or rules governing the handling of their train service that is as near perfect as anything that comes from the hand of man.

They have expended millions in safety appliances and improvements, such as equipping freight engines and cars with automatic brakes, putting in interlocking switches and signals, and block systems, and making improvements in road bed, track, and bridges, and putting in passing tracks, etc. They have selected the best material that could be got, both physical and mental, to make up the personnel of their service—the law of the survival of the fittest governing. This great army of men who have become specialists in their different spheres are unequaled by any other class of laborers in sobriety, intelligence, and physical endurance; and yet, after all of these precautions have been taken, the destruction of property by accident and the congestion of the business of the roads is steadily increasing. There must be a reason for this that, like all of the other problems that have been met and solved, can be remedied.

A criticism, to be worth anything, must be just; therefore we will concede that the volume of business has enormously increased, taxing the facilities of the roads to their utmost capacity; but there is something else wrong, and the men at the top are responsible. Each general manager who takes charge of a railroad is confronted with the figures of the gross and net earnings of the property under the management of his predecessor, and is expected to show an increase over those figures, while the operating expenses decrease. He finds that every field of economy has been exploited by the man he succeeded. There are only two avenues open to him—one to neglect the physical condition of the property under his management, the other to make the employees produce more for the money they get. He chooses what he considers the less of the two evils—that of making the employees produce more. This has resulted in a continual increase in the tonnage, in the use of larger engines with higher steam pressure, longer hours of service, and a congestion of the business.

Every railroad man understands the significance of the figures which follow, and are taken from the *Bulletin of the United States Department of Labor* for November. The figures for 1893 show, for freight service, the movement of 107,129 ton miles of traffic per employee, while those of 1900 show 139,143 ton miles per employee.

This means that the burden of exhausting labor was more than one-fifth heavier in 1900 than it was seven years before for this class of the world's workers. These men work by the mile or trip, and the continual increase in the amount of work performed in one trip has reduced their earning capacity about 30 per cent., while the cost of living has advanced about 35 per cent.; and while they are doing more work, they are getting less money than they did ten years ago. This, in a great many cases, causes them to try to work longer than they should.

The old proverb, "The harder the storm, the sooner it is over," is reversed on the railroad and means, "The harder the storm, the longer it lasts;" as the tonnage increases, the work becomes more intense, the hours of service longer and more exhausting; and the end is not yet. It is true the capacity of the machinery used is strained in a like or greater proportion.

But machinery can be replaced, and its shorter life is more than compensated by the greater results accomplished; but the man, even counting him as a part of the machinery, cannot be so easily replaced. He is being crowded to a point where tired nature will not be restored, and at a pace which, like that of the engine he drives, will

soon measure his days of usefulness. In our scheme of life he sees the scrap heap only a little way ahead of him. Coldly, mathematically are his capacities measured, and, like his engine, he is driven at the highest speed until he fails. A splendid army of trained men is under a constant forced march which is hurtful and demoralizing, bringing them down to a mere test of physical endurance. Shoulder to shoulder, under the whip of progress, these men are rushing forward — forever forward. Let one of them fail through sheer exhaustion, and the result is chronicled as another railroad disaster. Very few people not connected with railroads know the exacting conditions under which these men perform their duties — especially the engineer. Leaving a terminal, he must make himself familiar with all of the special instructions posted in the bulletin book, where he will find instructions that signals at different places are out of order, and he must be governed accordingly. He will receive orders to reduce speed on certain parts of the road over which he runs, each place requiring a different rate. If there are any new signals put up or interlocking plants put in, he must know where they are and how they work. He must watch the track in front of him for danger signals, see that all fixed signals are displayed properly and switches set right, blow road-crossing signals at grade, call the attention (with the whistle) of all trains he passes to the signals displayed on the front of the engine, and often have in his possession orders to be executed at five or six different points; watch for the markers on the rear of his train and see that it is all together; respond to signals from the conductor; teach the new firemen and brakemen who enter the service their duties. Besides these he must carry the water in the boiler at its proper level, work the engine in the most economical manner that will be consistent with the work it is required to do, and make the time and watch to see that he does not get ahead of his schedule time; and if the engine is leaking or running hot, or the injectors working badly, his duties are increased.

Can men who have been on duty for eighteen or twenty hours, often with but very little to eat during that time, perform successfully such duties as these? Are their eyes and brains as clear, or their judgment as good, as those of men not overtaxed and in full use of their faculties in normal condition?

And when his term of usefulness is over, with nerveless hands and a heart of old age in the breast that ought yet to be filled with youth, the victim realizes that such years as may yet be vouchsafed him will be filled with pain and penury. He is thrown into the scrap heap. The race loses in his loss, for he once represented its highest physical energy. Can the race for its own sake, or for humanity's sake, indorse this sort of economy? Will railway consolidation lessen rivalry and stay the whip of this sort of progress? Or is the spirit of a higher civilization going to enter into the management? Or will the saving common-sense of the general managers lead them to check this fatal progress? Already the hands are growing unsteady and the brains beclouded. The year just closed has been a very carnival of railroad disasters. Shorter hours of service and less exhausting labor in one trip must come, or more and yet more appalling disasters await the railroads and the people.

Good business sense may govern in finding the remedy, but how much more pleasant life would be if the remedy were found in man's humanity to man!

HUNTINGTON, W. VA. H. R. MCLAUGHLIN.

Some New Educational Theses.— The address on "The American University" recently read by Professor J. McKeen Cattell, of Columbia University, before the Phi Beta Kappa of Johns Hopkins, has a combination of sense, audacity, and breeziness that amounts almost to a gale. For example, he says: "Ten years of age is early enough to begin to read, write, and calculate; primary education should be chiefly for the formation of motor habits; a child's head will not hold more miscellaneous facts than can be injected in a year or two; he can learn nearly as much of his present scholastic studies in two hours a day as in eight. If the required school attendance for each child were reduced to one-half or one-third, then, without additional expense, the fewer buildings and smaller equipment might be doubled or tripled in value, and the salaries of teachers might be doubled or tripled. The best-trained teachers, more men than women, should be in charge of the younger children. If society must develop a class similar to the neuter insects, it should not have charge of the education of children.

The boy should stay in the high school until he is eighteen, and then go to the university, or he should enter the college at sixteen and pass forward to the university in two years. The man should begin to take part in the real work of the world at twenty-one, but he should never regard his education as complete, and should for many years, if not always, continue to spend some time in work at the university. . . . .

"In my opinion, the university is or should be a group of professional schools, giving the best available preparation for each trade and profession. It is more feasible to give such training than to teach culture or research. These, like the building of character, are not the result of any particular kind of curriculum. Culture comes from daily and immediate association with the best that the world has; and this should be found at the university. . . . .

"The chief difficulty in securing the right men for university chairs is the small field from which they must be drawn. When we have a hundred thousand men of university training teaching in the schools, there will be those deserving promotion. When we have more students doing research work at the universities, there will be more men of genius for the higher offices. . . . . We should, without delay, introduce the *Privatdocent* system of Germany." E. C. H.

The Definition of Sociology.—The opening article in the *Popular Science Monthly* for June reproduces a discussion before the Philosophical Society of Washington, on "The Definition of Some Modern Sciences." There was an introduction by Professor W. H. Dall. Hon. Carroll D. Wright spoke on statistics, Professor Roland P. Falkener on political economy, Professor E. A. Pace on psychology, and Lester F. Ward on sociology.

Mr. Ward offers the proposition that "in the complex sciences the quality of exactness is only perceivable in their higher generalizations," or "scientific laws increase in generality as the sciences to which they apply increase in complexity." Accordingly, in sociology, the most complex of the sciences, the laws must be the most highly generalized. The wants and passions of men everywhere show resemblances, and are subject to a uniform law of psychic and social development in all corners of the earth. "There is nothing new in 'news' except a difference in the names. The events are always the same." Society is a domain of law, and sociology is an abstract science in the sense that it does not attend to details except as aids in arriving at the law that underlies them all. There are many social or sociological laws, but they all may be grouped and generalized into one fundamental law, the law of *parsimony*. This has been regarded as merely an economic law, but it is much broader than this. It has its homologue in the natural sciences, and is the scientific corner-stone of that collective psychology which constitutes so nearly the whole of sociology. A sentient and rational being will always seek the greatest gain, or the maximum resultant of gain — his "marginal" advantage. This refers not alone to pecuniary gain, or temporary or immediate gain. It allows the effectiveness of worthy as well as of unworthy motives, and the "transcendental" interests. E. C. H.

Abolition of the Death-Penalty.—In the *Archiv für Kriminal-Anthropologie und Kriminalistik*, 9. Bd., 2. Heft, Ernst Lohsing has an article on "Abschaffung der Todesstrafe." Professor Hans Gross, editor of this publication, in its seventh volume had maintained that to put to death anarchists who have attempted assassination is to help them in the direction of their desire to die in the glory of martyrdom, while taking along a mighty companion to the shades. He accordingly argued that, if not for all classes of criminals, at least for anarchistic assassins the death-penalty should be abolished.

Upon this proposition the present writer makes two comments: (1) The criminal has no right to punishment. Punishment is meant to be without the will or against the will of the criminal. Yet, as in the case of tramps who steal in order to be housed and fed in jail through the winter, crime may have punishment as its aim. (2) But if the above suggestion regarding anarchists were adopted, then any murderer who wished to escape the death-penalty would need only to make it appear that he was an anarchist aspiring to martyrdom. The writer nevertheless welcomes the reopening of the question of abolition of the death-penalty. There are cases in which the inno-

cent are condemned. Indeed, as Goldfield remarks, "earthly justice must let fall her sword if she could condemn only in cases of absolute certainty, for witnesses may lie, documents be false, confessions untrue, circumstances misleading."

At the close of this article the editor reiterates his belief that the death-penalty is unjust, antiquated, and dangerous to public weal. E. C. H.

Land and Landscape in the North American Popular Spirit. — While it is impossible to adequately analyze the soul of a people, the task may be simplified by showing the unquestionable influence of the natural surroundings on the mind. The vast political and economical schemes of the American people were suggested to them by the wide area which opened free lands before the immigrant colonists. The imperialistic idea is not of recent origin, but has been working in the people from the begining. It was released from fetters by the War of Independence and was given a new sense of power by the successful struggle for national unity.

Out of the huge enterprises of a continental opportunity has arisen the maker of commercial combinations. To the American "business is art and science, and he devotes himself to it as we do to a scientific work, and he finds therein the poetry of discovery and of solutions of puzzles." The huge in finance is adored, and out of the "golden calf" has grown the mastodon calf.

Individualism is trusted to the extreme limit, even where many weak ones are crushed. In Emerson the doctrine of self-reliance becomes a philosophy of life. Under all the rough and crude aspects of life a real scientific spirit is growing, and in Cooper, Whittier, and Emerson a delicate and spiritual appreciation of landscape which lends luster to the hard struggle of life in the New World. In the sense of humor also lies an evidence and a source of power. In all ways this young people has "grown up with the country" and come to be conscious of its lofty destiny.— PROFESSOR FRIEDRICH RATZEL (Leipzig University), in *Deutsche Monatschrift*, July, 1902.

C. R. H.

The Value of Human Life.— In the *Popular Science Monthly* for June, Marshall O. Leighton concludes that courts of law have given such careful scrutiny to the value of the individual to his family, measured by economic productiveness, as to yield trustworthy results; that these results are corroborated by common observation and statistical reasoning; and that the pecuniary value of a life is subject to the same economic laws that apply to the more vulgar commodities. According to these principles the average life rises from an economic value of $1,000 soon after birth to a maximum of nearly $8,000 soon after the age of twenty-five, and thence declines to half the latter amount at the age of sixty. Such results have a curious interest, based as they are upon the decision of courts. E. C. H.

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A NEW FACTOR IN THE ELEMENTARY-SCHOOL CURRICULUM.

PREVIOUS to the invention of the printing press there was no elementary school. The education of children was provided by other agencies, among which the family was most important. The elementary school, as a separate institution, originated in the democratic movement that swept over western Europe during the closing years of the Middle Ages and the centuries immediately following. Its function, at first, was not to take charge of those phases of education previously attended to by the family, but to supplement the work by supplying the child with tools made necessary by changed social conditions. The practical education supplied by the family was now found to be insufficient. A demand arose on the part of the people for the opportunity to learn how to read, write, and compute simple arithmetical processes. In response to this demand the elementary school arose, and the three R's long reigned supreme.

But times change. The needs of one age are not identical with those of another. As a consequence of this fact, the institutions organized to meet the demands of one age need constantly to adjust themselves to changing conditions in order to render to society the service that is due.

Stupendous changes have taken place in society since the organization of the elementary school. Revolutions in the

industrial and political world have transformed the entire social fabric. The school has felt the action of the new forces and has recognized, in a measure, the validity of the claims represented by each. The scientific spirit, so strong during the last decade, has made itself felt; and we have, in addition to the older geography, the elements of nearly every physical and natural science. Political forces have extended throughout the length and breadth of the land, and appear in the elementary curriculum in the form of civics, political history, and lessons in patriotism. Increasing wealth and leisure are making it possible for art to flourish, and in many quarters it now occupies an important place in the elementary curriculum. The rapid growth of cities, which has attended the development of the factory system, has crowded people together as never before. The consciousness of social responsibility that has been developed in the process is making itself felt, and appears in the school in the demand for a place for the study of social conditions and means of amelioration. The commercial spirit that dominates the age operates to place an emphasis upon the more utilitarian aspects of life. The manual-training movement, which originated in northwestern Europe in the desire to preserve, through school instruction, the technique that was threatening to disappear, has extended to this country, and, under the combined influence of utilitarian and educational forces, has been added to the curriculum. And, finally, educators have become conscious of the fact that there is a deeper significance in the simple house industries in which all children formerly participated than the practical result obtained; and they are beginning to demand an opportunity for the child to participate in industries that have been transferred from the home to the factory. In spite of all these new and vigorous forces, tradition is still powerful and clings to a Middle-Age formalism with a tenacity that would do credit to a better cause.

It is not strange that for several years the subjects corresponding to such diverse forces as these just enumerated should fail to find in one another mutual support. There has not yet been time for the reconciliation to be made. The lack of unity

has been felt in many places, and attempts have been made, both in theory and in practice, to supply the need. Many tendencies in school practice indicate that the time is ripe for more organized effort than has hitherto been possible. There is less tendency than formerly to occupy children with mere "busy-work." There is an increasing eagerness on the part of teachers of all grades to avail themselves of any opportunity by means of which they can substitute for isolated activities occupations vitally related to the content studies of the period. Teachers of manual training are groping about in search of some clue to the problem of how to co-operate with teachers of other subjects and at the same time preserve the integrity of their own work. The same tendency is manifest in the desire to illustrate the content studies by means of various forms of hand-work. Such tendencies as these, although promising with reference to the temper of the times, are superficial and temporary in their effect. They furnish no principle by means of which to unite head, heart, and hand in a process sufficiently broad and far-reaching in its effects to be truly educative.

The many attempts of educational philosophers to discover a unifying principle need not be reviewed at this time. They serve to suggest that, theoretically at least, the need of such a principle has long been felt. Experiment has added the weight of its evidence toward the same end. Many noteworthy contributions have been made. But, in spite of all these, the curriculum of the elementary school, except in specially favored localities, is in nearly as confused a state as ever.

During the past ten years the attention of the educational world has been focused upon the work of Professor John Dewey. He, more than any other educational philosopher, embodies the spirit of the new age and finds a genuine reconciliation of conflicting forces within the educational process itself. His work thus stands in marked contrast to previous attempts at unification which have sought a principle of unity in some one phase of the process or from some external source. His analysis of the educational process as to its form and its content is, perhaps, the most remarkable contribution that has yet been made to

educational philosophy.[1] In respect to content, he classifies the various forces in the educational process under two heads: the individual and the social. The individual factor corresponds to the psychological conception of the process and represents the means, the agency, the method; while the social factor corresponds to the social conception of the process and represents the end, the work to be done, the subject-matter. The point that he emphasizes throughout the discussion is the fact that each of these conceptions, abstracted from the educational process, is but a partial truth, requiring the other in order to give it its true meaning.

Perhaps the most significant fact with reference to the work of Professor Dewey is his educational laboratory, where he is bringing his educational theories to a practical test in the teaching of children of all ages. The general interest manifested in this school the world over indicates the general belief that problems are being worked out there that promise rich results along educational lines.

It is very probable that some of the most fruitful work of this period will be along lines which will render available for general use materials necessary in order to apply the principle that Professor Dewey has been most successful in establishing. Many difficulties are now in the way of the teacher who would make a practical application of the principles. But the very fact that we are becoming conscious of these circumstances as difficulties is a most favorable sign, and promises much toward securing a more rational adjustment than has hitherto been possible.

While such questions are being worked out in a practical way, an attempt is being made to bring to the problem of the elementary school another force which has not generally been recognized as having any relation to the problem. Anthropology is a comparatively new science. The difficulties encountered in the collection of the necessary data and in the interpretation of materials are such as to require the use of refined intellectual

[1] A complete exposition of this subject may be found in PROFESSOR DEWEY'S unpublished lectures on the "Philosophy of Education."

tools. For the development of these tools anthropology had to await the development of geology, biology, psychology, sociology, and other kindred sciences. But the organic character of society is illustrated here as elsewhere, and anthropology is now ready to render service to the sciences to which it owes its rise. An examination of its relation to the various sciences and arts would well repay the labor involved in a careful investigation of the subject. But that is too large a subject for this occasion. Attention is invited at this time to but one phase of the larger subject—the relation of anthropology to the curriculum of the elementary school.

The curriculum represents the social factor in the educational process. It corresponds to the stimulus, the individual factor being represented by the response. Since stimulus and response are but two phases of one activity, it is evident that the complexity of the stimulus bears a direct relation to the complexity of the response. That which constitutes the stimulus in a given case is not the external object itself, but the object functioning with reference to the individual. Whether an object functions as a stimulus in a given situation depends upon its relation to the attitudes of the child. These attitudes, which are largely the product of remote racial activities, and hence social products in a measure from the first, determine, within fairly definite limits, the nature and complexity of social stimuli. Manifestly it is the part of education to discover these attitudes, in order that materials may be presented that are best adapted to promote the normal growth of the child. It is likewise important to guard against the use of materials that are liable to occasion experiences not conducive to such growth.

Anthropology has made important contributions to the study of the child's attitudes, and, as the science develops, it will undoubtedly yield still greater results. Assuming that the reader is familiar with these results and with the literature of mental development, let us pass directly to the consideration of the relation of anthropology to the elementary curriculum.

Because the child's attitudes are yet comparatively simple, because they have not yet been overlaid by complex social

habits, the social forces represented in our highly organized institutions cannot function completely in his life. The greater part of what they represent, not being appropriated by the child, remains as something external and quite foreign to his experience. There are some phases of the complex life about him that he can experience, but too often that which is most vital is obscured in the complexity of the situation. This is as true with reference to the social forces represented in a text-book as with reference to the industrial and social processes observed in the community. In either case it is impossible for the child to gain an experience that is truly educative, for the process represents a technique too advanced for him to control. As long as such a relation exists between the ability of the child and the technique involved in the subject-matter of study, the question of the unification of the curriculum must remain forever unsolved, for the educational process from which the principle of unification is derived is not present. But, if the partial experiences of the child with reference to the complex life about him are supplemented by experiences similar in kind, but of a type suited to his powers, he can deal with the situation in an adequate way; and, if he be encouraged to invent simple ways of improving the crude processes, he gradually acquires such an insight and control as to enable him to recognize the essential elements in the more complex processes of civilized life. He is thereby enabled to participate more fully in the life of the present, because he has had the opportunity to experience it in more elementary forms.

Under such circumstances the unification of the curriculum is a simple matter, provided the anthropological materials necessary in order to present the simple forms of present problems are available. Under such favorable conditions the various subjects of the curriculum appear as different phases of one process. The industrial activities of the stage of culture under consideration furnish a proper field for manual training, which, enriched and liberalized by the social experiences of the race which called forth and developed the activity, is no longer open to the criticism that it serves merely utilitarian needs. These experi-

ences, which form the social setting for the child's constructive activities, constitute the history of this period.

Constructive activity is also the means of acquiring an experience which is the foundation of the sciences and arts. The science of the child is but one phase of his constructive activity. This activity requires that the child of seven years exploit his environment in the search of raw materials which he requires for his constructive work; that he experiment with them until he finds a way of rendering obstinate materials more pliable, and crooked ones straight; that he invent tools and devices of various kinds by means of which he can economize his own energy, or apply a motive power other than that of his own muscles; that he exploit his own neighborhood with reference to the fitness of different localities to supply the needs of the various hunting, fishing, pastoral, agricultural, mining, or trading people that he may be interested in at the time. Such activities as these bring the child into close contact with the earth as the source of supply and enable him to gain control over his own powers. Thus the way is paved for a more intelligent control over the materials and forces of his natural environment.

The child's spontaneous art activities, as well as his interest in art products, indicate that there is much in the art of primitive peoples that is necessary in order to pave the way to an appreciation of the higher art forms. In fact, each subject of the curriculum finds the germ of its development in the life of primitive peoples. When this fact is more generally recognized, when all subjects of the curriculum are developed naturally, it will be possible for the child to translate the subject-matter into terms of his own practical activities. This is the essential condition in order to secure a unified curriculum. When subjects are presented that are too far beyond the reach of the child to become a part of his experience, when he is obliged to use words that have little significance to him, the search for a unifying principle must be in vain.

The question of organizing constructive activities so as to present well-graded steps in the evolution of technique is a fundamental one. It is not at all strange that many teachers—

who appreciate its importance, and who have secured it by a logical series of constructive activities with little or no relation to the curriculum as a whole—hesitate to change their position. But, if it can be shown that it is possible to organize the curriculum so that the various subjects will stand in mutually helpful relations, while each preserves its own individuality, there will be less reluctance in making the change.

One of the most important considerations in determining the gradation of the steps in technique is the demand made by each upon the physical co-ordinations of the child. His spontaneous activities furnish the clue to this, and it is always possible to find stimulating problems which represent important achievements of the race at a time when its problems in technique were similar to those with which the child is now grappling. When we consider that the type of the child's physical co-ordinations was fixed by the activities of primitive people, and that the type of his emotional and intellectual attitudes is largely a product of that time, from the point of view of the satisfaction of the child in the use of his powers the path marked out by the race is a safe guide. When, on the other hand, we consider that our forefathers, when still in the stages of savagery and barbarism, acquired a sympathetic knowledge of nearly every raw material now used for manufacturing purposes, that they acquired an almost inimitable skill in many industrial processes, that they worked out all of the mechanical principles that have yet been discovered, and that the problems that they worked out during the long ages are the basis of the civilization of today, we cannot fail to recognize that the history of their achievements furnishes a variety of technical sequences of inestimable value for educational purposes. Sequences which exhibit the development of tools, utensils, modes of cooking and serving food, habitations, modes of defense, means of travel and transportation by land and water, clothing, ornament, musical instruments, etc.—all these are especially valuable if made use of at a time when the technique of the processes involved is sufficiently difficult to stimulate and sufficiently simple to be worked out thoroughly enough to secure educational results.

As the child develops, the materials of the curriculum should change to keep pace with the change in his attitudes and powers. To assume that the materials derived from the study of anthropology are of equal importance at all times during the elementary-school period would be a mistake. It would likewise be a mistake to assume that all other considerations should yield place to the establishment of a course of study based upon anthropology. The social factor is but one phase of the educational process, and anthropology at no time represents the whole of the social factor. Unless anthropological material is so used as to function with reference to the present and the future, it falls short of its real mission. It is an essential factor in the educational process only when it represents a stimulus that appeals to the child more powerfully and more fruitfully than social stimuli selected from other stages in the development of society. A technique founded upon the nature of the child and upon the successive achievements of the race along cumulative lines is a safer one to follow than one which is an abstraction from various processes related only in respect to technique. It has the advantage of a more pronounced individuality than a purely logical course can ever have; and, in addition, it has associations which cannot fail to stimulate the inquiring attitude along lines fundamental in the development of the sciences and arts.

Anthropology is of service, also, in arousing an interest in public works. Its simplest beginnings may be illustrated in the improvement made in such natural means of protection as trees, islands, rocky peninsulas, and marshes; the erection of pile dwellings in lakes; the protection of springs and quarries; the building of roads and bridges, and the digging of canals and irrigating ditches. Such activities furnish the child basal concepts of service in interpreting the public works in his own city. Anthropology presents to the child a simple society. Its social forces are clear and well defined. Motives are evident. Processes are simple and fairly direct. Technique is simple, and its relation to the process is evident. The child is thus able to perceive the need, and, the need once realized, the child is alert in inventing ways of meeting it.

The limitations now placed upon practical activity in the schoolroom are such that much of the child's interest in public works must expend itself in an illustrative and a dramatic rather than in a more real way. The facilities afforded by playgrounds and the unoccupied land in the vicinity may be made use of in many cases. Where such opportunities are not present it is important that the means of illustration be supplemented by activities which call forth such a degree of co-operative effort as is represented in the real construction of the work. The magnificent public works of ancient times are significant, not with reference to the huge piles of masonry which appear in the external product, not with reference to the form, although that is not a matter of indifference, but with reference to the social conditions of the people whose ideas they embody. Public works have a larger place in the curriculum of the elementary school than is usually accredited to them. They serve to widen the sympathies and to arouse a consciousness of a larger self than those activities which have reference merely to the individual, the family, or smaller social groups. It is to anthropology that we must look for the most valuable racial experiences available for the enrichment of the child's first efforts along these lines.

When anthropological research shall have become more extended and its results organized with reference to educational needs, the difficulty that teachers now feel in attempting to correlate the various subjects in the curriculum will be greatly minimized, if they do not entirely disappear. The service which anthropology can render is to furnish the fundamental facts with reference to the typical activities in the successive stages of primitive culture. These facts once in the possession of one fitted by interest and training for the work of interpretation and organization, a course of study can readily be outlined which will represent the social factor of the educational process more vitally than ever before.

With the development of anthropology, and with the growth of the departments of education in our great universities, it ought not to be necessary for teachers in the elementary schools

to be handicapped much longer for the lack of proper materials, or for children to be deprived of their full heritage from the past. We can no longer close our eyes to the significance of the long period of development from which our civilization has but recently emerged. We cannot cut loose from the past if we would. We dare not build our educational institutions upon any other foundation than that which has been marked out for us by the action of both physical and social heredity. The activities of our prehistoric forefathers condition every instinctive act of our lives. They form the larger element in the motive of our most refined activities. They contain the germ of all in life that we most prize.

When specialists in anthropology and education shall have restored the means of appropriating a larger share of our heritage, when through their united efforts there is a more general understanding of the nature of the child and his relation to the various social forces in life, the teacher will find her work less irksome, and the child will find in the activities of the school the satisfaction that comes from a successful use of his own powers. The materials in the educational process are not static. They are rich in associations. They call forth varied trains of imagery. They speak in a language intelligible to the child, for he recognizes them as a part of his own activity.

Anthropology, then, is one factor in the education of the child. It serves to utilize energy which might otherwise become wasted or expended in anti-social forms, and to enrich the practical activities of the child by relating them to society. It makes possible a natural unification of the various subjects of the curriculum, securing to each a richer and fuller development by establishing its fundamental relations with the others. It makes it possible for the child to conceive of the work of the school as akin to that in the larger world. It is beginning to render to the cause of elementary education such a service as that rendered by industrial activities in the upbuilding and maintaining of society.

The following list of recent books and articles serves to indicate the direction that the educational thought of the time is taking with reference to the questions which are considered in the above article:

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Some Demands of Education upon Anthropology. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, Vol. II, p. 839.

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YOUNG, ELLA FLAGG. Isolation in the School. The University of Chicago Press.

The Elementary School Teacher and Course of Study. Ibid.

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THE NUMBER OF MEMBERS AS DETERMINING THE SOCIOLOGICAL FORM OF THE GROUP. II.

MERELY another variation of the same fundamental sociological constellation may be expressed in the observation that relationships of twos, composition of a whole out of only two participants, must presuppose a higher degree of individualization on the part of each of these than, *caeteris paribus*, in the case of combinations of many elements. In the present instance the essential factor is that in a combination of two there is no majority which can override the individual, and that occasion for such a majority is given so soon as a single unit is added. Relationships, however, in which the domination of an individual by a majority is possible, not merely depress the individuality, but, so far as they are voluntary, they will not be readily entered upon by very decided individualities. In this connection, nevertheless, we must distinguish two frequently interchanged concepts; namely, the decided and the strong individuality. There are persons and collective structures of the extremest individualization that, however, have not the energy to protect this peculiarity against suppressions or leveling forces. On the contrary, the strong personality may confirm its formation in reaction with these very contrasts, in struggle for its peculiarity, and in opposition to all temptations to smoothing and mixture. The former, the merely qualitative individuality, will shun unions in which it finds itself in antithesis with an eventual majority; it is, on the contrary, as it were, predestined to the manifold unions in pairs, because, by reason of its differentiation, as well as its susceptibility to attack, reinforcement by another is its indicated recourse. The other type, the more intensive individuality, rather courts, on the other hand, the opposition of others against whose quantitative excess it can preserve its dynamic superiority. Technical grounds, so to speak, will justify this preference: the triple consulate of Napoleon was decidedly more convenient for him than a duality would have been, for he needed to gain

over only the *one* colleague (which is very easy for the stronger nature among three) in order to dominate the other; that is, in fact, to dominate the other two in the most legal form. On the whole, it may be said that unions in pairs, as contrasted with those of larger numbers, favor a relatively higher individuality of the participants, while, on the other hand, they presuppose that the restraint of peculiarity through the social articulation to an average level is lacking. If it for that reason is true that women are the less individual sex, that their differentiations vary less from the species type than is on the average the case with men, it would help to explain the further very general opinion that they are, as a rule, less accessible to friendship than are men. For friendship is a relationship entirely founded upon the individuality of the elements, perhaps even more than marriage, which, through its traditional forms, its social fixities, its real interests, includes much that is super-individual and independent of the peculiarity of the personalities. The fundamental differentiation upon which marriage rests is, in itself, not individual, but it pertains to the species; friendship, however, rests upon a purely personal differentiation, and hence it is intelligible that in general real and permanent friendships are rare at the inferior levels of personal development, and that, on the other hand, the modern highly differentiated woman manifests notably enhanced capacity and inclination for friendships, alike with men and with women. The entirely individual differentiation has, in this case, attained decisiveness over that which pertains to the species, and we thus see the correlation formed between the sharpest individualization and a relation that at this grade is absolutely limited to duality. This, of course, does not prevent the same person from forming at the same time various relations of friendship.

That combinations of two in general have, as such, specific traits is shown not merely by the fact that the entrance of a third modifies them entirely, but still more the variously observed fact that the still further extension to four or more by no means modifies the nature of the combination to a correspondingly wide degree. For example, a marriage union resulting in a single child has a quite different character from a childless union,

while there is not an equally significant difference between it and the union resulting in two or more children. To be sure, the difference in its essential nature which the second child produces is again much greater than that springing from the arrival of the third. But this simply follows the above rule; for a family with one child is still, in many respects, a relationship between two members; namely, the parents as a unity, on the one hand, the child on the other. The second child is then in fact not merely a fourth, but, sociologically considered, at the same time also a third member in a relationship, and it exerts the peculiar influences of such third members; for within the family, so soon as the actual age of minority is passed, the parents constitute much more frequently a working unity than do the children as a totality.

Furthermore, in the realm of the forms of marriage the decisive difference is whether, on the one hand, monogamy prevails, or, on the other, the man has a second wife. If the latter is the case, the third or the twentieth wife is relatively without significance for the structure of the union. Within the boundaries of such a structure, the step to the second wife is here also, at least in *one* direction, richer in consequences than that to a still larger number, for precisely the duality of wives may give occasion, in the life of the man, to the sharpest conflicts and profoundest perplexities, which, in general, do not arise in the case of each higher number. For in the latter instance such a fundamental declassing and deindividualizing of the wives is involved, there is so decided reduction of the relationship to its sensuous basis (since every more spiritual union is always of a more individual nature), that in general it cannot lead to those profounder disturbances for the man which may flow directly and only from a dual relationship.

It is the same fundamental motive which reappears in the assertion of Voltaire about the utility of religious anarchy; that is, two rival sects within a state produce, unavoidably, disturbances and difficulties such as never could arise in the case of two hundred. The meaning which the dualism of the one element in a combination of several members possesses, is, of course,

not less specific and significant when it serves to secure, rather than disturb, the total relationship. Thus it is asserted that the collegiate relationship of the two Roman consuls perhaps operated more effectively against monarchical ambitions than the system of the nine highest functionaries in Athens. It is the same tension of dualism which works, now destructively, now conservatively, according to the other circumstances of the total association. The essential thing here is that this total association receives a totally different sociological character so soon as the performance in question is the work either of a single person, on the one hand, or of more than two, on the other. In the same sense as the Roman consuls, controlling colleges are often composed of two members: the two kings of the Spartans, whose incessant frictions were expressly emphasized as the security of the state; the two highest war chiefs of the Iroquois; the two civic heads of mediæval Augsburg, where the movement for a unified mayoralty was threatened with severe penalties. The peculiar tensions between the dualistic elements of a relatively large structure maintain the functions concerned at the *status quo;* while, in the instances cited, reduction to unity would easily produce an individual dominance; the extension to many, on the other hand, would easily establish an oligarchical clique.

In addition, now, to the type which presented the duality of the elements in general as so decisive that further numerical increase did not change it in a marked degree, I mention furthermore two very singular, but nevertheless, as sociological types, highly important facts. The political status of France in Europe was immediately modified most significantly when it entered into a close relationship with Russia. A third and fourth member of the alliance would produce no further essential variation after the principal change had once occurred. The contents of human life vary to a considerable degree in accordance with whether the first step is the most difficult and decisive, and all later steps have in comparison with it secondary importance, or whether the first step in itself means nothing, but its continuations and advances realize the modifications toward which it

merely points. The numerical relationships of socialization furnish, as will later appear more and more, abundant examples for both forms. For to the state which has lost its political prestige by isolation, the fact of any alliance at all is the decisive matter, whereas perhaps definite economic or military advantages may be reached only when a circle of combinations is realized, from which not even *one* may be lacking without totally preventing the success of the whole. Between these two types there is evidently, then, the one into which the definite character and result of the combination enter, in direct ratio with the number of the elements; for example, as a rule in the case of the unification of great masses. The second type comprises the experience that relationships of command and assistance change their character in principle when, instead of *one* servant, assistant, or other subordinate, there are two in the same relationship.[1] Housekeepers often prefer, entirely apart from the question of expense, to get along with a single servant, on account of the peculiar difficulties that come with an increase of the number. From the natural need of attachment the single servant will seek to approach and identify himself with the personal sphere and the circle of interests of his employer. Precisely the same cause will influence him, however, to compose, with a possible second servant, a party against the employer, for now each has a recourse in the other. The class feeling, with its latent or conscious opposition against the employer, does not become effective until there are two, because it emerges as the common element between them. In short, the sociological situation between the superior and the inferior is absolutely changed so soon as the third element is added. Instead of solidarity, party formation is rather the more natural tendency. Instead of emphasis upon that which is a bond of union between servant and master, the emphasis is rather put on that which divides them, because community is now sought on the side of the

[1] [This example is drawn from the conditions of central Europe. The author asks to have any necessary comment added, in case American experience is different. The illustration is quite as vivid to Americans as to Europeans, and thousands of American households reckon constantly with this among other factors of domestic problems.—Tr.]

associate, and is, of course, found precisely in that which constitutes the antithesis between the two and the superior. Moreover, the transformation of the numerical into a qualitative difference remains not less fundamental when it shows the reverse result for the controlling element of the association. It is easier to hold at the desired distance two subordinates than one, and their superior possesses, in their jealousy and competition, an instrument for keeping each down and making him obedient, for which there is no equivalent to be used in the case of a single inferior. In a formally similar sense, an old proverb says: "He that hath one child is its slave; he that hath more is their master." In each case the combination of threes is distinguished as a completely new structure from that of twos. The latter are characterized by the fact that the former are specifically differentiated, only backward, in contrast with the dual combinations, but not forward, by contrast with those which are composed of four and more elements.

In transition to the special forms of the tripartite combination of elements, attention must be called to the variety of group characters which their division into two or into three chief parties announces. Periods of excitement habitually place the whole of public life under the motto: "He that is not for me is against me." The consequence must be a division of the elements into two parties. In such case the duality appears, not as the point of departure of sociological formations, but as result and expression of them. We cannot make the tremendous variety of the forms of relationship, and of the degrees of repulsion and attraction within them, more evident than in the application of that principle; for all interests, convictions, impulses, which place us in any positive or negative relationship whatsoever to others, are differentiated by the extent to which the principle applies to them, and they may be arranged in a series, starting from the radical exclusion of all mediation and nonpartisanship and extending to tolerance for the contrasted standpoint, as one that is also legitimate and, up to a certain gradation of *more-or-less*, in agreement with the peculiar standpoint. Every decision which has a relationship to the narrower or wider circle that sur-

rounds us, which assigns us a station in it, which includes a subjective or external co-operation, a well-wishing or a mere acquiescence, a magnifying of self, or a positive imperiling of self, occupies a definite degree in such a scale. Each draws an ideal line around us which definitely includes or excludes every other with finality, or it has gaps to which the question of inclusion or exclusion is not proposed, or the line is so drawn that it makes possible a mere tangency, or a merely partial inclusion and partial exclusion. Whether and with what decisiveness the question "for me or against me" is raised, is determined by no means merely by the logical precision of its content, nor by the passion with which the soul insists upon this content, but rather by the relation of the questioner to his social circle. The narrower and more compact this circle is, the less can the agent coexist with others than those who are of entirely similar minds; and the more his ideal demand synthesizes the totality of all the latter as a unity, the more uncompromising will be, in each case, the pressing of the question "for or against." The radicalism with which Jesus formulates this alternative rests upon the unlimited strength of the feeling of the peculiar unity of all those to whom his message has come. That there can be, with reference to this message, not merely acceptance or rejection, but only acceptance or hostility, this is the strongest expression of the unlimited unity of those who belong with him and of the unlimited externality of those who do not belong with him. The struggle, the being against me, is always a decisive relationship; it proclaims a still stronger subjective unity, although perverse in its tendency, than the indifferent standing by, and the compromising half-and-half doing. The basal sociological feeling will consequently impel to the division of the whole complex of elements into two parties. Where, on the contrary, that passionate, comprehensive feeling with reference to the whole is lacking, which constrains each to take a positive attitude of acceptance or of attack with reference to the emerging idea or demand; where every fractional group contents itself essentially with its existence as a partial group, without taking seriously the demand for inclusion of the whole, there a platform is given for

a multiplicity of party structures, for tolerance, for intermediate parties, for a scale of graded changes. That epochs in which great masses are set in motion closely correspond with the dualism of parties, exclude indifferentism, and degrade the influence of mediating parties, is intelligible from the radicalism which we have observed as the character of mass movements. The *simplicity* of the ideas by which these are led demands a decisive yes or no. In the presence of the fundamental practical problems, there are, as a rule, only those two simple standpoints, while there may be innumerable that are mixed and thus mediating. In the same way, as a rule every *energetic* movement within a group, from the domestic group through the whole series of interest communities up to the political, will tend to promote stratification into a pure dualism. The accelerated tempo in the evolution of interests in the progress through stages of development, urges constantly toward more definitive decisions and separations. All mediations require time and leisure; quiet and stagnant epochs, in which the live questions are not stirred up, but are left covered by the regularity of the everyday interests, easily permit unobserved transitions to occur, and they give room for indifferent personalities which a more energetic tendency would necessarily drag into the antithesis of the principal parties. The typical difference of the sociological constellation remains thereby evidently always that of the two or of three chief parties. In the function of the third, namely, that of mediating between two extremes, several may share in graded degrees. This function is, so to speak, only a sort of extension or refinement in the technical equipment of the principle. This mediation itself, however, the decisive modification of the configuration from within, occurs only through the addition of the *third* party.

The rôle which the third party plays, and the configurations which result between *three* social elements, are herewith already indicated in large measure. The two presented both the first synthesis and unification and also the first separation and antithesis. The appearance of the third denotes transition, conciliation, abandonment of the absolute antithesis—sometimes, indeed,

also the founding of such an antithesis. The tri-unity as such appears to me to produce three sorts of typical group-forms, which on the one hand are not possible with two elements, on the other hand, in case of a number greater than three, are either likewise excluded, or are merely extended quantitatively without changing their form-type.

1. *The unpartisan and the mediator.*—It is a highly effective sociological fact that the common relationship of isolated elements to a potentiality existing outside of themselves produces a unification between them—beginning with the league of states which is formed for defense against a common enemy, and extending to the "invisible church," which composes all believers into a unity, through the like relation of all to the one God. This society-constructing mediation of a third element is, however, to be treated in a later connection. For the third element has here such a distance, so far as the two others are concerned, that a real sociological reciprocity which embraces the three elements in a unity is not at hand. We have rather configurations of twos, since either the relation of those who act together is in question sociologically, or that which exists between them as a unity, on the one hand, and the center of interests in contrast with them, on the other hand. At this point, however, the question is concerning three elements so close to each other, or so approaching each other, that they permanently or temporarily constitute a group.

In the most significant case of bipartite combinations, namely, monogamous marriage, the child or the children, as a third element, may often exercise the function of holding the whole together. In the case of many nature peoples, the marriage is only considered actually complete or as indissoluble when a child is born. The ground for this rests, of course, in the value which the child has for the man, and in his inclination, sanctioned by statute or custom, to disown a childless wife. The actual result, however, is that this third additional element really for the first time closes the circle by binding the two others together. This may occur in two forms. Either the existence of the third element immediately produces or strength-

ens the attachment of the two, as for example, when the birth of a child increases the love of the parents for each other, or, at least, that of the man for the wife, or the relation of each one of the two to the third produces a new and *indirect* attachment between them, as the common cares of parents for a child universally signify a bond which must always lead beyond this child, and does not consist of sympathies which could spare this intermediate station. This coming into existence of essential socialization out of three elements, while the two elements of themselves offer resistance to socialization, is the reason why many essentially disharmonious married pairs wish for no children. It is the instinct that therewith a circle would be closed, within which they would be bound closer together—and that not externally alone, but also in the profounder psychic strata —than they are inclined to be. It is by no means a contradictory case if sometimes very intimate and passionate unions prefer to be childless. In such instances the immediate attachment is so strong that if a third element were to enter the circle, even though it is indirectly an element of cohesion, it would stimulate consciousness not so much of the attachment, which already exists in its highest degree, but rather of the indirectness of the relation through the third factor, which would thus operate relatively as an interruption. We must not overlook the fact, which is of the highest importance for all human attachment, that every mediation inserts itself *between* the elements which are to be combined, and thus separates in the very act of uniting them. When mediation is no longer necessary, this factor of interposition and separation, latent in every mediation, is accentuated: where mediation is superfluous, it is for that very reason worse than superfluous, and becomes quite as obnoxious as where its unifying function as such is not desired.

Another variation of mediation occurs when the third element functions as a nonpartisan. In that case the mediator will either secure a consensus of the other two colliding elements, in which instance the mediator seeks to eliminate himself, and only to bring to pass that the two disunited or ununited parties may unite directly; or he acts as arbitrator and

attempts to reconcile to each other the conflicting claims, and to eliminate whatever in them is irreconcilable. The conflicts between laborers and employers have produced both forms, especially in England. We find boards of conciliation in which the parties, under the presidency of a nonpartisan, put an end to quarrels by conferences. The mediator in this form brings about reconciliation, to be sure, only when, in the belief of both parties, the circumstances in themselves indicate the advantage of peace; in a word, when the real situation in itself justifies peace. Apart from matter-of-course removal of misunderstandings, appeals to good intentions, etc., the way is prepared for progress of this belief among the parties, through the mediation of the nonpartisan, somewhat in the following manner: While the nonpartisan holds the claims and the arguments of the one party before the other, they lose the tone of that subjective passion which produces the like on the other side. Here appears, in a wholesome way, what is so often to be regretted; namely, that the feeling which accompanies a psychic content within its first agent, within a second, to whom this content is transferred, is considerably weakened. For that reason recommendations and testimonials which must first pass several intermediate persons are so often impotent, even if their objective content comes with no real diminution to the person who is to give the final decision. In the transfer affective imponderabilities are lost which not only insufficient actual reasons replace, but even sufficient ones supply with the impulse for realization. This fact, which is highly significant for the development of purely psychical influences, brings to pass, in the simple case of a third mediating social element, that the modulations of feeling which accompany the demand, because they are formulated from one unpartisan side and represented to the other, suddenly fall away from the material content, and thus the circle fatal to all conciliation is avoided, viz., that the intensity of the one provokes that of the other, and then the latter reacts to increase the violence of the first, and so on until there is no stopping-place. More than this, each party not merely hears more objective statement, but each must also

express himself more objectively than in the case of immediate confronting of the contestant. For now it is an object to each party to win over the mediator also to its standpoint. Where the third party is not arbitrator, but merely the leader of the attempted reconciliation, and must constantly hold himself this side of actual decision, whereas the arbitrator finally takes a decided position on one side, this winning of the mediator's approval can be hoped for only on the basis of the most real grounds. Within the range of sociological technique there is nothing which so effectively promotes the uniting of conflicting parties as their objectivity; that is, the attempt to let the bare material-content underneath the complaints and demands speak for itself—to put it in philosophic terms, to let the objective spirit of the party standpoint speak—so that the persons appear only as the irrelevant vehicles of the same. The personal form in which objective contents are subjectively living must pay for its warmth, its shading, its depth of feeling, with the keenness of the antagonism which it produces in cases of conflict; the toning down of this personal factor is the condition upon which agreement and understanding are attainable between the opponents; and this is the case especially because only under such conditions does each party actually perceive what the other *must* insist upon. Psychologically expressed, the problem is that of reducing the volitional form of antagonism to the intellectual: the understanding is everywhere the principle of consensus; upon it as a basis there may be accommodation of those things which, upon the basis of feeling and of final appeal to the will, irreconcilably repel each other. The mediator's office is, then, to promote this reduction, to represent it at the same time in himself, or, otherwise expressed, to constitute a sort of central station which, in whatever form the controverted material may come in from one side, may give it out to the other side only in objective form, and may hold back everything over and above the objective which needlessly encourages strife carried on without mediation.

For the analysis of community life it is important to make clear that the constellation just characterized constantly occurs

in all groups which count more than two elements, even where the mediator is not specially chosen, and is not, as such, particularly known or designated. The group of three is here only type and scheme. All cases of mediation finally reduce to its form. There is no community of threes, from the conversation for an hour up to family life, in which there does not presently occur dissension, now between this pair, now between that, harmless or acute, momentary or permanent, of theoretical or practical nature, and in which the third does not exercise a mediatorial function. This occurs countless times in quite rudimentary ways, perhaps only in suggestive fashion, mixed with other actions and reciprocal relationships from which it is impossible to abstract the mediating function distinctly. Such mediations need not occur in words: a gesture, a way of listening, the quality of feeling which proceeds from a person, suffices to give to this dissent between two others a direction toward consensus, to make the essentially common underneath an acute difference of opinion perceptible, to bring this into the form in which it will most easily exert its proper influence. The issue need by no means be a real strife or struggle. It is rather the thousand easy varieties of opinion, the jarring of an antagonism of natures, the emergence of quite momentary antitheses of interest or feeling, which color the fluctuating form of every association, and is constantly modified in its course by the presence of the third party, who almost of necessity exercises the mediatorial function. This function passes around among the three elements in rotation, so to speak, since the ebb and flow of associated life constantly realize this form in the case of every possible combination of the elements.

The nonpartisanship demanded for mediation may have two sorts of pre-condition. The third party is nonpartisan if he is either beyond the interests and opinions which separate the others and is thus untouched by them, or if he shares in *both* in equal degrees. The former case is the simplest, and it involves the smallest number of complications. In conflicts between English laborers and employers, for example, a nonpartisan is often called in who must be neither laborer nor employer. In

this case the decisiveness with which the above emphasized separation of the material from the personal elements of the conflict is realized, is very noticeable. According to the presumption, the nonpartisan attaches no sort of personal interest to the material content of the partisan position. In him they are weighed merely as in a purely impersonal intellect, without affecting any subjective stratum of his personality. For the *persons* or the combinations of persons, however, who are the parties to these which for him are purely theoretical conflicts, he must have a subjective interest, for he would otherwise not undertake the function of mediator. Here, therefore, a purely objective mechanism will at the same time be set in motion by a subjective impulse; personal distance from the objective significance of the quarrel and interest in its subjective meaning must coexist in order to mark the status of the nonpartisan, and make him the more fitted for his function, the more distinctly each is differentiated in itself, and the more as a unity the two can work precisely in this differentiation.

The position of the nonpartisan tends to more complicated formation when he owes his position to equal participation in the contradictory interests instead of to indifference to both. A mediatorial status upon this basis is often made possible when a personality belongs locally to another circle of interests from that which is immediately concerned with the material question. Thus, for example, in earlier times the bishops could often intervene between the secular lord of their diocese and the pope. In the same way the administrative functionary who is involved in the special interests of his district may be the most appropriate mediator when a collision occurs between these interests and the general interests of the state of which he is an official. Likewise the degree of nonpartisanship and simultaneous interest which qualifies for mediation between two locally separated groups is often found in the case of persons who came from one of the groups and live in the other. The difficulty of such position of mediator usually consists in the fact that the equality of his interest for both parties, his essential equilibrium of interest, is not securely demonstrable, and is often enough suspected by

both parties. A still more difficult and often tragic situation occurs, however, when it is not such separated interest-provinces of the third party with which he is attached to each of the others, but when his *whole* personality is close to both. This case is most sharply defined when the object of struggle cannot be distinctly objectified, and the essential significance of the struggle is only an excuse or an accidental occasion for deeper personal incompatibilities. In such a case the third party, who is intimately united by love or duty, by destiny or habit, with each of the two in equal degrees, will be directly consumed by the conflict much more than if he placed himself upon one of the two sides. This is all the more the case since in these instances the equilibrium of his interests, which permits no one-sided decision, usually leads to no successful mediation, because reduction to a merely material antithesis is impossible. This is the type of very many family conflicts. Whereas the mediator who is nonpartisan through equal distance from the contestants can with relative ease do justice to both, he who is mediator by reason of equal nearness to both will find it very much more difficult, and will come personally into the most painful dualism of feeling. On that account, in case the mediator is *chosen*, under otherwise similar circumstances the equally uninterested will be preferred to the equally interested; as, for example, Italian cities in the Middle Ages often got their judges from other cities in order to be sure of their freedom from prejudice with reference to internal party quarrels.

Herewith is the transition given to the second form of unification by means of the nonpartisan: that is, to arbitration. So long as the third party works as a real mediator, the ending of the conflict rests finally in the hands of the parties themselves. By choice of the arbitrator they have put this ultimate decision out of their own hands. They have at the same time projected their purpose of conciliation beyond themselves. It has become a person in the arbitrator, whereby it attains special distinctness and energy in contrast with the antagonistic forces. The voluntary appeal to an arbitrator, to whom the parties subordinate themselves *a priori*, presupposes a greater subjective confidence

in the objectivity of the judgment than any other form of decision, for even before the civic court the action of the appellant only proceeds from confidence in the justness of the decision (since he regards that decision as just which is favorable to himself); the respondent must take part in the process, whether he believes in the nonpartisanship of the judge or not. Arbitration, however, occurs, as was said, only through this belief on *both* sides. In principle mediation is differentiated from arbitration very sharply by the difference thus pointed out, and the more official the conciliatory action is, the more tenaciously will this differentiation be kept in mind, from the conflicts between capitalists and laborers mentioned above, to those of high politics, in which the "friendly offices" of a government, for the adjustment of a conflict between two others, are something quite different from the function of arbitrator which the ruler of a third land is sometimes invited to undertake. In the everyday affairs of private life, where the typical group of three constantly forces the one into the evident or latent, complete or partial, difference between the other two, very many intermediate grades are produced. In the endless multiplicity of possible relationships the appeal of the parties to the third, and his voluntary or even forcibly undertaken efforts for unity will give him a status in which the mediatorial and the arbitrative element cannot always be separated. As preparation for understanding of the actual structure of human societies, and of their indescribable fulness and mobility, it is highly important to sharpen the vision for such additions and transitions, for the merely suggested and again disappearing forms of relationships, for their embryonic and fragmentary realizations. The examples in which, in each case, one of the concepts constructed for these forms of relationship is distinctly represented, are, to be sure, indispensable technical devices of sociology; but they have very much the same relation to the actual life of society which the approximately exact spatial forms with which we exemplify geometrical theorems have to the immeasurable complexity of the real forms of matter.

On the whole, in accordance with all the foregoing, the existence of the nonpartisan serves to promote the stability of the

group; as provisional representative of the intellectual energy, in contrast with the momentary disposition of the parties to be controlled more by will and feeling, he reinforces these parties, so to speak, to completeness of the psychic unity which resides in the life of the group. He is, on the one side, the retarding factor opposed to the impulsiveness of the other, while, on the contrary, he may carry and lead the movement of the whole group in case the antagonism of the two other elements would paralyze its energy. Nevertheless, this result may be transformed into its opposite. In case of the assumed correlation the elements of the group that are intellectually most endowed will especially incline to nonpartisanship, because cool intelligence is likely to find light and shade on both sides, and is not likely to find objective equity wholly on either side. Consequently the most intelligent elements are often unable to exert influence upon the decision of conflicts, although such influence from precisely such a quarter were highly to be wished. Just such elements as these should throw their weight into the balance when the group must choose between yes and no, since with their help the balance would be the more likely to incline toward the right side. If, therefore, nonpartisanship does not contribute to practical mediation, the consequence will be that through its connection with the intellectuality of the group the decision will be left to the play of the more foolish, or at least the more prejudiced, forces of the group. If, consequently, the nonpartisan attitude as such is so often, since Solon, the object of disapproval, the fact is, in the social sense, very salutary, and it runs back to a much deeper instinct for the welfare of the whole than merely to the suspicion of cowardice, to which nonpartisanship is often, though also often quite falsely, liable.

2. *The tertius gaudens.*—The nonpartisanship of the third element has benefited or injured the group as a whole, in the combinations thus far discussed. The mediator and the arbitrator alike wish to preserve the group unity against the danger of disruption. The nonpartisan, however, may use his relatively superior status in a purely egoistic interest. While in the former cases he acted as a means to the ends of the group, in this case,

on the contrary, he makes the reciprocal occurrences between the parties and between himself and the parties a means for his own ends. Here we have to do not always with previously consolidated structures, in the social life of which this occurrence emerges by the side of others, but now the relationship between the parties and the nonpartisan is often formed *ad hoc*. Elements which otherwise constitute no reciprocal unity may come into conflict; a third, previously unattached to both alike, may seize, by means of a spontaneous action, the opportunities which this conflict gives to him, the nonpartisan, and thus may set up a purely precarious reciprocity, whose vitality and richness of forms may for each element be entirely out of proportion to the fluidity of its constitution.

I note, without further discussion, two forms of the *tertius gaudens*, because the reciprocity within the tetrad, with the typical forms of which we are here concerned, does not appear very characteristically in these instances. Rather is the significant thing in these cases a certain passivity, which rests either upon the two contestants or upon the third element. The forms are these: In the first place the advantage of the third may be produced by the fact that the two others hold each other reciprocally in check, and he can now make a gain which one of these two would otherwise contest with him. The quarrel brings about in this instance merely a paralyzing of forces which, if they could, would turn against the third. The situation in this case thus really suspends the reciprocity between the three elements, instead of establishing it, without on that account, it must be added, excluding the most appreciable results for all three. We have to treat the intentional production of this situation in the case of the next configuration of threes. In the second place, advantage may accrue to the third party merely because the action of the one contending party realizes this advantage for purposes of its own, and without the necessity of using any initiative on the part of the person reaping the advantage. The type for this form is furnished by the benefactions and the promotions which a party may confer upon a third, merely for the sake of thereby embarrassing the opposing party.

For instance, the English laws for the protection of labor had their origin at first partly in the mere spite of the Tories against the Liberal manufacturers, and in the same way competition for popularity has produced very many ostensibly philanthropic actions. Strange as it is, it is a peculiarly petty and malicious temper which, for the sake of afflicting a second, confers a benefit upon a third. That indifference to the self-serving effects of philanthropy which is proper to altruism cannot more sharply appear than through such an exploiting of it. Moreover, it is doubly characteristic that one may reach the end of irritating the opponent both through the favors which one shows to his friend and through those conferred upon his enemy.

The formations of this type which are more essential at this point, result when the third party, for reasons of prudence respecting his own interests, adopts an attitude of practical support toward the one party (that is, not merely by way of intellectual decision, as in the case of the arbitrator) and from this attitude derives his mediate or immediate gain. Within this form there are two chief variations; namely, two parties are hostile to each other, and for that reason compete for the favor of a third; or two parties compete for the favor of a third, and are for that reason hostile to each other. This difference has specially important bearings upon the further development of the constellation. If an already existing hostility makes in the direction of an attempt by each party to get the favor of the third, the decision of this competition, that is, the attachment of the third to the one party, will really mean the beginning of the conflict. On the other hand, in case the two elements independent of each other seek the favor of a third, and this constitutes the ground of their hostility, of their partisanship, the final assignment of this favor, which is in this case end, not means, of the strife, will terminate the same. The decision is reached, and further hostility is therewith made meaningless. In both cases the advantage of nonpartisanship, with which the *tertius* originally stood in antithesis with the other two, consists in the fact that he can set his own *conditions* for the decision. Where, for any reason, this assignment of conditions is denied

to him, the situation does not bring to him the complete advantage. Thus, in one of the most frequent cases of the second type, namely, the competition of two persons of the same sex for the favor of the same person of the opposite sex. In this case the decision of the latter does not in general depend in the same sense upon the will of the latter as that of a purchaser between competing vendors, or that of a prince dispensing favors between competing solicitors. It is rather given through existing feelings, which are not determinable by will, and to that extent do not permit the decision to depend on completely free choice. For that reason we are not here speaking of proposals, the significance of which is merely the guidance of choice, and, although the situation of the *tertius gaudens* is completely given, its specific utilization is on the whole forbidden. The most comprehensive illustration of the *tertius gaudens* is the purchasing public under a régime of free competition. The struggle of the producers for purchasers gives to the latter almost complete independence of the individual source of supply, although the purchaser is completely dependent upon the aggregate of sellers, and therefore a coalition among them would at once reverse the relationship. The former situation of independence permits the purchaser to make his purchases conditional upon satisfaction of his demands as to quality and price of the goods. His status thus has, moreover, the special advantage that the producers must even seek to anticipate these conditions, to guess the unspoken or unconscious wishes of the consumer, to suggest to him conditions that are not present, or to accustom him to desirable conditions. From the first-mentioned case of the woman between two admirers, in which, because the decision depends upon their personality, and not upon their actions, she does not set conditions, and therefore does not exploit the situation, a continuous series of phenomena leads up to the case of modern commerce, from which the element of personal characteristic is completely eliminated, and in which the advantage of the party selecting extends so far that the competing parties even relieve him of the trouble of advancing the conditions to their maximum. This last is the utmost which the situation of *tertius gaudens* can accomplish for the latter.

Of the other formation, namely, that a conflict originally entirely unrelated to the third party forces its opponents to compete for the help of the latter, the history of every alliance, from that between states to that between members of a family, usually furnishes examples. The very simple typical course of events gains, however, in such a modification as the following, a peculiar sociological interest. In order to produce this advantageous situation for the third party, the energy which he is called upon to bring to bear by no means need possess a considerable quantity in proportion to that of either party. On the contrary, the necessary amount of the energy which he must have for the purpose is determined exclusively by the relationship which the energies of the parties exhibit toward each other. Evidently all that is necessary is that the addition of his reserve force to one of these shall give to the same a preponderance. When, therefore, the quantities of force are practically equal, a minimum of addition often suffices in order to give a final decision to one of the sides. Hence the frequent influence of small parliamentary parties, an influence which they could never win by their proper significance, but only through the fact that they are able to turn the scale between the great parties. Wherever majorities decide, that is, where everything often depends upon a single vote, the possibility exists that utterly insignificant parties may set the most relentless conditions for their support. The like may occur in the relationship of smaller to larger states when the latter are in conflict. It is merely necessary that the energies of two antagonistic elements paralyze each other, in order that the never so weak position of the unattached third party may attain to unlimited strength. Elements that are strong in themselves will, of course, profit not less from this situation, and especially because it frequently spares them the real mobilization of power. The advantages of the *tertius gaudens* will accrue to him from the situation here indicated, not merely when actual conflict occurs, but even from a tension and latent antagonism between the others. He functions in such a case through the mere *possibility* of giving his adhesion to the one or to the other, even if it does not come to

the serious extreme. This variation was illustrated in the case of English politics at the transition from mediæval to modern time; that is, it appeared in the fact that England no longer sought possessions and immediate power upon the continent, but always possessed a power which stood potentially between the continental governments. Already in the sixteenth century it was said: "France and Spain are the scales of the European balance; England, however, is the tongue or the holder of the balance." This case occurs, however, only when the potential capacity of the third party is *considerable*, because, if this power is transformed into a merely potential operation, it sacrifices in a very large degree its effective force, and it withdraws to a distance at which a power that is not very substantial would no longer enjoy much respect.

But the advantage which accrues to the third party from the fact that he has to the two others a relationship *a priori* equal, equally independent, and for that very reason decisive, is not solely dependent upon the fact that these two are in a relationship of hostility. It is enough, on the contrary, that between them there is only a certain degree of variation, alienation, or qualitative dualism. This is, indeed, the universal formula of the type, of which the hostility of the elements constitutes merely a special, although the most frequent, case. The following, for instance, is a very characteristic situation of advantage for a *tertius*, resulting from the mere duality: If B is under obligations to perform for A a certain definitely limited duty, and this obligation passes from B to C and D, between whom the performance is to be divided, it is a very natural temptation for A to impose upon each of the two, if possible, a fraction more than the half, so that in the aggregate he enjoys more than before, when the duty was in a single hand. In 1751 the government of Bohemia was obliged to forbid, in the case of the division of peasant holdings by the proprietors, the imposition upon each partial holding of more than its proportional share of the burden of customary service which attached to the undivided holding. In division of an obligation between two, the impression prevails that each individual has still less to do than the former individual

upon whom the whole rested. The precise balancing of the quantity consequently becomes a secondary matter, and may thus easily be omitted. While here, therefore, as it were, the mere numerical fact of the duality, instead of the unity, of the party produces the situation of the *tertius gaudens*, in the following case it arises from a duality that is determined by qualitative differences. The juridical prerogative of the English king after the Norman conquest, which was something unknown to mediæval Germany, is to be explained as follows: William the Conqueror encountered existing rights of the Anglo-Saxon population, which had to be respected in principle, and at the same time his Normans brought with them their peculiar rights; but these two legal complexes did not harmonize. They produced no unity of popular rights as opposed to the king, who could, by means of the unity of his interest, interpose between the two and to a considerable extent annul them. In the cleavage between the nations—not merely because they were in constant friction with each other, but because their very divergency forbade their uniting upon a law to be maintained in common—was the pillar of absolutism, and consequently its power steadily declined so soon as the two nationalities actually dissolved into a single one.

The favored status of the third party disappears, as a matter of course, at the moment in which the two others come together in a unity; that is, the grouping reverts in the respect that is now in question from the triad to the dyad type. It is instructive not merely with reference to the special problem, but as to group life in general, that this result may also occur without personal unification or consolidation of interests, while the object of antagonism is withdrawn from the conflict of subjective determination through objective fixation. The following case seems clearly to illustrate this generalization. Since modern industry leads to incessant interpenetration of the most numerous occupations, and constantly sets new tasks which do not belong historically to existing occupations, it produces, especially in England, very frequent conflicts about prerogative between the different classes of laborers. In the great industries the ship-

builders are in constant conflict with the carpenters, the tinmen with the blacksmiths, the boilermakers with the metal-workers, the masons with the roofers, as to which of them has a right to do a certain piece of work. Each trade quits work at once when it believes that another trade has invaded its rightful province. The insoluble contradiction in this case is that definite boundaries are assumed for subjective rights in objects which in their nature are in perpetual flux. Such conflicts between laborers have frequently very seriously disturbed their status as related to employers. The employer has a moral advantage so soon as his workmen strike on account of their differences with each other, and thus cause him immeasurable loss, and it is furthermore in his power to constrain at will each separate trade by the threat of employing another trade to do the work in question. The economic interest of each trade in preventing the transfer of the work rests upon the fear that the competing laborer may do it cheaper, and thus eventually depress the standard of wages for this work. It is consequently proposed, as the one possible solution, that the trade organizations in conference with the associated employers should set a standard of wages for each distinct kind of work, and then leave it to the employers to decide which class of laborers they will employ for the work in hand. In that case the excluded trade need not fear any harm to its economic interest *in principle*. Through the objectification of the matter in controversy, the employer loses the advantage in respect to depression of wages, and the playing off of the two parties against each other, although he retains the choice between the different bodies of workmen. The former indefiniteness between the personal and the material element is thus differentiated, and while in respect to the first the employer is still in the situation of the *tertius gaudens*, the objective fixation of the second has taken from this situation the chances for its exploitation.

Many of the species of conflict referred to here, and in the next formation, must have co-operated in the case of the secular powers of the Middle Ages, to produce or to increase the power of the mediæval church. In the presence of the perpetual dis-

turbances and conflicts in the larger and smaller political areas, the one stable power, which for its own sake was already honored or feared by each party, must necessarily have gained an incomparable prerogative. Times without number it is only the stability of the third party, in the changing stadia of the struggle, its indifference to the material in controversy, about which the parties oscillate up and down, which brings to it superiority and chances for gain. The more violently, and especially the longer, the struggle of parties keeps their positions in doubt, the more superior, respected, and advantageous will firmness and persistence, *purely as a formal fact*, make the position of a third party, even when, beyond this superiority given by the sociological form, those struggles lead to accumulations of power and developments of worth which are not assured by the stability and greater or less inflexibility of the third. Of this everywhere observable constellation there is probably no more gigantic example than that of the Catholic church. For the universal characterization of the *tertius gaudens*, applicable to all its forms, it is to be added that among the causes of his prerogative belongs the mere difference of psychical energies which he and the two others bring into the relationship. What I mentioned above in connection with the nonpartisan in general, namely that he represented rather the intellectuality, the contestants rather the feeling and the willing, gives him, in case he wants to exploit the situation egoistically, a controlling situation, as it were enthroned upon an ideal height, with that external advantage which in every complication he possesses who is not concerned with it on the affective side. And even where he declines practical exploitation of his more unprejudiced insight, and of his not previously engaged but always disposable powers, his situation brings him at least the feeling of an easy ironical superiority over the parties who for such an indifferent price, as it seems to him, risk so very much.

3. *Divide et impera.*— In these combinations of the triad scheme we have to do with an existing or an emerging conflict of two elements, from which the third derives an advantage; it is now a variation to be regarded as separate, although it is in

reality not always separable, that the third instigates the difference intentionally, in order to gain a controlling situation. It is also to be premised in this case that the triple number is, as a matter of course, only the minimum number of the elements requisite for this formation, and consequently it may serve as the most simple scheme. The essential fact here in question is that two elements are opposed to a third, and in this opposition they are either combined with each other or dependent upon each other, and that the third is able to set in motion *against each other* the two powers which are combined *against him.* The consequence is, then, that they either hold the balance against each other, so that he, undisturbed by the two, may follow his advantage, or that they reciprocally so weaken each other that neither of them can withstand the superior power of the third. I proceed to characterize a few steps of the scale in which one may arrange the phenomena here in question. The most simple occurs when a superior power prevents the uniting of elements which do not positively attempt to form such a union, but still *might* perhaps make such an attempt. Here belong first of all the legal prohibitions of political combinations, both of such combinations in general, and of unions between societies which are individually permitted. In this case there may be present as a rule no distinct fear, no determinable endangering of the ruling powers by such combinations. But the form of unification as such is feared, because it might *possibly* result in its appropriation of a dangerous content. The experience that revolutionary tendencies or movements, aimed toward modification of the existing order, take the form of unification of as many interested parties as possible, grows to the logically false but psychologically very intelligible inversion that all combinations have a tendency aimed against existing authorities. The prohibition is therefore based, as it were, upon a possibility of the second power: not only are the combinations forbidden from the start merely possible, and frequently do not have so much as an existence in the *wish* of the persons so held apart, but also the dangers on account of which the prohibition issues may have been, even if the combinations had been realized, only *possible*

ones. In the form of these prohibitions of association the *divide et impera* occurs, therefore, as the most highly sublimated thinkable prophylaxis of the one element, against all eventualities from the combination of the others. This preventive form can also recur in qualitatively the same fashion, in case the multiplicity which is in contrast with the one consists of the various elements of power in one and the same personality. The Anglo-Norman monarchy took care that the fiefs in feudal times were as widely scattered as possible. Some of the most powerful vassals had their lands in from seventeen to twenty-one shires. Through this principle of local separation, the domains of the crown vassals could not, as on the continent, be consolidated into great sovereign principalities.

The prophylactic prevention of unification operates now more distinctly in case there exists a direct endeavor for union. Under this scheme belongs the phenomenon—complicated, to be sure, with other motives—that employers generally hesitate most decidedly to treat of conflicts about wages and other matters with third persons, who do not belong to their own body of laborers. They thereby not only prevent the laborers from strengthening their position, by combination with another personality with nothing either to fear or to gain from the employer, but they also embarrass the unified program of the labor bodies of different trades which, for example, is aimed at the introduction of a single scale of wages everywhere. By declining the offices of the intermediary person, who could at the same time treat for several bodies of labor, the employer heads off the threatening combination of the laborers. As a measure against the existing efforts in that direction, this is regarded as so important for his position that combinations of employers frequently impose upon each of their members this isolation of their workmen, in case of conflicts and conferences, as a part of the stipulated duty of their membership.

This preventing of combination between the elements attains, instead of a merely prohibitive, an active form in case the third party instigates jealousy between them. We have not here in mind the cases in which he instigates hostilities between the

other two in order to produce at their cost a new order of things; but the facts here in question are frequently conservative tendencies, the third party tries to maintain his already existing prerogative through preventing a dreaded coalition of the two others, by means of jealousy between them, at the beginning or at least early in the course of the development of the combination beyond its first elements. There is especial likelihood of utilizing this constellation in case the two personalities to be restrained from combination already possess certain competencies; property, official station, social rank, etc. These furnish the appropriate objects of jealousy. For that reason this technique of *divide et impera* is not easily applicable in the case of personalities low in the social scale or without property. Use was made of this form with a special *finesse* in a case which is recorded in ancient Peru. It was the universal practice of the Incas to divide a newly conquered race into two approximately equal halves, and to instal in each a magistrate, but *with a slight difference of rank between the two.* This was in fact the means best calculated to produce between these two chieftains a rivalry which prevented all unified action of the subjugated territory against the conquerors. Not merely a quite equal position, but also a very different one, would have made such coherence more readily possible; the former because, in the case of ultimate action, actual halving of the leadership would have been practicable more than any other relationship, and because, in case subordination were necessary, actual peers can easiest adapt themselves to such a technical necessity; the latter, because in that case the leadership of the one would have encountered no opposition. The *trivial* difference in rank offers the least encouragement to an organic and satisfying relationship in the here dreaded union, since the one, because of his *plus*, would undoubtedly have demanded the unlimited prerogative, while the *minus* of the other was not significant enough to make him resign the same ambition. Along with jealousy, suspicion is the chief psychological means which is applied to the like purpose, and which in contrast with the former suffices to restrain great multitudes from oath-bound combinations. The Venetian govern-

ment used this means most effectively by offering extraordinary inducements to the people to denounce any sort of suspicious character. No one knew whether his nearest acquaintance was not in the service of the civic inquisition, and consequently revolutionary plans, which presupposed the reciprocal confidence of a great collection of persons, were cut off from the root; so that in the later history of Venice public revolts practically did not occur.

The baldest form of *divide et impera*, the instigation of positive struggle between two elements, may have its purpose in the relation of the third party either to these two, or to an object existing outside of them. The latter occurs in case one of three candidates for an office understands how to instigate the two others against each other, in such a way that by gossip and slander, which each of them sets in motion against the other, they spoil each other's chances. In all cases of this type the art of the third shows itself in the degree of the distance at which he is wise enough to place himself from the action which he instigates. The more he guides the conflict by merely invisible threads, the more he understands how to tend the fire so that it continues to burn without his further assistance and observation, the sharper and directer will be the struggle between the other two, until their reciprocal ruin is accomplished; but, more than that, the prize of the struggle at stake between *them*, or the objects otherwise of value to the third party, will seem to fall into his lap of themselves. In this technique, too, the Venetians were masters. In order to get control of the estates of nobles upon the mainland, they had the means of conferring high titles upon young or inferior nobles. The indignation of the older and higher nobles, in consequence, always gave occasion for friction and disturbance of the peace between the two parties. Thereupon the Venetian government, with all formal legal observance, confiscated the estates of the delinquents. Precisely in such cases, where the co-operation of the disunited elements against the common oppressor would be of the most evident utility, it is, very evidently, a general condition of *divide et impera* that enmities should have their sufficient

ground in something more than the collision of material interests. Only when some occasion for enmity is general, some antagonism which has its active occasion to find, exists in the soul, is it so easy to substitute a quite different opponent from the one against whom enmity would have a meaning and purpose. *Divide et impera* demands of its artist, that he shall evoke that general condition of excitement and pugnacity in which the smuggling in of an opponent not at all properly indicated can succeed, by means of nagging, slander, flattery, rousing of expectation, etc. Accordingly, the form of the struggle may be entirely separated from its content and its reasonableness. The third party, against whom the enmity of the two others should properly be directed, may, at the same time, make himself invisible between them, so that the clamor of the two does not follow against him, but against each other reciprocally.

In case, finally, the purpose of the third does not reside in an object, but in the immediate control of the two other elements, two sociological points of view are essential.

(1) Certain elements are so formed that they can be successfully opposed only by similar elements. The will to subjugate them finds no proper point of attack in themselves, so that the only thing remaining is, as it were, to divide them against themselves, and to maintain between the divisions a struggle which they now can carry on with homogeneous weapons, until they are sufficiently weakened, and so may fall a prey to the third party. It has been said that England could gain India only by means of India, as Xerxes earlier understood that Greece could best be conquered by means of the Greeks. Precisely those who by likeness of interests are brought together best know reciprocally each other's weaknesses and their vulnerable points, so that the principle of *similia similibus*—the annihilation of a condition by producing a similar condition—may here be produced in the widest degree. Although reciprocity and unification may best be obtained with a certain degree of qualitative variation, because reinforcement, consolidation, organically differentiated life can thus result, reciprocal disturbance seems to succeed best in case of qualitative likeness, apart, of course,

from so great quantitative superiority in the energy of the one party that the terms of correlation are a matter of utter indifference. The whole category of enmities of which fraternal strife is the extreme derives its radically destructive character precisely from the fact that experience and knowledge, just like the instincts which have their source in the same radical unity, place in the hands of each the most deadly weapon against this very opponent. That which constitutes the basis of the relationship of similars to each other — namely, knowledge of the external situation, and ability to enter sympathetically into the subjectivc situation — this is evidently quite as much the means of the deepest wounds, which do not allow any opportunity for attack to escape, and it leads, since by its very nature it is reciprocal, to the most utter destruction. Consequently struggle of like against like, the division of the enemy into two qualitatively homogeneous parties, is one of the most thorough realizations of *divide et impera.*

(2) Where it is not possible for the oppressor to have his purposes carried out so exclusively by his victims themselves, where he must himself enter into their struggle, the scheme is very simple. He simply supports the one until the other is a practically eliminated factor, whereupon the former is his easy prey. This support is most advantageously given to the one who of himself is the stronger. This policy may be carried out in the more negative form, that the more powerful, in a complex of elements which is to be suppressed, may merely be protected. Thus Rome, in its subjugation of Greece, placed upon itself, with respect to Athens and Sparta, the most obvious reserve. This behavior must necessarily produce grievance and envy on the one hand, arrogance and overconfidence on the other, a division which made the booty easy for the oppressor. The technique of a domineering will, namely, of two parties equally interested against the third, to protect the stronger until he has ruined the weaker, and then, with change of front, to proceed against the now isolated party and to subdue him — this technique is not less in favor in case of the establishment of world-empires than in the case of brawls between street urchins, in the manipulation

of political parties by a government not less than in competitive struggle in which, for instance, the three elements opposed to each other are a very powerful financier or manufacturer, and two less important but disagreeable, and in comparison with each other unequal, competitors. In this case, the first mentioned, in order to prevent the coalition of the other two against himself, will enter into an agreement about prices, or amount of production, with the stronger of the two, an agreement which assures to him actual advantages, and through which the weaker is embarrassed. So soon as this has taken place, that more powerful opponent may throw off his previous ally, who has no longer any recourse, and he may annihilate him by underbidding or other methods.

I now pass to a quite different type of those sociological formations which are determined by the numerical definiteness of their elements. In the case of the dyad and triad configurations, we had to do with that inner group-life, with all its differences, syntheses, and antitheses, which develops with this minimum or maximum number of members. The question did not concern the group as a whole, in its relation to others, or to a larger group of which it is a part, but the immanent reciprocal relationship of its elements. If, now, on the contrary, we ask about the significance which the numerical precision betrays in external relations, its most essential function is that it makes possible the subdivision of a group into minor groups. The teleological meaning of this is, as already indicated above, the more ready visibility and docility of the total group, frequently the first organization and proper mechanization of the same. In purely formal respect, the possibility is thereby given of preserving the formation, character, arrangements of divisions of the whole, independent of the quantitative development of the whole. The component parts with which its administration reckons, remain qualitatively always the same sociological factors, and the increase of the whole changes only their multiplier. This is, for example, the enormous advantage of the numerical division of armies; their increase proceeds thereby with relative technical ease because it follows as a

constantly repeated structure of the numerically and organically already fixed type. This advantage attaches itself evidently to numerical definiteness in general, but not to certain numbers only. Nevertheless, a group of a particular number, already mentioned above, is of especial historical significance for social subdivision, namely, the decimal group and its derivatives. Undoubtedly the number of the fingers was the decisive occasion for this grouping of ten members for efforts and responsibilities in a body, which occurred in many of the oldest cultures. While yet entirely lacking arithmetical talent or skill, primitive men had in their fingers a primary principle of orientation, with which to designate a plurality of units, and to visualize their subdivisions and their combinations. This universal and frequently enough emphasized sense of the five and ten principle has, besides, an additional importance for its social application; viz., since the fingers have a relative reciprocal independence and autonomous mobility; since, on the other hand, however, they are indissolubly dependent (it is said in France of two friends: *ils sont unis comme deux doigts de la main*), and thus come to their proper meaning only in their combination, they furnish a highly striking picture of the social unification of individuals. The unity and peculiar co-operative capacity of those small collective elements of larger groups could not be more vividly symbolized. Even in recent time the Czechish secret society *Omladina* was constituted according to the principle of quintettes. The leadership of the society belonged to numerous "hands," which consisted in each case of a "thumb," *i. e.*, the chief leader, and four "fingers." How strongly the decimal number was regarded as a constituent unity within a greater group is shown perhaps in the case of the custom, which reaches back to the remotest antiquity, of the "decimation" of divisions of armies in the case of revolts, treason, etc. Precisely ten was looked upon as a unity which, for the purpose of penalty, could be presented by a single individual; or an approximate experience worked in co-operation to the effect that in every ten, on the average, a ringleader was to be found. The subdivision of a total group into ten numerically equal parts, although evidently leading to

a totally different result, and although without materially practical relationship to the subdivision into the ten individuals, appears to me to have been derived psychologically from the latter. As the Jews returned from the second exile, 42,360 Jews with their slaves, they were so subdivided that a tenth, selected by lot, took up their abode in Jerusalem, the remaining nine-tenths in the country. These were too few for the capital, wherefore there was immediately a taking of thought about the increase of the population of Jerusalem. The power of the decimal principle, as a basis of social division, seems thus to have operated blindly against the demands of practice.

The hundred, derived from the decimal principle, is primarily and essentially also a means of subdivision, and historically indeed the most important. I have already observed that it immediately became the conceptual substitute for subdivision in general, so that its name remained attached to the subgroup even when the latter contained considerably more or fewer members. The Hundreds appeared—most decisively perhaps in the important rôle that they play in the government of Anglo-Saxon England—at the same time as the idea of the subordinate group in general, whose inner meaning their incomplete realization does not alter. It is, in this instance, very notable that the Hundreds in ancient Peru still voluntarily paid their tribute to the Incas, with the exertion of all their powers, after they were reduced to a fourth of their typical number. In this case the fundamental sociological fact is that these territorial associations were regarded as unities beyond their members. Since, however, the liability to taxation, as it appears, rested not on the society, as such, but upon its hundred participants, the assumption of this obligation by the remaining twenty-five shows the more distinctly that the hundred was regarded as a unity of absolute and essential solidarity. The strong centripetality which thus rules this structure enforces the suggestion that its significance is to be found, not merely in its utility as a principle of division, which is at best something external to it, and with which it serves the larger circumscribing group. Apart from this, therefore, it is found, in fact, that the number of one

hundred members, purely as such, lends to the group a special significance and dignity. The nobility in Locri Epizephyrii traced its origin back to noble-women of the so-called "hundred houses" that had shared in the founding of the colony. In the same way, tradition has it that the original settlements by which Rome was founded comprised a hundred Latin gentes, a hundred Sabellic, and a hundred composed of various elements. The complete number of one hundred members evidently lends the group a certain style, the precisely and accurately limited outline, in contrast with which every somewhat smaller or larger number appears, to a certain extent, vague and less complete in itself. The hundred has an essential unity and system which made it especially available for every genealogical mythology, a species of symmetry and of rational necessity, while all other numbers of group-elements seemed to be accidental, not in like manner cohering of inner necessity, not equally unchangeable in their proper essential structure. The peculiarly adequate relation to our intellectual categories, the easy visibility of the number one hundred, which makes it so available as a principle of subdivision, thus appears as a reflex of an *objective* peculiarity of the group, which accrues to the latter from this numerical precision.

This just-mentioned qualification is completely separate from those previously treated. In the case of the dyad and triad combinations, the number determined the proper inner life of the group, but it does this still not as quantity; the group displays all those phenomena, not because it, as a whole, has this size, but the essential thing is definite relationships of each individual element, on account of reaction with one or with two other elements. Quite different was the case with all survivals of the number of the fingers. Here the ground of the synthesis lay in the more convenient visibility, organization, docility; in short, properly not in the group itself, but in the agent that had theoretically or practically to deal with it. A third significance of the number of members is connected finally with the fact that the group objectively and as a whole—that is, without distinction of the individual positions of the elements—betrays

certain qualities only below or above a definite extent. This has been treated above quite generally in connection with the difference between large and small groups. The question now arises, however, whether traits of character in the total group are not derived from *definite* numbers of members, in which case, of course, the reactions between the individuals constitute the real and decisive event. The question merely assumes, however, that not the members in their individuality, but their assemblage in a picture of the whole, now constitutes the object of inquiry. The facts which point to this significance of the group-quantity all belong in a single type, namely, the legal prescriptions as to the minimum or maximum membership of associations in order that, as such, they may lay claim to certain functions or rights, or may be liable to the performance of certain obligations. The ground for this is close at hand. The special qualities which associations develop on the ground of their membership, and which justify the legal prescription with reference to them, would, to be sure, always be the same, attached to the same number, if there were no psychological differences between men, and the effect of a group followed its quantity as exactly as is the case with the dynamic action of a moved homogeneous mass of matter. The inevitable individual differences of the members, however, make all precise and anticipatory determinations completely elusive. They bring it to pass that the same degree of energy or thoughtlessness, of centralizaton or decentralization, of self-sufficiency or need of leadership, which once appears in a group of definite numbers, would a second time be discovered in a much smaller, and a third time only in a much larger group. The legal provisions, however, which must be related somehow to those qualities of associations, cannot reckon technically with such paralysis and variations on account of the accidental human material. They must rather name definite numbers of members held to be an average, to which they attach the rights and obligations of societies. The assumption must be at the basis that a certain common spirit, a certain temper, energy, tendency, emerges within a combined number of persons when, and only when, this number has

reached a definite height. According as this result is desired or deplored will a minimum number be demanded or only a maximum number permitted. I cite first certain illustrations of the latter. In the early Greek period there were legal provisions that the crews of ships should not number more than five, in order to prevent development of piracy. From fear of combination among apprentices, the Rhine cities determined in 1436 that not more than three apprentices should appear in the same costume. Political prohibitions are most frequent in this sense. Philip the Fair in 1305 prohibited all assemblies of more than five persons, regardless of the rank of the persons or the form of their meeting. Under the *ancien régime* twenty nobles might not assemble even for conference, without special concession from the king. Napoleon III. prohibited all unions of more than twenty persons that were not specially authorized. In England the conventicle act of Charles II. made all religious assemblages of more than five persons under one roof penal, and the English reaction at the beginning of the nineteenth century forbade all assemblages of more than fifty persons, that were not announced a long time in advance. In cases of siege it is frequently the case that more than three or four persons are forbidden to congregate upon the street, and recently the Berlin Kammergericht has decided that a *Versammlung*, in the sense of the law, *i. e.*, which requires police notification, occurs when eight persons are present. In the purely economic realm the case is found, for example in the English law of 1708, which the influence of the Bank of England carried through, that legal associations for dealing in money should not include more than six participants. In such cases there must always be, on the side of the rulers, the conviction that only within groups of the given size is there to be found the courage or the rashness, the enterprise or the suggestibility, for certain transactions, the occurrence of which is not desired. This motive is most evident in the case of the laws in restraint of vice. When the number of persons present at a rout, of members of a procession, etc., is limited, it is because of the experience that in a larger mass the impulses that come through the senses easier gain the upper

hand, the effects of bad example are more rapid, and the feeling of individual responsibility is weakened. The reverse direction is taken, with similar basis, in the case of prescriptions which demand a minimum number of participants in order that a certain legal effect may occur. For instance, in England any economic association may achieve corporate right when it numbers at least seven members. In the same spirit, the law everywhere demands a definite number as a minimum, even though that number may be extremely variable, in the case of judges whose finding is to have legal force, so that, for example, in many places certain judicial colleges are simply called "the seven."

With respect to the former phenomenon it is assumed that only with this number of members are the sufficient guarantees and the adequate solidarity furnished, without which corporate rights are a danger for public economy. In the second example the prescribed minimum number seems necessary to secure protection against the mistakes and extreme views of the individuals in the number, and thus a collective opinion which shall be objectively correct. This demand for a minimum number emerges very prominently in the case of religious structures. The regular religious meetings of the Buddhistic monks of a given territory for the purpose of religious revival and a sort of confessional demanded the presence of at least four monks. This number formed, as it were, the synod, and each monk had, as member of the same, a somewhat different significance from that of an individual, which he was merely so long as only three were present. Likewise the Jews should number at least ten for purposes of prayer, and again, according to the constitution of North Carolina, which is credited to Locke, any church whatsoever or religious community might be formed when it consisted of at least seven members. The necessary concentration of force and stability of religious community-feeling is in these cases, therefore, expected only of a certain number of associates who reciprocally support and promote each other. In a word, in case the law prescribes a minimum number, confidence in the plurality and distrust against the isolated individual ener-

gies are the operative principle. Where a maximum number is fixed, mistrust toward the plurality, which does not operate toward its separate components, is, on the contrary, the effective principle.

Whether a prohibition is attached to a maximum or permission to a minimum, the legislators will not have been in any doubt that the result which they fear or wish occurs only quite irregularly, and in a merely average constancy in connection with the fixed limits, but the arbitrariness of the determination is in this case quite as unavoidable and justifiable as in the determination of a period of life after which persons assume the rights and duties of their majority. Without any question, subjective capacity for this responsibility occurs in the case of many earlier and in others later, in the case of *none* at one stroke in the precise minute fixed by law, but praxis can obtain the fixed standards which it needs only by means of dividing the series, which in itself is continuous, for the purposes of the law at a given point into two divisions, the quite distinct methods of treating which can find no precise justification in the objective characteristics of the two. Hence it is so extremely instructive that in all definitions from which the above examples are selected, the special quality of the persons affected by the definition does not at all come into consideration, although it necessarily determines each individual case. It is, however, nothing tangible, and as the tangible element there remains, therefore, only the number. It is essential to demonstrate the universally prevailing profound feeling that the number would be the decisive factor if the individual differences did not counteract their working; that, however, for precisely this reason these effects are securely contained in the ultimate total phenomena.

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THE SCOPE OF SOCIOLOGY.

VIII. THE PRIMARY CONCEPTS OF SOCIOLOGY.[1]

1. *The physical and spiritual environment.*—On the physical side we have said all that is needed for the purposes of this survey in the fourth paper of this series.[2] In a word, sociology is not a physical science, but at every step the sociologist must be prepared to ask the question: To what extent are the activities of men that we are considering influenced by that natural environment which the physical sciences interpret? Sociology is science rather than philosophy—using both terms in an old sense which we shall explain away presently—for this reason: We are not trying to construct a speculative, conceptual abstraction, in order to make that the subject of our inquiry. We are not dealing with a subject that exists in a vacuum, or in the clouds, or merely within the realm of thought-phenomena. We are aware that an earthquake, or a thunderstorm, and an outburst of human passion or a play of human sentiment, occur in the same world, and have to be accounted for, in the case of the second order of facts, by reference in part to the same laws which operate in the case of the first order of facts. Why are crimes against property more frequent in winter than in summer, and why are the same classes of crime more ingenious in the temperate than in the torrid zone? For one reason, among others; that in the former cases the struggle with nature for the means of subsistence is much more difficult. The conditions of life are more relentless. It costs more effort to live at all. The criminal impulse is more sharply stimulated under the pressure of the more acute necessity.

This perception that men are dependent upon physical nature is so obvious that it has often been impossible to break away from the force of its implications sufficiently to see that any

[1] The first seven papers of this series appeared in this JOURNAL, Vol. V, Nos. 3, 4, and 5; and Vol. VI, Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4.

[2] AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, Vol. VI, pp. 47–60.

other factor is concerned in human life. We have had materialistic interpretations of life galore, from some of the pre-Platonists to living writers. The fact which all these philosophies have overworked is that every external act, and every subjective emotion which occurs in the case of any person, has the whole mass of physical surroundings and antecedents as its conditions. One does not utter a sentiment, or compose a song, or offer a prayer, or feel a transcendental emotion, without being, in some degree or sort, moved to the same by the soil and climate and technical processes and institutional arrangements which constitute the vehicle of one's life. But the fact that the same farm produces Websters whom the world has already forgotten and the Webster whom the world will never forget, proves that the materialistic interpretation of life is a snap-judgment. The physical environment is always present, but it is not all that is present. In considering any social problem we must always ask: *How much* does the physical environment have to do with the case? The answer will in some instances be a negligible quantity. In others it will furnish the only clue to the situation, as distinguished from similar situations that turn out differently under other physical conditions.

For instance, the chief reason why Germany cherishes a colonial policy today, and why the United States merely tolerates a provisional colonial policy, is the physical difference between German over-population and American under-population. On the other hand, the reason why Germany clings to the union of church and state, while America abhors it, is so very remotely connected with physical conditions that it would be a strain upon language and ideas to give the physical factor in the case any weight at all. Whether we are dealing with percentages of individual cases of given types in a population, or with types of purely social organization on a large scale, the sociological program must always be to give the physical factor precisely the value which it has — no more, no less, neither minimized nor exaggerated by any *a priori*, speculative assumptions.

Parallel with the physical environment we must prepare to give proportionate value to the second condition mentioned in

the title of this section, viz., the *spiritual* environment. As Professor Thomas has said in his paper on "The Gaming Instinct":[1]

> Psychologically the individual is inseparable from his surroundings, and his attitude toward the world is determined by the nature of suggestions from the outside. The general culture and social position of his parents, the ideals of the social set in which he moves, the schools he attends, the literature he sees, the girl he wants to marry, are among the factors which determine the life-directions of the youth. From the complex of suggestions coming to him in the social relations into which he is born or thrown, he selects and follows those recurring persistently, emanating from attractive personalities, or arising in critical circumstances.

Professor Ross has used the term "social ascendency" for the whole sum of facts in a society by which tradition and derived standards impose themselves upon the individual. This social ascendency is partly by means of social machinery, like the industrial and the governmental systems. It is partly by means of ideas, customs, standards of taste, form, morals, which most of the persons affected by them do not express in words. They are an invisible presence, but they often dictate the course of social events as absolutely as a physical cause procures its effect. Perhaps the best illustration for Americans is the race-sentiment in the South, as contrasted with the promiscuity of sentiment on the same subject in the North. A visitor from the North goes to a southern state, and before he has been there an hour, if he mingles with the people, he detects a something in the social tone which he has read about, but never before directly experienced. He finds himself among some of the most genial, warm-hearted, high-minded people he has ever seen, but he finds them governed by a code of sentiments toward the colored man which seem to him unintelligible and inconsistent. The northern man does not know how to draw the distinctions in his conduct toward the black man which the southern man draws instinctively, and on the other hand the northern man will draw lines at points where the southern man does not feel the need of them. Here are two different spiritual environments. The southern man lives in an environment of race-distinctions. The northern man lives in an environment of merely personal dis-

[1] American Journal of Sociology, Vol. VI, p. 761.

tinctions. To the northern man personal likes and dislikes, social inclusion or exclusion, will depend on the individual. His being a negro makes no more difference than his being a Spaniard or Italian or Russian or Englishman. To the southern man the idea of a socially acceptable negro is a contradiction in terms.

No argument on the merits of the case is implied in the illustration. The point is that these familiar mental attitudes are convenient evidences of the universal reality, viz., a spiritual tone, atmosphere, perspective, standard, which sets the limits of action for individuals in the community.[1]

It is necessary to emphasize the fact of the spiritual environment, partly because we have that familiarity with it which breeds contempt. It is so commonplace that we think it may be ignored. It is necessary, also, because in other cases the fact is like the pressure of the atmosphere. Each of us is affected by it most intimately, but few of us have discovered it. Just as every portion of space has its physical atmosphere, so every portion of society has its thought-atmosphere. This mental envelope largely explains habit and custom, impulse and endeavor, power and limitation within the society. To know the act, the person, the episode, the social situation, the social problem, the social movement in any single case, we must know the thought-environment or the spiritual environment in which it occurs. This is a requirement that is universal and without exceptions.[2]

2. *The personal units.*—Nothing more clearly signalizes the difference between present sociology and the older philosophies of history than the matter-of-fact analysis which we now make of the persons who compose society. We do not deal with the metaphysical conception of a fictitious individual, on the one hand, nor are we, on the other hand, any longer speculating about "society" as though it were an affair independent of persons,

[1] *Vid.* above, Vol. VI, pp. 354–6, "A Subjective Environment."

[2] It has recently been made use of in a very forcible way by PROFESSOR JOHN DEWEY in a paper entitled "Interpretation of the Savage Mind," *Psychological Review*, May, 1902.

and leading a singular and superior order of life apart from persons. We see that human society in all times and places is the combined activities of persons who react upon each other in countless ways. It becomes a first consideration, then, to derive a thoroughly objective, positive, literal conception of these personal units, always producing social situations and social reactions.

Social philosophy, as just now hinted, has always vibrated between theories of *individuals*, regarded as independent, self-sufficient existences, and theories of *society*, regarded as an entity which has its existence either altogether independent of individuals or at least by and through the merging and the submerging of individuals. Accordingly the question has been debated from time immemorial: "Does society exist for the individual or the individual for society?" or, more specifically, "Does the state exist for the individual or the individual for the state?" In contrast with all the forms of philosophy which propose problems of this sort, it is a primary proposition of sociology that the issue raised by these inquiries is essentially artificial and fictitious, because the dilemma presented is created only by a begging of the real question. It is assumed that there is a disjunctive, alternative, exclusive relation between individuals and societies. At best the one is assumed to be merely a means to the other, in such a sense that the means ceases to be of account when it has done what it can toward the end. It is impossible to criticise in full this way of looking at things, without using concepts which need previous explanation — concepts which we shall reach presently. It is also impossible to say whether the psychologists or the sociologists have had most to do with discovering this fallacy. However this may be, the formulation of life in terms of activity has brought psychologists and sociologists to the point of view that individuals and societies are not means to each other, but phases of each other. A society is a combining of the activities of persons. A person is a center of conscious impulses which realize themselves in full only in realizing a society.

Quite recently there has been revived discussion of Aristotle's

dictum, "man is a social animal." It has been asserted and denied that Aristotle was right. Whether Aristotle meant to express what we now see to be the truth or not may be left to those who care for such trifles. That there is a sense, and an important one, in which man is a social animal is a primary sociological datum. Man cannot be man without acting and reacting with man. The presence of others is necessary in order that I may be myself. The self that is in me cannot become aware of itself, and display itself, except by means of contacts with other people. Just as the mind needs the body in order to be a force in the world; just as the hand needs the eye, and both need the nerves, and all need the heart, in order that either may be its peculiar self by doing a peculiar work in partnership with other organs; so a person is not a person without the reaction and the reinforcement which partnerships with other persons permit. It may be that men begin to occupy their place, a little above the anthropoid ape and a little lower than the angels, by perpetually fighting with each other. Whether this is the case or not, we know that the fighting which men have done with each other has been among the means of developing the individual and the social type. Using the term "social," not as an expression of moral quality, but as an index of reactions between conscious beings, it is as literally true, and first of all in the same sense true, that man is a social animal, as that the eagle is a bird of flight. The latter proposition does not mean that the eagle is born flying. It simply means that the eagle does not get to be an eagle except through learning to fly, and in the practice of flying. So men are social animals in the sense that they do not get to be men except through learning and practicing the arts of contact with other men.

All this is so simple, to be sure, that it might well go without saying, if different kinds of philosophy had not made the seemingly obvious fact a matter of doubt, dispute, and confusion. The sociologist needs to make the fact clear to himself at the outset of his attempts to understand society. The personal units that are the integers in all social combinations are not of themselves, apart from such combinations, integers at all. A

brick is as much a brick when it is dropped and forgotten on the way from the kiln to the building as the other bricks that are set in the wall. It is not a part of a structure, but it has all its individual characteristics independent of other bricks. A brick, *qua* brick, is not a social phenomenon. A person, on the contrary, cannot come into physical existence except through the co-operation of parent persons; he cannot become a self-sustaining animal unless protected for several years by other persons; and he cannot find out and exercise his capabilities unless stimulated to countless forms of action by contact with other persons. The personal units in society, then, are units that in countless ways depend upon each other for possession of their own personality. They find themselves in each other. They continually seek each other. They perpetually realize themselves by means of each other.

We might go on to show that mere consciousness itself is, to a considerable degree, an affair not of an assumed individual, existing like a brick, unrelated to other bricks, and not dependent upon other bricks for its characteristics. Consciousness in itself, or at least self-consciousness, is not an individual but a social phenomenon. We do not arrive at self-consciousness except by coming into circuit with other persons, with whom we achieve awareness of ourselves.[1] For sociological purposes this degree of refinement is unnecessary. We need to know simply that persons do not enlarge and equip and enrich and exercise their personality except by maintaining relations with other persons. Even Robinson Crusoe kept up a one-sided connection with society. If, when he walked out of the surf to the shore, he had left behind him the mental habits, the language, the ideas which he had amassed in contact with other persons, not enough available means of correlating his actions would have remained to provide him with his first meal.

It must be observed, further, that these considerations are not mere pedantic generalities. Some of the most intensely practical public questions of the present and the immediate future go back to premises involved in the foregoing. Some of the

[1] *Vid.* BALDWIN, *Social and Ethical Interpretations.*

sharpest conflicts of opinion and practice in politics and business will have to be fought out on lines drawn from the base just indicated. For instance, old-fashioned Jeffersonian democracy was a political philosophy which assumed precisely the individualism rejected above as an optical illusion. All the modern variations of Jeffersonian democracy, in spite of their stalwart and salutary traits, are weak from the implications of this impossible individual, and they are foreordained failures in just the proportion in which they ignore the composite, dependent, social character of the individual. On the other hand, all the socialisms, from the mildest to the most radical, imply the opposite misconception, viz., that society is the only real existence, and that the personal units have no separate and distinct claims or character sufficient to modify theories devoted solely to the perfection of social organization. All socialisms tend to gravitate toward programs which magnify social machinery, and minimize the importance of the personal units. All such questions as that of municipal control of public utilities; the relation of the state to education, morals, the dependent classes, religion; the relation of the public to corporations and combinations, to artificial encouragement of industries by tariffs, patents, treaties, and other devices; with the thousand and one variations of the problems continually confronting every modern community; imply and involve assumptions about the relation of society as a whole to the personal units. Of course, very few persons will bring these fundamental considerations, in their naked academic form, into the arena of practical politics or business; but every person who influences politics or business will, consciously or unconsciously, throw into the scale the weight of his prejudice about this matter of the personal unit *vs.* the social whole. The sort of work that the sociologist has to do is needed as a means of reducing the weight of both kinds of prejudice, and of substituting for each a just conception of the intrinsic relation between the personal units and the social whole.

Accordingly, while we must emphasize this, so to speak, diffused social personality of the apparently individual units, and while the fact that each person realizes himself very largely at a

distance from himself in the activities of other persons — while this fact becomes a very significant factor in the most practical calculations of politics and business, the present tendencies in social theory and practice so strongly favor this side of the facts that emphasis of the personal side, the individual aspect, of the situation is imperative.

As a mere latest and highest order of the animal kingdom, the human race is simply a mass of matter formed by the operation of physical forces, and distributed through space by the operation of other physical forces. So far, the human race is one aggregate, as truly as the land and the water of the earth's surface, or the atmosphere that surrounds the earth, or the system of the starry host that fills the heavens. As a conscious company, however, the human race is not one aggregate, but a whole composed of as many distinct and self-impelled units as there are persons in the human family. We have taken due account of the fact that society is always and inevitably conditioned by its character as a portion of flotsam and jetsam within a physical environment, and furthermore as a portion of that environment. But society, in that portion of its character which sociology has especially to consider, is not matter, but persons. These persons have such fundamental likenesses that certain general propositions are true of them all, and we both may and must think of them as one and inseparable. They have such decisive differences that we have to count with them as though they were radically and finally separate.

To express the facts in an illustration, society is not a machine, a locomotive, for instance. Society has no single motor contrivance which furnishes power to all other parts of the machine. Society has no fire-box and boiler which send steam into the cylinders, and society does not transfer force from certain active parts to certain inert parts, so that the latter have power of motion. The trucks of the locomotive could not move of themselves. The driving-wheels could not move of themselves. The connecting-rod could not move of itself. The piston could not move of itself. The water could not boil of itself. Society, on the contrary, is a whole made up of

parts each of which can and does move of itself, and indeed the only way to get these personal units to move as persons is to call upon the motor machinery which is located in each person. When the engineer wants the locomotive to do its work, he does not appeal to trucks and driving-wheels and connecting-rods and boiler-pipes, etc., to exert motor energy of their own. He supplies an external energy. When society acts, it has no source of energy outside of the consciousness of the personal units who compose it. Thoughts and feelings in these units must set the units in motion. Thoughts and feelings in one unit must correspond with thoughts and feelings in many others in order that there may be positive social action. If the thoughts and feelings in the units fail to co-operate, there is simply negative or destructive reaction between them.

A profounder psychological analysis of the individual than is necessary for our purpose is both possible and necessary before we reach ultimate theorems of conscious action. We may content ourselves, however, for sociological purposes, with going simply thus far, viz.: persons are centers of likes and dislikes, of sympathies and antipathies, of wants and aversions, of demands and of rejections, of desires and of disgusts. All action that goes on in society is the movement and counter-movement of persons impelled by the particular assortment of these feelings which is located in each. Society is what it is at any time as the resultant of all the efforts of all the personal units to reach each its own peculiar sort of satisfaction.

We have found it most convenient to group the wants which all men feel under six heads. Every desire which men betray may be analyzed down to elements which fall into these groups, viz.: (*a*) health, (*b*) wealth, (*c*) sociability, (*d*) knowledge, (*e*) beauty, (*f*) rightness.[1] Our main proposition with reference to this analysis of the personal units is this: *In order to have an adequate analysis of any social situation, past or present, it is necessary to have an account of the precise content and proportions of these several wants, both in typical persons of the society and in the group as a whole; i. e.*, what proportion do the physical desires, for

[1] *Vid.* American Journal of Sociology, Vol. VI, pp. 177–93.

example, bear to all the desires, and in what form are physical satisfactions sought? So of each of the other desires.

No better brief illustration is at hand than one furnished by Professor Dewey in the paper mentioned above.[1] His thesis is that occupations determine the fundamental modes of human activity, and that the occupation, presupposing different immediate and remote objects of desire, and requiring variations in fundamental modes of activity, produces variations of mental type, including variations of desires. For instance, the hunting life differs in turn from the agricultural, the pastoral, the military, the trading, the manually productive, and intellectual, etc. Each of these different kinds of life presents distinct classes of problems. Each stimulates its peculiar classes of desire. Each promotes the formation of peculiar habits, in adapting effort to satisfaction of the desires. Each of these types of habit formed by an earlier and necessary stage in conquering the conditions of life tends to persist, and it reappears as a modifier of the impulses and habits that survive and are more appropriate in a later stage.

Whether the illustration goes as far as necessary or not, we have sufficiently emphasized the main contention: *All social problems are problems of the relations of personal units that have in themselves distinct initiative and choice and force. This personal equation must be assigned its real value, in order to reach a true formula of the social reaction.*

3. *Interests.*—No single term is of more constant use in recent sociology than this term *interests*. We must use it in the plural partly for the sake of distinguishing it from the same term in the sense which has become so familiar in modern pedagogy. The two uses of the term are closely related, but they are not precisely identical. The pedagogical emphasis is rather on the voluntary attitude toward a possible object of attention. The sociological emphasis is on attributes of persons which may be compared to the chemical affinities of different elements.[2]

[1] *Vid.* p. 200.

[2] Probably it is needless to say that the term "interest" in this connection, whether used in the singular or the plural, has nothing to do with the economic term "interest."

To distinguish the pedagogical from the sociological use of the term "interest," we may say pedagogically of a supposed case: "The boy has no *interest* in physical culture, or in shop-work, or in companionship with other boys, or in learning, or in art, or in morality." That is, attention and choice are essential elements of interest in the pedagogical sense. On the other hand, we may say of the same boy, in the sociological sense: "He has not discovered his health, wealth, sociability, knowledge, beauty, and rightness interests." We thus imply that interests, in the sociological sense, are not necessarily matters of attention and choice. They are rather affinities, latent in persons, pressing for satisfaction, whether the persons are conscious of it or not; they are indicated spheres of activity which persons enter into and occupy in the course of realizing their personality.

Accordingly we have implied, and to some extent expressed, all that is involved in the fact of interests, in what was said in the previous section about the personal units. Interests are merely specifications in the make-up of the personal units. We have several times named the most general classes of interests which we find serviceable in sociology, viz.: health, wealth, sociability, knowledge, beauty, and rightness. These have been sufficiently commented on in the passage already cited.[1] In that passage these interests were treated as elements of personality.[2]

We need to emphasize, in addition, several considerations about these interests which are the motors of all individual and social action: First, there is a subjective and an objective aspect of them all. It would be easy to use terms of these interests in speculative arguments in such a way as to shift the sense fallaciously from the one aspect to the other; *e. g.*, moral conduct, as an actual adjustment of the person in question with other persons, is that person's "interest," in the objective sense. On the other hand, we are obliged to think of something in the person himself impelling him, however unconsciously, toward that moral conduct, *i. e.*, interest as "unsatisfied capacity," in the subjective

[1] AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, Vol. VI, pp. 177–200.

[2] For a somewhat more highly generalized expression of them as interests, *vid. ibid.*, Vol. VI, pp. 60–66.

sense. So with each of the other interests. The fact that these two senses of the term are always concerned must never be ignored; but, until we reach refinements of analysis which demand use for these discriminations, they may be left out of sight. Second, human interests pass more and more from the latent, subjective, unconscious state to the active, objective, conscious form. That is, before the baby is self-conscious the baby's essential interest in bodily well-being is operating in performance of the organic functions. A little later the baby is old enough to understand that certain regulation of his diet, certain kinds of work or play, will help to make and keep him well and strong. Henceforth there is in him a co-operation of interest in the fundamental sense, and interest in the derived, secondary sense, involving attention and choice. If we could agree upon the use of terms, we might employ the word "desire" for this development of interest; *i. e.*, physiological performance of function is, strictly speaking, the health interest; the desires which men actually pursue within the realm of bodily function may be normal, or perverted, in an infinite scale of variety. So with each of the other interests. Third, with these qualifications provided for, resolution of human activities into pursuit of differentiated interests becomes the first clue to the combination that unlocks the mysteries of society. We need not trouble ourselves very much in general about nice metaphysical distinctions between the aspects of interest, because we have mainly to do with interests in the same sense in which the man of affairs uses the term. The practical politician looks over the lobby at Washington, and he classifies the elements that compose it. He says, "Here is the railroad interest, the sugar interest, the labor interest, the army interest, the canal interest, the Cuban interest, etc." He uses the term "interest" essentially in the sociological sense, but in a relatively concrete form, and he has in mind little more than variations of the wealth interest. He would explain the legislation of a given session as the final balance between these conflicting pecuniary interests. He is right, in the main; and every social action is, in the same way, an accommodation of the various interests which are represented in the society concerned.

It ought to be plain, then, that our analysis of society, first into personal units and then into the operative interests within the units, is not the construction of an esoteric mystery, to be the special preserve of sociology. It is a frank, literal, matter-of-fact expression of the reality which society presents for our inspection; and it is the most direct step toward insight into the realities of society. Social problems are entanglements of persons with persons, and each of these persons is a combination of interests developed in certain unique proportions and directions. All study of social situations must consequently be primarily a qualitative and quantitative analysis of actually observed mixtures of interests. Whether it is a problem of getting the pupils in a school to do good work, or of making the religious force in a church effective, or of defending a town against illegal liquor traffic, or of organizing laborers for proper competition with employers, or of securing an enlightened national policy toward foreign peoples—whether the particular social situation or problem which we have in hand fills out the four walls of our house or reaches to the ends of the earth, in every case the primary terms of the problem are the particular interests of the particular persons who compose that particular situation.

The phrase "properties of numbers" survives in many minds from their earliest encounters with arithmetic. Whether or not it was good pedagogy to use the phrase we will not inquire, but the idea and the program behind the phrase may furnish an analogy for our present use. The boy who simply makes change for the papers he sells on the street corner has this at least in common with Newton and Laplace, and the bookkeepers, and the actuaries, and the engineers, who carry on the most complicated mathematical calculations, viz., they are concerned with the "properties of numbers." So far as the problems of each go, they must learn, somehow or other, to know the properties of numbers under all circumstances where they occur. In like manner, people who seek social intelligence, whether they are street gamins hustling for a living with help from nobody, or social philosophers attempting to report the past and to foretell the future of the human family, all are dealing with the properties

of persons. Just as the chemist must very early get familiar with certain primary facts about his "elements," their specific gravity, their atomicity, their relation to oxygen, etc., etc.; so the sociologist, whether amateur or professional, must early get a working knowledge of the essential peculiarities of persons. Sociology accordingly amounts to a technique for detecting, classifying, criticising, measuring, and correlating human interests, first with reference to their past and present manifestations, and second with reference to their indications for the future. The sociological study that is provided for in university courses is not like the instruction in law, which is calculated to make men the most effective practitioners under the code that now exists. All our programs of sociological study are more like the courses in pure and applied mathematics which a West Point student is obliged to take. They are not expected to give him specific knowledge of the situations which he may encounter in a campaign. They are supposed to make him familiar with the elements out of which all possible military situations are composed, with the means of calculating all possible relationships that can occur between these elements, and with the necessary processes of controlling theoretical and practical dealings with these elements under any circumstances whatsoever.

Every real social problem throws upon the sociologist who undertakes to deal with it the task of calculating a unique equation of interests. General sociology is a preparation for judging a concrete combination of interests very much as general training in physiology and pathology and clinical practice prepares the physician for diagnosis of the new cases which will occur in his practice. He may never meet precisely the same combinations of conditions and symptoms which he has considered in the course of his preparatory training, but he is supposed to have become familiar at least with all the general types of conditions and symptoms which can occur, and to have acquired ability to form reliable judgments on the specific nature of any new combinations of them which he may encounter.

Suppose, for instance, we are dealing with the practical problems of law-enforcement in a particular town in a state which has

a prohibition law. There are certain very familiar types of persons who persist in treating the situation as though it were an affair of two and only two simple factors, viz., the law on the one side, and its violation on the other. The fact is that both the law and the violation are expressions of highly complex mixtures of interests, and neither the law nor the violation precisely represents the actual balance of interests in the community. On the one hand, the law was derived from a co-operation of at least these six factors, viz.: first, a high, pure, *moral* interest that was uppermost in certain people; second, an interest in *good social repute*, spurred by a state of conscience that condemns the liquor traffic, but without enough moral sympathy with the condemnation to act accordingly unless lashed to action by the zeal of the first interest; third, a *political* interest, in making capital out of a policy which would win certain voters; fourth, a *business* interest, in getting the trade of certain people by opposing a traffic that they oppose, or in creating difficulties for a traffic which is indirectly a competitor; fifth, a *personal* or *family* interest, in preventing or punishing a traffic which has inflicted or threatens to inflict injury upon self or relatives; sixth, an interest in the *liquor traffic itself*, which calculates that opposition can be fought more adroitly when it is in the shape of positive law, than when it is vague and general. In every particular case these six sorts of interest that create the law will be subdivided according to circumstances, and the relative influence of each will vary indefinitely. We no sooner realize these facts than we are aware that in its substance, its force, its spirit, the law is not the absolute, categorical, unequivocal factor that it is in its form. While it has no uncertain sound as a statutory mandate, expressed in impersonal words, it has a most decidedly quavering quality when traced back to the human wills whose choices give it all its power.

On the other hand, if we analyze the violations of the law, we find that it arises, first, from thoroughly *immoral* interests — greed of gain, contempt for social rights, willingness to profit by the physical and moral ruin of others. Second, the interest in satisfying the *drink appetite*. This ranges from the strong and

constant demand of the habitual or besotted drunkard to the weak and intermittent demand of the man who uses liquor somewhat as he uses olives or citron or malted milk. Third, the interest in *personal freedom.* There are always people in considerable numbers who want to do whatever others presume to say they ought not to do. This faction includes elements from hopeless moral perversity to highly developed moral refinement. Fourth, *business interests* not directly connected with the liquor traffic : belief that trade follows the bartender ; desire to keep solid with the interests directly dependent upon the liquor traffic ; competition with other towns that are said to draw away trade by favoring liquor sellers, etc. Fifth, *political* interests, desire to use the liquor interest for personal or party ends. Sixth, *social* interests. Friends are directly or indirectly interested in the liquor traffic, and influence must go in their favor, from the negative kind that allows hands to be tied and mouths closed, to the positive kind that manipulates influence of every sort to obstruct the operation of the law. Seventh, *legitimate business* interests.

This rough analysis of the situation shows that, instead of two simple factors, viz., *law* and the *violation*, we are really dealing with a strangely assorted collection of interests, awkwardly struggling to express themselves in theory and in practice. We are not arguing the question how to deal with the liquor traffic, and we are not implying an opinion one way or the other about prohibitory laws. We are simply showing that, whether we are dealing with one kind of a law or another, we may be very uncritical about the ultimate factors involved. The two facts in question, viz., the law and the violation, prove to be in reality the selfsame persons expressing different elements of their own interests. The father of the prohibitory policy has been known to plead with a judge not to pass sentence on a liquor seller in accordance with his own law. The same persons who sustain the law also violate the law in some of the different degrees of violating and sustaining referred to above. The law on the one hand, and the violation on the other, are nothing but shadows, or apparitions, or accidents, except as they reflect the actual balance of interests present in

the members of the community. The real problems involved are, first, to discover whether the law or the violation most nearly corresponds with the actual desires lodged in the persons; and, second, to devise ways and means of changing the balance of desires in the persons, in case immorality proves to be the community choice.

It is both a social and a sociological blunder to proceed as though the law were something precise, invariable, and absolute. The law is an approximate verbal expression of social choices which are mixed, variable, and accommodating in a very high degree. The law has no existence, as a real power, outside of the continued choices of the community that gives it effect. In a very real and literal sense it is necessary to get the algebraic sum both of the law-abiding and of the law-violating interests, in order to know just what the psychological choice of the community, as distinguished from the formal law, really is.

This illustration has been carried out at such length because it is a kind of problem with which all of us are more or less in contact, and our ways of dealing with it so frequently show practical disregard of the elementary significance of the operative interests concerned. The main point is that for theoretical or practical dealing with concrete social problems we need to be expert in detecting and in measuring the precise species of interests that combine to form the situation. To carry the illustration a little farther, most of the states in the American union agree to prohibit both intemperance and ignorance. In general, all of us, both communities and individuals, condemn both vices. We put our condemnation in the shape of laws regulating the liquor traffic, on the one hand, and laws establishing free and perhaps compulsory education, on the other hand. When we attempt to define intemperance and ignorance, however, we find that we have infinitely varied points of view, and that our desires are correspondingly varied. We consequently lend very different elements of meaning and force to the formal laws. Some of us think that intemperance begins only when a man gets physically violent, or fails to pay for the liquor he consumes; and that ignorance means inability to read and write. Others of us

think that intemperance exists whenever fermented or alcoholic liquors are swallowed in any form or quantity, and that ignorance is lack of a college education. Accordingly the phenomena of the continued consumption of liquors, in spite of laws against intemperance, and of persistent non-consumption of school privileges, in spite of laws against ignorance, are equally and alike inevitable manifestations of the actual assortment of desires out of which the community life is composed. We repeat, then: the problem of changing the facts is the problem of transforming the interests (desires) that make the facts. Social efficiency, on the part of persons zealous to alter the facts, involves skill in discovering the actual character of the desires present, knowledge of the psychology of desires, and tact in the social pedagogy and politics and diplomacy which convert less into more social desires.

These statements imply all the reasons for the study of fundamental sociology. From first to last our life is a web woven by our interests. Sociology may be said to be the science of human interests and their workings under all conditions, just as chemistry is sometimes defined as "the science of atoms and their behavior under all conditions." Man at his least is merely a grubbing and mating animal. He has developed no interests beyond those of grubbing and mating, or those tributary to grubbing and mating. Every civilization in the world today carries along a certain percentage of survivals of this order of interests, and societies still exist wholly on the level of these interests. On the other hand, some men develop such attenuated spiritual interests that they pay only perfunctory and grudging tribute to the body at all, and live in an atmosphere of unworldly contemplation. Between these extremes are the activities of infinitely composite society, moved by infinite diversities of interests. These interests, however, as we have seen, are variations and permutations of a few rudimentary interests. Our knowledge of sociology, *i. e.*, our systematized knowledge of human society, will be measured by the extent of our ability to interpret all human society in terms of its effective interests.

4. *Association.*—Some of the terms in our schedule may be

classed as highly conceptual. They may be criticised as theoretical and even fanciful. Of course, we would not admit the claim, but there would be plausible pretexts for urging it. The present term, however, is only in the slightest degree open to that impeachment. It calls attention to one of the constant and universal facts of the human situation. It puts that fact in the form of a generalized expression. It thereby registers a fundamental condition of every human problem. This condition cannot be eliminated or ignored without reading the situation itself out of existence. In a word, the term means that whatever has to do with human society thereby has to do with *men associating* or *in association.* Society and association connote and presuppose and imply and involve each other. As terms they are correlates, as facts they are essentially identical.

But it is objected, on the other hand: "This goes without saying. It should be taken for granted. We cannot talk about society without assuming it. To say that society is association, or that all men live in association, is a commonplace and a platitude. It is not science, but only a parody and a burlesque of science." The answer is that the fallacy of all fallacies is the turning of the real into the unreal by neglecting the obvious. This concept "association" thrusts itself upon every man in his senses, but the history of philosophy down to the present moment is strewn thick with proof that men can be preternaturally skilful in avoiding it. Rousseau would have been a man without an occupation if he and his dupes had accepted association as a literal, universal fact. The theory of the "social contract" would have perished still-born, if this commonplace of *association* had been brought to bear upon it. The whole individualistic philosophy, in all its shades and qualities, from Cain to Nietzsche, would have been estopped if men had given due heed to this fact of association. The world would have been spared most of the theological controversies of the Christian centuries, and we should not have wandered until now in the labyrinth of ethical theories that apply only to a world which never was, if this commonplace of universal association had been allowed its natural and necessary value. All that we are, all

that we think, all that we do, is a function of our fellow-beings before and beside and beyond ourselves.

We are not professing that the term *association* reveals anything new except in the sense that every generalization of familiar things is a revelation. Every man who had ever seen apples on a tree knew that, if the stem broke, the apples would fall to the ground, but it took Newton to express that fact in a form that took in all the like facts in the world. When Newton made his generalization of the law of gravitation, it did not tell any new facts, but it enabled people for the first time to see a like element in a multitude of old facts which had not seemed to have any common element of likeness before. So our present term does not purport to increase the sum of knowledge. It merely arranges knowledge so that it can be put to more intelligent use.

Of course, there is no magical value in a word. This term "association" explains nothing, although the moment we get the perception that every individual or social situation is a fraction and an episode of an association we have a pointer toward explanations. The term, like all those which this paper emphasizes, merely affixes a name to a constant phase of human facts. It thereby signalizes the reality of that phase of things. It records the importance of the reality, and it invites attention to the reality. In thus proposing a technical term for one of the universal conditions of human life, we remove one of the excuses for false, distorted, fictitious versions of the facts of life. Like each of the terms in our schedule, our present term, "association," proves to be a mute cross-examiner of all evidence and theory about social facts; *e. g.*, we have a concrete problem, say a juvenile delinquent, a widespread practice of tax-dodging in a city, an astounding indifference of the Christian nations of Europe toward Turkish misrule. There is not only a possible but a very familiar way of treating situations of which these are types, as though the fact of association did not exist. To be sure, it cannot be utterly excluded from anyone's attention, but it is made an entirely negligible quantity. If the total-depravity theory of the individual is used as the explanation, if the action

of a community or a nation is accounted for solely by hypotheses of qualities within its members, the fact and the force of association are virtually ignored. With this concept in mind, on the other hand, we are bound to ask: What have the associates of the boy or the men or the nations to do with their acts? The result is that we find a ground for familiar proverbial wisdom of all times and peoples; *e. g.*, "Evil communications corrupt good manners;" "A man is known by the company he keeps;" "*Cherchez la femme*," etc.; *i. e.*, whatever our philosophy, we have always in practice looked for some part of the reasons for people's acting in other people. The boy in the slums may give no more real evidence of depravity than the boy on the boulevards, but the difference of his associates, young and old, turns the scale. The men who dodge taxes in New York or Chicago may be in themselves no worse than other men, but they may have a belief that other men turn the public revenues to private benefit, and that still other men in other parts of the state escape burdens that are loaded on the cities. Their tax-dodging may be no more praiseworthy; but, instead of being an act of unmitigated meanness and unsociability, we find it has an element at least of self-defense and quite natural if not justifiable retaliation. So England's inertness in the face of Turkish atrocities proves to be less from English indifference than from Russia's watchfulness of opportunity, and *vice versa*. In a word, *all human facts, from those most narrowly individual to those which concern the whole living population of the world, are to be understood fairly and fully only as phases of the larger ranges of facts with which they are associated.*

5. *The social.*—With this term we denote a concept which is less directly available outside of technical sociology than those which have gone before, and most of those which will follow. For the professional sociologist, however, it is a matter of cardinal necessity to find for this concept a distinct and clear content. If he is confused or vague at this point, his whole sociology will be a blur in consequence. The concept has been discussed incidentally, however, in earlier papers of this series, and reference to those passages is sufficient for our present purposes.[1]

[1] AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, Vol. V, pp. 784–8 and 796–802.

To illustrate the bearing of the abstract propositions just cited, reference may be made to an argument from the present viewpoint against Professor Giddings. It is contained in a review of *Inductive Sociology* published in *Science*, May 2, 1902. The claim urged is that, if the technical sociologist lacks a distinct perception of what *the social* involves, particularly a clear appreciation of the contrast between the individual and the social phases of human conditions, it is possible for his analysis virtually to ignore the associational factor altogether, and to degenerate into futile speculation about an arbitrarily abstracted individual. Our thinking will be realistic only in proportion as we discriminate between the individual elements in social problems, on the one hand, and the social elements, on the other.

6. *The social process.*[1]—Again we have to deal with a concept which the psychologists have been elaborating simultaneously with the sociologists. It is impossible to distribute credit for work at this point. It is sufficient to acknowledge that the sociologists have doubtless been assisted by the psychologists, more than they are aware, in expressing the social reality in this aspect.

In this case, too, we are dealing with a concept which is among the most necessary of the sociological categories for organizing all orders of social knowledge, from the most concrete to the most generalized. That is, we have not arrived at the stage of sophistication peculiar to our epoch, unless we have learned to think of that part of human experience to which we give attention as a term or terms in a *process*. The use of the word is immaterial. The possession of the idea, the perception of the relation between portions of experience, is essential. We do not represent human experience to ourselves as it is, unless we think every portion of it as a factor in a process composed of all human experiences.

In the absence of any generally accepted psychological formula of the concept "process" the following is proposed: *A process is a collection of occurrences, each of which has a meaning for every other, the whole of which constitutes some sort of becoming.*

[1] *Vid.* GIDDINGS, *Principles of Sociology*, Book IV, chap. i, "The Social Process, Physical;" chap. ii, "The Social Process, Psychical."

The thesis corresponding with the title of this section is: *Every portion of human experience has relations which require application of this concept "process."* Human association, or society, is a process. Every act of every man has a meaning for every act of every other man. The act of Columbus in discovering America is going on in the act of reflecting on this proposition, and our reflection upon this proposition has a bearing upon every act of every man now living or hereafter to live in America. All the acts together which make up the experiences of man in connection with America constitute the becoming of a social whole, and an organizing and operation of that whole beyond limits which we can imagine.

Our present thesis anticipates nothing with reference to the nature of the social process, or its mechanism, or its results. We are concerned at the start merely with the empty, formal conception that human experience, whether taken in its minutest fragments or in the largest reaches which we can contemplate, is, so far as it goes, a congeries of occurrences which have their meaning by reference to each other. The task of getting for this concept, "the social process," vividness, impressiveness, and content, is one of the rudiments of both social and sociological pedagogy. That is, if we are trying to get the kind of knowledge about society which the sociologist claims to be all that is worth getting, because it is all that is complete in itself, all that goes beyond partialness and narrowness and shallowness, we must learn to analyze that portion of experience which we are studying, in terms of the process which it is performing. For instance, suppose we are studying history. Our attention will be given either to more or less detached series of events, or we must ask, "Just what phase of the social process is going forward in this period?" A conception of the general meaning of the period as a whole gives us clues to the proportions and other relations between the particular events. It gives us pointers about the classes of occurrences best worth watching in the period. It enables us to determine in some measure whether we have actually become acquainted with the period, or have merely amused ourselves with a few curious details which had a certain fractional value within the period.

To make the illustration more specific, suppose our attention is given to the French Revolution. Thousands of writers have described facts and essayed interpretations of the Revolution, without having approached the sociological conception of the meaning of the period. Expressed in the rough, study of the French Revolution, under guidance of the sociological categories, would proceed somewhat after this fashion:

First: All the activities of the French during the period accomplished some portion of the process of realizing the essential human interests. What was that portion of the process in its large outlines? The question sends us forth to get a bird's-eye view of the Revolution from some altitude which will reveal the great lines of movement usually obscured by the picturesque details which first attract attention. Let us suppose that we make out the following as the general process: The French, from lowest to highest, had become conscious of wants which the traditional social system arbitrarily repressed. The Revolution is a spontaneous, spasmodic effort of the French to release themselves from those inherited restrictions, and to achieve a social situation in which the wants of which they are now conscious will be free to find satisfaction.

Second: What, then, were the actual wants which impelled different portions of the French people? In brief, the peasantry wanted to eat the bread which their toil produced, instead of giving the most of it to the landlords who did not toil; the wage-earners in the towns wanted work enough and pay enough to improve their condition, and they saw no way to get either without abolishing the privileges of the rich. The third estate, according to Sieyès's famous dictum, had been nothing in the state, and wanted to become something; the thinkers were enamored of new notions of individual rights, and were romantically eager to change the situation so that those rights might be realized; on the other hand, the privileged classes, the economic, the political, and the ecclesiastical aristocrats, wanted to preserve their privileges. They wanted to defeat the purposes of their fellow-citizens. They wanted to perpetuate a situation in which the wants antagonistic with their own would continue to be defeated.

Third: To understand the Revolution as a section of the social process we have to follow out the details of analyzing these several classes of wants down to the concrete demands which each interest urged, and of tracing the relations of each occurrence worth noticing during the whole episode to the whole complicated interplay of these desires throughout the whole complex movement.

Fourth: To complete our insight we have to reach at last a new expression of the new situation in France, at a selected period after the crisis. We have to discover the form and the manner and the degree in which these wants that expressed themselves in the upheaval realize themselves in the situation that remained after the upheaval. We thereby have a measure of the absolute motion accomplished by the French as a result of the relative motion between the units during the period. That is, we have followed the process from something to something else through intermediate correlations of actions.

Of course, everyone who has written history or read it has had some more or less vague instinct of the program just indicated. It would be hard to find a recent writer of history who might not maintain a plausible argument that his plan of work implied all, and more than all, just specified. Whether a given writer or reader gives due place to the process-category is a question of fact, to be decided on the merits of each case. Our present business is to bring the necessity of the concept into clear view. If it should prove that everybody in practice uses the concept already, our contention that it is necessary will surely not be weakened. If it should prove that the concept is not as distinctly before our minds in studying history as the contents of experience require, our contention will in the end not be in vain.

Recurring to our proposition above, that we must employ the concept *social process*, whether we are getting intelligence about society by studying strictly past events or present problems, we may put the case again in more concrete form by applying the argument to the present "labor problem" in the United States.

To some people the case of the coal operators and the work-

men in Pennsylvania is merely a fight between two parties for their rights under the law. Without implying an opinion about the merits of any specific case, we may assert that no one has a proper point of view from which to form an opinion until he can present the situation to himself in more adequate terms. The fact is that the production and distribution of wealth occur now under conditions that have been changing very rapidly, not only since the so-called "industrial revolution" of nearly a century ago, but particularly during the last twenty-five years. In the course of this changing a parallel mental process has been going on; our concepts of social rights have undergone decided modifications. A hundred years ago American men had to deal only with other men like themselves. Today the distinctive factors in the situation are, first, that racial intermixture has radically changed the character of the population, and, second, that a host of artificial men are actors on the scene, and they are relatively as much superior to real men as the mythological gods were in turning the tide of battle now one way and now another before the gates of Troy. Corporations, *i. e.*, legal persons, giants more mighty in the economic field than ancient chieftains were in the field of war, have transformed the situation in the working world. Our social process in the last century has been the play of five chief factors: first, the composition of the population; second, the development of a technique of production; third, the development of a governmental system; fourth, the development of general social or moral ideas; fifth, the development of a system of distributing the output of our productive technique. Today we are confronted by the fact that our system of production has developed along one line of least resistance, viz., that discovered in the economics of the productive process, while our system of distribution has developed very largely along other lines of least resistance, viz., in accordance with the relative power in competition of men, on the one hand more and on the other hand less, able to get artificial helps in the struggle for distribution. One consequence is that the results do not conform strictly to the ratio of contributions to production. Meanwhile our politics and our social philosophy have

developed in a sort of alternating current between these main factors of the process. Consequently, the inevitable problem immediately upon us is that of reconsidering and readjusting our whole scheme of distribution with its underlying concepts of justice.

This being the case, every strike, or other interruption of the process, becomes an implicit challenge to the thinkers to find out what meaning the interruption has with reference to the healthiness or unhealthiness of the process itself. The immediate question is: Has either party failed to meet the requirements of public law and of private contracts? This immediate question, however, is relatively trivial. The more important question is: Do the law and the social situation make it morally certain that one party can and will take an unjust advantage of the other part in deciding how the burdens and the products of industry shall be divided? Especially, has the legal creation of artificial persons so changed the balance of power between men that those who are simply left to their individual resources as natural persons are in an unjust degree at the mercy of those who are clothed with the power of artificial persons?

These questions open the whole problem of the actual process which is going forward in our own day. They require such knowledge of the demographic, economic, legal, and moral factors of our present activities that we can form the same kind of a judgment about a given labor difficulty which a trainman forms about a cracked wheel or a hot bearing.

The most characteristic feature in our American social process today is the instinctive effort of all to defend themselves against the superior power which some have gained by combination, and then to find a way of getting for themselves the advantages of combination. The most important discovery which the nineteenth century made was the secret of multiplying individual power, and of intrenching individual security by combination of interests. The present stage of the social process is a typical reaction against a monopoly of that discovery by the few, and a typical effort to get the benefits of the discovery for the many.

As has been urged above, an adequate conception of human

association as a process involves something in addition to analysis of what has actually taken place, or what is occurring. It extends to perception of what is coming to be in course of this occurring. Here we must leave the solid ground of certainty and venture into the dangerous region of inference. Yet no knowledge is worth having unless it is convertible into forecast of the future. What we want to know of the social process first of all is whether it is likely to continue beyond us. Are there indications of what the process will amount to if it does so continue? Do we get any light from the process, so far as it has gone, about the elements in the process which are best worth promoting? Does the process reveal anything about the means available to direct and develop the process? In other words, do we discover in human attainments and achievements details and tendencies which impress us as good and desirable in themselves? Do we conclude that the future human process must be a tragedy of sequestrating those goods to the uses of a few, or that it will be a widening epic of the advance of the many toward the same attainments and achievements and enjoyments? At this point is the critical position in our whole attitude toward the social process. Is it to us a process of the advance of all men toward all the goods that seem good for any men, or is it a perpetual process of the preferment of some at the cost of others? Do the good things that men discover, and think, and perform, belong forever to select men, or are they merely samples of the things which the continuance of the social process will procure for the general typical man?

It is not essential to an exposition of the concept "social process" that this question should be answered here, but so much must be compressed into this outline that a theorem of which no demonstration can be presented may be ventured gratuitously, viz.: *If we are justified in drawing any general conclusions whatever from human experience thus far, it is safe to say that the social process tends to put an increasing proportion of individuals in possession of all the goods which have been discovered by the experience of humanity as a whole, and that all social programs should be thought out with a view to promotion of this tendency.*

In other words, the social process, as we find it among men thus far, bears testimony that the inclusive aim which men should set up for themselves ought to be the perfecting of social co-operation, to the end that the lot of every person in the world may be to share, in a progressively widening proportion, in all the developing content of the most abundant life. The social process is not to be forever a consumption of men for the production of things. It must become more and more a consumption of things for the production of men. This human product must be perfected in all the qualities and dimensions of life. More and better life by more and better people, beyond any limit of time or quality that our minds can set, is the indicated content of the social process.

7. *Social structure.*[1]—The concepts dealt with thus far in this paper have come into conscious use in sociology rather late. They have been forced upon our attention as analysis and interpretations have become more exact. They are rudimentary and necessary, from the logical point of view, but it took the sociologists a long time to see the need of such concepts.

Under the present title, on the other hand, we encounter a concept which has had much more than its due share of influence upon sociology since Comte, and it would be easy to show that it has implicitly played an important rôle, though most of the time it was unexpressed in direct terms, throughout the whole range of thinking about human actions. The notion of social structure has certainly dominated all the social sciences during the past fifty years. So far as we can see, it is a concept which we must always use. It seems probable, on the other hand, that we shall reduce the ratio of its prominence below that which it has enjoyed during the formative period of sociology.

Every activity implies a formation of elements by means of which the activity takes place. In general this means a *structure* of parts concerned in the activity.[2]

[1] *Vid.* SMALL AND VINCENT, *Introduction*, pp. 87–96; AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, Vol. II, p. 311; Vol. IV, p. 411; Vol. V, pp. 276 and 626–31.

[2] Thus the *Century Dictionary* has, among others, the following definition of the term: "In the widest sense, any production or piece of work artificially built up or composed of parts joined together in some definite manner; any construction . . . .

It is not intended that the term "social structure," as here used, shall cover any questions that are in dispute about the sense in which the concept is applicable to society. The notion has been overworked, abused, distorted, misrepresented, and misunderstood. Many sociologists have accordingly felt obliged to protest against the notion altogether; or, at least, they have so strongly objected to certain versions of the notion that they have virtually argued against the validity of the fundamental category itself. At the same time, everyone who has attempted to interpret men's activities has been obliged to use the concept in some generic form. The essential fact is that, *when men act together, whether in pairs or in multitudes, there is always an adjustment of some sort between them.* Thus in a matriarchal family the woman has a certain conceded prestige and influence, with reference to which the man and the children are subordinate. In the patriarchal family there is similar subordination, but the man is the center of power. In every group of boys or girls at play, the arrangement of leaders and led is sure to develop in some degree or other, sooner or later. In a gang of men at work, there will always be a gravitation toward definite arrangement of leaders and led, or boss and bossed. So in every larger and more developed human activity. The adaptations of the individuals to each other may be entirely fluid and flexible and transitory, as in a crowd accidentally assembled by curiosity; or they may become definite, rigid, and relatively permanent, as in the legal institutions of civilized society. Wherever social activities occur, however, this manner of adjustment between the actors, this structure of the parts, is just as real as the existence of the parts themselves. This structure into which persons arrange themselves whenever they act together is both effect and cause of their actions. The activities cannot be fully or truly known, therefore, without knowledge of the social structure within which and by means of which they take place. It has

An organic form; the combination of parts in any natural production; an organization of parts or elements. . . . . Mode of building, construction, or organization; arrangement of parts, elements, or constituents; form; make: — use of both natural and artificial productions."

come about, accordingly, that many sociologists have virtually made the treatment of social structures the whole of sociology. They have, moreover, interpreted social structure in such a dogmatic way that progress of social knowledge has been retarded by reaction against their methods. In refusing to accept unfortunate versions of social structure many people have placed themselves in an attitude of antagonism to the whole conception of social structure. This is an impossible war between words and realities. The latter must prevail. Men act in and through correlations with each other. This is the essential fact which the concept "social structure" recognizes. We are inevitably forced to find out at last what manner of social structure is concerned in any given portion of human experience which attracts our attention. This is as true of a district school, or of a country town, or of a local church, as it is of China or the "concert of the powers." "What are the customary, understood, accepted, and expected modes in which the individuals concerned get along with each other?" This is one of the first questions to which we must find an answer, if we are attempting to understand any portion of society.

For many reasons the most available help in reaching a working familiarity with the concept "social structure," as it is now held by all sociologists, is Spencer's *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. I, Part II, "The Inductions of Sociology." Spencer's account of social structure must be taken with many grains of salt. In the first place, whether Spencer himself was perfectly clear in his own mind about the matter or not, the biological analogies which he uses so liberally are to be taken as purely illustrative, good so far as they go, but not to be confounded with the literal relationships between persons which they are employed to symbolize. People who use biological figures most liberally in expressing social relations are most emphatic today in asserting that they use those forms of expression merely as the most convenient rhetorical device for making social relationships vivid. Society is not a big animal. There is no social stomach or brain or heart or eye or spinal cord. The digestive process for society is performed by the digestive organs of the

individuals who compose society. The thinking of society is done in the minds of the individual members of society, and so on. Yet all the individuals in a society are, as we have seen, in association. The feeding and thinking and other primarily individual activities which they perform all have a positive or negative effect on the maintenance and activities of the association. It comes about, therefore, that we are practically justified in speaking as though society itself had these parts or organs which are literally located in individuals only. This will be more evident if we combine with further discussion of the present subject the closely related subject of the next section.

8. *Social functions.*[1]—Men in association have common work to do. Because they have this common work to do they associate, and because they associate they find more occasions for common work. Everybody has to eat, but, after people have associated a little while, they find that some of their number are not producing food. They are doing other things, like singing patriotic songs, or decorating weapons, or performing religious rites. Their activities would not feed them if the association did not exist. In fact, however, the interests of the members of the association have become so specialized that there is a demand for these activities which are only indirectly connected with the food-producing activities. We may express this fact in terms of social function in this way: some persons become set apart in the course of the social process for the social function of supplying food; other persons are gradually permitted or required by the interests of all to perform other functions less essential to the sustaining of life than the function of food-getting. Each of these kinds of work involves some detail of social structure, and, on the other hand, all social structures are assortments of persons incidental to the supply of incessant general wants, *i. e.*, the performance of *social functions.*

There is nothing mystical or arbitrary about these two concepts, social structure and social function, as they are held by all sociologists. They are merely the most convenient sym-

[1] *Vid.* SMALL AND VINCENT, Book IV, "Social Physiology and Pathology," and SPENCER, *Principles of Sociology*, Book II, chap. v, "Social Functions."

bols that we can adopt for literal facts in society. On the one hand, human life is a vast complex of work interchanged between all and each. In brief, men in association carry on a system of functions for each and all. To do this the associates arrange themselves in certain more or less permanent adjustments to each other. This is the fact indicated by the term "social structure." Wherever there is society there is social function and social structure. The closer we get to the real facts of society, the more specifically must we be able to answer the questions: Precisely what are the functions which the society is carrying on? and, Precisely what structure has the society adopted as its equipment for performing the functions?

It cannot be too often repeated that every person who is trying to exert an influence of any sort upon other people, whether for good or evil, is concerned to know, first, just what objects in life those people are pursuing, and, second, just what social adjustments they have adopted in pursuit of the objects. As we shall see presently, these two aspects of the situation are not only important in themselves, but they powerfully affect each other. It follows that ability to comprehend the particular society with which one is dealing, in terms of social structure and social function, is a part of the necessary outfit of both theoretical and practical sociologists.

We may return to Spencer for our illustrations of the ways in which these conceptions have been developed and applied. In the simplest terms, the sociologists long ago discovered that they must learn how to find out what communities are really doing and how they are doing it. That is, we must be able to go behind the visible and the conventional and discover the real aims and methods which the visible and the conventional often conceal. For example, Spencer divides social institutions, for certain purposes, into, first, domestic institutions; second, ceremonial institutions; third, political institutions; fourth, ecclesiastical institutions; fifth, professional institutions; sixth, industrial institutions. Now every society, except the most primitive, and quite minute portions of every society, may have some parts of each of these sorts of institutions. It is necessary to know

them by their general traits and to know them in particular. In every age each of them has done much that does not appear on the surface. The family, for instance, is not a "domestic" institution alone. It has always been, more or less, each of the other kinds of institution—ceremonial, political, ecclesiastical, professional, industrial. The same thing is true of each of the other groups of institutions. The *paterfamilias*, the priest, the king, the artist, the farmer, the blacksmith, do not have one and the same meaning in all times and places. In one society the farmer may be little more than a part of the clod he tills, while in another he may be maker of political constitutions and a prophet of new civilizations. The priest may be either a minister of religion or a pander to political and personal corruption. The king may be either a creator and developer of the state, or a parasite sapping the material and moral power of his people. Institutions are but the shell of social activities. Analyses of them simply as institutions are necessary; but that sort of analysis is merely a step toward more real analysis of the place which they actually occupy in working social arrangements, and of the social content which their operation actually secures.

While Spencer's account of social structure and functions is not to be recommended as the final form which those concepts should take in our minds, it is historically and pedagogically expedient to approach more literal renderings of actual social structure and function through Spencer's version. All the sociologists have obtained their present insight by means of preliminary analyses more or less like Spencer's. It is doubtful if anyone will reach the limits of our present perceptions of social relations without making some use of the Spencerian mode of approach. This does not mean that there is any logical relation of antecedent and consequent, of premise and conclusion, between the method of biological analogy and literal interpretation of social structures and functions. It simply means that, as a practical matter, there is no way of making the intimacy and complexity and interdependence of social structural and functional relations so vivid as by making biological structures and functions illustrate them. This latter device,

however, is not the social interpretation itself. It is merely a convenience tributary to the end of social interpretation. If it does not serve that end in any case, it is to be brushed aside accordingly.

It would occupy more space than is available to pursue the discussion of social structure and function into particulars. We might begin with Spencer's primary classification of social structure into the *sustaining* system, the *distributing* system, and the *regulating* system. We might show that the functions of production, transfer, and regulation go on, in some manner or other, in every group, from the parts of the animal body considered as a group, to the whole of the human race. We might show how the work performed by these great structural or functional systems[1] varies indefinitely in content and proportions from time to time and from place to place, and that the same essential functions go on in social structures so different that only trained insight can discover the identity in the difference. We might show that much experience in analyzing social situations, so as to demonstrate the actual structure and functions concerned, is necessary to form mature and reliable sociological judgment. We might go through a critical analysis of the structure and functions of some selected society, as a sample of the work which every sociologist must be prepared to perform upon the situation with which he has especially to deal. In a conspectus of this sort, however, all this must be omitted.

One further consideration hinted at above may be added. One of the most frequent problems encountered in the practical affairs of social life is, in most general terms, a problem of the relations between social structure and function. It is a universal principle that function develops structure, and that structure limits function. For example, need of defense against men develops the military or police structures; need of defense against fire develops the fire department; *per contra*, the kind of a military, police, or fire department which a community possesses determines the sort of work which will be done in

[1] They are the one or the other according as we think of them from the side of mechanism or from the side of the work that they perform.

their lines, and indirectly the sort of work which other parts of the society can perform in discharging other functions.

Now, it is a further general fact that social structures, although differentiated to perform functions, tend to assert themselves, even when the function is no longer necessary, or when the structure is no longer adequate to the function. The parts of social structures are persons. Selfish interests are closer than social interests. The persons who compose a social structure get their living or their repute by doing the work of that structure, or by perpetuating the assumption that they do the work. To the persons in this situation the structure is something desirable in itself, because from it their livelihood and their social prestige are derived. Every revolution in history has accordingly been, wholly or in part, a throwing away of some social structure which once performed a needed function; which had ceased to do the work; which useless people nevertheless wanted to perpetuate because it was a good thing for themselves; which the rest of society wanted to abolish because it stood in the way of their personal interests.

Accordingly, one of the most radical inquiries suggested by any strained social situation, whether it is merely the case of a local church which fails to prosper, or the case of a national government against which the people revolt, or anything intermediate between these extremes, is: What social structure is involved? What functions are its ostensible charge? Are the functions performed? What changes of structure would promote the performance of the functions? What interests insist upon the permanence of the structure at the expense of the functions?

9. *Social forces.*—No treatment of this subject is so full and clear as that of Ward.[1] What we have said and suggested in the section on interests should, however, be recalled as the basis for analysis of the social forces.

We must guard at the outset against an illusion that has exerted a confusing influence at this point. There are no social forces which are not at the same time forces lodged in individuals, deriving their energy from individuals, and operating in

[1] *Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. I, 468–82; and *The Psychic Factors of Civilization.*

and through individuals. There are no social forces that lurk in the containing ether and affect persons without the agency of other persons. There are, to be sure, all the physical conditions of which we have spoken above, that affect persons just as they affect all other forms of matter. So far, these are not social forces at all. They do not get to be social forces until they get into persons, and in these persons take the form of feelings which impel them to react upon other persons. Persons are thus transmuters of physical forces into social forces; but all properly designated social forces are essentially personal. They are within some persons and stimulate them to act upon other persons, or they are in other persons and exert themselves as external stimuli upon otherwise inert persons. In either case social forces are personal influences passing from person to person and producing activities that give content to the association.

The conception of social forces was never challenged so long as it was merely an everyday commonplace. When it passed into technical forms of expression, doubts began to be urged. If anyone in the United States had questioned the existence of Mrs. Grundy fifty years ago, he would have been pitied and ignored as a harmless "natural." Social forces in the form of gossip, and personified in Mrs. Grundy, were real to everybody. But the particular species of social forces which Mrs. Grundy represented were neither more nor less real than the other social forces which had no name in folk-lore. Persons incessantly influence persons. The modes of this influence are indescribably varied. They are conscious and unconscious, accidental and momentary, or deliberate and persistent. They are conventional and continuous, the result of individual habit, or of custom crystallized into national or racial institutions.

It is difficult to imagine how there could be any reality, or at least any significance, in the fact which we have named "the spiritual environment," if that environment did not have means of affecting persons. The ways in which the spiritual environment comes to be an environment at all in effect are simply the modes of action followed by the social forces. Yet our analysis of the social forces must not be treated as though it were in any

sense a deduction from the idea of a spiritual environment. The reverse is the case. We do not get the idea of a spiritual environment until we have found out that there are many distinct social forces, and then it becomes convenient for some purposes to mass them in one conception, to which we give the name "spiritual environment," or some equivalent. The simple fact which the concept "social forces" stands for is that every individual acts and is acted upon in countless ways by the other persons with whom he associates. These modes of action and reaction between persons may be classified, and the more obvious and recurrent among them may be enumerated. More than this, the action of these social forces may be observed, and the results of observation may be organized into social laws. Indeed, there would be only two alternatives, if we did not discover the presence and action of social forces. On the one hand, social science at most would be a subdivision of natural science. On the other hand, the remaining alternative would be the impossibility of social science altogether.

But social forces are just as distinctly discernible as chemical forces. The fact that we are not familiar with them no more makes against their existence and their importance than general ignorance of the pressure of the atmosphere takes that phenomenon out of the physical world. The social forces are the atmosphere of the moral world. They are not only the atmosphere, but they are a very large part of the moral world in general. If we could compose a complete account of the social forces we should at the same time have completed, from one point of attention at least, a science of everything involved in human society.

As suggested above, a preface to Ward's analysis of the social forces should be found in antecedent analysis of interests. As Ward correctly observes:

> All beings which can be said to perform actions do so in obedience to those mental states which are denominated *desires*. . . . . We will, therefore, rest content to assume that desire is the essential basis of all action, and hence the true *force* in the sentient world (AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, Vol. I, p. 468).

But we have gone back a step beyond desires, and have found

it necessary to assume the existence of underlying interests. These have to desires very nearly the relation of substance to attribute, or, in a different figure, of genus to species. Our interests may be beyond or beneath our ken; our desires are strong and clear. I may not be conscious of my health interests in any deep sense, but the desires that my appetites assert are specific and concrete and real. The implicit interests, of which we may be very imperfectly aware, move us to desires which may correspond well or ill with the real content of the interests. At all events, it is these desires which make up the active social forces, whether they are more or less harmonious with the interests from which they spring. The desires that the persons associating actually feel are practically the elemental forces with which we have to reckon. They are just as real as the properties of matter. They have their ratios of energy, just as certainly as though they were physical forces. They have their peculiar modes of action, which may be formulated as distinctly as the various modes of chemical action.

The only scientific doubt which is admissible about the social forces concerns the division of labor in studying them. If the social forces are human desires, is not the study of them psychology, rather than sociology? We may answer both "yes" and "no." In the sense that both psychology and sociology either begin or end in each other, the study of the social forces belongs to psychology. In the sense that either psychology or sociology can be supposed to treat a whole situation, if its distinctive point of view is held apart from the other point of view, neither psychology nor sociology can be credited with sole responsibility for interpretation of the social forces. The emphasis of psychology is upon discrimination of the mental activities (in this case the desires) and the mechanism of their action. The emphasis of sociology is upon the social stimuli of the desires, upon the various content which they carry in different situations, and upon their operation within associations of persons. The relations of psychology and sociology to knowledge of the social forces are consequently complementary, not competitive.

Ward's briefer classification of the social forces is as follows (p. 472):

- The social forces are:
  - Essential forces.
    - Preservative forces.
      - Positive, gustatory (seeking pleasure).
      - Negative, protective (avoiding pain).
    - Reproductive forces.
      - Direct—the sexual and amative desires.
      - Indirect—parental and consanguineal affections.
  - Nonessential forces.
    - Æsthetic forces.
    - Emotional (moral) forces.
    - Intellectual forces.

Whether we assume or not that Ward has found the final classification of the social forces, his analysis is a point of departure which affords the readiest approach to the subject.

It is hardly necessary to enlarge upon the importance of the concept *social forces*, because the argument was virtually foreshadowed in our discussion of interests. Every desire that any man harbors is a force making or marring, strengthening or weakening, the structure and functions of the society of which he is a part. What the human desires are, what their relations are to each other, what their peculiar modifications are under different circumstances — these are questions of detail which must be answered in general by social psychology and in particular by specific analysis of each social situation. The one consideration to be urged at this point is that the concept "social forces" has a real content. It represents reality. There are social forces. They are the desires of persons. They range in energy from the vagrant whim that makes the individual a temporary discomfort to his group, to the inbred feelings that whole races share. It is with these subtle forces that social arrangements and the theories of social arrangements have to deal.

10. *Social ends.*—To suggest the notion of "ends" is to invite metaphysical argument. Our philosophical traditions incline us to speculation about ends as they exist in the absolute mind; ends proposed at the beginning of things; ends to which all events within our knowledge are tributary, whether we discover it or not; ends toward which the whole creation

moves, whether men consent or not. If it were practicable to enter into greater detail at this point, we might easily show that what we have said about the unconscious phase of human interests, as contrasted with specific desires, lends itself to a theory of ends that are not immediate and visible, but many steps removed, and so not consciously proposed by all or many of the members of society. For instance, to take the classic American illustration, the colonists in the seventh decade of the eighteenth century wanted "redress of grievances" from the mother-country. That meant certain specific things, which they plainly stated. To get redress of grievances they adopted a series of concerted measures—committees of correspondence, continental congresses, non-intercourse agreements, insurrection. But these steps did not avail. To get the specific things that all wanted, it became necessary to strike for another thing, independence, that none wanted. Having obtained independence, it soon became apparent that another thing, which few wanted, was the only alternative with loss of what had been gained. Accordingly the colonies founded that other thing, nationality. Now, there is a use of the conception of ends, in which independence and nationality may be said to have been the "ends" of American activities from the beginning. That is, they were consummations which the logic of events must bring to pass, whether any individual could foresee them or not. In this sense every stage of development through which men and nations pass in reaching more complete life is an "end" of all previous stages, and human experience is a scale of means and ends, regardless of men's thoughts about the meaning of their acts. This is the sense in which we think of all life as being a preparation for some undefined end—"that far-off divine event toward which the whole creation moves."

The conception of ends thus indicated has a place in social philosophy, but our present business is with a much more restricted concept. In a word, *human associations always have reasons for existence as associations, and those reasons are conscious ends for the association, in a way which differs somewhat from that in which they are ends for the individuals in the association.*

Take, for example, the *family*, either primitive or modern. From a variety of motives a man and a woman unite to form a family. They thus secure certain reciprocal services. They assure to themselves certain comforts, conveniences, safeguards, dignities, which unattached persons lack. To each of these persons individually independence is a desired end. These other goods are also desired, and for the sake of them the individuals exchange a certain kind of independence for that kind of interdependence which the family relationship involves. That very interdependence now becomes an *end* for the persons united in the family. The continued existence of the family is an end in itself. Both man and woman may shortly become aware that this end, which is decisive for them as a family, comes into sharp collision with ends that are dear to them as individuals. Each says in his heart, "I would like to do so and so;" but each is restrained by the thought, "That would break up the family." Whether the conflict between the individual ends and the family ends becomes sharp enough to be thus realized by the members of the family, or not, it is always there in principle. Each society, large or small, has ends which may have every degree of harmonious or inharmonious relation with the interests and desires of the individual members.

For our present purposes it is not worth while to dwell upon the relation of social ends to individual ends. The present proposition is that social ends exist. Societies exist for purposes that are distinctive. Accordingly, the first end of every society, as of every individual, is *self-preservation*. Whether it is one of the most permanent species of association, like the family or the state, or an accidental and unimportant association, like a bicycle club or a reading circle, every human society has its peculiar degree of tenacity of life. The end of perpetuating its existence asserts itself with corresponding force against the reactions of its individual members, on the one hand, and against collisions with the rest of the world, on the other.

This fact of social ends, more or less at variance with the ends that the individuals who compose the society might, could, would, or should pursue if they were outside of the soci-

ety, is another of those cardinal realities in which we find clues to the mysteries of human experience. From the savage, who is merely a wolf in the human pack, to the court circle of London or Berlin or Vienna or the Vatican, every individual is carried along, partly by his own desires, partly in spite of them, in the current of the social ends pursued by the society to which he belongs. All human experience is thus not merely a fabric of personal desires, but those personal desires operate in a very large measure impersonally. That is, the desires get organized into institutions, and those institutions then in turn make requisitions upon persons, just as though the institutions actually had an existence of themselves, outside of and above the desires of the persons who make the institutions. We have just seen this in the case of the family. As members of the family the man and the woman composing it enforce demands upon both which may sharply antagonize each. These institutionalized demands become the ends which associations of persons pursue. The acts which individuals perform would be unaccountable if we did not know the social ends that dominate individual ends. Why do I obey the laws? Why do I perform jury service? Why do I pay taxes? Why do I observe certain conventional proprieties? My strictly individual preferences may take up arms against each of these every time it demands my conformity. To remain in society at all, or to remain in good standing in society, which may seem to me more important, I must subordinate some of my individual ends to the social ends.

Later chapters of sociology have to consider a great number of relations which depend upon the fact here involved; *e.g.*, when are social ends and when are individual ends progressive, or retrogressive? Our present object is merely to give the fact of social ends its proportionate emphasis.

Since social ends are organizations of the desires of persons, since they are the demands enforced by common elements in the desires of numbers of persons increasing with the size of the society, the presumption is strong that the social ends which control at any time correspond more closely with the real inter-

ests of the persons in the association than their individual desires. That this has been the case, in the aggregate, more than the contrary, is evident if we believe that real human interests have, on the whole, been promoted by the course of events thus far in history. It would be a generalization much too sweeping, however, if we should say that social ends are an expression of genuine human interests, while individual ends express merely apparent or approximate interests. The contrary is often the case. It is more nearly true to say that the social ends are more likely to express the demands of essential interests when they emphasize *functional* wants, and less likely to correspond with these interests when they converge upon social *structure*.

Without attempting to reach an equation of the social and the individual ends, we may further illustrate the existence of the former by use of a diagram.

The interests implicit in every individual are scheduled in the horizontal line at the bottom of the diagram. Each of these interests may assert itself in desires that form a rising scale, through innumerable gradations. The diagram merely indicates these variations of the desires within the six interest-realms represented by the capital letters A–F, by the small letters a–f, with exponents from ^{i} to ^{xiv}.

The left-hand column of the diagram follows Ratzenhofer. It means that there is a visible scale of progress in human society at large. To state Ratzenhofer's thesis we must use terms which come later in our schedule. But, in brief, the proposition is that men arrange themselves from the beginning in groups, which are at first small and exclusive. These groups grow larger, both by growth from within and by various sorts of assimilations and mergings. Starting at the bottom of the column, there are two distinguishable lines of development: first, that in which *conflict* between groups is the cardinal activity; second, that in which reciprocal interests of groups are recognized. These two lines of development are not absolutely separable in time. In general, the former is first in historical order; but, after a certain stage of progress, the latter development begins to overlap the former.

THE SOCIAL INTERESTS AND THEIR STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT.

STAGES OF ETHICAL DEVELOPMENT.	A Bodily Well-Being.	B Control of Natural Resources.	C Adjustment of Personal Relations.	D Discovery and Dissemination of Knowledge.	E Artistic Creation and Enjoyment.	F Satisfaction of Conscience.
VIII. Ethical satisfaction	a^{xiv}	b^{xiv}	c^{xiv}	d^{xiv}	e^{xiv}	f^{xiv}
VII. Preservation and multiplication of sources of supply....	a^{xiii}	b^{xiii}	c^{xiii}	d^{xiii}	e^{xiii}	f^{xiii}
VI. Intensive production.....	a^{xii}	b^{xii}	c^{xii}	d^{xii}	e^{xii}	f^{xii}
V. Diplomacy between states...	a^{xi}	b^{xi}	c^{xi}	d^{xi}	e^{xi}	f^{xi}
IV. Universal freedom with equality of legal rights.....	a^{x}	b^{x}	c^{x}	d^{x}	e^{x}	f^{x}
III. Political self-restraint for the sake of peace	a^{ix}	b^{ix}	c^{ix}	d^{ix}	e^{ix}	f^{ix}
II. Community of interest.....	a^{viii}	b^{viii}	c^{viii}	d^{viii}	e^{viii}	f^{viii}
I. Care for fellow-beings.....	a^{vii}	b^{vii}	c^{vii}	d^{vii}	e^{vii}	f^{vii}
STAGES OF CONFLICT DEVELOPMENT.						
VII. Aggressive combinations crossing state boundaries.....	a^{vi}	b^{vi}	c^{vi}	d^{vi}	e^{vi}	f^{vi}
VI. Balance of power.....	a^{v}	b^{v}	c^{v}	d^{v}	e^{v}	f^{v}
V. Coalitions.....	a^{iv}	b^{iv}	c^{iv}	d^{iv}	e^{iv}	f^{iv}
IV. Hegemony and world-control..	a^{iii}	b^{iii}	c^{iii}	d^{iii}	e^{iii}	f^{iii}
III. State as exclusive society.....	a^{ii}	b^{ii}	c^{ii}	d^{ii}	e^{ii}	f^{ii}
II. Settled race	a^{i}	b^{i}	c^{i}	d^{i}	e^{i}	f^{i}
I. Horde and race.....	a	b	c	d	e	f
UNSOCIALIZED INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS.						
	Health Minimum.	Wealth Minimum.	Sociability Minimum.	Knowledge Minimum.	Beauty Minimum.	Rightness Minimum.

Human groups, then, begin early to be conscious of distinct group-ends. The lowest in the scale is that of the horde, and then presently of the race. Each may be hard pressed in the struggle for food. It has, consequently, an intense group-desire to keep the group intact, as the means of defending the sources of food; and, for the same reason, to weaken and beat off or destroy all rival hordes or races.

The ends which the groups pursue, as they develop from the horde, vary in two ways, which we may call extension and content. The former is represented somewhat ideally by the rising scale in the left-hand column. The latter may be represented by combinations of terms in the other columns.

We may find a group at Stage III of conflict-development, for instance. Suppose we take Sparta or Athens as our illustration. The society leads a very close and exclusive life. Its purposes are bounded by its own political confines. People beyond these boundaries are slightly esteemed. When accident brings the Spartans or Athenians into intercourse with outside individuals or states, the standard of conduct toward them is distinctly less sympathetic and humane than the public and private standards which the state or the population shows in domestic intercourse. Thus the social end, as such, is restricted in its extent. Meanwhile, in Athens, at the age of Pericles, many individuals have desires which we might represent as follows:

$$\text{Desire} = a^{x} + b^{vi} + c^{v} + d^{xi} + e^{xiv} + f^{vii}.$$

Accordingly, the social end of Athens, compounded of many individual desires, might be symbolized, as to its *content*, in this way:

$$\text{Social end} = a^{vii} + b^{iii} + c^{ii} + d^{viii} + e^{xii} + f^{iv}.$$

I. e., every society whatsoever will have, in addition to its primary social end of self-existence, a qualitative end, which is the algebraic sum, so to speak, or, better, a chemical compound, of the desires cherished by its individual members within the realm of the several great interests.

Having thus pointed out the meaning of the phrase "social ends" in general, and having indicated that every human

association, however minute, has its peculiar social ends, subordinate, as the members and the association itself may be, to a hierarchy of more inclusive ends, we are prepared to see that identification of the precise ends cherished and pursued by any society is a very considerable item in the program of getting an understanding of that society. The desires of individuals and of societies, from least to greatest, give us, on the one hand, our means of interpreting the social process as a whole; and, on the other hand, our conception of the social process as a whole gives us a basis of comparison by which to pass judgment upon the wisdom or the unwisdom, the progressiveness or the obstructiveness, of the social ends actually in view in the particular societies with which we are dealing.[1]

All that has been said thus far in this paper is an argument to the effect that, for a long time to come, the chief value of sociology will be derived from the use of its distinctive *point of view*, rather than from a subject-matter to which sociology can maintain an exclusive claim. Our argument is that human life cannot be seen whole and real unless it is construed in the terms which we have discussed. We do not know anything unless we know it in its relationships. The details of human experience are as meaningless as a form of type knocked into pi, unless we have the clues which enable us to distribute and reset the events. We have called the terms treated in this paper "the primary concepts of sociology." It is hardly worth while to offer here a justification of that designation. In brief, it will be found, after a little experience in studying society with the use of these concepts, that the others to which we now turn, are either details which are met so soon as analysis grows precise, or they are notions necessarily implied by the larger conceptions. Indeed, we have used most of them already, whether they have been named or not.

It is not necessary to offer any general principle about the relative importance of the different concepts. It is sufficient to

[1] A group of hypothetical illustrations of social ends of different grades, in the case of states, is proposed in AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, Vol. VI, pp. 512–31. Formulas of the social end in general are proposed *loc. cit.*, pp. 201–3.

say that every one of those named in our schedule is actually present, in some degree or other, in every stage or part or episode of the social process large enough to be observed. Analysis of a given section of experience involves use of these categories, then, not in any mechanical way, as though they were equally prominent and equally significant. It involves their use just as the different phases of reaction known to chemistry are employed in analyses of physical substances, *i. e.*, in precisely the proportions in which they prove to have significance in the case in hand. We proceed to mention a series of concepts which are not of one and the same order of generality. Indeed, we have been obliged to employ most of them in the foregoing discussion. Although it would be desirable to place them more definitely in hierarchical relations, we must be content merely to schedule them provisionally.

11. *Contact.*—This concept has been emphasized earlier in this series. We have said that the most general and inclusive way in which to designate the subject-matter with which sociology must deal is by saying that it is concerned with *all human contacts.* One detail which cannot possibly be eliminated from the social condition, or from the idea of the social, is contact of one person with others.[1]

12. *Differentiation.*—We might recall Spencer's formula of evolution, viz.:

> Evolution is an integration of matter and a concomitant dissipation of motion, during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity, to a definite, coherent heterogeneity, and during which the relative motion undergoes a parallel transformation (*First Principles*, sec. 145).

Reduced to a single word, this formula would be that evolution is *differentiation.* The rest of the formula merely characterizes certain features of this differentiation.

The social process, as a part of the world-process in general, is likewise a collection of differentiations. One way of telling the story of every individual life, or of universal history, or of anything intermediate, would be to narrate the differentiations

[1] *Vid.* AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, Vol. V, pp. 798, 799, and Vol. VI, pp. 328, 329.

that occurred from beginning to end of the career. Discussion of this concept could hardly be reduced to a few concise statements. We might choose from numberless societies the material for illustration. For instance, we might adopt Ratzenhofer's classification of the concrete interests differentiated in a modern state, as follows:

a. The universal interest: sustenance.
b. The kinship interests.
c. The national interests.
d. The creedal interests.
e. The pecuniary interests.
f. The class interests.
  1. Extraction.
  2. Artisanship.
  3. Manufacture.
  4. Wage labor.
  5. Trade.
  6. Professional and personal services.
  7. Begging.
  8. Pseudo-classes.
    a) Capital.
    b) Massed capital.
    c) Massed labor.
g. The rank interests.
h. The corporate interests.

With the differentiation of each of these forms of interest there naturally follows corresponding differentiation of social structures and functions.[1]

13. *Groups.*—The fact of social groups is so obvious, and is of such constant import, that we have necessarily referred to it more than once in the foregoing discussion. All that need be said further in this rapid survey is that the term "group" serves as a convenient sociological designation for any number of people, larger or smaller, between whom such relations are discovered that they must be thought of together. The "group"

[1] The profoundest discussion of this concept is in SIMMEL's *Sociale Differenzierungen*, unfortunately out of print. RATZENHOFER devotes a chapter to much more concrete description, *Die sociologische Erkenntniss*, chap. 15. Specific phases of differentiation are referred to above under the titles "Individualization" and "Socialization," AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, Vol. VI, pp. 351–4.

is the most general and colorless term used in sociology for combinations of persons. A family, a mob, a picnic party, a trade union, a city precinct or ward, a corporation, a state, a nation, the civilized or the uncivilized population of the world, may be treated as a group. Thus a "group" for sociology is a number of persons whose relations to each other are sufficiently impressive to demand attention. The term is merely a commonplace tool. It contains no mystery. It is merely a handle with which to grasp the innumerable varieties of arrangements into which people are drawn by their variations of interest. The universal condition of association may be expressed in the same commonplace way: people always live in groups, and the same persons are likely to be members of many groups. All the illustrations that we need suggest may be assembled around the schedule of interests in the last paragraph.

14. *Form of the group.*—This conception has been pushed to the front by one of the keenest thinkers in Europe — Professor Simmel, of Berlin.

Simmel distinguishes two senses of the term "society": "first, the broader sense, in which the term includes the sum of all the individuals concerned in reciprocal relations, together with all the interests which unite these interacting persons; second, a narrower sense, in which the term designates the society or association as such; that is, the interaction itself which constitutes the bond of association, in abstraction from its material content" (AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, Vol. II, p. 167).

Using his own explanation:

> Thus, for illustration, we designate as a cube, on the one hand, any natural object in cubical form; on the other hand, the simple form alone, which made the material contents into a "cube," in the former sense, constitutes of itself, independently and abstractly considered, an object for geometry. The significance of geometry appears in the fact that the formal relations which it determines hold good for all possible objects formed in space. In like manner, it is the purpose of sociology to determine the forms and modes of the relations between men, which, although constituted of entirely different contents, material, and interests, nevertheless take shape in formally similar social structures. If we could exhibit the totality of possible forms of social relationship in their gradations and variations, we should have in such exhibit complete knowledge of "society" as such. We gain knowledge of

the forms of socialization by bringing together inductively the manifestations of these forms which have had actual historical existence. In other words, we have to collect and exhibit that element of form which these historical manifestations have in common abstracted from the variety of material — economical, ethical, ecclesiastical, social, political, etc.— with respect to which they differ.[1] (*Loc. cit.*, p. 168.)

"The thesis of Simmel, that sociology must be the science of social *forms*, has at least this effect upon the present stage of correlation: viz., it makes us conscious that we have no adequate schedule of the *forms* of social life."

15. *Conflict.*— The facts referred to in sections 12 and 13 above, and yielding the concepts "differentiation" and "group," have other relations which the present term brings into focus. In a word, the whole social process is a perpetual reaction between interests that have their lodgment in the individuals who compose society. More specifically, this reaction is disguised or open *struggle* between the individuals. The conflict of interests between individuals, combined with community of interest in the same individuals, results in the groupings of individuals between whom there is relatively more in common, and then the continuance of struggle between group and group. The members of each group have relatively less in common with the members of a different group than they have with each other.

The concept "conflict" is perhaps the most obvious in the whole schedule. It has not only been a practically constant presumption of nearly all social theory and practice in the past, but it has had excessive prominence in modern sociology. The central conception in the theory of Gumplowicz, for example,[2] is that the human process is a perpetual conflict of groups *in which the individuals actually lose their individuality.* The balance between "conflict," on the one hand, and co-operation and correlation and consensus, on the other, has never been formulated more justly than by Ratzenhofer.[3] His thesis is that conflict is primarily universal, but that it tends to resolve itself into co-operation. Socialization, indeed, is the transformation of conflict

[1] For list of possible social forms *vid.* AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, Vol. VI, p. 390.

[2] *Grundriss der Sociologie.*

[3] Particularly *Wesen und Zweck*, Part II, secs. 17–27, and *Soc. Erk.*, sec. 30.

into co-operation.[1] Sociological analysis accordingly involves discrimination and appraisal of the kind and quantity of conflict present in each society with which it deals.

16. *Social situations.*—Certain concepts which might have been placed in this schedule were listed in the sixth paper of this series, under the title "Some Incidents of Association."[2] Still other concepts must be employed in later stages of our discussion. Some of them have a working value in excess of that which can be claimed for many of those assembled in this paper. They are not elementary enough in logical rank, however, to require mention in this catalogue. We therefore close the list with a concept which is, of course, essentially psychological. Indeed, any attempt to conceive of association in terms of activity, or psychologically, presupposes the idea for which the term "social situation" is a symbol.

In a word, a "social situation" is any portion of experience brought to attention as a point in time or space at which a tension of social forces is present. More simply, a "social situation" is any circle of human relationships thought of as belonging together, and presenting the problem: What are the elements involved in this total, and how do these elements affect each other? This term, again, like the term "group," carries no dogmatic assumptions. It is not a means of smuggling into sociology any insidious theory. It is simply one of the inevitable terms for the sort of thing in which all the sociologists find their problems. A "social situation" is any phase of human life, from the least to the greatest, which invites observation, description, explanation. For instance, the Hebrew commonwealth, when hesitating between the traditional patriarchal order and a monarchical organization, presents a "social situation;" a quarrel between a husband and wife, threatening the disruption of a single family, presents a "social situation;" the existing treaty stipulations between the commercial nations constitute a "social situation;" the terms of a contract and the disposition of the parties toward those terms, in the case of a single employer and his employees, present equally a "social situa-

[1] This thesis is represented in the left-hand column of the diagram above, p. 242.

[2] AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, Vol. VI, p. 324.

tion." That is, the term is simply a convenient generic designation for every kind and degree of social combination which for the time being attracts attention as capable of consideration by itself. The term is innocent of theoretical implications. It is simply serviceable as a colorless designation of the phenomena which the sociologist must investigate.

Sociology is not a mechanical forcing of the facts of life into these categories. On the contrary, the more we generalize the facts of life, the more they force us to think of them under these forms. Our thought in these forms may prove to be a passing stage in progress toward more complete and positive knowledge. Meanwhile these concepts certainly stand for a stage, whether permanent or transient, in approach to apprehension of social fact and social law. Intelligent use of these concepts is the condition of attaining that measure of insight into social reality which sociology at present commands. As this paper has implied throughout, it is a very simple matter to get a list of the important sociological concepts. It is quite another thing to get so used to applying them that they are the natural forms in which the ordinary facts of experience present themselves to the mind. On the other hand, merely filling one's sentences with terms from the sociological vocabulary does not, in itself, give evidence of sociological insight. The state of mind which sociological study should produce is that in which the activities of society present to the mind simultaneously all these relationships. Then the mature sociological judgment will instinctively select the one or more of these relationships which may be peculiarly significant for the case in hand, and will take the others for granted. In other words, it is necessary to get so much experience in analyzing societies in terms of these concepts that we can readily tell which of them we must continue to consider and which of them we may throw out of the account.

ALBION W. SMALL.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

[*To be continued.*]

THE STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY IN INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING IN THE UNITED STATES. III.

CATALOGUE OF COURSES IN SOCIOLOGY—*continued.*

ILLINOIS (continued)— UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS.

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY.

6. Practical ethics. In this course those questions which bear the closest relations to life and conduct are raised and discussed. The duties of the individual, the family, the state, are among the subjects discussed. Special subjects in social ethics may be taken up. (Inadvertently omitted from July list.)

9. Political ethics, historical and applied. A study of the various phases of thought concerning the ethics of social organization, theories of the nature of the state, including views of the state of nature, of natural law, and of natural right. A discussion of rights and duties in relation to social institutions; international rights and duties; the ethics of diplomacy. (Inadvertently omitted from July list.)

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

Sociology 31*a*. Origin and psychology of occupations — research course. (Inadvertently omitted from July list.) Associate Professor Thomas.

BIBLICAL AND PATRISTIC GREEK.

12. Social and religious history of Palestine in New Testament times. Introduction to Course 64. Professor Mathews.

64. The social teachings of Jesus. The teaching of Jesus concerning society, the state, the family, wealth, and other social institutions. Professor Mathews.

65. The social teachings of the apostles. Professor Mathews.

EUREKA COLLEGE.

POLITICAL SCIENCE.

II. Sociology. Method: The same as in political economy, with the addition of reviews of books on social science. Bascom's *Social Theory*. B. J. Radford.

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY.

MORAL AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY.

A. Ethics. Social philosophy. Second semester: Social philosophy. The problem of social philosophy and the principles of sociology, the nature of the social problem and of social science; the conclusions of anthropology and of the other sciences on which sociology rests; the theory of sociology by reference to the work of the leading social philosophers. Practical application of sociological principles to the chief social problems. This course attempts to outline that application of science and philosophy to society and social problems which is such a characteristic tendency of today, and also to point out the main lines along which social advance may best be made. Lectures, use of some serviceable manual, readings, reports, practical investigations. There will be scope for discussion as in the first semester. Open to students who have completed thirty hours. Professor Caldwell.

B. Social philosophy. Practical problems. Brief class-room study of some introductory, practical book. Investigation by students (under direction) of social conditions, problems, agencies, institutions. Intended to start students in the work of social observation and reflection. Open to students who have completed thirty hours. Second semester: Continuation of the work of the first semester, or similar work. Professor Caldwell. Credit will be given for time spent in investigation.

C. Practical ethics. First semester: Ethics of the social questions; the problems of the family, education, wealth, poverty, temperance, social discontent, social reform, in the light of ethical theory. Lectures, special researches, discussions. Second semester: Moral pathology and the science of character; class-room study and discussion of such books as Giles's *Moral Pathology*, or Sidgwick's *Practical Ethics*, MacCunn's *Making of Character*. Reports and investigations of students upon topics. Professor Caldwell.

D. Social psychology. Consideration of the attempts of recent American and European philosophers and psychologists to approach the study of society from the psychological (as distinct from the hitherto prevailingly biological) point of view. The logic and mind of society; the psychology of social action; the psychical factors in civilization; the relation of the social mind to the mind of the individual; the application of social psychology to education and reform. Study of Professor Baldwin's *Social and Ethical Interpretations of Mental Development*, and of Tarde's *Social Laws*, with reference to the writings of others, such as Le Bon, Sidis, Ward, Bosanquet, etc. Second semester: Continuation of the work of the first semester. Open to students who have had or are taking Course A, or who have had or who are taking Course A in psychology. Professor Caldwell.

E. Advanced course. First semester: Ethics. Reading and analysis of advanced works upon ethics, such as the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Wundt, Gizycki, Paulsen, Sidgwick, Green, Spencer, Stephen, Martineau and others. Lecture and study notes upon special topics such as the metaphysic of ethics, the logic (methods) or psychology of ethics, the art of conduct, the moral ideal, social or political or religious ethics, etc. Or, study of special periods in the history of ethical growth, or of ethical speculation, such as the ethics of the Greeks, or of German philosophers, etc. Paulsen's *Ethics* may be used as a guide. Second semester: Social philosophy. Social theories of leading thinkers, ancient and modern. Tendencies in contemporary social philosophy ("English" and foreign). The philosophy of social advance and of social reform. Mackenzie's *Introduction to Social Philosophy* may be used as a guide. Open to students who have completed Course A. Professor Caldwell.

F. Seminary. Research study of topics connected with any of the above courses. Subjects can be announced only after consultation with those fitted for the work of investigators. Professor Caldwell.

POLITICAL ECONOMY.

G. The labor question in Europe and the United States. The purpose of this course is to acquaint the student with the economic condition of the working classes in Europe and the United States during the past century, and to discuss the relation of labor organizations to capital in the production and distribution of wealth. Among other phases of the subject are discussed the rise and growth of labor organizations, the development of the labor contract, methods of industrial remuneration, the shorter

working day, workingmen's insurance, and employers' liability. Lectures, discussions, and a systematic course of prescribed reading; one written report on a selected topic each semester. Dr. George.

LOMBARD COLLEGE.

SOCIOLOGY.

SERIES A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY.

1. An introduction to the study of sociology. An outline study of the characteristic concepts of recent sociological thought. Professor Kimble.

2. Pre-Comtean sociology. A careful study of the earlier theories concerning social relations. Professor Kimble.

3. Pre-Comtean sociology. (Continuation of Course 2.) Professor Kimble.

4. Modern sociological theory. The chief works of the more prominent modern sociologists are studied with a view to the characteristic positions of each author and the relation borne by each to sociological theory as a whole. Professor Kimble.

5. Modern sociological theory. (Continuation of Course 4.) Professor Kimble.

6. Types of sociological theory. The utopians, the organicists, the psychologists. Professor Kimble.

SERIES B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ASSOCIATION AND OF SOCIETY.

7. An introduction to the comparative study of association. The method, scope, and aim of comparative sociology. Professor Kimble.

8. Biography. A general sketch of the influence of "natural conditions" upon upon the associative activities of living organisms. Professor Kimble.

9. The development of association. A study of the lower stages of the associative process, with especial reference to the earlier forms of food, sex, and conflict association. Professor Kimble.

10. The development of association. (Continuation of Course 9.) The investigation begun in Course 9 is continued among organisms of a higher type than those there studied. Professor Kimble.

11. The development of association. (Continuation of Courses 9 and 10.) The associational process as manifested among the natural races. Professor Kimble.

12. The development of association. (Continuation of Courses 9, 10, and 11.) The associational life of a modern community. Study of the local environment. Professor Kimble.

13. Abnormal and pathologic variations of the associative process. An introductory and outline study of the sociology of crime, pauperism, etc. Professor Kimble.

14. Abnormal and pathologic variations of the associative process. (Continuation of Course 13.) A study of the preventive, curative, and ameliorative factors of associate life. Professor Kimble.

15. Reproductive association. The family is taken as the most highly developed and best known example of this type of associational life; attention is given to its origin, development, and significance. Professor Kimble.

16. The chief types of association. Food, sex, and conflict. The characteristic associational activities centering about each. Origin, development, and significance. Professor Kimble. For the most advanced students only.

17. The sociology of religion. A consideration, from the standpoint of sociology, of the phenomena of religion. Professor Kimble.

ILLINOIS COLLEGE.

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY.

PRESIDENT BARNES.

2. Sociology. Second semester: A study of the forms of human association and the principles underlying them, together with a brief consideration of the various problems resulting from a dependent and defective class, and the different means employed for remedy and relief. Text: Giddings, *Principles of Sociology;* Wright, *Elements of Practical Sociology.*

NORTHWESTERN COLLEGE.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE.

Sociology. The aim is to give a true conception of society, to trace the principles underlying the social conditions of life, and to promote thoughtfulness concerning the diversified relations of man to man. It embraces the study of the genesis and structure of society, and the forces that have determined its development. The economic phenomena of society are carefully examined, and current problems of social reform receive special attention. Small and Vincent; Henderson; Giddings, *Principles;* and Mackenzie.

SHURTLEFF COLLEGE.

POLITICAL SCIENCE.

VII. Elementary sociology. Small and Vincent is used as a text. Elective for juniors and seniors.

WHEATON COLLEGE.

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE.

PROFESSOR WHIPPLE.

4. Sociology. The conclusions reached in economics during the two previous terms applied to current theories of socialism and to the present trend toward a larger control of business by the state, with a view of ascertaining what dangers are ahead, and what changes are likely to prove advantageous to mankind. Comparison of textbooks; collateral reading; reports by students appointed to investigate special topics of interest.

INDIANA— INDIANA UNIVERSITY.

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCE.

10. Socialism and communism. A study of ideal commonwealths and of the theories of the chief socialistic writers since the French Revolution. Particular attention is given to the present position of the various socialistic groups in Germany, England, and America. Lectures and reading. Professor Weatherly.

7. General sociology. A study of the work of leading sociologists, with a comparison of views and a critical discussion of theories and conclusions. Professor Weatherly.

4. Social pathology. (1) Fall term: pauperism and charities. (2) Winter term: crime and penology. (3) Spring term: social questions. In 1900–1901 the special subject investigated in the spring term was the economic aspect of the liquor problem. Inasmuch as the subject varies in successive years, this division of the course may be taken more than once. Lectures, reading, and special reports. Professor Weatherly. Throughout the year.

8. Seminary in economics and sociology. Designed for advanced students who have shown ability successfully to undertake individual research. The subjects for investigation may be taken from the field of either economics or sociology, but it is intended that they shall have some degree of unity. Considerable attention is given to training in statistical methods. Professor Weatherly and Assistant Professor Rawles.

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY.

8. Social psychology. Includes a study of the more important recent books on social psychology. Lectures. Introduction to research methods and problems. Tarde, *Social Laws;* Baldwin, *Mental Development.* Professor Bryan.

DEPAUW UNIVERSITY—ASBURY COLLEGE OF LIBERAL ARTS.

POLITICAL SCIENCE.

PROFESSOR WEAVER.

Unity and scope of the department: This department embraces specifically the science and philosophy of the state or society *politically* organized. But as this depends so essentially on organized society in general, the science and philosophy of society fall naturally within its scope. Although the state springs logically from organized society, yet for the sake of clearness the theory of state is studied before sociology; the latter, being more complex and indefinite, demands more intellectual maturity. Then follow the special phases of political science, viz., those of law and economics. It is believed, furthermore, that none of these subjects should be divorced from ethics, particularly the practical part, which may be denominated its art; and, although history forms a distinct department, this does not imply that its vital importance is overlooked in this department. On the contrary, it is emphasized at every step, since all social theory and philosophy must be tested by historical data properly interpreted. The historical-philosophic method is the only safeguard against ideology on the one hand and empiricism on the other.

Explanation and suggestion as to method: No special text-books are required. Particularly in sociological subjects the laboratory method has proven its superiority. Students are co-laborers with the instructor in the investigation of specific subjects. Too much help stunts the intellect; it must rather be quickened to self-dependence. Syllabuses, when practicable, are utilized to supply bibliography and unify class work. A departmental library, containing the best literature of the subjects taught, is placed at the fullest disposition of the student. Individual problems are assigned for special research, and co-operation in acquisition is utilized in class reports and theses. Instead of purchasing additional text-books, the students pay fifty cents per term to the department library fund, from which over one hundred volumes are purchased annually, so that very soon one of the best special libraries in the country will have been collected.

2. Sociology, principles and theory: (1) Scope, method, organization, evolution, problems, goal, etc. (2) Defective, dependent, and delinquent classes.

3. Practical sociology, or its applications: Institutions, family, school, church, market, and state.

4. Socialism, history and philosophy: (1) Communistic utopias. (2) Socialistic schemes. (3) Social reform.

10. Seminarium in political science. This embraces only advanced work, viz.: the investigation of original and unsettled problems, together with such additional

subjects as may be assigned. All graduates and such undergraduates as can present sufficient attainments are eligible, at the option of the professor in charge. One year's satisfactory work in the seminarium entitles undergraduates to three courses' credit on graduation.

HANOVER COLLEGE.

1. Sociology. Three months.
2. Questions of the day. One year, four hours.

BUTLER COLLEGE.

The department enjoys the advantage of having access to the large collection of public documents in the state library, and the very complete collections of works pertaining to the social sciences in the libraries of the state, the city, and Butler College.

The courses in sociology, economics, and political science are so arranged that the student may elect work in these branches aggregating five years of study. Work in this department should not ordinarily be begun before the junior year; but students having mature minds and desiring to elect junior and senior work largely from this department may enter the introductory classes in the sophomore year.

COURSES IN ECONOMICS.

PROFESSOR FORREST.

4. Problems of capital and labor: A study of the growth of large industries, and the place and nature of public service and industrial corporations, "trusts," and labor organizations. Consideration will be given to the causes of conflicts between capital and labor, the relations of both to the consuming public, questions of taxation, and methods of public control.

COURSES IN SOCIOLOGY.

3. Philanthropy: A study of the causes of poverty and methods of amelioration. The department enjoys the hearty co-operation of the excellent Charity Organization Society of Indianapolis, and is thereby enabled to make a thorough study of the charities of the city. Such agencies as the social settlement, the institutional church, the labor colony, etc., will also receive consideration. The student will be expected to make a personal investigation of actual conditions found in the city.

5. Anthropology: A study embracing both anthropology, in the narrower sense, and culture-history, intended to give a general understanding of the beginnings and earlier stages of social evolution. Such an examination of the method of social development serves as a basis for advanced historical, sociological, and ethical investigation, and for the study of comparative religion.

6. Social history: A study of the development of the main elements of modern civilization. The emphasis is laid on the interrelation of the industrial and ethical lines of development. An investigation is made of the beginnings of civilization in antiquity, the transition from the Græco-Roman empire to the mediæval period, and the leading movements of the modern period. This course employs in the study of civilized peoples the same method that is used in the preceding course in the study of peoples of lower culture.

7. Socialism: A brief historical sketch of modern socialistic theories, followed by a critical examination of present-day socialistic positions. The economic bearings of socialism receive first consideration, but its influence on the family, the state, and religious and ethical ideals is the main subject of the course.

8. General sociology: This course attempts to reach a general view of social phenomena. It is based on the results obtained by the course in anthropology and those of some of the recent writers on social psychology.

9. Development of social philosophy: An examination of the principal attempts to interpret social phenomena, from Plato to Comte. Lectures, readings, reports.

10. Contemporary social philosophy: An examination of the principal sociological contributions since Auguste Comte, with special emphasis upon the work of living writers. This course is intended to be an introduction to general sociology, since it takes up most of the important attempts to interpret society.

20. Social forces in English Romanticism: This course deals with the English Romantic movement from a social and literary point of view. The former phase of the work is considered in lectures on the different social and political forces in the literature at that time; the latter side of the work consists chiefly of a study more or less minute of the prominent authors of the Romantic movement. In collaboration with Professor W. D. Howe.

UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME.

COURSES IN PHILOSOPHY.

(*b*) Social duties. The domestic society and marriage; monogamy; polygamy and divorce; relations between parents and children. Education: the part of the parents, the church, and the state. On slavery in ancient and modern times; duties of masters and servants. On capital and labor.

(*c*) Sociology. Necessity of a public society; the city. Origin of the civil and political organization; theories of Hobbes and J. J. Rousseau; source of authority in human society. On the divine right of kings; the absolute sovereignty of the people; the reasonable system. The different forms of government; the primitive polity; the best form of government; opinions of O. A. Brownson. On modern democracy; the position of the church; the usurpation and transfer of the supreme power; on the government *de facto*. On despotism; is it lawful to resist a tyrant? Theory of St. Thomas and Machiavelli on government. The distinction of the three social powers; parliamentary and representative government. Qualities of a good ruler; the question of the poor. Public liberties; freedom of the press and of conscience; the right of the sword; on war and treaties. The international law. Civilization. Church and state.

VIII. The elements of sociology. Lectures, readings, and examinations on required texts. Two hours a week for five months.

IOWA— COE COLLEGE.

PHILOSOPHY.

(Mental science 9.) Charities and correction. This is a course in sociology applied to the pauper and criminal classes. (Not given after 1902–3.)

HISTORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE.

I. Political and social sciences.

III. Sociology, three hours. Senior year.

(Social economics treated in political economy.)

DES MOINES COLLEGE.

ELECTIVES.

1. Social science. An introductory course reviewing the general facts of society. A discussion of social forces and remedies. Text, Giddings's *Elements of Sociology*, with references to the works of Spencer, Ward, and Small.

DRAKE UNIVERSITY.

SOCIOLOGY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY.

PROFESSOR SHEPPERD.

1. Sociology. During the fall term the general subject of sociology is sketched in broad outlines. The method of study is illustrated by direct investigation of interesting problems, each student being assigned a special topic and asked to present before the class a written report, embodying methods and results obtained. After the first month the class will have one meeting per week additional in order to hear reports.

PARSONS COLLEGE.

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE.

23. Sociology. An elementary course in which significant social phenomena and the problems involved are recognized and appreciated. An attempt is made to seek the principles upon which social well-being and progress depend, and the best means of applying them in order to secure the healthiest condition of the social organism. Special study is made of labor organizations, monopolies, pauperism, ignorance, crime, disease, the liquor traffic, and temperance reform. Lectures, discussions, and readings.

IOWA COLLEGE.

APPLIED CHRISTIANITY.

PROFESSOR WYCKOFF.

The courses at present given in this department are sociological in character. Special attention is given, however, to those institutions and processes with which Christianity is to be chiefly credited. The ultimate aim of the work is practical in character, namely, education for good citizenship. No attempt is made to develop a science of society from the teachings of Christ, but it is hoped that good results may come from the effort to appreciate the spirit of Christ on the one hand, and on the other, modern society and its needs.

1. American social life. This course is intended as an introduction to the study of society. It is believed that the necessary training in statistics and other methods of descriptive sociology can be best given in connection with concrete investigations. So each student is expected to make a special study of the social life of a family, a community, and a city, and embody the results in carefully prepared papers. The same method is then extended to the study of Iowa and the United States, use being made of the census and other statistics — of newspapers, novels, books of history or travel, describing or illustrating the life of different sections of the country. Attention is given to the influences upon society of physical conditions, race characteristics, scarcity or density of population, and voluntary socializing movements.

2. Industrial history and problems of labor. Beginnings of industry; Greece; Rome; mediæval Europe; English labor history; the guild system; industrial revolutions; modern factory system; American industrial history; trade-unions; factory legislation; co-operation; profit-sharing; communistic and socialistic ideals and experiments; the capitalist system.

3. Charities and penology. Early Christian charity; mediæval church charity; English poor-law development; modern institutions and methods; philanthropy. The criminal; causes of crime; classical theories; influence of school of criminal anthropology; treatment of crime; extermination, retaliation, seclusion, reformation. Development of institutions and methods.

4. Evolution of society. The horde, clan, family, tribe, and nation; primitive methods of control; modifications of the family; development of social organs; rise of modern social institutions and processes of modification; structure of modern society.

5. Sociology and social reform. Half the term is spent on a study of the more important contributions to social philosophy made by Hobbes, Vico, Montesquieu, Comte, Spencer, Tarde, and the principal American sociologists. The work of the leaders in the great reform movements of England and America during the last century is then taken up. The nature of the appeal and the methods employed are the chief objects of attention.

6. The city. City state of Greece and Rome; feudalism; rise of cities in Italy and Germany; the guild government; the modern industrial city; municipal functions in Europe; the sphere of the municipality; city government and administration; recent progress in America.

SIMPSON COLLEGE.

ECONOMICS.

2. Applications of economic theory to social and civic problems.

3. Field work in the study of social problems.

STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA.

SOCIOLOGY AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

PROFESSOR LOOS, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR PATTERSON, MR. CADY.

1. General sociology, Part I. Social structure and growth. A study of the primary factors and forces of social phenomena, with introductory lectures on anthropology and ethnology, followed by a systematic examination of the genesis of social institutions, gentile and civic. The course closes with a brief review of social theory from Plato to Spencer. Professor Loos.

2. General sociology, Part II. Social amelioration. (1) The general theory of social amelioration: police, sanitation, charities, correction, public utilities, and education. (2) Municipal administration, dealing with the social and economic problems of modern cities. Professor Loos.

3. Theory and technique of statistics — see political economy 13. Assistant Professor Patterson.

4. Social statistics. Population in its social aspects, with special reference to modern cities, tenement-house conditions, education, crime, and income. Assistant Professor Patterson.

5. Domestic institutions. The origins of marriage and the family; evolutionary, progress of types; forces leading to the survival of the monogamic type; economic and utilitarian bases of domestic ethics; present industrial dangers to domestic foundations; the problem of divorce. Mr. Cady.

6. Charities and correction. Criminology and penology; pauperism and methods of relief — institutional care of dependents and defectives; philanthropic financiering — social settlements. Mr. Cady.

8. Introduction to political philosophy. Lectures on the development of political philosophy and the elements of legal history. The class will read Plato's *Republic* and *Laws*, Aristotle's *Politics*, Machiavelli's *Prince*, Hobbes's *Leviathan*, and other selections. Professor Loos.

9. The distribution of wealth. A study of modern theories of distribution, with an account of the fundamental social institutions that are regulative in the distribution of income. Professor Loos.

10. Socialism and contemporary social legislation. A critical examination of contemporary socialism and current tendencies in legislation, 1860–1900. Professor Loos.

11–12. Political philosophy. Studies in political and social philosophy, with special reference to modern conditions and problems. The class will read Spencer's *Man vs. the State*, Huxley's *Administrative Nihilism*, Ritchie's *Principles of State Interference*, selections from the writings of Thomas Hill Green and other modern philosophers, and Schmoller's *Einige Grundfragen der Socialpolitik*. Professor Loos.

13–14. Graduate seminary in sociology. Designed to assist graduate students in specific lines of research. Professor Loos.

POLITICAL ECONOMY.

PROFESSOR LOOS, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR PATTERSON, MR. THOMAS.

2. Recent economic history. A study of recent economic history with detailed analysis of the industrial revolution in its economic and social aspects. Special attention will be given to the development of the individualistic philosophy and its reaction on practical politics and legislation — the factory acts, trade-unionism, and the trust problem. Open to all students except freshmen. Professor Loos.

3. Debating course. Selected topics in economics, politics, and sociology. Open only to students who have taken at least one course in one of these subjects. Students may schedule for this course at the beginning of each semester. Professors Loos and Wilcox, Assistant Professor Patterson.

CORNELL COLLEGE.

POLITICAL ECONOMY, SOCIOLOGY, TEACHING.

I. Sociology. The aim of the work will be to give a knowledge of the character and content of the science. Its principles and history will be discussed and some lectures will be given, and reports and book reviews will be required. Giddings's *Elements of Sociology* will be used as a text, other authors will be examined, and, in order to give the student some idea of the practical side of sociology, Warner's *American Charities* will be read.

TABOR COLLEGE.

Sociology. This course will embrace the study of social problems, with special reference to the defective, dependent, and criminal classes. Communism, socialism, immigration, the factory system, and the tenement will be subjects for careful investigation. Students will be trained in research and in the review of books and special magazine articles. Wright's *Practical Sociology* will serve as the basis for class work. In the second term there will be a careful study of the criminal. Drahm's *The Criminal* is the text. Professor Farnham.

WESTERN COLLEGE.

POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIOLOGY.

II. Sociology. Small and Vincent's text is used as a guide, while Giddings and other authors are studied. Bryce, *The American Commonwealth;* Gilman, *Profit-Sharing;* Shaw, *Municipal Government in Great Britain;* and Mayo-Smith, *Statistics and Sociology.*

KANSAS— MIDLAND COLLEGE.

VII. Social science. This course makes a systematic introductory study of the origin, development, and scope of sociology, and aims at a scientific exposition of the "social organism" and its various functions. Small and Vincent's *Introduction to the Study of Society* is used as a text-book, supplemented by lectures on social reform.

General sociology. Small and Vincent.

BAKER UNIVERSITY.

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE.

B. Sociology. Three hours per week during second term of senior year. Study of the science of society, together with the nature and scope of sociology and methods of sociological study; the defective and delinquent classes; pauperism and charity; immigration; the family; the state; the nation.

CAMPBELL UNIVERSITY.

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND SOCIOLOGY.

PROFESSOR WALTER GIDINGHAGEN.

Sociology. Origin and growth of sociology, sociology and ethics, social reform, social evolution; competition and combination, association, nature and stages of civilization, race psychology, social organization, natural selection in society, law of survival, nature and end of society. Giddings's *Elements of Sociology* forms the basis of the work. Reference is made to other works on sociology and articles found in magazines.

KANSAS CITY UNIVERSITY.

Social problems. Introductory to the general principles of social science, including historical and critical views of various theories and ideals of society and the state.

UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS.

SOCIOLOGY.

UNDERGRADUATE COURSES.

I. Elements of sociology. This study includes the principles of sociology, and a careful survey of social laws, social theories, and social organization. Lectures and text-book, with collateral reading and investigation in the library required. Professor Blackmar.

II. Social pathology. A general study of pauperism, crime, charities and corrections, and social problems. Practical investigation and study required of all students. Written reports of special investigations required. Professor Blackmar.

III. Socialization and social control. Lectures upon principles, laws, and methods, with collateral readings and reports on same by students. Conducted on the seminary plan. Professor Blackmar.

IV. Social statistics. A practical course in social relations and social problems by the use of statistics. Practical study in the statistical determination of society. Conducted on the seminary plan. Professor Blackmar.

GRADUATE COURSE.

VIII. Criminology and penology. A careful study and comparison of the more scientific authors on crimes and punishments, with investigation of prison reports. The study of criminals and penal institutions by visitation. Professor Blackmar.

IX. American and European charities. Careful study of the conditions and methods of conducting charitable institutions. Library work and reports of same, and study by visitation of institutions. Professor Blackmar.

X. Social theories and social problems. Lectures on the various theories of society and social organizations, with particular reference to their bearings on present problems of society. Professor Blackmar.

SOUTHWEST KANSAS COLLEGE.

SOCIOLOGY.

PROFESSOR GILSON.

1. General sociology. The aim of this course is to acquaint the student with the scientific principles of sociology. It is the basis of all subsequent work in the department. Very particular attention is paid in class-room discussions to the meanings, aims, methods, relations, and limitations of sociology as a science. A term thesis is required. Giddings's *Elements of Sociology* is used as a text-book.

2. Practical sociology. In this course the practical social problems of American society are studied historically and analytically. These include questions of population, family, poor-relief, labor, education, immigration, etc. A term thesis is required. Collateral reading and research is done by the class. Wright's *Practical Sociology* is the text-book.

3. During the third term, for the first half, Le Bon's *The Crowd* is used as a text, and an analytic study is made of the constitution, sentiments, ideas, and leaders of crowds. In the second half the text is Ely's *Social Aspects of Christianity*. Special attention is paid to class-room discussion on the text and on collateral reading.

WASHBURN COLLEGE.

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY.

PROFESSOR DANIEL MOSES FISK.

1. A brief general outline of the field and of the contributions from such sciences as biology and psychology, with critical attention to those facts of associated human life which give the necessary data for a science of society.

2. An advanced course on the social interpretation of history.

KENTUCKY—

BEREA COLLEGE.

Sociology. Carroll D. Wright's *Practical Sociology*. Lectures on the advantages and duties connected with society. Essays by students on assigned topics. Spring term, five hours a week, every even year.

CENTRE COLLEGE OF KENTUCKY.

Senior elective in sociology. Third term, following a course in ethics. Second term. Instruction by text-book. Lectures and papers, covering a wide range of subjects, prepared by members of the class. Professor W. H. Johnson.

LOUISIANA— TULANE UNIVERSITY.

ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY.

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR ALDRICH.

GRADUATE COURSES.

3. Principles of sociology.

4. Comparative economic and social condition of workingmen. The labor question in Europe, Australia, and the United States.

5. Race problems. The Indian, the Chinaman, and the negro in the United States.

6. Economic and social history of the United States.

II. Research course. Competent students are encouraged to conduct investigations, under the guidance of the instructor, in such subjects as the economic status of the negro, economic aspects of colonies, etc.

MAINE— BOWDOIN COLLEGE.

ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY.

PROFESSOR CALLENDER.

2. Development of modern industry, and problems relating to labor and capital. Hobson's *Evolution of Modern Capitalism.* Lectures and assigned readings.

4. Economic and social history of the United States, from the middle of the eighteenth century to the present time, with particular reference to the history of commerce, manufactures, transportation, and agriculture, the currency and revenue systems, and the more important social and economic problems, such as slavery and immigration.

COLBY COLLEGE.

3. Sociology. The study of practical social problems, with special reference to the defective, dependent, and criminal classes, communism, socialism, immigration, factory system, the tenement, etc. Text-books, assigned readings, lectures, reports, training in research and book-reviewing. Professor Black.

BATES COLLEGE.

ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY.

The methods of instruction are similar to those pursued in the more advanced work in history. Students are trained to scientific habits of thought upon economic, industrial, and social phenomena, and are encouraged to independent thinking.

3. Social science. A study of the principles of sociology, together with living social problems; the family; immigration; pauperism; charities; crime; socialism.

MARYLAND— JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY, POLITICS, AND ECONOMICS.

Economics. Labor problems. The group of movements having for their object the increase in the economic security of the laboring class. Each of the contingencies was considered in which workingmen are unable to earn wages, as disability, accident, premature invalidity, old age, and inability to secure work, and the efforts now being made in Europe and the United States for providing for them through insurance or otherwise. A few lectures were also given on the organization and practical work of statistical bureaus in various countries. Mr. W. F. Willoughby, of the United States Department of Labor.

Dr. J. R. Brackett, chairman of Board of Charity and Correction, Baltimore, conducted a course of ten lectures on "Public Aid, Charity, and Corrections." Attendance about thirty, including several physicians and trained nurses actively interested in philanthropic work, several clergymen, two or three colored, and students from graduate and undergraduate departments. Ten conferences of six students were held; subjects: English poor-law and charitable law and custom, reports of meetings, and reviews of important books and subjects.

HISTORY.

Associate Professor Vincent lectures to graduate students on the history of Europe. The courses direct attention to the social, economic, and constitutional development of European peoples since the fall of the Roman empire. The subjects follow in consecutive order, the topics for each year forming a complete and independent group. The whole series of courses requires three years for completion and offers opportunity for close study of mediæval and early modern history of the continent and England.

MASSACHUSETTS— AMHERST COLLEGE.

Ethics and sociology in philosophy.

BOSTON COLLEGE.

ETHICS.

Special ethics. The philosophy of religion; individual rights and duties; suicide; dueling; charity and justice; freedom of conscience; right of self-defense; ownership; socialism; society in general; the family; marriage; emancipation of woman; parental right; slavery; the state; origin of the state; false views of Hobbes and Rousseau; constitution of the state; powers and rights of the state; church and state; the school question; liberty of the press; international law; intervention; treaties; concordats; war.

POLITICAL ECONOMY.

Second term. The distribution of wealth; real and nominal profits; rents; wages; rich and poor; various proposals by communists, socialists, anarchists, for the division of wealth; rights of property; various social relations; needed reforms; revenue and expenditure of government; taxation; public debts; wider aspects of economic study; modern illusions.

BOSTON UNIVERSITY.

ECONOMICS, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND LAW.

PROFESSOR BALDWIN AND DR. FALL.

5. Elements of social science. An introductory course in the principles of sociology and the history of institutions.

6. Socialism and social reform. A descriptive and critical course showing the development of socialistic doctrines, and the rise and progress of the movement in Germany, England, and America. Topical study of present problems of social reform.

See also under "Theological Seminaries."

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

PHILOSOPHY.

5. The ethics of the social questions. The problems of poor relief, the family, temperance, and various phases of the labor question, in the light of ethical theory.

Lectures, special researches, and prescribed reading. Professor Peabody and Dr. Rand.

20*b*. Psychological seminary. Problems of comparative and social psychology. Professor Münsterberg.

20*e*. Sociological seminary. Subject for the year: The Christian doctrine of the social order. Professor Peabody.

This course is designed for advanced students who have a special interest in the relations of the Christian religion to problems of social duty.

ECONOMICS.

3. Principles of sociology. Theories of social progress. Assistant Professor Carver.

Course 3 begins with a study of the structure and development of society as outlined in the writings of Comte and Spencer. This is followed by an analysis of the factors and forces which have produced modifications of the social structure and secured a greater degree of adaptation between man and his physical and social surroundings. The relations of property, the family, the competitive system, religion, and legal control to social well-being and progress are studied with reference to the problem of social improvement. Spencer's *Principles of Sociology*, Bagehot's *Physics and Politics*, Ward's *Dynamical Sociology*, Giddings's *Principles of Sociology*, Patten's *Theory of Social Forces*, and Kidd's *Social Evolution* are each read in part. Lectures are given at intervals, and students are expected to take part in the discussion of the authors read and the lectures delivered.

9²hf. The labor question in Europe and the United States. Half-course (second half-year). Mr. Willoughby.

Course 9 is chiefly concerned with problems growing out of the relations of labor and capital in the United States and European countries. There is careful study of the methods of industrial remuneration — the wages system, profit-sharing, sliding scales, and collective bargaining; of the various forms of co-operation; of labor organizations; of factory legislation and the legal status of laborers and labor organizations; of state and private efforts for the prevention and adjustment of industrial disputes; of employer's liability and compulsory compensation acts; of the insurance of workingmen against accidents, sickness, old age, and invalidity; of provident institutions, such as savings banks, friendly societies, and fraternal benefit orders; of the problem of the unemployed. While the treatment will necessarily be descriptive to a considerable extent, the emphasis will be laid on the interpretation of the movements considered with a view to determining their causes and consequences, and the merits, defects, and possibilities of existing reform movements. A systematic course of reading will be required, and topics will be assigned for special investigation.

9*a*²hf. Problems of industrial organization. Half-course (second half-year). Mr. Willoughby.

This course will give a critical study of modern industry, with special reference to the efficiency of production and the relations existing between employers and employees. The actual organization of industrial enterprises will first be considered. Under this head will be treated such subjects as corporations, the factory system, the concentration and integration of industry, and the trust problem in all its phases. Following this, or in connection with it, will be studied the effect of the modern organization of industry, and changes now taking place, upon efficiency of produc-

tion, stability of employment, and industrial depressions. Careful attention will be given to the relations existing between employers and employees, and the functions of organizations of both classes. Finally will be considered the position of the individual under the present system — his preparation for a trade through apprenticeship, technical education, or otherwise; his opportunities for advancement; his economic independence. Conditions in Europe as well as in the United States will be shown. Topics will be assigned for special investigation, and the results of such inquiries will be considered in class.

TUFTS COLLEGE.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE — SOCIOLOGY.

PROFESSOR METCALF.

15. Practical sociology. A general course on the nature and methods of social science, comprising a study of the laws of population, the institution of the family, rural and urban communities, pauperism, charities, social treatment of crime, and so on. Lectures, readings, and visits to charitable and correctional institutions in Boston and vicinity.

16. Seminary in economics and sociology.

(See also Tufts Divinity School.)

WILLIAMS COLLEGE.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE.

DR. BASCOM, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR BULLOCK, AND DR. MUNRO.

3. Sociology. The aim of this course is to give economics, ethics, and civics their true and immediate bearing on our social life.

4. Municipal government. Statistical studies of city growth; a comparative analysis of the structure of urban and rural populations, together with a discussion of the greater problems of municipal government as these present themselves in the larger centers.

CLARK UNIVERSITY.

INCIDENTAL WORK IN ANTHROPOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND EDUCATION.

PSYCHOLOGY.

A complete course in psychology at Clark University includes the following subjects:

VII. History of psychology and philosophy, including the chief culture institutions, science, medical theories, Christianity, and education generally. Dr. Hall's historical courses and Dr. Sanford's seminary.

III. The psychology of Jesus. This course involves a critical consideration of the lives of Jesus and the other literature concerning his person and teaching from the standpoint of modern psychology, from which these subjects have not yet been treated. President Hall.

ANTHROPOLOGY.

DR. CHAMBERLAIN.

A. General, embracing: (*d*) Ethnology, including sociology; origin and development of the arts and sciences; mythology; folk-lore; religions. (*f*) Criminal and pathological anthropology; ethnic morals. (*g*) Historical and archæological; primitive man and primitive culture.

B. Special courses upon anthropological topics most akin to psychology and

pedagogy, embodying the results of the most recent and important studies and investigations; the physical anthropology of infancy, childhood, youth, manhood, old age; the anthropological phenomena of growth, arrested development, degeneration; anthropological aspects of heredity and environment in the individual and in the race; uncivilized races and civilized races; the evolution problems of humanity; education among primitive peoples; the anthropological history of America; the interpretation of folk-lore; the psychology of primitive peoples; the trend of human progress.

The lectures in anthropology will have special bearing upon the courses in psychology and pedagogy in the university, and every effort will be made to utilize the latest results of anthropological investigations.

From time to time the most important current literature will be reviewed and students made acquainted with the best contributions to anthropological science in the various foreign languages. The importance of a thorough acquaintance with the bibliography of their subjects is impressed upon all students, and all possible assistance in this direction is always at their disposal.

EDUCATION.

B. Principles of education. This course treats certain fundamental educational principles and involves also a study of several important chapters in the history of education, with a brief account of a few representative educational systems. Such topics as the following will be included: Educational ideals. The dominant aim at different stages of development. The correlation of educational forces. The family and education. The church and education. State aid and control. The field of scientific study in education. Antithetic educational principles. The history of nature *versus* convention in education. Rousseau, Pestalozzi as "pedagogical socialist." Modern *Social-Pädagogik.* Present problems and tendencies. One hour a week; half a year.

Education. Dr. Hall will offer a course almost entirely new. Beginning with a brief review of systems of marriage from a biological standpoint, including age and mode of life so far as they bear on fecundity, the lectures will summarize the laws of embryonic development, birth customs, treatment of early infancy among different races, the first stages of development, growth, regimen, teething, nutrition, walking, the beginnings of speech and its implication, first efforts at drawing, singing, plays and games, social relations, methods of studying the first stages of childhood. The environment, treatment, and education of children during this period will involve a consideration of the kindergarten.

HOLY CROSS COLLEGE.

Special ethics treats, *int. al.*, the following topics: Society in general; nature and end of domestic society; unity and indissolubility of matrimony; divorce; parental authority; education of the child; civil society, its nature, end, origin; false theories on the origin of civil society; Hobbes, Rousseau; scholastic doctrine; forms of civil government; citizenship; freedom of worship; freedom of the press; state education.

MICHIGAN— ALMA COLLEGE—SCHOOL OF PEDAGOGY.

KINDERGARTEN TRAINING COURSE.

Sociology.

Sociology.

ish social life.

VI. Principles of sociology. An advanced general course. It includes an analysis and classification of social facts; discussion of the principles of social theory and the process of socialization; a study of social feeling, public opinion, and organized action; an inquiry into the causes of emotional epidemics, panics, mob violence, revolutions; an explanation of the growth of public opinion on great questions; an attempt to show from history and current events that public action is governed by definite laws of social chance. Giddings's *Principles of Sociology* is used as a text.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

PHILOSOPHY.

2. Principles of ethical, social, and æsthetic evolution. An introduction to the origin and development of modern literary and political thought, and of modern views of society. Professor Wenley.

4. Ethics of social evolution; a study of ethical types as seen in social and industrial relations. Professor Wenley.

18. Systematic ethics. Practical philosophy. Ethical problems in their relation to the individual and to social life and conduct. Paulsen. Professor Wenley.

16. Political philosophy. A critical study of society. The principles of political association and evolution; relations of political and industrial institutions to fundamental ideas of philosophy and religion; outline of the history of the theories of society; applications to present-day social problems. Lectures, discussions, theses. Professor Lloyd.

SCIENCE AND ART OF TEACHING.

10. Social phases of education. A consideration of the school as a social factor in its relation to the child, to the home, to the church, to the state; also a discussion of the relation of education to vocation and to crime. Lectures and recitations. Dutton, *Social Phases*. Professor Whitney.

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY.

5. Problems in political economy. The immigration problem, industrial crisis, free trade and protection, the railway problem, the municipal or trust problem, taxation. Professor Adams.

5*a*. Social and industrial reforms. Co-operation, profit-sharing, communism, socialism, factory legislation, workingmen's insurance, trades unions, industrial federation. Professor Adams.

14. Seminary in economics. Labor organizations. Webb's history of trade-unionism. Professor Adams.

Mr. Kenyon L. Butterfield has been appointed lecturer on rural sociology.

19. Principles of sociology. Lectures and quiz. Assistant Professor Cooley.

By special permission students may elect this course without the quiz to count as three hours. This course aims at a systematic and comprehensive study of the underlying principles of social science. The general plan followed is to begin with personal relations in their simplest and most direct form; proceeding thence to the more complex forms of association, to an analysis of the processes of social change, and, finally, to a study of social tendency and the theory of progress. Historical references are freely used, but the main aim is a rational interpretation of existing society, and ample contemporary illustration is given of the principles advanced. While some attention is paid to the differing views of prominent writers, the course, in the main, is

constructive rather than critical. Each student is assigned special reading and required to write an essay upon it.

20. Problems in sociology. Lectures, quiz, and assigned reading. Assistant Professor Cooley.

This course embraces a study of the laws of population, degeneracy, the liquor problem, poor relief (public and private), vagrancy, crime, and penology, the divorce problem and kindred questions, the assimilation of the foreign element in American population, the development of cities, the tenement question, slums, social settlements, and other sociological questions of present interest. The class is supplied with a list of about twenty-five topics, accompanied by references, and each student is required to choose one of these topics and write an essay upon it.

21. Historical development of sociological thought; study of Comte, Spencer, Ward, Giddings, and others. For advanced students. Assistant Professor Cooley.

This course is intended to furnish an opportunity for comparative study and discussion of the writers who have contributed most to the growth of sociology. The class consists chiefly of graduate students and is conducted somewhat as a seminary.

22. Psychological sociology. For advanced students. Assistant Professor Cooley.

This course is similar in character to Course 24 and usually, though not necessarily, succeeds it. The views of Baldwin, Giddings, Tarde, Durkheim, and others are carefully studied, but, as in other courses, it is endeavored to make this study constructive rather than merely critical.

21*a*. Special work with graduate students. Assistant Professor Cooley.

HILLSDALE COLLEGE.

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE.

Introduction to the study of sociology. Concrete descriptive study of American society will be made, dealing with the population, its groupings, institutions, and ideals. Wright, *Principles of Sociology*.

KALAMAZOO COLLEGE.

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE.

1. Sociology. The organic conception of society. The social elements; land and population. The primary social group; the family. The life of society; social intelligence, social feeling, social volition. Morality and law. Professor Stetson.

OLIVET COLLEGE.

SOCIAL SCIENCE.

The first semester will give a general introduction to sociology, stating its problems and indicating the methods for their solution. In the latter part of the course special attention will be given to the practical problems of charities and penology.

MINNESOTA— UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.

Mr. Samuel G. Smith.

SOCIOLOGY.

Course I. Elements of sociology.
Course II. Social pathology.
Course III. Social theory.

CARLETON COLLEGE.

POLITICAL SCIENCE.

1. Sociology. A study of the character and organization of society, the causes and modes of social activity, and the processes of social development. Lectures from men who are prominent in practical sociological work in Minnesota, text-book, class discussions, and written reports on collateral reading in the library.

HAMLINE UNIVERSITY.

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY.

"The senior class takes sociology four hours a week during spring term; elective. We take general sociology and practical work by investigation and topics."

MISSOURI— UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI.

SOCIOLOGY.

PROFESSOR ELLWOOD.

FOR UNDERGRADUATES.

1. Elementary sociology. Lectures on certain fundamental social problems, as, *e. g.*, the origin and evolution of the family, the growth of population, immigration, the race problem, the growth of cities, the nature of society, etc. Study by the class of special subjects for investigation.

2. The social teachings of Jesus. A lecture course open to all students of the university.

3a. Modern philanthropy. Lectures on the social treatment of the dependent and defective classes, management of state institutions, etc. Reports by the class on special subjects of investigation.

3b. Criminal sociology. Lectures on criminal anthropology and on the social treatment of criminals.

4. Advanced sociology. Lectures, discussions, and reports on special investigations by the class.

PRIMARILY FOR GRADUATES.

5a. Ethnology. A study of the evolution and relations of the different races of mankind.

5b. Race psychology. A study of the comparative psychology of races as shown in their customs, institutions, and social organization.

6a. Psychological sociology. A critical study of the writings of Tarde, Le Bon, and Baldwin, with some attempt to make use of psychological principles in the interpretation of social phenomena.

7b. History of social philosophy. Lectures on the development of social thought from Aristotle to the present, especially since the time of Comte. Assigned reading.

8. Sociology of religion. A study of religious phenomena from the sociological standpoint.

9. Seminar. Special training in the sociological investigation and research.

CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY.

"We have not opened a department of sociology, but have had a course of general lectures on the subject given two hours a week for six weeks, attended by about forty students. No examination required."

MISSOURI VALLEY COLLEGE.

J. W. GALLOWAY.

I. Descriptive sociology.

III. Social development.

WILLIAN JEWELL COLLEGE.

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE.

CHARLES LEE SMITH.

Pauperism and charities. The causes of pauperism and the principles and methods of poor-relief.

NEBRASKA— CENTRAL WESLEYAN COLLEGE.

ECONOMICS.

Socialism. History and theory of social science. Professor Addicks.

GRAND ISLAND COLLEGE.

Sociology. Small and Vincent.

UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA.

POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIOLOGY.

PROFESSOR ROSS.

Seminary on colonies and colonization. Round-table work. Synthetic course treating of the special problems of economics, sociology, finance, and government presented by the over-sea colony. Special attention to the tropical colonization and to the colonial problems of the United States.

24. Seminary on cities. Round-table work. The city as to the laws of its location, its structure, its economic basis, and the laws of its growth. The population of the city is compared with that of the country in respect to race, sex, and age composition, birth rate, marriage rate, divorce, longevity, pauperism, education, moral character, political traits.

25. Sociology. Lectures and text; composition and constitution of the social body; seeks to distinguish the parts, organs, and force of the society; presents the historical evolution of the leading social institutions. Complementary to the course in psychology of society.

26. The psychology of society. Lectures and readings. The nature and laws of mob-mind, collective hysteria, "craze," fashion, conventionality, custom and tradition, "standard of comfort," "spirit of the age," etc. Different races compared in point of aptitude for social ascendency. These studies in imitation balanced by studies in non-conformism, invention, innovation, leadership, the influence of great men. Illustrations mainly from contemporary American life.

27. Charities. Economic and social aspects of poor-relief. Visits to charitable institutions. Mr. Prevey.

28. Criminology. A study of the criminal class and of the systems and methods of reformation and punishment.

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY.

PROFESSOR HILL.

Social psychology and race psychology. Readings from Baldwin, Tarde, and others.

NEBRASKA WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY.

ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY.

PROFESSOR CLINE.

II. Sociology. Elements of sociology and American charities.

NEW HAMPSHIRE— DARTMOUTH COLLEGE.

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY.

PROFESSOR WELLS.

3. Anthropological geography. This considers man in his relation to his physical environment, as determining his dispersion over the face of the globe, his mode of life, and the density of population. It traces the bearings of the natural surroundings upon man's physical and mental characteristics, and follows this fundamental and necessary adjustment through the history of the family and the state, and in the evolution of the forms of economic life.

4. Social statistics. This course begins with a study of demography, or the social groups given by statistics. It considers the classification of the population in modern society due to physical or social causes. It then inquires into the results of vital statistics, such as the mortality from different diseases, birth and marriage rates under varying climatic and social conditions. Finally the above data are brought into connection with crime, pauperism, and social reform. It is a study of the biologic side social life.

5. Constructive sociology. This is an attempt to formulate the laws of social evolution and social organization. It is an analysis of the phenomena that are considered as at once physical and mental, but whose ultimate explanation must be in terms of social psychology. The end constantly in view is a true interpretation of social facts, in the concrete terms of science.

History, theory, and technique of statistics.

Studies in American statistics.

FRANK L. TOLMAN.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

[*To be continued.*]

REVIEWS.

The Rise of Religious Liberty in America. By SANFORD H. COBB New York: The Macmillan Co. $4.

THE task which the author undertakes is a new one. Others have confined their attention to the development of religious liberty in some definite locality — Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Maryland, Virginia, for example. Mr. Cobb surveys the entire field, so far as our own country is concerned, and makes good his claim that the principle of liberty on which the religious institutions and life in the United States are founded today "is peculiarly an American production."

This new principle he states as follows: "Neither should the church dictate to the state, as having peremptory spiritual jurisdiction over things civil; nor should the state interfere with the church in its freedom of creed or of worship, in its exercise of ordination and spiritual discipline; nor yet again should the individual be subjected to any influence from the civil government toward the formation or refusal of religious opinions, or as regards his conduct thereunder, unless such conduct should endanger the moral order or safety of society."

But, before entering on his main purpose, and in order to bring into clearer view the rightfulness of his claim that this principle "is peculiarly an American production," Mr. Cobb gives a glance backward to the state of things under the old-world idea as to the relation of church and state during the Christian centuries down to the earlier period of the Reformation, when Protestant and Romanist alike would as soon think of assailing any other principle of government as that of the right of the civil magistrate to propagate religion by the sword. Of course, here and there voices were raised in opposition to this avowed right, asserting the right of religious liberty, and in his reference to these the author very justly gives the place of honor to the once generally despised Anabaptists of the Reformation period. "Their doctrine," he says, "is one of the most remarkable things which appeared in that wonderful age;" and he adds: "There can be but one mind as to the grandeur of the doctrine thus propounded by the Anabaptists, nor as to the immense blessings which it finally conferred upon the world."

Singularly enough, however, the author passes over the influence of the Anabaptists in England. Indeed, he says: "In England the only voice lifted for freedom of conscience and worship was that of Brownists and Barrowists." It is a well-known fact, however, that the Anabaptists, whose influence in behalf of religious liberty on the European continent the author clearly recognizes, came over into England and propagated their views there before the time of Brown and Barrow, while it is an equally well-known fact that neither Brown nor Barrow, nor those who bore their names, could in any way be regarded as the champions of religious liberty.

When American colonization began, church and state were agreed in the fundamental principle that the prosperity of both depended upon a union more or less vital. Very naturally, the colonists generally were in sympathy with this principle. In Virginia and the Carolinas the Church of England was established at the beginning, and remained the state church until the Revolution, displaying at times strong and bitter feeling against all forms of dissent. In the New England colonies, with the exception of Rhode Island, the Congregational churches were established by law, and there was more or less proscription of other forms of worship. In New York and New Jersey an unsuccessful attempt was made to establish the Church of England on a Dutch foundation. Maryland began with religious toleration under Roman Catholic auspices, but at length established the Church of England; while Georgia, which commenced with liberty of worship, came, shortly before the Revolution, to a like state of things religiously as Maryland. In Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, and Delaware no church was ever established; but Rhode Island, from the beginning of its history, took a unique position with reference to religious liberty. Mr. Cobb says: "Rhode Island, from the beginning, imposed no religious restrictions whatever upon its citizenship, and allowed no question by the civil law as to the belief or unbelief of anyone . . . . There never has been a more perfect equality of religious beliefs before the law than was enacted in Rhode Island at its very beginning." The slow and hesitating way in which the principle of religious liberty was accepted by the colonists is exhibited at length in the body of Mr. Cobb's work. There was conflict strong and long continued. The stress of the conflict, as the author shows, was in Massachusetts, Virginia, Maryland, and New York, especially in the first two. The part which the Baptists played in the struggle in these two colonies, however, is very inadequately presented. Yet this is not surprising when

one turns to the "authorities" which the author had before him in the preparation of his work, a list of which he gives on pp. xvii–xx. In this list no mention is made of such works as Isaac Backus's *History of the Baptists of New England*, Hovey's *Life and Times of Backus*, and Ford's *New England's Struggles for Religious Liberty*. In fact, even the name of Isaac Backus, who was for many years the agent of the Baptists of Massachusetts and Rhode Island in their efforts to secure religious liberty at the time of the Revolution and subsequently, is not mentioned in Mr. Cobb's work. With Stillman, of Boston; Smith, of Haverhill; Montague, of Sunderland; Meacham, of Enfield; Wightman, of Connecticut, Isaac Backus was appointed by the Warren Baptist Association in 1770 a committee on "grievances," and this committee addressed the general court of Massachusetts with reference to the ill-treatment to which the Baptists were subjected. In 1772 the Warren Association made Backus the chairman of another committee on "grievances," a position which he continued to hold for ten years. In an address to the public, prepared by Backus, the case of the Baptists was forcibly stated. In 1774 Backus addressed a letter to Samuel Adams, in which he protested against the treatment which the Baptists were receiving. It was Backus who, not long after, carried to the general court the case of the Baptists of Royalston. By request of the Warren Association, Backus attended the meeting of the Continental Congress in Philadelphia in 1774, in order to call the attention of that body to the importance of securing religious liberty. At the Provincial Congress, which met at Cambridge in December, 1774, and at the general court of Massachusetts, which met at Watertown, September 20, 1775, Backus was present with memorials in behalf of his brethren. In 1777 Backus prepared an address to the people of New England in which the various points concerning religious liberty were discussed. In 1778 he presented another address on the same subject. In a word, he was indefatigable in his efforts to promote the great object in which he and his brethren were so deeply interested, efforts which ended only with his death. It would seem impossible, therefore, in any attempt to give a history of the struggle for religious liberty in this country, not to mention the services of Isaac Backus. The failure of the author to do justice to Backus doubtless arises in part from the fact that he confines his attention so largely to the beginnings of the struggle, and accordingly pays scant attention to the development of religious liberty in the eighteenth century.

On the other hand, the influence of Jonathan Edwards in striking

the "staggering blow which made ecclesiastical establishments impossible in America" seems to us greatly exaggerated. In smiting the Half-way Covenant and throwing the weight of his great influence against the evils it had wrought, Edwards unquestionably helped in bringing about the conditions which made the efforts of Backus and his associates in New England successful. But when the utmost has been said, the work of Edwards in establishing religious liberty was slight in comparison with that of Backus.

Aside from a few such defects as have been mentioned, Mr. Cobb's work is one of great merit, and it will receive grateful recognition as an exceedingly able and valuable history of the rise of religious liberty in this country.

HENRY S. BURRAGE.

PORTLAND, ME.

Crime in its Relations to Social Progress. By A. C. Hall. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1902. Pp. 427.

A RATHER startling thesis is announced: Society makes crime, and increase of crimes is an evidence of advancing civilization. But what the author actually seeks to prove in this very instructive and encouraging exposition is the less sensational and more correct proposition: Society, with an advancing and more refined moral standard of conduct, raises its demands on the individual, and brings a larger number of antisocial actions under the definitions and sanctions of penal law. Crime is properly defined (p. 10) as "any act or omission to act, punished by society as a wrong against itself." When the author confuses the word "crime" with "definition" or "category" of crime, he confuses the issue. Thus (p. 6): "the production of crime and criminals is one of the saving processes of nature;" and (p. 2): "the nation that persists in choosing its crimes wrongly is on the highroad to degeneration and decay;" and (p. 126): "Now we shall study the growth of crime and its usefulness in relation to social progress."

To the ordinary definition of crime already cited the author adds (p. 19) still another factor: "Unless it actually *succeeds* in punishing, often enough to make the average citizen believe offenders likely to be brought to justice, the act is not yet a crime." Selling liquor in Portland, Me., is not a crime.

The evidence on which the argument rests is historical, and the book is a very clear and strong survey of the efforts of society to attain clearer notions of the requirements of general welfare and to enforce obedience to the law of welfare.

The topics treated are: the evolutionary function and usefulness of crime and punishment; social punishment among animals; crime among savages; savage races in Australia, America, Asia, and Africa; the European Aryans; the Anglo-Saxons in England; England under Normans and Plantagenets; parliamentary government and the new feudalism; Tudor England; England under the Stuarts; modern England; increase of crime in the nineteenth century; the efficacy of punishment; the trend in modern times; an ethical theory of crime.

The interpretation of the familiar fact that serious crime is diminishing while milder forms of offenses are increasing in progressive countries is itself not altogether novel; but, in the massing of historical and statistical evidence and the critical sifting of the material, the author has rendered a valuable service to students of the subject.

He accounts for the enormous increase in the number of less grave offenses by the increase of social regulations required by the more complex structure and activities of modern industrial and urban life, and by the inability of many persons to adjust themselves to these new conditions and to the more exacting requirements of a rapidly advancing society. He believes there is reason in the statistics for the hope that society will finally succeed in reducing the truly antisocial elements to a minimum and in educating the majority of the capable and sound members of society to intelligent and voluntary acceptance of the law of general welfare. The discussion of this argument is so strong and competent that it places the book distinctly in the class of works to which students of criminology must give attention.

CHARLES RICHMOND HENDERSON.

Annales de l'Institut international de Sociologie. Publiées sous la redaction de RENÉ WORMS, Secrétaire général. Tome VIII: Travaux des années 1900 et 1901. Paris: Giard et Brière. Pp. 330.

L'Année sociologique. Publiée sous la direction d'ÉMILE DURKHEIM. Cinquième année, 1900–1901. Paris: Alcan. Pp. 634.

IN former years we have referred to these journals together, and it is a natural association. The subject treated in this number of the *Annales* is "Le matérialisme historique." The contributors are Messrs. Casimir de Kellès-Krantz, J. Novicow, A. Loria, Maxime Kovalewsky, R. de la Grasserie, Ad. Coste, N. Abrikossof, F. Toennies, G. de Greef,

Lester F. Ward, Ch. Limousin, A. Groppali, F. Puglia, E. de Roberty, René Worms, Alfred Fouillée, G. Tarde, Ed. Sanz y Escartin, L. Winiarski. The discussion is a portion of the material treated at the fourth congress of the *Institut*, in 1900, another portion having appeared in the issue of last year. A disciple of Marx, M. Kellès-Krantz, submits a statement of the doctrine of this school, and around it the symposium centers, as though it had been a debate in which all actually participated. Readers will doubtless agree with the editor (p. 45) that the impression left by the discussion is that it is another display of the impossibility of accounting for the social process as the working of a single principle, and consequently that neither of the special social sciences can maintain a claim to supremacy over the others. The strength and the weakness of historical materialism are nowhere, to my knowledge, more clearly exhibited than in this discussion. It ought to be of permanent value as an approach to a tenable philosophy of social forces.

Professor Durkheim's journal contains two original papers: one by the editor, on totemism, the other by M. F. Simiand, "Étude sur le prix du charbon, en France et au XIXe siècle." The monographs in this publication have always been important, and the present volume continues the tradition. We must repeat our former judgment, however, that the reviews leave much to be desired. As a bibliography the list is far from complete, yet an attempt is made to pass judgment on more material than the contributors have time to examine carefully enough to give their judgment weight. There are so many evidences of hasty conclusions that this part of the volume has very doubtful value. It would be worth more if it merely catalogued two-thirds of the works named, and gave more critical attention to the more important of the remaining third.

A. W. S.

Le Dottrine Sociologiche. Del Dr. Fausto Squillache. Roma: C. Colombo, 1902. Pp. 539.

To Americans this volume will be interesting chiefly as an index of the attention which Italian scholars are paying to the subject of sociology. We have gone over the ground covered by the book so often that we have feeble interest in another review of the literature of the subject, unless it has decided superiority of some sort. If we had no other account of the different schools of sociology, we should cer-

tainly welcome this. So far as essentials are concerned, Dr. Ward has packed as much into his three recent papers on "Contemporary Sociology" (AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, Vol. VII, Nos. 4, 5, and 6) as this book contains. It is divided into four parts, following a preface on "The Actual Status of the Study of Sociology," and an introduction on "The Precursors of Sociology." Part I treats of "Sociology Based on Physics and Natural Science;" Part II is entitled "Sociology Based upon Biology;" Part III deals with "Sociology Based upon Psychology;" and Part IV designates its subject as "Sociology Based upon Social Science."

More writers are cited than in Barth's *Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie*, but there is no advance upon Barth's diagnosis of the tendencies betrayed by people at each of their view-points. Dr. Squillache has presented a very well-balanced account of the different schools of sociological doctrine, but, while his estimates of the writers are interesting, they are by no means novel. Students of sociology need such a text as this, and it is a matter of congratulation that the Italians are producing a literature of the subject worthy to be used in the higher institutions of the country.

A. W. S.

D'où nous venons. Essais suivis d'une Étude sur la décadence des peuples. Par LÉON POUTET. Paris: Fontemoing. Pp. 381.

THIS is a sort of thesaurus of picturesque details picturing evolution, and especially social evolution, at different stages of its progress, and in different divisions of human activity. It is hardly a philosophy, but rather a panorama of evolution.

A. W. S.

Les classes sociales: Analyse de la vie sociale. Par ARTHUR BAUER. Ouvrage récompensé par l'Institut de France. Paris: Giard et Brière. Pp. 359.

WITHOUT finding in this book a very long journey toward the goal of sociology, we may still pronounce it worthy of serious attention by the most competent sociologists. Its object is to discover what are "the social facts." The second chapter discusses the possibility of a social science. The third chapter analyzes various methods of social science. The fourth chapter presents "the method," and the fifth

chapter contains a classification of social facts under the general rubrics: (1) the state, (2) the moral powers, (3) economic facts, (4) family and education, (5) social pathology.

Our readers will not be likely to find this classification very persuasive, and it is doubtful if the author's argument would remove the objections. It would be possible to apply much of his method regardless of the theory of social classification. For this reason it would be worth while for sociologists to weigh well the fourth chapter. It is practically a program for the study of social psychology.

A. W. S.

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS.

Social Problems of the Farmer.— The July, 1902, number of the "Publications of the Michigan Political Science Association" is entitled *The Social Problems of the Farmer*, and is devoted to papers read at the joint meeting of the Michigan Political Science Association and the Michigan Farmers' Institutes, February 25 and 26, 1902. The meeting was one of unusual significance from the fact that it was the result of co-operation among various educational interests, namely the Farmers' Institutes, the Agricultural College of Michigan, and the University of Michigan. We summarize below several of the addresses delivered upon the occasion:

"Higher Education and the People," by Professor H. C. Adams, of the University.— The relation of higher education to the people may be considered from three points of view:

First, the point of view of those who seek education. So far as the individual student is concerned, very little can be said upon the topic in hand. Were the question of education entirely, or even primarily, a personal question, there would be no answer to the argument that he who is benefited by instruction ought to pay for it. But this assumption does not present the matter in its true light. The life of each individual is bound up in the life of all. Such being the case, the advantage of an education to the individual cannot present the point of view from which the question of the relation of the higher education of the people may reasonably be discussed. It is a matter of no slight importance to the people of this state that the highest in education lies open and practically free.

Second, the point of view of those who make use of the services of experts and professional men trained at the college or university. Specialization is the rule in all progressive life, and the degree to which specialization is carried may be accepted as a measure of social advancement. An expert physician, for example, is possible only upon the basis of a highly developed science of medicine. Such a physician must avail himself of thousands of experiments in the many laboratories scattered throughout the world. Each laboratory makes its contribution; each publishes its discovery. As isolated facts, these contributions and discoveries are of slight importance, but, correlated with the contributions and discoveries of other laboratories, they build up a body of useful knowledge which, in the hands of a skilled physician, permits not only the alleviation of pain, but the control of diseases before regarded as a sentence of death.

Third, the point of view of political, social, and industrial conditions. No industry can continue to be progressive without its experts, and the higher institutions of learning which train experts are an essential factor in establishing and maintaining our present industrial efficiency. Without our schools, not only would further progress be arrested, but we should soon lose the general intelligence necessary to avail ourselves of the technical progress already made.

Certain changes are taking place which promise much for country life. I refer to the extension of rural electric lines and of local telephone service, to the wide dissemination of electric power, to rural mail delivery, and the like. I look confidently for the time when social intercourse and manufacturing on a small scale will be restored to rural communities; when this shall have been accomplished, the country rather than the town will offer the opportunity for sensible living. To whom will the country be indebted for the realization of so bright a picture? It is to the professor who, with his students, works patiently within his laboratory at the occult problems of electricity and other mechanical agencies; yet he is not entirely responsible, for without the generous support of the people he would be unable to devote his life to such a service.

It is doubtless easier to illustrate the popular advantage of higher institutions of learning by reference to the physical sciences and mechanical inventions than by

referring to the culture studies. The physical sciences minister to the conditions of life; these other branches of learning minister to life itself. Ask yourselves what it is you desire from your clergymen, your teachers, your statesmen, and you will be forced to recognize that the culture studies are in reality professional studies for these men. Consider this suggestion from the point of view of the clergyman. I know of no professional class which stands in greater need of a broad and comprehensive education. If the church is to serve as a center of positive influence in the community, it must touch the community at all points. The clergyman must be able to see how good roads are related to right living; how manual training and technical education bear upon the moral life of the boys and the girls; how charity is related to poverty; how industrial organization is but a phase of social organization and carries with it a moral influence; how the circulation of good books may result in fruitful thinking and healthful living; how through clubs for the young and societies for the old the roof of the church may be brought to shelter the pleasures of the people as well as their worship, and how all these agencies may be made to exert a positive influence for righteousness in the community. The clergyman, under this newer and broader interpretation of his functions, is nothing less than a social engineer, and it is imperative that he understand the complex and intricate machine which we call society.

You have doubtless heard the question frequently discussed whether our democratic form of government is likely to stand the strain of commercial prosperity. The chief danger to which we are exposed arises from the popular worship of business success. Our society is dominated by the commercial ambition. Our form of popular government is threatened by the overmastering influence of commercial interests. The cure can be accomplished only by a widespread appreciation of what makes life worth living. The worthiness of life does not depend upon conditions, but upon an intelligent interest in those things by which life is surrounded. Our universities and colleges are the guardians of this intelligent interest. The truly organized society is one in which human interests are evenly balanced. It is not desired to curb the commercial ambitions in men, for without the commercial interest there could be no industrial progress; it is, however, imperative that by the side of this interest there should flourish other interests and other aims, to the end that our magnificent industrial organization, which is the wonder of history, should not in the end crush out the ideal of high living. Institutions of learning which add to technical instruction and research, the spirit of culture and of attainment, render a direct service to the community in that they provide relief from the intensity of the demands of commercial life. From whatever point of view we look at education, it is the people who are the chief beneficiaries, partly because of the use they make of expert training, but primarily because of the influence which education exerts upon the form and spirit of society, which touches the life of the individual at every point.

"The Church and Rural Organization," by Graham Taylor, warden of Chicago Commons Social Settlement.—In the organization of rural life the country church has a threefold social function. Its primary and perhaps supreme function is to keep the highest ideal of individual and community life flying like a flag, far overhead. By its worship, its example, and its prophetic aspirations it should hold aloft what is worthiest for man, woman, and child to be. To initiate agencies and movements for realizing these ideals practically and progressively is the second social function of the church, but its own organization is not to attempt to administer the social agencies thus initiated. For, neither in the form of its organization, nor in the constituency of its membership is the church adapted to be an effective executive of social movements; and, even if it were, it has a higher function, which is all its own. The final function of the church, most essential to all social and civic organization, is to generate that public spirit and self-sacrifice which serve the common interests at the cost of personal ease and gain or of class and institutional aggrandizement. Without this social self-denial no patriotic, philanthropic, or progressive organization of a community can succeed or survive. For the generation of this social power and for putting each citizen in possession of it, the community rightfully looks to the church more than to any other agency. In conclusion, the speaker urged the need of the co-operation of all religious denominations in rural social work.

Mr. Kenyon L. Butterfield, in discussing the preceding paper, urged the importance of the co-operation of the various institutions working for the betterment of

rural conditions. He said: "This whole program is based on the idea that there is room in rural life, and not only room, but imperative need, for the religious factor as represented by the church, for the educational factor as represented by the school, and for the business factor as represented by the farmers' organization. And not only that, but this meeting is based on the further idea that co-operation and mutual aid among all these forces are extremely desirable. This is the correct view. If the church cannot become *the* center for *all* rural activities, it can at least become the center for those activities that are more directly religious, and a center for many other activities. If the school cannot become *the* center of country life, it can at least take the leadership in all educational work, and no doubt can enlarge its social interests. If the farmers' organization cannot do the work of church and school, it can at least supplement them, besides doing a distinctive work relating to the practical questions of farming, of business, of legislation. Moreover, will it not be better if all will admit the necessity for the work of others, and will seek to co-operate? That is the magic word, Co-operate. We hear about the necessity of co-operation among the churches, between teachers and school patrons, among farmers as farmers. But there is need of a still higher form of co-operation between church and school and farmers' organization. This meeting has not attempted to show just how this co-operation can be brought about; it will have done its work if it has convinced a few farmers and a few educators and a few country clergymen that 'co-operation between all rural forces' is one of the twentieth-century watchwords for rural progress."

"The Dependence of Agriculture upon Transportation," by Hon. E. A. Prouty, of the Interstate Commerce Commission.—A significant point in this paper is that of the relation between the over-capitalization of railway corporations and the legal regulation of railway charges. Mr. Prouty maintained that the remedy for monopoly in transportation is the control by public agencies of transportation charges, and that over-capitalization of railway corporations interferes with such control. The great evil arising out of railway combinations lies in over-capitalization. "Ten years ago the state of Texas, believing its railway rates were unreasonable, created a commission and instructed that commission to formulate a schedule of rates which the railroads of Texas were ordered to observe. They did so, and the Supreme Court of the United States enjoined the state of Texas from enforcing those rates because they did not permit a return upon the capitalization of the Texas roads. A little bit later the state of Nebraska, smarting under what it thought unfair freight rates, made a schedule of freight rates which the roads should not exceed. The Supreme Court of the United States held that that law could not be enforced because the rates did not suffer those railroad companies to earn a fair return upon their capitalization. The experience of the state of South Dakota was exactly the same. In finding a reasonable rate, whether that question is decided by the railroad or whether it is decided by the government in revising the rate, the only thing to be considered is the capitalization of the railroad. If in time to come I am asked to fix a rate on the Great Northern Railroad, must I not take into account the fact that those $200,000,000 of of bonds with interest have got to be paid? One of the great faults in our present financial condition is over-capitalization, not only of steam railroads, but of every quasi public service." R. M.

The Evolutionary Method as Applied to Morality.—In much recent discussion about validity or objective value, writers have taken up indiscriminately two different standpoints. One question is this: What is the validity of the moral point of view as such? A distinct question is the following: How is the validity of a given moral point of view or judgment determined? Now ethical science is primarily concerned with problems of validity in the latter sense.

The historic method is a method, first, for determining how specific moral values (whether in the way of customs, expectations, conceived ends, or rules) came to be; and, second, for determining their significance as indicated in their career. Its assumptions are that norms and ideals, as well as unreflective customs, arose out of certain situations in response to the demands of those situations; and that once in existence they operated with a less or greater meed of success (to be determined by study of the concrete case). We are still engaged in forming norms, in setting

up ends, in conceiving obligations. If moral science has any constructive value, it must provide standpoints and working instrumentalities for the more adequate performance of these tasks. Shall we say that a defined and critical knowledge of the origin, history, and destiny of such matters in the past life of humanity is aside from the mark in our present situation?

Intuitionalism, as ordinarily conceived, makes the ethical belief a brute fact, because unrelated. Its very lack of genetic relationship to the situation in which it appears condemns it to isolation. This isolation logically makes it impossible to credit it with objective validity. The genetic theory holds that the content embodied in any so-called intuition is a response to a given active situation; that it arises, develops, and operates somehow in reference to this situation. This functional reference establishes in advance some kind of a relationship to objective conditions, and hence some presumption of validity. If the "intuition" persists, it is, within certain limits, because the situation persists. The probability is that it continues in existence simply because it continues to be necessary in function. The presumption or probability, however, must not be pushed too far. It is a well-known fact that habits endure and project themselves after the conditions which originally generated them pass over, and that under such circumstances the habits become sources of error and even of hallucination. The point of the genetic method is, then, that it shows relationships, and thereby at once guarantees and defines meaning. A given belief or intuition represents, as regards its content, a cross-section of a historic process. No wonder it becomes meaningless and obstructive when the static section is taken as if it were a complete and individualized reality.

Empiricism is no more historic in character than is intuitionalism. Empiricism is concerned with the moral idea or belief as a grouping or association of various elementary feelings. It regards the idea simply as a complex state which is to be explained by resolving it into its elementary constituents. By its logic, both the complex and the elements are isolated from a historic context. The genetic method determines the worth or significance of the belief by considering the place that it occupied in a developing series; the empirical method by referring it to its components. Elementary feelings or sensations, as the empiricist deals with them, have no inherent or intrinsic time-reference at all. Such reference is a purely external matter that attaches to the accidental way in which one of these elements happens to fall in with others; accidental because its position of antecedence or consequence is something lying wholly outside of the element itself. The empirical and the genetic methods thus imply a very different relationship between the moral state, idea, or belief, and objective reality. From the genetic standpoint, the moral idea is essentially an attitude that arises in the individual in response to the practical situation in which he is involved. It is the estimate the individual puts upon that situation. It arises as a response to a stimulus, and its worth is found in its success, as response, in doing the particular work demanded of it. The empirical theory holds that the idea arises as a reflex of some existing object or fact. Hence the test of its objectivity is the faithfulness with which it reproduces that object as copy.

The empirical method holds that the belief or idea is generated by a process of repetition or cumulation; the genetic method, by a process of adjustment. The empiricist holds that conscious customs are generated by the persistence of biological habits, and that moral practices form the cumulative effect of the customs. But more instinctive acts simply make instinct more instinctive; more acts of habit just harden an original custom. It is only through *failure* in the adequate working of the instinct or habit — failure from the standpoint of adjustment — that history, change in quality or values, is made. Simple repetition of acts of caring for the young, however long continued, would not awaken a consciousness of obligation, or of virtue, or of any moral value, as long as the acts were habitually performed — just because there would be no need for a transformation. Some failure of instinct created the demand for a conscious attention to the nurture of the young. Only through this conscious attitude and its tension *against* some instinct could an ethical adaptation arise out of a physiological adaptation.

This, then, is the case for the moral significance of the genetic method: it unites the present situation with its accepted customs, beliefs, moral ideals, hopes, and aspirations, with the past. It sees the moral process as a whole, and yet in perspective

Whatever, then, can be learned from a study of the past, is at once available in the analysis of the present. It becomes an instrument of inquiry, of interpretation, of criticism as regards our present assumptions and aspirations. Thereby it brings their constitution and formation out into the light as far as may be. It eliminates surds, mere survivals, emotional reactions, and rationalizes, *so far as that is possible at any given time*, the attitudes we take, the ideals we form. Both empiricism and intuitionalism, though in very different ways, deny the continuity of the moralizing process. They set up timeless, and hence absolute and disconnected, ultimates; thereby they sever the problems and movements of the present from the past, rob the past, the sole object of calm, impartial, and genuinely objective study, of all instructing power, and leave our experience to form undirected, at the mercy of circumstance and arbitrariness, whether that of dogmatism or skepticism. To help us see the present situation comprehensively, analytically, to put in our hands a grasp of the factors that have counted, this way or that, in the moralizing of man — that is what the historic method does for us. If our moral judgments were just judgments *about* morality, this might be of scientific worth, but would lack moral significance, moral helpfulness. But moral judgments are judgments of ways to act, of deeds to do, of habits to form, of ends to cultivate. Whatever modifies the judgment, the conviction, the interpretation, the criterion, modifies conduct. To control our judgments of conduct, our estimates of habit, deed, and purpose, is in so far forth to direct conduct itself.— PROFESSOR JOHN DEWEY, "The Evolutionary Method as Applied to Morality;" II: "Its Significance for Conduct," in *Philosophic Review* for July, 1902.

R. M.

Interesting Features of German Law.— The German civil code is entitled *Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch für das Deutsche Reich* ("Citizens' Book of Law for the German Empire"). It represents all those provisions of law which regulate the legal status of a person, as a private person, and his relations to others as private persons. To enable the imperial Parliament to enact such a code, an amendment to the constitution was required, which became operative in 1873. In 1874 a committee of five eminent jurists was appointed to report upon the plan and method of preparing a draft of a civil code. Upon the report of this committee, a committee of eleven members was appointed to prepare a draft of the code. The greatest scientists and practitioners were selected for membership. This committee began its work in the latter part of 1874, and drafts of the several parts of the code by the several members of the committee were completed in 1881, when the entire committee continued the work. In 1887 a first draft of a complete code was submitted to the imperial chancellor. This draft was published, and the public invited to contribute criticisms and suggestions. These were subsequently published. In 1890 a committee of twenty-two members was appointed, which submitted a second draft of the code to the Council of the empire in 1895. The Council prepared a third draft upon the basis of the first two drafts, and laid this third draft before the imperial Parliament. Parliament enacted the code in August, 1896, to take effect January 1, 1900. The new civil code is a victory of the national idea and of the modern spirit. It guarantees the equal rights of all persons. There is no distinction of class. Its great subjects are: property, the family, inheritance.

Other important codes of the German empire are as follows: code of commerce, code of negotiable instruments, the groundbook code, the code of bankruptcy, code relating to the constitution of courts, code of civil procedure, code of voluntary jurisdiction, penal code, code of criminal procedure. The body of private law and remedial justice of Germany is, with slight exceptions, incorporated in codes for the entire empire.

The doctrine of *stare decisis* does not prevail in Germany. As a consequence, the law contained in the 2,385 sections of the civil code will not be enlarged by volumes of decisions construing the several sections, having the sanction and force of law. If the lowest court in Germany differs on a question of law from the decision of the imperial court, it is its duty to follow its own conviction. The German jurist is not and cannot be a case lawyer. He receives special training to interpret the various sections of his codes upon general principles of law. The imperial court at Leipzig, the *Reichsgericht*, is the highest appellate court in Germany. In publishing

their judgments and decisions the German courts do not give the names of the parties.

It is difficult for an English or American lawyer to appreciate the simplicity of the rules of evidence in Germany, or rather the absence of those rules which are familiar to us, though we may not always know them, and which cause so many mistrials and appeals. Hearsay evidence is received. A witness may state his conclusions and may give his reasons for such conclusions. Documents of all kinds are admitted without proof. In certain cases where a witness may not be sworn, his unsworn testimony may be taken and considered. A useful provision seems to me to be that which requires the court, before administering an oath to the witness, to point out to him in a proper manner the importance of such oath. Each witness must be examined separately and in the absence of other witnesses thereafter to be examined. The theory of evidence is that the court is to ascertain the truth without regard to technical rules. The German parties may not call expert witnesses. The court determines whether the testimony or the opinion of experts is required and then appoints such experts. If a man has committed crimes other than the crime with which he is charged, that is deemed material. With us evidence of the other crimes is excluded.

Civil causes are not tried by juries. The jury, on the trial of a criminal case, consists of twelve members. Assistant jurymen may take the place of jurymen-in-chief who, after becoming members of the jury, are prevented from further service. If the verdict of the jury is unfavorable to the accused, it must state that it was found by more than seven votes; if the jury find there are no extenuating circumstances, the jury must state that this was found by more than six votes. In other respects, it must not be stated how the vote stood.

The law of inheritance makes no distinction between real property and personal property. The transfer of real property in Germany is as easy as that of personal property.

The courts and authorities in Germany provide greater legal aid than our courts. No citizen of Germany will hesitate to apply for legal aid. He does so as a matter of right. If he has a legal claim in any foreign land, he will apply to the foreign office, expecting to receive, and receiving, aid and advice. The German consulates throughout the world are largely engaged in giving such aid to their countrymen. The idea of legal aid as a charity is of German origin. We all know what a noble charity the Legal Aid Society in New York has become. It was formerly a German society designed to aid German poor only. Its example is being followed in other cities in the United States.

German law impresses the student as being more popular than the law of England or of the United States, because it is less technical and theoretical. The American lawyer may learn many lessons from a study of German law. To those of us who favor a codification of substantive law and believe it to be feasible and desirable for this country, what a great example it is! The German empire, comprising twenty-six states, with a population of fifty-six millions, has, within twenty-nine years from its birth, achieved a popular and scientific codification of its entire private law for all its citizens. Its administration of justice is speedy and successful, owing to the comparatively small bulk of its law, the numerous trained judges whom it employs, the absence of jury trials in civil causes, and the comparative simplicity of its law of procedure.—Condensed from a paper read before the last convention of the New York State Bar Association by RUDOLF DULON, ESQ., of New York city, and published in the *American Law Review* for July-August, 1902.

R. M.

The Maryland Workmen's Compensation Act.—The General Assembly of Maryland during its recent session passed an act for the co-operative insurance of employees engaged in certain dangerous occupations against injuries resulting in death. While the law is confessedly tentative and narrowly restricted in its scope, it is noteworthy because it introduces a new principle into American labor legislation. In the United States attention has been given heretofore to modifying the common law rules as to negligence. The Maryland act goes further, and, following the lines marked out by foreign legislation, provides for the indemnification of all injuries resulting in death, irrespective of cause. It is recognized that the burden of the trade

risk should not fall primarily on the workman. At the same time, also, a practically compulsory system of insurance against such injuries is created.

The law hinges on the conditional abrogation of the "fellow servant rule." It is provided that "any corporation, company, partnership, association, individual, or individuals engaged in the business of operating any coal or clay mine, quarry, steam or street railroad in the State of Maryland, and any incorporated town, city, or county engaged in the work of constructing any sewer, excavation, or other physical structure, or the contractors for any such town, city, or county shall be liable in law to any employee engaged in the above-named occupations, or, in case of death, to his wife . . . . for the damages flowing from an injury to said employee or from the death of such employee when such injury or death is caused by the negligence of the employer or by the negligence of any servant or employee of such employer." Heretofore, the negligence of a fellow-servant has not been ground for a damage suit in Maryland. The remainder of the act offers to employers a method by which they may escape this increased liability for damages. In order to be relieved from liability to their employees for damages, they must annually pay into the hands of the state insurance commissioner the following sums per employee: coal and clay mining, $1.80; steam railroads, $3.00; street railroads and trolleys, $0.60. The commissioner fixes the amount for municipal works. One-half of the amount paid by an employer may be deducted by him from the wages of the employee. If any employee insured under this act comes to his death in the course of his employment and by causes arising therein, the insurance commissioner shall pay one thousand dollars to the family of the deceased.

The number of workmen covered by the act is small, at the present time probably not exceeding 15,000. The insurance commissioner may exempt from the provisions of the act those employers who give satisfactory evidence that they are already, and will continue, "making better provisions for the workmen employed than they would be obliged to do under the provisions hereof." The commissioner is authorized to extend the insurance sections of the act to other trades; but he cannot change the liability of employers in such industries, and it cannot be expected that many employers will voluntarily insure their workmen.

The law is open to criticism in a number of directions. A workman insured under the law, and severely but not fatally injured, not only has no claim for compensation from the insurance fund, but will no longer have a right of action, even if his injury has been caused by the negligence of his employer. The system of assessment provided for gives no encouragement to employers to be careful that their workmen shall not be injured. All employers in an industry pay into the insurance fund at the same rate. The provisions for the maintenance of the insurance fund are ill-considered. The intent of the law seems to be that the receipts and payments shall balance each year. A single accident in the coal-mining industry may involve the loss of the lives of many workmen, and a serious mishap of this character might deplete the fund for several years. But, despite these imperfections, the position of the workman, looked at from the standpoint of practical protection, is undoubtedly better than under the legislation formerly existing.—GEORGE E. BARNETT, "The Maryland Workmen's Compensation Act," in *Quarterly Journal of Economics* for August, 1902.

Legislative Control over Municipal Corporations.—The question of the extent of legislative control over municipal corporations has occasioned a square conflict of opinion among the courts of this country. One line of cases, by decisions or *dicta*, has laid down the broad proposition that municipal corporations are the creatures of the legislature, and except for constitutional limitations, expressed or clearly implied, entirely subject to its control (Commonwealth *vs.* Moir, 199 Pa. St. 534). On the other hand, in many states the doctrine has been established that municipal corporations cannot be deprived of the right to local self-government; and this view is rested upon either one of two grounds: implied constitutional guarantee, or implied reservation to that effect (People *vs.* Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44). The result reached in this second class of cases commends itself as being in accordance with the spirit of our institutions and prevailing views of political expediency, but it is doubtful whether it can be supported upon principle. The constitutionality of an act must be determined by reference

to the constitution itself, and, while undoubtedly certain restrictions upon the power of the legislature may be implied from the language of that instrument, it is only where the implication is strong and clear that the courts are justified in asserting its existence.

Even those courts that have championed the right of the municipality to self-government have confined that right to matters of purely local concern. The principle upon which this distinction is based is that the municipality acts in a dual capacity: as the agent of the state with regard to certain matters, and as the agent of its own inhabitants with regard to others; and in respect to the former it is subject to the complete control of the state (People *vs.* Common Council of Detroit, 28 Mich. 228). While extremely difficult of application, the distinction is indispensable if the doctrine of local independence is accepted. The difficulty lies in drawing the line between matters of general and matters of local concern. In two recent cases it is held that the management of the municipal waterworks and fire department is a matter of purely municipal concern, and that a statute transfering their control to a state board is an unconstitutional interference with the right of municipal self-government (State *vs.* Barker, 89 N. W. Rep. 204 [Iowa]; State *vs.* Fox, 63 N. E. Rep. 19 [Indiana, Supreme Court]). Although the weight of authority sustains these conclusions there are decisions *contra* (David *vs.* Portland Water Committee, 14 Oregon, 98).

A conflict of opinion must necessarily arise upon this question because of the nature of the problem to be solved. The courts are called upon to decide whether the empowering of a municipality to carry on a certain work is a delegation by the state of a matter of general concern, or merely the grant of power to do things in the doing of which the state as a whole has no particular interest. Inasmuch as whatever involves the health and prosperity of a large body of citizens is a matter of interest to the entire state, the administration of matters local in their nature is likely to become of state concern. Where this is true it can fairly be said that the municipality is acting as the agent of the state with respect to those matters and is subject to its control. Under this view the analogy of the decisions upon what constitutes a public use justifying the exercise of the power of eminent domain should be followed, and a wide legislative discretion should be recognized even by those courts that uphold the local independence of the municipality.—*Harvard Law Review*, June, 1902.

R. M.

National Convention of Employer and Employed.—According to the statement of the promoters, this national gathering, which will take place at Minneapolis, September 22–26, 1902, is designed to afford an opportunity for the free exchange of ideas on the present labor problem. It is an attempt to inaugurate a great educational movement, in which all sides are to participate and work in harmony for a common purpose, namely, a better understanding and a more satisfactory adjustment of the relation between employer and employee. Representative employers, some of the ablest champions of the cause of the workingmen, and well-known investigators of social and economic problems will meet to consider the situation, and to take such action as will make for harmony and tend to elevate the dealings between the employer and his employees to a higher and nobler plane. Among the speakers who will address the conference are: President Roosevelt; Cyrus Northrop, president of the University of Minnesota; J. B. Clark, professor of political economy in Columbia University; Hon. Carroll D. Wright, United States commissioner of labor; James Kilbourne, president of the Kilbourne & Jacobs Manufacturing Co., Columbus, O.; Richard T. Ely, professor of political economy in the University of Wisconsin; Frank L. McVey, professor of political economy in the University of Minnesota; Miss Jane Addams, of Hull House, Chicago; Senator J. W. Bailey, of Texas; John Ireland, archbishop of St. Paul, Minn. The convention will be held under the auspices of the Eight Hour League and the citizens of Minneapolis. Cyrus Northrop, president of the University of Minnesota, is chairman of the executive committee that is making arrangements for the occasion.

R. M.

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THE NORTH SLESWIC QUESTION.

A FORTY YEARS' WAR.

IN a struggle between races, as between individuals, it is not always easy for the disinterested observer to find the proper point of view from which to estimate the relative merits of the opposing claims advanced by the two contestants. With cool impartiality to place in their just relations the humanitarian impulses born of a natural sympathy with the weaker and those considerations of ulterior end forcing themselves upon the judicious mind, has ever been a difficult task. No nation at war with a neighbor, whatever the bone of contention, has enjoyed the moral support of an undivided public opinion in the world at large.

Great Britain in her campaign against the Boer republics is a case in point. An evident disposition among broad-minded people generally to view with favor the theory of her champions, that an extension of the English dominion in South Africa would mean a corresponding advancement of the best interests of civilization, was met by a strong undercurrent of skepticism, not wholly confined to quarters hereditarily hostile, as to whether even factories and schoolhouses, built up on the ruins of a nation's freedom, might not be bought too dearly. This lack of enthusiasm in applauding their aim, and their means of pursuing it, has undoubtedly been a source of surprise to those English

statesmen who fondly fancied that the ethical loftiness of their motives was beyond impeachment.

On the other hand, the bands of Boer farmers fighting to the last ditch for their existence as an independent people have had difficulty in understanding the apparent apathy with which their fate was being watched by the outside world. Panegyrics on their valor, as harangues against their foes, there have been enough and to spare; substantial, whole-souled support there has been next to none. No voice of weight was ever raised, entreatingly, threateningly, in their behalf — even in countries where their sympathizers were in avowed majority and a determined, intelligently directed public opinion might have compelled the governments to act.

So hopelessly involved are often questions of right and wrong; so scrupulously slow, so languidly fair, is the average man in reaching a conviction; so discouragingly reluctant to stake anything on it when reached.

But even where the case seems clear beyond a shadow of doubt, and the injustice too palpable for argument, the moral forces of humanity move with measured gait. There is a supply of indignation ready at hand for such contingencies, which is generously drawn upon for immediate consumption; the columns of the press flow over with it; it is voiced by eloquent orators in meetings of protest; resolutions of sympathy are passed with acclamation; messages of good cheer are dispatched to the sufferers. But the channels of the public conscience are clogged with calculations; in the crucible of popular sentiment the reddest wrath soon pales into pink compassion. The wrongdoer, noting with equanimity the distant rumblings and the thunderbolts lost in the sand, emerges from his shelter when the storm has blown over; and pursues his path, serenely.

So timid at initiative is the collective man, so ever-ready to count the cost, so fearful lest his love for the loser lose him the good-will of the winner; so potent are yet considerations of expediency in twentieth-century international relations.

In the face of these facts, what hope of more than a patient hearing has the native of a small state, robbed and wronged,

pleading the cause of his country before a court of equity composed of the intelligent men and women of a friendly and fair-minded but far-away nation? What will his appeal avail? A world that saw Armenia bleed and stood by in silent horror fearing the complications intercession might engender; that hears the wails of the homeless hosts of Roumanian Jews driven from place to place like hordes of cattle, and has no word of censure for their persecutors;[1] that placidly wends its way while the air is rent by the manly protest of outraged Finland, and the groans of starving Russian peasants being shot down like dogs for demanding a share in the soil they tilled and the grain they grew — will the moral sense of this enlightened world, when once aroused from its lethargy, prevail to stem the tide of iniquity surging out over the lands from the seats of power and engulfing in its muddy maelstrom so much that were worth preserving? What use — one might reason — of arguing before a jury where, no matter what the evidence, a verdict is rarely reached, and, reached, never enforced? Public opinion is an unreliable watchman whom it takes a constant supply of stimulants to keep awake; who cries "Fire!" at a shooting star, but tranquilly drowses at his post while the block is ablaze, dreaming it is only that neighboring wall the ruin of which — the Roman poet to the contrary notwithstanding — he considers no concern of yours.

But it *is* your concern.

The problem of the small state — if a problem it is bound to become — will be solved according to the law of the survival of the fittest. The small state itself worthy to survive is willing that it should. Put on trial for its right to independent existence, it will not ask for allowances on the score of its size; nor is it apt to preface its plea with an apology to those of bigger

[1] Since this was written, Secretary Hay's note to the powers, protesting against the treatment by Roumania of her Jewish population, has stirred up the European hornets' nest. If this plucky act should be devoid of practical results, nobody is likely to be disappointed. International jealousies are yet too rampant to lend to such a step by a disinterested government, however powerful, any other than a moral significance in setting a precedent and pointing the way. It is, however, to be hoped that Mr. Hay will not confine his efforts to third-class powers, but next time will go for bigger game.

bulk. "Fitness" and "bigness" are not synonymous terms, and the decision of the battlefield is not always the judgment of history. If in individual existences notable achievements are conditioned to a degree upon physical vigor, an analogy cannot without modification be applied to the life of nations. True, the nation numerically weak and of limited material resources will seldom be found in the van of conquerors — oftener in the wake of colonists; its military prowess will cause little trepidation around the camp-fires of an armed world; in the field of industrial and commercial rivalry it is not likely to take the lead, and the enterprises of its citizens may appear modest indeed measured with the gauge of a Morgan or a Rockefeller. But in the appraisal of life's values there are other standards than those expressed in terms of square miles and billion-dollar trusts. There is no inherent reason why a small people might not excel in the pursuits of peace, and within its narrow boundaries not only enjoy a healthy national life and economic prosperity, but also attain to the topmost rung on the ladder of culture. Territorial restrictions present no barrier to the thoughts of the thinker or the songs of the singer; numerical limitations do not restrain the hand that wields the chisel or the operating knife. Its line of defense will follow the furrow of plow and keel; and over against cannon and conquests and colonies over the sea — every citizen a soldier and every sword the king's — it will set the silent battles of library and laboratory, the peaceful victories of pen and brush — every man in his workshop and every tool his own.

My neighbor's wall afire *is* my affair. A wrong perpetrated against any member of the sisterhood of nations, the weakest not excepted, *is* the concern of all, the strongest included. No validity can be attached to the argument that this is but a special plea for the adjustment of troubles of a purely local nature, of little interest and less import to the outside world. To the extent that any nation has contributed to the sum-total of human progress in the realms of mind and matter, to that extent it has made all mankind its debtor, and any transgression against its integrity or its particular national culture becomes a crime against

civilization in general, and as such the business of the whole civilized world, which it cannot afford to ignore.

With the dawning of the twentieth century, and with the revival of the national principle everywhere, is it not time that steps be taken toward the cultivation of a conscious sense of solidarity among the best in every land, with the practical object in view of insisting upon the application to dealings of nations one with another of the common rules of fairness and justice governing the relations of man with man? International courts of arbitration may serve a useful purpose; undoubtedly they are a step in the right direction. But back of them, and above them, as the court of last resort from whose final decision there is no appeal, and whose dicta no ruler in the world dares to defy, must be this mighty fellow-feeling—the calm, watchful, unbribable sense of righteousness of the common people, led by those to whom they are wont to look for guidance.

I. CONDITIONS IN SLESWIC.

I. PRUSSIAN METHODS OF ASSIMILATION.

The causes leading up to the war of 1864, in which Denmark lost one-third of her territory, are ancient history and need not be rehearsed here. Allegedly a question of succession, when Prussia and her ally, Austria-Hungary, deemed it expedient to repudiate the London protocol of 1852, by the terms of which the present king of Denmark was made lawful heir to the whole Danish monarchy, the little kingdom found itself involved in a cruel struggle against two great powers and, abandoned by the other signatory governments, foredoomed to crushing defeat. After a six-months' campaign peace was concluded at Vienna. The three duchies of Sleswic, Holstein, and Lauenburg were the price exacted. Two years later, in 1866, the victors fell to quarreling over the booty, and by the peace of Prague Austria was forced to deed over her share to Prussia.

Of the conquered provinces, Holstein and Lauenburg were wholly German. No one in Denmark at the present day regrets their loss. In Sleswic the case was different. Out of a total population of 400,000, approximately three-fifths, inhabiting the

southern portion, were German in speech and sentiment, while the remaining two-fifths, or about 160,000, occupying the northern half, were of Danish language and nationality. It is these latter whose stubborn refusal to become Germans has given rise to what is known as "the North Sleswic, or Dano-German, question."

If the existence of such a question has hitherto escaped the notice of a great majority of the American people, the reasons are not far to seek. In the first place, there is an obvious lack of direct connection between the interests uppermost in the average American mind, and conditions and events in far-off, politically insignificant Denmark. Whatever surplus capital the United States have had to invest in international philanthropies has thus far found ready takers nearer home. Secondly, at the time when Denmark succumbed to the joint attack of Prussia and Austria, things of momentous significance were happening in this country, eclipsing in their colossal proportions any contemporaneous event in other parts of the world. The stronger for her trial, America forgave and forgot; Denmark, mutilated and forgotten, was left by the wayside bleeding. And, thirdly, a controversy the origin of which lies back of the memory of most living men must possess elements of an exceptional quality to keep its existence fresh in the consciousness of a later generation. A mere handful of Dutch farmers holding out for years against the concentrated forces of a world-empire, in addition to the other odds, have had to battle against a waning interest among those at the outset having their cause at heart. The soldier who made a world resound with his battlecry must take heed to fall in the first round, lest he outlive his own renown. Daily bulletins from the field of war announcing a stereotyped half-dozen killed and a score put *hors de combat* are liable to prove dull reading in the long run, unless occasionally relieved by performances on a more generous scale. How, then, can a struggle of forty long years' standing; a ceaseless, monotonous strife, where nothing happens from day to day to stir the enthusiasm of the onlooker; a combat between silent armies, with no victors to cheer, no vanquished to bemoan, no renegades to jeer; a bloodless battle royal of rival sentiments — how

can such a struggle hope to hold the attention of a busy world?

And yet, is there not in this very nature of the fight something to appeal to all thinking people? Is not this little army of Danes heroically struggling to maintain their nationality against the combined governmental and cultural forces of powerful Germany entitled to the remembrance and sympathy of liberal America?

During the first few years after 1864 the conquerors treated the alien population of the subjugated province with a fair degree of leniency. Through the instrumentality of Napoleon III., who since his Italian campaign was looked to in Europe as the foremost champion of the national principle, a clause had been inserted into the Treaty of Prague making the people of North Sleswic arbiters of their own fate.[1] Prince Bismarck, in a speech before the Prussian lower house in December, 1866—repeated later in the North German Reichstag—with direct reference to Sleswic voiced his unqualified assent to this principle in the following terms:

> I have ever been of the opinion that a population which in indubitable manner and constantly evinces a determination not to be Prussian or German, but desires nationally to belong to an immediately adjacent state, does not add to the strength of the power from which it strives to separate itself.

And again in 1873, at a reception given by the prince—then chancellor—to members of the Reichstag, he addressed these words to the sole representative from North Sleswic, who had reminded him of the treaty rights of his constituents and the desirability of an early settlement: "Yes, you are right; I am entirely of your opinion. Persevere in your fight!"

How much sincerity may be attributed to these utterances by the astute politician is perhaps open to doubt. In this "man of blood and iron" there was not lacking a vein of bloody irony, strangely contrasting with the almost brutal frankness so domi-

[1] "His majesty the emperor of Austria transfers to his majesty the king of Prussia all his . . . . claims to the duchies of Holstein and Sleswic, with the stipulation that the populations of the northern districts of Sleswic are to be ceded to Denmark, if they by a free vote manifest a desire to be united with Denmark" (Treaty of Prague, Art. V).

nant a trait in his character, and which found eloquent expression on numerous occasions. To a deputation of Holsteinians visiting him at Friedrichsruh in 1895, when responsibilities of office no longer sealed his lips, he openly confessed that the war against Denmark had been of long preparation, and that he as leading statesman in regard to Sleswic and Holstein had always been actuated by the principle that "that must we have!"

However that may be—whether there in Prussian government circles at that time actually existed a disposition to redeem the pledge of 1866, or whether assimilation was thought to be more quickly attained by conciliatory means—at any rate, during the first decade or so there prevailed a condition comparatively free from the harsh methods characteristic of a later period. Trusting to a speedy reunion with the mother-country, a large proportion of the population (at the present time numbering about 20,000) had taken advantage of an agreement between Prussia and Denmark guaranteeing to all announcing their intention prior to 1870 the privilege of retaining their Danish subjectivity, though domiciled in Sleswic, thereby, of course, barring themselves from all participation in public affairs; while the majority of the young men, in order to escape Prussian military service, emigrated to the United States or Denmark. The danger of this policy, from a national point of view, had not yet become apparent to a people who, despite their inborn antipathy for Germany and the Germans, did not hesitate to place confidence in their good faith as a nation.

This confidence was, however, doomed to disappointment. In the year 1878 the covenant of Prague was emended by the contracting parties, Germany and Austria-Hungary, and Art. V, solemnly sworn to and signed by the rulers of the two countries "in the name of the most holy and indivisible Trinity," was unceremoniously stricken from the statute books. In the intervening twelve years official Germany had revised her code of international ethics. Ideas of national honor had been subordinated to ideals of territorial grandeur. The reawakened spirit of German unity, bewailing the fate of compatriots, severed from the parent stem, in Austria and Baltic Russia, felt no compunc-

tion over the enforced presence within the confines of the empire of large non-German, antagonistic elements. These, according to the German theory, ought to be grateful for the opportunity afforded them of becoming sharers in the reflected glories of Germany's great past and greater future. If they were foolish enough to stand in their own light by refusing to fuse, they must be crushed.

As the Danes in North Sleswic showed not the slightest sign of gratitude nor of inclination to yield, "crush" from now on became the watchword of the local Prussian authorities, inspired from headquarters at Berlin.

Of that which characterizes a nation and distinguishes it from any other, language is at once a principal constituent and the truest expression. Two peoples may originally speak the same tongue; they may be closely allied racially, occupying adjoining territories; or the one may be an offshoot of the other. Under the influence of different climatic, economic, and social conditions, modifications of speech will gradually appear, which in time may develop into a distinct idiom. Germany and Holland, Denmark and Sweden, are examples of the first class; England, in relation to her colonies and to the United States, of the latter. On the other hand, two or more separate languages, belonging to ethnically separate groups welded into a political unit, may be used side by side, on terms of the fullest equality, within the limits of one, even small, state, the community of interests being a bond sufficiently strong to hold the heterogeneous elements together. Austria-Hungary, or, still better, Belgium, may serve as an illustration of this type. But a conquered nation, or part of a nation, possessing a culture essentially different from that of its oppressor, cannot abandon its language and hope to retain its national individuality. Its language is the bulwark, the very corner-stone, of its civilization, the life-blood of its existence as a people. That dead, its struggle for survival is hopeless. The conqueror who, by fair means or foul, succeeds in imposing his language upon a defeated population has more than half won his game.

In North Sleswic both victor and vanquished realized from

the beginning that here was the ground upon which the decisive battle must be fought. Hence, when the Prussian masters had made up their minds to keep the spoils, regardless of treaties, and make Sleswic an organic part of their state, their every effort was bent toward suppressing the Danish mother-tongue of the inhabitants. That these voluntarily should become Germans there was no prospect. Consequently they must be forced, first to learn, then to speak, and finally—it was hoped—think *in* German. This accomplished, it was held to be a question of only a comparatively short time when they would learn to think *as* Germans.

The first step toward this goal had been the exclusion of Danish from the churches, schools, and courts in districts of a mixed population, and the substitution of German, which a large percentage of the people did not understand. This was followed, in 1871, by a decree making instruction in German, to the extent of six hours weekly, compulsory in the schools of the purely Danish districts. In 1878—the year of the annulment of Art. V—this number was further increased to fourteen hours. At the same time all private Danish secondary schools were closed throughout the province, and an administrative order was promulgated making it obligatory upon all Prussian citizens to have their children taught in Prussian schools. Danish parents wishing to give their children a fuller knowledge of their mother-tongue were compelled either to keep private tutors, whose German qualifications must first be passed upon by the authorities, or, at the end of the public-school age, send them to Denmark for a complementary education.

Finally, in 1888, the time allotted to Danish in the schools was reduced to four hours' weekly religion. All other instruction was henceforth to be in German. The employment of tutors, still formally permissible, was made practically impossible through a multitude of ingenious obstacles devised by the local officials.

This is the condition obtaining at present in the schools of North Sleswic. Not only has Danish absolutely ceased to be taught as such, but, with the exception of these four hours of cate-

chism—and even they have recently been abolished in a large number of schools—utterly banished as a medium of instruction. All questions and answers must be given in German; all conversation must be carried on in German; German are the lessons set the children for home preparation; German the themes—German praise of German deeds, German hymns to German heroes. And that to children whose parents understand no other language than Danish, and in whose homes not a word of any other was ever spoken!

Scarcely better have the churches fared. The clergy are an imported flock, trained in the German universities, utterly out of touch with the people to whose spiritual wants they are supposed to minister; barely able to understand their language, mutilating it beyond recognition from their pulpits. Officially, Danish is yet the ecclesiastical language of the northernmost districts, where the pastor himself and his family, and the schoolmaster and his, are often the only German sympathizers found in the parish. If this German minority, however—through the addition, say, of the personnel of a new local branch of the state railway—encouraged by the authorities, grows sufficiently confident to get up a petition for the partial or complete replacement of Danish by German as the language of the church, it is always sure of a favorable hearing. In one instance, of a community in which only 2 per cent. of the population spoke German, upon the inspired petition of these 2 per cent., Danish was entirely excluded from the church. Wherever Prussian administrators have a chance to promote at the same time the interests of religion and patriotism, they are never found wanting.

As a result the prelate preaches to empty pews. The population, by tradition and training strongly religious, has been thrown upon its own resources for the satisfaction of its needs in that direction. Long lines of carriages Sunday after Sunday darken the highways leading to Denmark. But many of those who cannot travel the distance have banded together into free congregations, built their own meeting-houses, and appointed their own pastors. Though perfectly legal, this proceeding has always incurred the displeasure of the authorities, who throw all

sorts of obstacles in the way. The strictest police surveillance is maintained during the meetings. On some pretext or other—that the formalities of law have not been complied with, that "politics" is being discussed, etc.—the churches are arbitrarily closed, sometimes for years, and the pastors enjoined from officiating at any religious function, while the "case" is being tried back and forth in all the courts of the empire. When at last a supreme-court decision unbars the door, a policeman in uniform is stationed on the inside throughout the services, noting the names of those present and the words spoken, from the platform and between man and man—for future reference.

This police espionage and persecution have gradually assumed forms the bare mention of which ought to be enough to arouse the indignation of all liberty-loving persons. The population is harassed in every conceivable manner. No annoyance seems too petty, no trick too mean, to gratify the officious arrogance of these excrescences on the great Prussian body politic. True, they often act on their own initiative, without the knowledge or consent of their superiors, who repeatedly have disavowed their acts when brought to their notice. But wherever the establishment of one's plainest rights, in the everyday affairs of life, involves no end of administrative red tape, or prolonged and costly litigations in court, a final vindication is often a Pyrrhus victory that many can ill afford. This fact, of which the subordinate police officials are well aware, only serves to render them the more overbearing.

A few illustrations, selected at random, and which could be multiplied *ad infinitum*, may serve to indicate the methods by which it is sought to inspire an unappreciative populace in North Sleswic with awe and admiration for its German masters:

It is forbidden to sing Danish songs of patriotic content, not only in public and in open air, but in one's own home. This ban has lately been extended to embrace songs by Norwegian authors. At gatherings of a strictly private character, such as weddings or birthday parties, a police eavesdropper will station himself under the windows and arrest anyone found guilty of this offense. Defendants are fined for talking Danish in court,

whether or not they understand the language in which the charges against them are being preferred. Actors from Denmark cannot obtain permission to produce their plays — even vaudevilles of the most harmless sort — on North Sleswic stages, and are expelled if they do not, immediately upon their arrival, report to the police. The same fate is in store for Danish lecturers, no matter what their topics — literary or religious. A lecture on the sun and planets announced by a Sleswic man was prohibited by the local magistrate on the ground that the stereopticon views by which it was to be illustrated might present pictures of Danish persons and landscapes!

Entrance is forced into meetings of agricultural or charitable societies, and the audience dispersed without explanation, or on the pretense that the assemblage has a "political" character. Sometimes the hall is closed, the organization forcibly dissolved, and its papers carried off, in which case it takes a lawsuit to reopen. When the "political" proclivities of the gathering are only suspected, all women are chased out of the room, the guardians of Prussia's public morals considering it their province to suppress with severity any incipient desire on the part of the fair sex to cultivate an interest in affairs of state.

The flying of the Danish flag is, of course, interdicted. But a man may not even paint his fence-posts or his weathercock in the Danish colors (red and white). A red-and-white emblem on a book-cover will subject the whole edition to confiscation. Red and white flowers cannot with impunity be put on a family grave in the cemetery. Even a conspicuous preference for these shades in one's dress is regarded as an act of treason.

Parents have been fined for refusing to let their children attend the special services held in all Prussian schools on the anniversary of the battle at Sedan, in commemoration of the German victory over the French. A fine has been imposed for the illumination of the windows in a private residence in honor of some Danish celebration; another on an editor for announcing in his paper that "today is King Christian's birthday" — without adding the words "of Denmark." A farm hand of Danish sympathies called a German swineherd a "swine king" —

a common epithet in Sleswic — for which he was sentenced to two years' imprisonment for — *lèse majesté* against Emperor William!

It is deemed "grave disorder" (*grober Unfug*), and is subject to heavy penalties, publicly to use the name "South Jutland" (Sönderjylland) in connection with Sleswic. This is the ancient Danish name for the province, still predominantly employed in Denmark in lieu of "Sleswic" (Slesvig). Since time immemorial the Cimbrian peninsula has politically been divided into North Jutland and South Jutland, this latter appellation thus having ample historical as well as geographical justification. But woe to the writer who forgets himself to the extent of using it in print, even in quotations, thereby suggesting a connection — if only one of relative location — between the two divisions that fails to take account of the present political affiliation of the southern half!

The climax of this remarkable phase of modern assimilative endeavors was reached after Herr von Köller, in the summer of 1897, had been appointed governor of the province of Sleswic-Holstein. This typical Prussian *Junker*, whose notions of the relations of rulers and ruled had been cast in the mediæval, feudalistic mold, and who regarded his administrative domain as a special fief he held from his war-lord, to whom alone he was responsible, found in North Sleswic an inviting field for the working out of his patriarchal theories. Sizing up the situation, he pronounced the methods hitherto pursued for the extirpation of the Danish nationality too slow and inefficacious, and inaugurated what he was pleased to term "the policy of the firm hand" (*die Politik der festen Hand*).

As mentioned above, after the conclusion of peace in 1864 the majority of the population had chosen to become Prussian citizens, thereby acquiring the right of suffrage and in every other respect being placed, juridically, upon the same footing as other subjects of the crown. By this means they hoped to be enabled to carry on a more successful war of defense. A considerable number had, however, refused to take the oath of allegiance and, as Danish subjects, had retained their domicile in Sleswic. Although the exact legal status of these latter has never been

clearly defined, and they have been compelled to lead a sort of amphibious existence as neither fowl nor fish, it had always been understood that they were to be left at liberty unmolestedly to pursue their vocations as long as they did not violate any of the laws of the realm and rigidly abstained from giving public expression to their national sympathies.

Governor von Köller, determined to please his imperial master with more tangible results than had up to that time been attained, early in his régime turned his attention to these resident "foreigners." Unable to punish Prussian citizens for speaking and voting Danish, he retaliated by originating an ingenious scheme, according to which, upon the principle of vicarious punishment, the "optants," as the Danish subjects are styled, were to be made to suffer for the perversity of their neighbors.

The period of expulsions was at hand—a bloodless reign of terror, where innocent, law-abiding people, without process of law and without warning, with forty-eight hours' notice were evicted from the homes that had been their families' for generations, and under police guard sent across the frontier, often to economic ruin, for no fault of theirs, but because a brother or a friend had voted the Danish ticket, or made a speech before a Danish audience, or participated in an excursion to Denmark.

These drastic measures were made to include also the hired help on the farms—inoffensive boys and girls from Denmark crossing over for a season or two and returning when their time had expired. Few, if any, remain and settle in Sleswic permanently. Nevertheless, they were expelled in bulk, on the plea of "burdensomeness" (*Lästigkeit*), and as being "a danger to the security of the Prussian state"!

Two objects were aimed at by this policy. It was thought, in the first place, that this threat, constantly hanging over the heads of the people, of the expulsion of members of their families or of servants, would intimidate them into a more submissive attitude; and, on the other hand, that the vacated places would be occupied by immigrated Germans, thus forcing from the south into the solid front of recalcitrant Danes that entering wedge

which in time would wax strong enough to split their ranks. If they could neither be won over nor be subdued, they might be replaced. A Danish buyer for a farm whose owner had been expelled would, it was believed, be hard to find. So many young men having emigrated, there was a dearth of youth in the land. Naturally, Danes from the kingdom were not anxious, under existing circumstances, to throw their lots with their Sleswic brethren; even if they were willing, it would be an easy matter to hit upon means of preventing them. Consequently, von Köller reasoned, the deserted homesteads must go by default to German purchasers, aided by the special government fund held in readiness for just such contingencies.

Similarly in regard to servants. By practically making it impossible to keep Danish help, employers must be thrown back upon the German supply. And the theory—not devoid of a certain degree of plausibility—was that the daily contact, especially of the children, with German-speaking people in their own homes must needs produce beneficial results—directly by furthering the understanding and use of the German tongue, indirectly by breaking the point off the bitter national antagonism in relations of mutual dependence.

However, as will be seen later on, von Köller reckoned without his host.

But the end was not yet. There remained to be put into effect one measure the nature of which was such as to evoke a storm of indignant protests, not only in North Sleswic and Denmark, but as far as the echo was heard—even in Germany herself. This was von Köller's assault upon the parental right. As has been stated, Danish parents are in the habit of sending their children, past public-school age, to Denmark to complete their education. This means of keeping alive Danish language and sentiment, in the opinion of the governor, tended to counteract his Germanizing efforts. He therefore resolved that it must be stopped. Parents were warned to withdraw their children from the Danish schools under penalty of heavy fines, the deprivation of their educational rights, and the appointment of German guardians for their sons and daughters.

Of course, the request was flatly refused. The whole population arose as one man in defense of a principle so vital to all as freemen and as Danes. Herr von Köller—possibly realizing that he had gone a step too far, and foreseeing ultimate defeat in the higher courts; or perhaps also acting upon a suggestion from Berlin, where the matter had been aired in spirited sessions of the representative bodies—soon, however, dropped this feature of his scheme, and reverted to the safer method of banishment.

The expulsions continued unabated as long as he filled the gubernatorial chair. To a deputation having the temerity to ask him why and for how long this war was being waged he gave, in substance, this characteristic answer: "I want peace; but peace on my terms, not on yours. Stop your agitation; dissolve your organizations; keep quiet! Do as I say, and the expulsions will cease; if not, the war will go on." His terms were not accepted, and the war went on.

In 1901 von Köller's services for the aggrandizement of his fatherland were rewarded by his promotion to the governorship of Alsace-Lorraine, where the French are now presumably being initiated into the mysteries of the "policy of the fist." Under his successor, Herr von Wilmowski, relative quiet has hitherto prevailed in Sleswic, occasionally interrupted by a few sporadic cases of expulsion. That the present incumbent is in fullest accord with the spirit and methods of his predecessor there can, however, be little doubt. Modern German aggressiveness is not apt to retrace its steps. The whole in last analysis resolves itself into a question of expediency. The temporary lull may at any moment give place to a renewed outbreak of the storm. Ill-boding clouds are still lowering in the horizon. In the meantime the army of defenders is sleeping on its shields.

II. THE POPULAR RESPONSE.

Turning now briefly to this little army of a hundred and fifty thousand farmers—what, and whence derived, are its means for carrying on the unequal struggle?

A potent factor throughout the campaign has been the closeness of the relations with Denmark. It is hardly an exaggera-

tion to say that every Sleswic family has kindred across the frontier. Common memories of common defeats have served to tighten this bond. To most Danes the wound is as yet an open and a painful one, and there is naturally a strong desire on their part to alleviate the burdens and keep up the spirits of their expatriated countrymen. As will readily be understood, the Danish government, as such, can do little or nothing toward that end. But private initiative, with hands unshackled, has rendered generous moral and material assistance.

This aid has taken manifold forms, determined by the exigencies of the situation. Frequent excursions to various parts of the kingdom are arranged on a large scale, in which thousands of Sleswicians take part; or open-air meetings, with speakers of national or Scandinavian reputation, are held just north of the frontier to make them the easier of access. Libraries containing the best of Scandinavian literature are distributed throughout Sleswic from the central offices at Copenhagen; and numerous scholarships are annually awarded to Sleswic young men and women in Danish secondary schools, or their tuitions paid by associations formed for this and like purposes in scores of towns in Denmark.

Another important agent is the ably conducted press. Under conditions difficult to appreciate in a country like America which enjoys an almost unlimited freedom of speech, a small band of intrepid journalists ply their laborious trade in this specially guarded corner of police-ridden Prussia, where the activities of the press are circumscribed by a multitude of censorial restrictions strongly suggestive of Russian conditions and enforced by a staff of eager magistrates. But trifling vexations and patent partialities only enhance their zeal. Pursued right and left — paying out his subscriptions in fines and court costs for hazarding a modest doubt as to the superhuman impartiality of some local interpreter of the law, or for expressing an opinion of some public act of a self-important official at variance with that gentleman's own estimation of its dignity; being at the same time daily defamed by his German competitors whose valued prerogative seems to imply a liberty of libel against any

Danish "traitor," and whose fine, if it is deemed worth while to try to dampen their patriotic ardor, is remitted by the emperor; spending half of his time in German jails serving sentences for treason and *lèse majesté*, while his assistants and his printers, who happen to be Danish subjects, are expelled — the path of the Danish editor in Sleswic is not strewn with roses. As an offset he is given the most loyal support by the people whose cause he so courageously champions. The positions of honor and trust are for the greater part filled by newspapermen. Recently the editor of the leading Danish paper — Mr. Jessen, of the *Flensborg Avis* — who between 1886 and 1899 spent an aggregate of forty-five months in prison, was rewarded with the highest gift within the bestowal of his constituents by being chosen as their representative in the German Parliament.

Among the means adopted by a weaker force for defending itself against the encroachments of a stronger, coalition has come to be recognized as one of the most effective. The maxim that "in union is strength" has been universally accepted in modern democracies. North Sleswic early was awake to the necessity of fortifying its position in accordance with this principle. Associations of every kind — educational, financial, agricultural, charitable, political — were formed and ramified throughout the district. At a time when almost all the young men left the land, and help as a consequence became increasingly hard to get, while prices arose correspondingly, a remedy was sought in co-operation. Producers' and consumers' societies largely superseded private enterprise. Under the leadership of men from Denmark, where this form of modern industrial evolution has reached its highest perfection, this movement has within recent years made rapid progress. When during von Köller's reign the expulsion of the hired men from the farms rendered the crisis acute, this centralization of energy, with its attendant reduction to a minimum of operating costs, enabled the population to endure with comparative ease the economic stringencies flowing from the abnormal political conditions. Von Köller's command to "pacify" was met by the response: "Organize!" In every walk of life forced to self-help, the people emerged from the

trial economically, as well as politically, more mature, united, and self-reliant. Thus the Prussian government indirectly contributed to their social education.

In the meantime the emigration of the young had practically ceased. Sons no longer left their fathers to struggle on alone, till death relieved them and German intruders took possession of the ancestral farms. The suicidal effects of this policy had been forcibly brought home by the constant decrease in the Danish vote. Those who in earlier years had preferred a sunnier life in free Denmark or freer America could not return; when they did—if only on a few days' visit to their parents—they were immediately arrested and escorted back over the border. But, beginning in the early eighties, an ever-increasing number of the young men decided to remain at home, don the Prussian uniform, and in time fill the gaps in the ranks. After two years' military servitude in some far-off garrison they returned the better Danes for their experience in the barracks. Soon the polls began to tell of a turning of the tide; the period of retrogression was at an end. Von Köller's frankly avowed replacement plan tended further to stimulate this determination; and thus again he helped to defeat his own end.

Besides the local battlefield, where the weapons have been suggested by and adapted to the conditions of the struggle, there is another arena where the same war is being carried on upon different, though scarcely more favorable, terms. This is the legislative halls at Berlin, where the three representatives from North Sleswic year after year incessantly toll the bell of national toleration before a drowsy German conscience.

Danish Sleswic is represented in the Reichstag by but a single member. So adroitly have the electoral districts been "gerrymandered" that, although the Danish votes at the first election (1867) in the new province to the parliament of the North German Federation outnumbered the German in the whole of Sleswic by 25,598 to 24,664, only one Danish candidate was elected to three German. This ratio has been maintained ever since. In the lower house of the Prussian Landtag two seats are occupied by Danes.

The position of these three members is in many respects a unique and a difficult one. Until 1882 the two Landtag representatives declined to take the oath of the Prussian constitution prescribed by the regulations of that body. As long as Art. V was still in existence, and there was prospect of a speedy solution of the national problem, they would not weaken their attitude by the theoretical recognition of Sleswic's incorporation into the Prussian state which such an act would be interpreted to imply. As a consequence they were denied the privilege of participating in the debates of the chamber. In the Reichstag, on the other hand, the one member let slip no opportunity of vigorously demanding justice for his constituents.

With the abrogation of Art. V the situation was at one stroke altered. All hope of a quick settlement now had to be abandoned. The struggle threatened to become long and obdurate. Judging it unwise to jeopardize the material interests of their districts by a continuation of the "policy of the empty chairs," without voice or vote in their own affairs, the Landtag members, with the approval of a majority of their electors, decided to change their tactics of passive protest, and took the oath.

To those at all familiar with the composition of the parliamentarian bodies in the German capital the precariousness of the position of a couple of members, without direct party affiliation, the sole burden of whose one and oft-repeated message is a demand for considerate treatment of a small but troublesome element of irritation within the state organism, is obvious beyond need of explanation. Liberal Germany, so conspicuous and wholesome an influence in the domains of science and abstract thought, and so stanch a defender of individual rights in the daily rounds of private life, is a negligible quantity in the Kaiser's law-making assemblies, and the more so in his advisory councils. Political Germany has not kept pace with cultural or commercial Germany. The liberal parties in the Reichstag, and still more in the class-elected Landtag, are numerically weak and split up into a number of factions. By effecting a union of all the conservative groups an impregnable government majority is secured for all reactionary measures, at whose hands any

advocate of leniency or considerateness toward the alien populations receives but scant courtesy. Every complaint, however well founded, is met with a shoulder-shrug; every recital of wrongs actually wrought, however crying, is brushed aside with a sneer or a flat denial; appeals are drowned in a chorus of hisses and calls "To order!"

Not a concession—not a confession—has ever been wrenched from the rulers. If legislative results were the only norm, the faithful labors of the three Danes at Berlin must, indeed, be deemed a failure.

However, these debates forced upon the government, these interpellations that *must* be answered, serve one purpose which should not be lost sight of: they keep North Sleswic in the eyes of the world; they accentuate the determination of its people never to give in; they stimulate the political conscience of a slowly but surely growing number of Germans into an acknowledgment of the fact that true national greatness cannot be firmly founded on police power; and the echo reverberating across the frontier reminds a watchful public in Europe and America that here is one acute phase of a problem that is fast pressing for solution—the problem of the right of a stronger nation to oppress a weaker with a distinct but equal culture, and "assimilate" it by coercion and annihilation.

III. RESULTS.

And what, now, have been the results of this forty-years' war—what the gains and what the losses? A hasty survey of the field will reveal the following facts:

There has been a constant influx of German elements into the towns—government officials with their retinues; military garrisons; tradesmen and shopkeepers dependent upon, or attracted by, these. Thus the slight Danish majority from the first period of the occupation has been changed into a slight German one in later years. Many workingmen of neutral national tint, who used to vote the Danish ticket as the politically more liberal one, have now definitively cast their lot with the Social Democratic party.

MAP I.

SHOWING THE PERCENTAGES OF THE DANISH-SPEAKING RESIDENT POPULATION IN THE COMMUNES OF NORTH SLESWIC.

In the rural districts, on the contrary, Danish language and sentiment have practically held their own. The accompanying map[1]—the figures of which are based upon a house-to-house canvass undertaken in the early nineties, and, it is presumed, have not since been subject to any appreciable change—shows the percentage of the Danish *resident* population in the different communes of North Sleswic. Little comment is necessary: barring the fluctuating official class—the minister and the schoolmaster, the policeman and the station-master, who all owe their appointment, directly or indirectly, to the government—parish upon parish, after these forty years of relentless persecution, presents an unbroken 100 per cent. of Danish-speaking people. Against the solid front of these rugged, determined farmers the blandishments and intimidations of a resourceful Prussian officialdom have availed naught.

Out of a population of 143,000 in 1895, in North Sleswic proper, 8,000, including the official class, had German speech. Of every 1,000 families 4 native and 8 immigrated spoke German, 988 Danish. And it is a significant fact that the German immigrants in many instances are absorbed by the native population to the extent of adopting its language, in the second generation, in their daily intercourse. From natural causes the Danish nationality in Sleswic need have no fear of extinction. Left to themselves, German culture and language would never triumph over Danish. This is admitted by the Germans.

The following table is instructive regarding political conditions. It shows the number of votes cast on both sides in elections to the Reichstag 1871–98:

	1871	1874	1877	1878	1881	1884	1886	1887	1890	1893	1898
Danish	18,725	17,897	15,575	14,447	12,831	12,228	11,616	12,480	12,860	13,672	14,821
German	3,578	3,778	4,573	4,421	4,194	4,723	5,052	5,945	6,054	6,026	6,741

In estimating these figures the fact must be borne in mind that the population during all these years has remained practically stationary; also that the full Danish vote, owing to the

[1] This and the following map have been reproduced from *Haandbog i det nordslesvigske Spörgsmaals Historie*, Copenhagen, 1901.

absolute German majority in two of the three districts embracing the disputed territory, is never polled. It will be observed, then, that, while the German column shows a steady, though slow, rise, the Danish vote constantly decreased down to 1886, when it reached its lowest level. As almost literally all sons of Danish parents had left home (the total emigration from North Sleswic 1867–90 amounted to 51,000), this result was bound to follow. The ranks of the older generation, by the natural course of human events, were gradually decimated; none there were to fill their places.

The year 1887 signalizes the turning of the tide. The young men, no longer shirking their responsibilities, were reaching the voting age. Every election since then marks a notable increase in the number of Danish votes, even relatively larger than that of the opponents. At a by-election held last spring to fill the vacancy caused by the death of the Danish representative in the Reichstag, the Danish vote, although on its face showing an actual diminution, virtually represented substantial progress, as the loss was considerably less than the number of names arbitrarily stricken off the registration lists on the eve of election, on the pretext that they belonged to persons whose Prussian citizenship was in doubt, although they had exercised their right of suffrage unchallenged for a number of years. "In this respect," writes *Kieler Zeitung* commenting on the result, "this newest phase of the 'policy of the firm hand' shows no progress." As a German estimate of the situation, this is not without interest.

II. GERMAN APOLOGETICS.

In attempting to trace the line of reasoning pursued by German apologists of the policy of denationalization in North Sleswic, due account must be taken of the fact that this, politically speaking, is primarily an internal Prussian affair, for which the nation as a whole cannot justly be held responsible. This aspect has been repeatedly emphasized by politicians and writers refusing to be identified with Prussian administrative methods. As a natural outcome of their mode of election, the

legislative assemblies of Prussia cannot be said correctly to mirror the prevailing opinions of the electorate at large. From their overwhelming reactionary majority any voice being raised in behalf of liberalism in any form can count on little sympathy. The Reichstag, on the other hand, being the product of universal suffrage and representing all parts of the empire, might *a priori* be supposed to be more favorably disposed toward a consideration of interests other than those of an arrogant militarism.

As a matter of fact, weighty voices have from time to time been lifted in the halls of Parliament in denunciation of the Bismarck-Köller régime. The Polish and Alsatian representatives are the natural allies of their Danish colleague and can always be relied upon to furnish the signatures required for bringing a matter officially before the house. But also some of the German factions have not seldom been outspoken in their criticism of governmental measures touching Sleswic. The large Center, or Catholic, party, for instance, though never acting in unison in Sleswic affairs, has through the utterances and votes of many of its most prominent members often set the Protestant side an example in national tolerance. The Liberal (*Freisinnige*) groups, numerically weak, but notable for the individual quality of their membership, have likewise shown a decided disposition to go against the government in its treatment of the Sleswicians, and much warmth and sincerity of feeling have occasionally been displayed in their behalf. It is, however, to the Social Democrats, as being utterly and uncompromisingly opposed to the entire prevailing system of governmental oppression in any form, that the Danes more and more have come to look for sympathy and help. To them as a parliamentary faction they owe a large debt of gratitude for the substantial support rendered at critical moments, when the members of the Liberal *bourgeois* parties have wavered between their adherence to the traditional policy of the empire and their individual sense of justice, or for tactical reasons have hesitated.

Especially during the debates precipitated by the wholesale banishments in 1899 the administration was subjected to scathing criticism. Dr. Lieber, leader of the Centrists, expressed

as his conviction that nothing could be more fatal than the policy pursued by Prussia in her border provinces. He condemned the persecution of the mother-tongue of the Danes and branded the encroachments upon the parental rights as an injustice that cried to heaven.

Of the Liberals several spoke in the same vein. Dr. Hänel, professor of international law at the University of Kiel, denounced the whole policy since 1888 as absolutely unjustifiable, particularly the decree of that year limiting Danish in the schools to four hours ; this measure, he said, was a grievous mistake which ought to be rectified. His colleague, Herr Lenzmann, declared that according to his "purely human feelings it was an unparalleled cruelty forcibly to deprive one of his mother-tongue, but that the cruelty became boundless when parents because of their national sentiments were robbed of that most sacred of rights — the right to educate their own children."

It was, however, left for Herr Liebknecht, the Socialist leader, to arraign the government in the severest terms. Recalling a remark by King William IV. of Prussia in 1847, that "the hatred between Danes and Germans was one of the greatest follies of the nineteenth century," he continued :

> Conditions in North Sleswic are a shame for us Germans, not only in the eyes of Europe, but in those of the whole civilized world. A system which makes such things possible must be abolished by the German people, lest they perish as a nation. This is the first duty which they owe themselves. . . . . Such a policy, the aim of which is oppression, is unworthy of Germany; it is a scandal. . . . . Germany is strong enough to be just.

The Liberal press throughout the country echoed the same sentiments. Leading publicists and university men came forth and attacked the government's policy. It will be remembered how Professor Delbrück, of the University of Berlin, was severely punished for publishing an article in *Preussische Jahrbücher*, of which he is editor, in denunciation of its actions. For a while it seemed as though the North Sleswic question was on the point of entering a new stage — where from the administrative bureaus it would be transferred to the forum of public discussion.

But with the temporary lull in the evictions, public excitement, and consequently interest, soon subsided, without the temporary outburst of indignation having crystallized into tangible results.

For, after all, it may well be questioned whether the vast majority of the German people are not in fullest accord with the foreign policy of their rulers. Much goes to bear out this theory. Dazzled by the glitter of the arms that welded the national union, they are not as yet ready to emancipate themselves from the magnetism of the mailed fist that pointed out to them their "manifest destiny" as the world's greatest military power. The spirit of Bismarck is still hovering above the waters of Germany's national aspirations.

It is undoubtedly for reasons connected with this fact that, while the suppression of foreign nationalities within the borders of the empire is held to be perfectly justifiable — nay, commendable — the highest degree of sensitiveness prevails in regard to the treatment of German residents in other countries. The position of the Germans in Bohemia and the Russian Baltic provinces can in no wise be compared to that of the Danes in Sleswic or of the Poles in eastern Prussia. Yet the Germans' sense of justice is continually being outraged by the iniquities to which their foreign-ruled compatriots are declared to be subjected by their masters. The selfsame methods which in Sleswic are decried as "traitorous" are being employed, with official approval and support, in the propaganda for the perpetuation of German language and sentiment in Russia and Austria. According to this adjustable standard, a Sleswic man who refuses to join in a "*Hoch der Kaiser!*" is stigmatized as a "perjurer," while the German merchant of Prague who declines to change the inscription on his sign at the behest of a Czechish mob is hailed as a hero. What in Flensborg is styled "agitation" in Riga is proclaimed as martyrdom. The modern ideal of pan-Germanism is conceived of as comprising all Germans from everywhere plus so many non-Germans from anywhere as can comfortably be digested. The means adopted for furthering the digestive process seem relatively immaterial.

A German politician has called Art. V of the Prague treaty a mortgage issued to the Danish population of Sleswic, which cannot lawfully be canceled without the consent of its holders. About the result of a vote taken on national lines in Sleswic nobody has any doubt. But were Sleswic's fate made dependent upon a referendum of the general electorate of Germany today, with the question put as a choice between a diminution of territory and the redemption of a national word of honor, the scales, there is reason to fear, would sink in favor of holding on to what they have. "No foot of German soil," says Kaiser Wilhelm, "shall ever be ceded except over the bodies of my dead soldiers." That sort of sentiment still strikes a responsive chord in the breasts of millions of his subjects.

It is a fact, also — and one which Denmark might do well in taking *ad notam* — that of all the speakers and writers who in Germany of late years have condemned the Prussian administration of Sleswic and urged fairness in dealing with the Danes, not one has been known to advocate a division according to nationality and the return to Denmark of the northern districts. All appear to agree that wherever the German flag has once been raised it cannot again be hauled down.

If such, then, are the ideal and the goal, pretexts will easily be found. The arguments advanced in justification of the annexation of Sleswic, and its political sequel, may be grouped under the following heads: (1) geographical, (2) ethnical, (3) historico-political, and (4) cultural.

I. THE GEOGRAPHICAL ARGUMENT.

Sleswic, it is asserted, is needed to "round off" the domains of the empire. It is part of the German mainland, a continuation northward of German Holstein, no natural barrier of any kind separating the "twin duchies." No geographical line can be drawn between the two nationalities, which, furthermore, largely overlap, making any scheme of division impracticable.

This, were it true, would seem a somewhat artificial defense of forbidding the singing of Danish songs and the wearing of Danish colors. Moreover, is not the division of populations on geographical lines a device which might with profit be relegated

among the relics of a past age? But a glance at the map will convince any unprejudiced observer that it is not so. Sleswic is an integral part of the Cimbrian peninsula, the southward extension of Danish Jutland, field joining to field and forests being cut into halves where the political ditch has been dug. And as to the narrow belt where Danish and German meet — let the majority rule. Such a line of demarkation would not only be theoretically just, but also easy of determination and practically well defined, as witness the percentage map inserted above.

II. THE ETHNICAL ARGUMENT.

But, it has been alleged, racially the people are Germans; the Sleswicians are Low Germans like the Holsteinians.

This is the plea of ignorance, betraying an utter lack of acquaintance with real conditions, and scarcely worth refuting. As Sleswic geographically is part of Jutland, so its people ethnically and linguistically belong to the same stock as the northern Jutes — *i. e.*, they are Danes, Scandinavians, in racial traits and in speech. In rural North Sleswic this stock is absolutely pure; the family tree of the Dane has no branches pointing southward. And even south of the Sleswic "Mason and Dixon line" the population still exhibits all the marks of an essentially Danish origin — the facial characteristics, the patronymics. The North Sleswic popular idiom is chemically free from German admixtures; and the place-names — those incorruptible witnesses — throughout the length and breadth of the land are hopelessly Danish, though ofttimes caricatured almost beyond identification by Prussian spelling reformers. And those grand old monuments, the rune stones, of which several have been unearthed in the southernmost part of the province, bear mute but unimpeachable testimony to the fact that nine hundred years ago this country was Danish and Danish men were engaged in the same struggle, with the same foe, for the maintenance of their land and their language.

III. THE HISTORICO-POLITICAL ARGUMENT.

Germany has a historic right to Sleswic, it is claimed.

Since from the dawn of history down to 1864 Sleswic has

never for a single day passed out of actual possession of the Danish crown, this right must be of a different nature from that claimed to Alsace-Lorraine — German territory reverting to the mother-country after a long period of estrangement. Behind the phrase "historic right" there lurks in reality another idea. It is charged that Denmark through misrule and abuse of her German wards forfeited her title to the province, and that the Danish population is now simply being paid back in coin of Denmark's own mintage — with interest added.

Does one wrong, then, justify another? Must punishment be meted out to innocent people for mistakes committed by their government in years gone by? If this rule were to hold, where would the Germans themselves be today?

But as to the facts in the matter, let these things be noted:

It is true that for long centuries Sleswic was treated as a step-child in the Danish household. Ever since the times of Charlemagne a buffer against German aggressions, it suffered the fate of all border provinces. Away back in the Middle Ages the kings of Denmark sliced it up into fiefs for younger sons to keep them from plotting against the throne. Matrimonial alliances between these and the Holstein counts led to close political relations; and thus the trouble began. In course of time a sort of quasi-sovereignty was obtained by the Sleswic dukes, more or less reluctantly acknowledged by their Danish suzerains. Constant intrigues and family feuds added fuel to the flame. Aided by the old historic doctrine of the "inseparableness" of Sleswic and Holstein, a strong separatistic sentiment — the so-called "Sleswic-Holsteinism" — developed, aiming at independence under the protectorate of the North German Confederation, to which Holstein, though a part of the Danish monarchy, belonged since 1815. These aspirations were winked at by Germany; and finally in 1848 the Danish government, which by its indifference had so long been sowing the wind of particularism, reaped the whirlwind of open rebellion. It took three years to quell the insurrection; and the fire of discontent still smoldered in the ashes. In 1864 the separatists hailed Germany as liberator and fought valiantly under her banner.

Bismarck, however, instead of setting up another German petty state, preferred to keep the spoils.

During all these vicissitudes the Danes in North Sleswic had remained steadfastly loyal. Placed in the unenviable position of having to protect themselves at once against the obtrusions of an inflated Sleswic-Holsteinism, on one side, and the deplorable consequences of systematic neglect at the hands of the rulers at Copenhagen, on the other, they never for a moment wavered in their fidelity to their national traditions. But with their every right ignored by their own government; with German established as the official language of central Sleswic, even where the Germans were in absolute minority; and with the officials all German-trained at Kiel, German-speaking, and German-sympathizing, the result became inevitable: Low German speech and German sentiment crept slowly, stealthily northward.

It was not until the beginning of the past century that Danish statesmen grew alarmed at this situation. Decrees were issued designed to arrest the invasion. But, the local authorities failing to co-operate, these soon became dead letters. Fifty years later, at the close of the rebellion, they were revived and amended, and stringent measures were adopted looking to their enforcement.

The substance of these rescripts was that in the purely German districts German, and in the purely Danish, Danish, should be exclusively used; in the mixed districts, where Danish was "spoken by the populace," this language was to be employed in the instruction of the children, who were to have four hours weekly of German; and alternately with German in the churches. At the same time, the Sleswic-Holsteinian officials were replaced by Danes, and special governmental organs were created for the province, independently of Holstein.

This arrangement seems fair on its face, and there was an unquestionable intention that it should be fairly carried out. However, the clause, "where Danish is spoken by the populace," presented a loophole for any who might be disposed to take advantage of it. As a matter of fact, by the construction put upon it by certain over-zealous administrators, whose patriotism

got the better of their discretion, Danish was made church and school language in several districts where it was spoken by a minority only, contrary to the spirit of the ordinances. Thus in Angeln, whose originally Danish population had become alienated as a consequence of the purblind policy of the Danish government, an attempt was made to regain the lost ground upon the same principle as is now underlying the German propaganda in Alsace-Lorraine. The tenability of this "historic right" dogma may well be drawn in question. In Sleswic, at any rate, the mistakes it fostered were few and of short duration. Neither in point of time and extension of territory, nor in severity, can a parallel justly be drawn between the acts of the Danish government in those days and the coercive measures of the present Prussian régime. This is openly admitted by unbiased Germans. It was for voicing this conviction that Professor Delbrück was disciplined. "What the Danes then did in Sleswic," he wrote, "was mere child's play compared with the violence with which we ourselves now rule that country." A glance at the appended map—which is self-explanatory—will demonstrate how true to the facts this statement is. From a Danish Tillisch in 1851 to a German von Köller in 1899 is a pretty far cry.

Yet, mistakes were made—and realized. Already in 1852 the language ordinances were amended. An honest effort was made to incorporate such provisions as would "insure perfect equality and efficient protection to both Danish and German nationalities." According to the new rescript, all laws and administrative announcements were to be promulgated in both languages; in the legislature, all communications by the government were to be read, and all debates reported, in both, while the deputies were at liberty to use either. All departments of the administration, secular and ecclesiastical, as well as the court of appeal, were subject to the same rule, and all examinations of candidates for office were to be conducted in Danish and German both. In regard to the "mixed" districts, Danish was made the language of the school, but with a liberal provision for instruction in German; while in the churches the two languages were to alternate, and in the local courts of justice the use of either was permitted at the choice of the defendant.

MAP II.

COMPARING THE DANISH LANGUAGE ARRANGEMENT OF 1851 WITH THE PRUSSIAN ARRANGEMENT OF TODAY.



Danish administrative, church, school, court language.

Mixed Danish and German administrative, church, school, court language.

German administrative, church, school, court language.

THE DANISH ARRANGEMENT OF 1850–51.

Danish popular language.

Mixed Danish and Low German popular language.

Low German popular language.

Mixed Low German and Frisian popular language.

ACTUAL LANGUAGE CONDITIONS 1864.

German administrative, school, and court language.

THE PRUSSIAN ARRANGEMENT OF 1888.

Could a more liberal, a more uniformly just, scheme have been devised? Where else in the world, in countries of mixed races and languages, did then—do now—similar conditions prevail? What other European nation has in modern times shown such toleration, such magnanimity, toward its foreign, hostile elements? Certainly not Germany. And yet Germans never tire of upbraiding Denmark and the Danes for what they did in Sleswic prior to 1864, which, they say, by the law of retribution, played the province into their hands—to have and to hold!

IV. THE CULTURAL ARGUMENT.

It has always been a favorite theory with a large class of German expansionists that, the two cultures being essentially alike—with the superiority rather on the side of the German—once the Danes in North Sleswic made up their minds to bow to the inevitable and become Germans in speech and thought, they would find the transition comparatively easy and in every way to their advantage. The annexation of Sleswic being an accomplished fact, they argue, and one not likely ever to be reversed, the population has everything to lose and nothing to gain by a continued clinging to their Danish traditions, when they might, with hardly any effort on their part, become sharers in the glories of Germany's greatness. To them the relation of Danish to German culture is very much the same as that of Dutch or Flemish—a sort of offshoot or satellite, whose insistence upon separate maintenance is nothing but sheer folly.

This argument would not be without weight, provided the premises hold. Recent history has clearly demonstrated the existence of vast numbers of enlightened and liberal-thinking people the world over viewing with equanimity or open approbation the consequences of a war waged by a stronger against a weaker power, on the theory that the success of its arms would be in the interest of a broad civilization and to the ultimate benefit of the conquered nation itself. To others it would seem as if the prevailing sentiment, expressed "in indubitable manner and constantly"—to quote Prince Bismarck—of a given population ought at any time to decide its political dependence,

regardless of geographical, ethnical, or historical affinities; and that the integrity of any nation capable of independence ought ideally to be safeguarded against attacks from without, and the right acknowledged of any part of such nation, forcibly cut loose from the mother-stem, to cherish a hope of, and by fair means work for, a reunion.

However, this may be debatable ground. In the meantime the burden of proof respecting Denmark as an intellectual dependency rests with the Germans. So far no evidence has been forthcoming. The best-informed among them concede the impossibility of furnishing it, the contention itself being untenable.

Nothing in reality could be farther from the truth. In a brief glance at the various aspects of the national culture of the Danes, let us first look at—

1. *The language.*—Here the analogy from Holland—which, by the way, has never shown any pronounced anxiety to join its fortune with that of the Prussian household—will be found to be no analogy at all, because, while Dutch sustains a similar relation to German as, say, Portuguese to Spanish, Danish can with no more right be regarded as a branch of German than English could be classed as a Romance language on account of the Latin elements it contains.

True, the two are akin. Both spring from the same Gothic parent-stem. Many roots they have in common. A direct descendant of Old Norse, Danish was more than the other Scandinavian idioms exposed to Germanic influences owing to adjacency of territory and close commercial relations. This propinquity has naturally left its mark on the vocabulary of the language. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when it was as yet in its swaddling-clothes as a literary medium, the indifference of a semi-German court and a foreign-bred aristocracy caused it to be swamped by a flood of German and French importations. Although this current was dammed before it had wrought irremediable havoc, it goes without saying that the elements thus absorbed during its formative stages became so deeply ingrained in its very organism that later attempts at

eradication have proved an extremely arduous task. Anglo-Saxon purifiers of the English tongue will appreciate this difficulty. While the weeding-out process is continually going on, led by able linguists and men of letters, German loan-words still abound, clad in Danish garb and naturalized. It would thus be futile to deny that the Danish language is indebted to its German neighbor; but it is not the indebtedness of a child to a mother or even an older sister; rather that to a midwife and a nurse.

The two are akin. But between modern High German and Danish, as it is today spoken and written by the educated classes, there is a wide gulf of differences in form and structure, in sound and genius. The Danish sentence construction is simple and direct as in English, not involved and labored like the German. Danish is rounded and smooth, with a tendency to slur and a strong predilection for soft consonants; German is rugged and pebbly, inclined toward hardness, harshness. In consonance with the national character of the two peoples, Danish is supple and conversationally easy — lyrically tender; German stiff and majestic, rhetorically ponderous — epically stirring. In the armory of dialectics Danish supplies the rapier of irony, German the war-club of pathos. Danish has been called the most subdued language in the world; the very core of German is robustness and force. German is an Alpine torrent, Danish a serene brook. The storm-swept pines of the Black Forest breathe through the German's songs; the lyre of the Dane is tuned by the balmy breeze from the beech woods of his low, green isles.

Which of the two offers the better vehicle for the expression of thoughts and feelings, in verse and prose, must remain a matter of individual taste. In any comparison allowance must be made for the national equation. Either is indissolubly wedded to, and must be seen in the light of, at the same time that it reflects, the national character which forged it. No touchstone has as yet been discovered for testing the relative merits of different languages as bearers of culture other than the degree of adequacy to which the products of culture have found utterance in them and through their medium been made accessible to all who master them. But the Dane who should venture the asser-

tion that his mother-tongue is fully the equal of German in that respect would probably not be sharply criticised by anyone familiar with the literatures in both.

2. *The literature.*—In drawing parallels in the literary field it must be remembered how seriously handicapped is the author writing in a language understood by but a few million people. Beyond the narrow confines of his native state known, if at all, through translations only, in whose approximations the essence of his stylistic individuality — so intimately bound up with the medium of expression — is always volatilized and often entirely lost, he enters the arena under conditions making a full appreciation next to impossible. Taking due account of this fact, it may well be questioned whether, aside from the three great language areas — English, French, and German — any nation, irrespective of size, has ever unfolded a more prolific and variegated, yet withal original and strong, literary activity than this little people numbering barely two million and a half. True, Denmark has not produced a Shakespeare. Neither has Germany. But Oehlenschläger, the greatest literary genius of the North, though inferior to Goethe in versatility and depth, has created works which in poetic qualities and mastery of language will bear comparison with those of the Weimar statesman-poet. The playwright Holberg, who in the eighteenth century became the founder of the Danish stage, has no rival in Germany in dramatic force and caustic wit.

The "golden age" of Danish literature, covering the last decades of the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century, like that of Germany coincided with a period of political distress and economic depression. To the generations of brilliant writers, of the then prevailing romantic school, which sprang up in those years, inspired by national ideals and extending over the whole range of literary categories, belong, besides that of Oehlenschläger, such names as Ewald and Baggesen, Grundtvig and Ingemann, Heiberg and Hertz, Hauch and Paludan-Müller, Steen Blicher and Goldschmidt, Aarestrup and Christian Winther — names all of which would be classed among the best in the literature of any country.

Of all Danish authors the most widely known is, however, Hans Christian Andersen, not so much because of the especial greatness of his genius — Denmark has produced greater poets — as owing to its peculiar quality, rendering his works in an eminent sense cosmopolitan and his place in the world-literature one of absolute uniqueness. His fairy-tales have been translated into a score of languages and are read by every American child.

In more recent years the novelist J. P. Jacobsen has revealed to the reading world the polish and pliability of the Danish language as a literary tool. No writer has handled it with greater skill, none with such infinite tenderness. His two volumes are linguistic as well as literary milestones. Being utterly untranslatable, foreigners have learned Danish solely in order to read him ; while in Germany several prosaists of the younger school are admittedly influenced by his style.

The songs of Drachmann, "the bard of the sea," reverberate throughout the sea-encircled plains of Denmark, and far beyond. Modern Germany can point to no lyricist of his talent or originality.

Georg Brandes, the æsthetician, whose fervent enthusiasm, the astounding sweep and penetrating keenness of whose lucid intellect, and whose unswerving devotion to his cause in the face of thirty years' ruthless opposition have left their indelible imprint upon the present generation, not only of writers, but of all spiritually interested men and women, in Scandinavia and in ever-widening circles in other lands ; who has liberated, in that he has liberalized, literary — and, through reaction, to an appreciable degree political — Denmark from the bondage of conservatism and stagnation — is universally recognized as the greatest living critic. It is to be regretted that so few of his works have been translated into English. His *William Shakespeare*, however, is found on the shelves of every student of the Stratford sage. Brandes, while freely acknowledging his indebtedness to the literature and philosophy of the Germans — with whom his works are extremely popular, and who have made repeated attempts to appropriate him as one of their own — like modern Danish writers generally, does not conceal his preference for French spirit and French *belles-lettres*.

In this connection probably the Norwegians Björnson and Ibsen ought to be mentioned. Norway may, in a sense, be said to belong to the Danish culture area. The cultural development of the two nations, after their political separation in 1814, has followed closely parallel lines; the literary language of Norway is still prevailingly Danish, and the works of her leading authors are published in Copenhagen, which remains the intellectual center of Scandinavia. Excepting Tolstoï and Zola, no littérateur of today enjoys a wider international reputation than the two great Norwegians. Everybody in America has heard of them, and multitudes have read one or another of their books. In Germany Ibsen especially has exerted a powerful influence upon contemporary thought and fiction, which is being ungrudgingly admitted on all sides.

3. *Science.*—In the domain of science Denmark has always kept pace with the world's progress, and in not a few instances has contributed notably to its advancement. The University of Copenhagen holds high rank among European institutions of learning, both as a professional school and as the home of scholars eminent in original research. Of names too many for enumeration a few only of the most prominent must be mentioned. It was the Danish astronomer Tycho Brahe upon whose observations Kepler based his laws; it was the Dane Ole Römer who first measured the velocity of light; it was the Danish physicist Oersted who discovered electro-magnetism, thereby paving the way for Morse's telegraph. The sciences of geology and archæology were founded in Denmark by Steno (Steensen) and Worsaae, respectively. In recent years the introduction by a Danish scientist of the ecological method has revolutionized the study of botany. Rasmus Rask has been called the father of comparative philology; after him Madvig attained world-wide fame for his work in the classical languages. Among philosophers Kierkegaard, Martensen, and Höffding are known in America. Around the name of the first-mentioned—a strikingly original thinker—a whole literature has of late years grown up in Germany.

The fine arts.—Here it is sufficient to remind of the fact that

Denmark was the birth-place of Thorvaldsen, the most famous sculptor in modern times. Pervading all the works of this great artist, however much influenced by classical models, "there was something essentially Danish, something taken from the blood of his nation, which was thus made to circulate through the veins of Europe," writes Julius Lange, the distinguished art critic. A worthy representative of contemporary Danish art was known to Americans in the person of the late Rohl-Smith, the talented young sculptor whose unfinished Sherman statue in Washington is declared by connoisseurs to be one of the finest monuments in the United States. Also an important and virile national school of painting is flourishing in Denmark, comprising many names of continental renown, conspicuous among which is that of Kröyer, easily the peer, and supposedly the superior, of any living German painter. At the same time, the artistic instinct has penetrated every layer of the population, systematically encouraged by the national and municipal authorities, as well as by private munificence, which in Denmark, as in Europe generally, seeks a favorite outlet in this particular field. The Danish Carnegie, a Copenhagen brewer, has donated to his native city art treasures worth millions.

5. *The press.*—The press of Denmark is thoroughly modern in spirit and a power that must be reckoned with. In proportion to population, it has nearly twice the circulation of that of any other country. Four-fifths of all the newspapers are affiliated with the democratic parties—affording in this a striking contrast to journalistic conditions in Germany.

Among Danish journalists one name stands out in bold relief, viz., that of Hörup, Denmark's greatest political genius. This thoroughbred, uncompromising radical, in his speeches as member of Parliament, but especially in his masterful daily leaders in his paper, the *Politiken*, in which he developed a style peculiarly his own—absolutely devoid of invectives, but relying solely upon the effect of irony and satire—for twenty-five years waged incessant war against the forces of reaction and militarism, thereby contributing more than any other single person to the political renaissance of his people; only to suffer the pathetic fate

of so many great leaders—dying at the verge of the wilderness, in view of the promised land they burned their lives out striving for. German journalism, past and present, can boast no talent such as Hörup's.

6. *Popular education.*—While the ability to read and write may not be accepted as a decisive criterion for the diffusion of education among the masses of a people, an entire absence of illiteracy can but be counted to its credit. This is the condition in Denmark today. Elementary education has been free and compulsory since 1814. Her public-school system equals, if it does not excel, that of any other European country, and in certain respects compares favorably with that of the United States.

But the popular demand for knowledge is not satisfied herewith. What are known as "people's high schools" (*Folkehöjskoler*), to the number of about 150, have been established in all parts of the land. This typically Danish form of secondary schools—which has been copied to some extent by Sweden and Norway, but is without counterpart elsewhere in the world—originated about the middle of the last century with the prelate-poet-reformer Grundtvig, and is primarily intended for the rural youth; and here thousands of young men during the winter months, and of women in summer, broaden their education and view of life by popular courses, principally in the natural sciences, history, and literature. Characteristic also is the fact that the *Frem*, a periodical for popularized science, in the first year of its existence obtained 80,000 subscribers. The educational and philanthropic activities of the Liberal Students' Society of Copenhagen—in leading, free of cost, largely attended classes and publishing, at a nominal price, series of pamphlets for the instruction of workingmen desirous of extending their knowledge along special lines, and in giving free legal advice to, and conducting the cases of, multitudes of poor people—have served as models for similar institutions in various parts of Europe.

7. *Politics.*—The Danish farmers are an intelligent, self-reliant, prosperous race, in an eminent sense the bone and sinew of the nation. In social and political development they are fully fifty years ahead of the bulk of their German neigh-

bors, and as a class it may well be doubted whether they have any equals anywhere. Thoroughly imbued with the spirit of democracy and home-rule, their interest in politics is intense. In their local administrative councils they train themselves in parliamentarian functions, and enter the larger field of national politics skilled in debate and tactics. Of the members of the lower house (*Folkething*) of Parliament (*Rigsdag*) one-half are practical farmers, many of them men of marked ability. A plain farmer holds the portfolio of minister of agriculture in the present Liberal cabinet.

The constitution of 1849 guarantees free institutions, universal suffrage, and equality for all before the law. Its original framers meant it to be one of the freest in Europe. Its spirit was, however, perverted and its intentions largely thwarted by the tenacious resistance of the conservative interests—the landed proprietors and the bureaucracy—that held the reins of power and for thirty years defied the will of an overwhelming majority of the people. No other nation, perhaps, would peaceably have submitted to a rule by such absurdly small a minority or to such flagrant violations of constitutional rights. The Danes, patient and persistent as they are, confined their warfare to parliamentarian maneuvers. An opportunistic alliance was formed against the common foe by the Left and Social Democratic parties. Every new election thinned the ranks of the reactionaries. Finally, in July of last year, when the number of Rightist representatives in the Folkething had dwindled down to 8 (out of a total of 114)—of whom 1 (out of 11) from the city of Copenhagen, their old-time stronghold—they had come to the end of their tether, and old King Christian bowed to the inevitable by appointing a cabinet of radicals—sons of the people. The victory, late in arriving, was the more decisive and amounted in reality to a bloodless revolution. Under the firm pilotage of the present government the Danish ship of state has been successfully launched upon the sea of political progress, and the Danish people will henceforth take their place in the front rank of nations in which the problems of modern democracy are being worked out.

8. *Economic conditions.*—After the disastrous war of 1864 the Danes beat their swords into plowshares. Their every nerve was strained toward recovering within what had been lost without. How well they have succeeded may partially be judged from the following data:

The population has increased until now it is equal to that of the whole monarchy before the loss of the duchies. Besides this, a surplus contingent of some 200,000 has during these years sought new homes across the ocean, where they have become a thrifty, progressive element in the community wherever they have settled, in fullest accord with American sentiment and institutions, through a process of natural, elective adaptation.

A tract of heaths and moors equivalent to one-tenth of the entire area of the country has been converted into grain-fields and plantations. Methods of agriculture have been modernized, processes rationalized, new markets opened up. The co-operative system has almost entirely supplanted individual enterprise, tending to make the farmers independent of outside capital. Co-operative dairies, slaughter-houses, consumers' societies, savings banks, insurance associations, experiment farms, stock-improving centers, literally litter the land—all managed by the farmers themselves. It is the boast of the Danes that they lead the world in agriculture. "There is no country in Europe that produces so much food as Denmark in reference to population or to area, the ratio being higher than that of the United States and more than double the general European ratio."[1] Danish dairy products hold a supremacy on the English market,[2] and everywhere command the highest prices. Only 8 per cent. of the land is owned by landlords, and the number of landless cottagers is decreasing year by year, thanks to a judicious system of parcellation supervised by the government.

Next to England, Denmark has the greatest per capita wealth of any country in the world. Practically half the popu-

[1] Mulhall. Most of the figures on which the statements in this section are based have been taken from MULHALL, *Handbook of Statistics.*

[2] The value of the export of Danish butter to Great Britain alone rose from $3,836,000 in 1870 to $40,146,000 in 1900 (= $18 per capita of the population).

lation has savings-bank accounts, the average deposit being higher than that of any other European nation. The national debt is relatively small, the per capita amount being about equal to that of the United States; and the national finances rest on a thoroughly sound basis, the income covering the expenditures. An important asset are the 1,800 miles of railroad, nearly all owned and operated by the state.

Denmark shares with New Zealand the distinction of being the first to introduce a general system of old-age pensions.

The workingmen of Denmark have formed powerful trades unions, as ready, perhaps, to make terms with capital as those of any other country in Europe. Wages generally range higher than elsewhere on the continent; and the principle of arbitration of labor disputes has been legislatively recognized. Though predominatingly of socialistic tendencies, the large labor party has taken its place among parliamentary factions, and, under able and opportunistic leaders, has become a strong factor in politics.

Conditions of soil, in connection with an absolute absence of raw materials, rendering agriculture the chief occupation and source of wealth of her people, one would not look for important industrial interests in Denmark. However, Copenhagen is rapidly developing into a manufacturing center. At her shipyards are built most of the vessels of the home merchant marine and of the Danish war fleet, besides lately also men-of-war for foreign nations. Of other industries of more than local significance may be mentioned the Danish art-industrial articles and the Copenhagen porcelain, which by virtue of original design and artistic execution have gained a high reputation in the marts of the world.

But that the commercial spirit has not been slumbering is evidenced by the fact that the tonnage of the merchant navy has trebled since 1870, and now surpasses that of such an old sea-faring nation as Holland and is more than half as large as Russia's; while the Danish United Steamship Company in respect to number of vessels is the largest in the world. The Great Northern Telegraph Company, covering northern and eastern Asia with its network of wires, is a Danish enterprise. Late years

have witnessed a notable stimulation of Danish shipping interests, which have resolutely entered the field of trans-oceanic competition, tending to vindicate for Copenhagen, backed by her excellent new free port, her historic position as the commercial center of the Baltic.

It will thus be seen that in the economic progress of the last decades Denmark has not lagged behind. Side by side with, but independent of, the phenomenal growth of German commerce and industry, her own development has been the more remarkable since it has been accomplished in spite of—or because of?—a low-tariff policy, in marked contrast to the dominant ideals of the German empire, whose protectionistic barriers have practically closed the German market to Danish products. As modern Denmark more and more looks to Anglo-Saxon models in politics and social reform, so commercial conditions have steadily served to strengthen the ties uniting her with her kinsfolk across the sea.

Here the case may rest. Can a people such as this be classed among the decadent nations of the world? Can it be justly charged with being on that downward grade which must needs end in extinction or oblivion? The facts above enumerated will not bear out such theory. Reduced to a footnote in the text-books on geography, to a pigmy among countries, Denmark is today a factor, stronger than ever before, in the world's intellectual advancement.

Left to herself, she will keep her place in the van. At peace with her neighbors, with nothing to fear from an outward foe, she will continue to progress along lines of democratic culture and enlightened liberality. Hers is not a dying race; her culture not in decay.

For years after the war, while yet bleeding from many wounds, there were resentment and bitterness in her feelings toward Germany. That was but natural. Germany was the hereditary enemy; her unjustified attack and later breach of faith were not apt to make Danes adore her name—or the spirit making such things possible. Quietly Denmark cherished the

hope of reunion with North Sleswic—perhaps through a general settlement of outstanding scores demanded by voices mightier than hers. And if she quietly prepared herself for her part in the drama, who will blame her?

But gradually the conviction grew upon a small group of Liberals that this unfriendly attitude was fraught with political peril. While not favoring Germans as Germans, they were mindful of the kinship between the two nations, and of Denmark's manifold indebtedness to her great neighbor; they perceived the folly of this traditional ill-feeling; they realized the necessity of Germany's good-will for Denmark's future safety.

They spoke and they wrote.[1] The gospel they preached was not a popular one, and they were branded as unpatriotic. But they persevered. They denounced the building of fortifications and armor-clads. "What is the use," Hörup asked year after year, "of throwing our poor millions into the jaws of an insatiable militarism? We cannot hope to defend ourselves." He was cried down as a coward. But he persevered.

Increasing numbers saw that he was right. His negative "What's the use?" with its sober, forsaken sound, from the watchword of a faction became the slogan of a party. Now Hörup is dead. But he lived just long enough to witness the triumph of the two causes for which he had fought so nobly—a government for and by the people, and the realization by his country that its rôle as a military power was forever at an end. Today the "traitor" is recognized as the truest of patriots, and

[1] GEORG BRANDES, in an article entitled "Denmark and Germany," published in *Contemporary Review*, July, 1899, makes reference to this movement, in which he himself was one of the leading spirits. MISS SARAH E. SIMONS, in her article "Social Assimilation" (AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, May, 1901, p. 809), in referring to conditions in Sleswic quotes Dr. Brandes as authority for the statement that "the Danes in Schleswig acquiesced readily in the unjust demands of Germany, and submitted gracefully to their fate. A group of politicians and writers was formed among them to take upon themselves the task of creating sentiment for Germany. What race-antipathy there was soon died out in consequence, and the work of adjustment and assimilation was successfully begun." This rests upon a misapprehension of Dr. Brandes's remarks, which applied to Denmark, not to Sleswic, and is very misleading as to actual conditions. There has never been "acquiescence" in Sleswic, never an attempt by any group to "create sentiment for Germany."

his thoughts are the thoughts of Denmark—not only of liberal and governmental, but largely of military Denmark as well.

Peace with the world, and with Germany first of all, at all costs and for all time to come; an absolute, permanent, guaranteed neutrality, similar to that of Belgium and Switzerland—and possibly with the two great Anglo-Saxon nations as sponsors—with just enough of armament to emphasize, but not to *defend*, it; no "entangling alliances" of any sort with anybody, however tempting the terms, but a consistent keeping aloof from all international embroilments of whatever kind; not too much faith in the saving virtues of matrimonial unions with heads of reigning houses; but trust to the future on the basis of an ever-growing inclination among the nations to listen to the dictates of justice in their mutual dealings, and of the universal recognition of Denmark as a factor in the world's aggregate of social and cultural values the elimination of which would mean a loss to the whole—these are the lines along which will be drawn up the program for Denmark's future foreign politics.

And as to Sleswic, the Danish people have not abandoned the hope that justice will yet prevail. They do not desire a reunion through the defeat and humiliation of Germany in a general European war; such a solution of the question would render the future forever insecure. But they watch with expectancy for every sign of the spread of wiser and more humane ideas among her people, which in due time may ripen into a recognition of the wrong done and a demand for its rectification through a *voluntary* restoration to Denmark of what, by every moral law, is hers. By such a course Germany would gain in Denmark—and through her in all Scandinavia—a firm and grateful friend, and in the world at large a host of true admirers.

Sane counsel has won the day in Denmark. Loyally she accepts the situation created by the war. The *de facto* government of Sleswic she acknowledges as the *de jure* rulers. This is politics. But above the exigencies of politics loom the demands of equity. There are Germans enough who deplore, and are willing to admit it, the tactics of the Prussian government in North Sleswic, and who ardently wish for a cessation of the age-

long, unnatural enmity between the two related peoples. These should not forget how infinitely difficult the present mode of administration has rendered the task of those who in Denmark urge conciliation and amity. When every approach on the part of Denmark is met by a fresh outrage in Sleswic, it is small wonder that the advocates of friendly relations sometimes halt and hesitate. The rapid abatement of the indignation caused by the expulsion policy among large classes of Germans, coupled with certain later developments, has warned the Danish people against being too sanguine in their reliance on German public sentiment.

Naturally, then, they turn to the outside world. With as strong a voice as the weaker, who knows himself to be in the right, can command in addressing the stronger, Denmark will say to Germany: "Be just! Do not stoop to measures unworthy of a great people and a civilized nation!" And in this she desires and hopes for the moral support of all liberal-thinking, liberty-loving individuals the world over. Humanity cannot afford to view with indifference such measures of suppressing a nationality as are now being employed against the Danes in North Sleswic, who are bound and gagged and treated like a band of criminals for no worse fault than their refusal to abandon their language and their national traditions. The sense of justice of the world at large must be invoked, must step in, must speak to the conscience of the German nation, in terms so unambiguous that every German cheek reddens with the blush of shame.

The United States of America have entered the arena of international politics. Their mighty voice will be heard with increasing frequency in the councils of the nations; and, wherever heard, it will be heeded. By their magnanimous treatment of Cuba they have pointed the way and set a precedent that is bound to be of far-reaching importance. More and more, in years to come, will every oppressed, downtrodden people on the face of the globe look to liberal America for sympathy and succor.

With the object of placing before an American public the facts in one such case of international injustice, these pages have been written.

LOUIS WARMING.

CHICAGO.

THE SOCIAL WILL.

Is it simply one more evidence of human conceit that at the present time thought about anything whatsoever, and the expression of thought, seem to involve greater difficulty and complexity than ever before? About this seeming there certainly can be no doubt. The thinker has to be so subtle and so versatile now, so gifted with all the arts of human skill. As if a trickster, he must keep so many balls in the air at once; as if a horseman, he must drive so many steeds; he must find the single resultant of so many forces and counter-forces. In the past, when men had only to do what was set before them, and express the simple thoughts that a simple life engendered, all this doubting and balancing, this strenuous effort and wearing suspense of our time, were plainly quite unknown. The past, I say, at least appears to have been very simple and easy and natural; but the present—was ever a more perplexing, uncompromising maze?

And when one turns to society and inquires about its nature, and tries to solve some of the mysteries of its activity, one's envy of the thinkers and writers of years gone by knows no bounds. And yet why look back? All too soon the past will be ours, the past and the ease of it. Our fathers and forefathers have gone to their reward, and this, perhaps, if the difficulties they seem to have escaped were, after all, really theirs, is to be measured by the envy that we feel. Moreover, we of today can hardly expect great assistance in our troubles from the ease, the relative ease, the apparent ease, of their activity. Living and thinking may be hard today, but today, not yesterday, we are living and thinking.

So, without more ado, with full intent of care and effort however difficult, and, above all, with the sobriety and seriousness of independence, what is the social will?

This exacting question falls at once into two parts, giving in consequence two fundamental questions instead of one: *What is society?* and *What is will?* and, although division of a sub-

ject and multiplication of its fundamental questions are treated by some as the limits of attainment for the investigations of men, I am going to venture upon answers to these two questions, and at the close to suggest what may be the nature of the will of society and what the consequences in an understanding of human affairs.

What is society? An organism.[1] But definitions in single words are always dangerous, involving, as they do and must, new meanings for the words employed. Thus society is not an organism exactly as anything else is; the patient amœba, for example, or the elephant or the octopus or even the individual person. Was ever anything describable in literally the same way as anything else? Some men, I know, have thought so and have fallen into the pits of wordy controversy for their mistake. Society, then, is an organism only if the word may have a reasonable enjoyment of the common right—I do not say the license—of all words—the right of extended application, the right at once of deepened meaning and wider scope. Society is an organism, not because with growth it increases in mass and in complexity of structure and interdependence of parts, nor yet because the whole survives while the parts die; for these at best are only analogies, and superficial at that, and they bring with them points of difference, equally superficial; but because it is a group of beings whose nature is one nature and one with all nature. Do the members of society have constantly to adapt themselves to each other? or, again, to a common environment that is subject in all its manifold phases to the same law, be this physical or psychical or spiritual, or all three together? Then is there a unity of the life of society, just as there is a unity of life in the special sense of biology and evolution; and, in the light of its unity, of the singleness or indivisibility of the total life of its members, society is an organism.

Someone objects that this makes society too large, since one really must draw a line somewhere; one cannot take in everybody. Theoretically—a convenient word—society may be one

[1] *Cf.* a former article, "The Organic Theory of Society — Passing of the Contract Theory," AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, March, 1901.

and all-inclusive, single and organic, embracing all that live and breathe, however far away and however "impossible;" but practically — a very convenient antithesis to theory — how can it be, and who wants it to be? To this there is just one reply, and a very decisive reply. Theory — responsible theory — is only a synonym for candor, and at least in the long run candor is practical.

But let the word "organism" go, and with it also its defense and the consequences of it, whether theoretical or practical. Enough if we get an idea — this idea, which possibly, in the following way of expressing it, will be recognized as one of the deepest convictions of current thinking: society, whatever else is to be said of it, whether describable or not describable as an organism, is immanent in individuality. Not individuals make society or enter into society; individuals *as such* — forgive the mark — are society. In evidence, were evidence necessary, I might appeal to psychology or biology or even theology, but I waste no time with familiar arguments. Moreover, even popular conceptions of today about personal individuality, or about the individuality of social classes, are thoroughly imbued with the idea of immanence. Simply in questions of good and bad conduct, of labor and capital, of learning and ignorance, even of genius and stolidity, social relation is recognized, indirectly when not directly, as an intrinsic part of individuality; not, I say, with danger of tedious repetition, as something that is external to and at times, perhaps, imposed upon individuals, nor yet as something that in any way really conflicts with and may even wholly suppress or destroy individuals, but as something that belongs to individuals and always has a part in their self-realization. The great man is at the acme of individuality; but was there ever political or religious or ethical or intellectual leadership that was not adaptation? or revelation — in any field — that was not inference? or invention — however original — that was not discovery? This is a world in which somehow everything participates in its own making; in which, then, everything — the falling stone perhaps, or the revolving planet, your life or mine, motherhood or kingship, the career of Cæsar or the thought of Immanuel Kant, the victory of Washington or

the mischief of a political boss—has the companionship, and lives by virtue of the companionship, of a larger, a deeper, and a broader and more lasting expression of itself. Society, the sphere of this larger expression, is thus a party to every deed and every thought of the individual. All of which is possibly only to say once more that society is an organism; but we have dismissed the word.

And now try another approach. Who is not familiar with the doctrines of earlier days about society, some of them making individuals primary in the order of nature, and society an afterthought, as if a means at some time devised for selfish ends; and some making, not society the special creation of individuals, but individuals the creatures of society? Whence such doctrines arose and what purposes of man's history they served are interesting inquiries; but they cannot occupy us at this time, and we have, besides, a way of dealing with them and with their entire retinue, that is, to say the least, effective. With as much of dogma as can be allowed in so rationalistic an age, we declare that only realities are really important, and that realities are somehow eternal, equally original or primary, and always contemporary, and, if together so early and so constantly, then more to each other than any ordinary partners; and, with this pronouncement, as if they were some unfriendly spirits confronted by the exorcism of a priest, all questions of mere origin or of mere destiny, of temporal sequence or precedence, take an ignominious flight, and the place is cleared for serious thought. In short—and just this must occupy us—society and individuals, in so far as real at all, are co-real, contemporaneous in origin and contemporaneous in development, and inquiries after their temporal order are impertinent.

But the rare atmosphere of mere theory, which—somewhat after Emerson—is the over-candor of human knowledge, is surrounding us completely; and, before it is too late, we will descend to what Emerson again might call the obscurity or obfuscation of the concrete, by which a dazzling light is diffused or refracted, and so adapted to human eyes. Socialism and individualism are well-known programs in the moral and political activity of

today. Indeed, they represent forces that are recognizable in almost any phase of human life. But now it is very significant that, whatever definite results they may have led to in the way of positive law or social custom or formulated doctrine or personal heroism and achievement, they have always been an inspiration to each other. They have been at once complements and counterparts of each other. Search the pages of history, of economic history or political history, of the history of science or art or morals or religion, and you will always find the two in evidence, if you find either, each giving meaning to the other, each the support and animus of the other. Exactly why this is I do not now undertake to say, nor for the present can we consider the light it may cast on the nature of society and social life; but it does suggest, in a peculiarly forceful way, the dependence for reality of either society or individuality on the other. The child learns to use its legs only if having something to kick and push against, and it would certainly seem as if individuality and society only supplied each other with a resistance of the sort that develops.

My meaning here is not what some are almost sure to imagine. Socialism and individualism are not the alternating swings of a pendulum; their common dependence is not that of mere negative reaction whereby each is again and again given its turn in the course of history; they are contemporaneous forces always. The swinging pendulum view of history, I know, has been and perhaps still is much in favor; it is Spencerian and it is undulatory; but it taxes one's patience greatly. Now individualism; now socialism; now individualism again; and once more socialism; and so on forever and with what futility! Before the coming of Christ irreligion everywhere, then a period of religion; before Luther more irreligion, then religious revival; and yesterday irreligion for a third time, but today or tomorrow all the verities of faith justified once more. What easy history! A child could write it. A child whose vision had never reached farther than the horizon of its birth-place would see in the relations of sun and earth only the swinging of a pendulum; day and night, day and night, day and night; but let it travel ever so

little and learn ever so little, let it start to dig a hole or two toward China, and the thought that there is day always and night always comes into mind, and at once good-by to its swinging-pendulum view of history. But in like manner there is religion always and there is irreligion always, religion being more than anybody's *credo* or any era's ritual, exactly as the day is more than the light on anybody's birth-place, and the irreligion being only the never-silent witness that religion is more. And there is socialism always and individualism always, society being more than either the programs or the institutions of any time, and individuality being the constant force that keeps society more. Why, if the teachers of rhetoric will allow me, I must express the wish that the pendulum historians now surviving at once set aside their frocks, assume man's attire, travel beyond the hills of their childhood's day and night, think a while, and then take to riding another horse. To any who can see only religion or only irreligion in any people or class of people or at any time, or—as of more direct concern here—who see only socialism or only individualism, there is, I think, no better advice than this: Start a hole to China. The hole will never get there, but their minds may.

So, again, we are impressed with the idea that society and individuality are not two realities, exclusive and independent, but one, or, if possibly two, so inseparable, being spatially and temporally concomitant, as to be only formally two, as to be virtually one; and this idea involves a very fruitful conception of society. Thus it carries with it certain definite conclusions about the social consciousness, and about the history and progress of society, and about the functions of the many social institutions; and, more than all, it implies a particular view of the social will. Before turning to this view, however, or to any of those other matters, we shall do well to consider the second of our two fundamental questions.

In general, what is will? Adaptive activity that is at once conscious of its meaning and constrained by its consciousness. Creatures of will know what they are doing and are impelled in what they do to enact or apply what they know. Of course, this

idea is not everybody's, but it is well in line with recent criticism. It sweats and pants with the effort of really modern thinking; for, apart from the mere complexity of the subject-matter, nothing meets with more of the conflict between sentiment and fact than the problem of will. The evolution hypothesis, never before in the history of man taken so seriously as now, has in the first place made man really one with nature, and then has flooded the study of human conduct with all sorts of disturbing facts and theories. Micro-organisms act so and so, but always mechanically; anthropods show peculiarities of phototaxis, which is sometimes negative and sometimes positive; and, the animal world over, tropisms with only mechanical determinations, heliotropism perhaps, or some other, are the rule, the law. Inheritance is chemical; generation and embryonic development and birth, to say no more of the life after birth, are mechanical. And, without wishing to pose as a prophet, I should say that the worst is not yet, for certainly anti-vitalism is today a thriving youth whose future can hardly be behind him. Then what of human conduct, man and nature being one? And particularly what of will? Can man by taking thought throw off the weight of all this modern mechanicalism, and so retain the freedom and independence which so often he has claimed for himself? For the last question I think not decidedly, since, under the same microscopes and under the same methods of inspection generally, man would develop with amazing facility the same tropisms and, in all he did, fall under the same chemistry and the same mechanics; nay, he has already done so. Some of my scientific friends, for an extreme example, would even have it that before science man is positively phototactic; before philosophy, of course the brighter light, negatively phototactic; and this is an interesting tropism certainly, and generally true and illustrative also, since in its case, as in so many other cases, unaccountable exceptions do assert themselves. But, again, with the mechanicalism retained, what of man's will?

Well, nobody can deny the fact of adaptation, and no scientist, it is certain, could ever wish to deny it, if for no other reason, because mechanicalism requires adaptation. And, sec-

ondly, nobody can deny — at least in the case of man — the fact of consciousness. Moreover, thirdly, if we may trust psychology, consciousness is always incident to existing activity, it is always an accompaniment of what is doing, and in its meaning or content is determined by the conditions of what is doing. Consciousness is no message from another world, whether as a mere memory out of a dead past or as a present perception of wholly external things, or as a sudden vision of an unborn, unrelated future; in its content and in its function it is here and now, even its memories and its foresights being relations of the present. If we may even speak of it at all as a thing by itself — the abstraction and the special name being perhaps necessary for description — it is so essential to the activity that it inseparably accompanies as to be at once conditioned by and always conditioning that activity. In summary, then, these are the facts with which we of today have to deal: adaptation; consciousness; and activity, that is adaptive of course, to which consciousness is vital, of which consciousness is no indifferent, gratuitous, epi-phenomenal accompaniment; and upon these facts the foregoing definition of will is based. Will is, to repeat, *adaptive activity that is at once conscious of its meaning and constrained by its consciousness.*

But not free will? Yes, free will, really free will, substantially free will. When has freedom been recklessness? How are men free when the will can be taken for the deed or when the thing done or doing or to be done can be treated according to convenience as external or not external to the will, as intended or as not intended? Freedom is not in being able to do or not to do something that was never done or ever done before, or to escape or appropriate the consequences of something that was done or not done in the past. Neither the commission nor the omission of past activity or of future activity can make freedom or unmake it. Only, first, in having something doing now, the more mechanical it is the better, and then in at once knowing what it is and being a party to it, is man — or any creature — free. Enough for freedom, the freedom of your will or the freedom of mine, if meeting our world

and beholding its wonderful activities we can know its adaptations, and, above all, our adaptation to it, and feel with assurance that the life about us is our life ; enough if we are not merely in it, but also actively and consciously of it. It is then our responsibility, and it imposes no more arduous duty upon us than the duty of what we are already doing ; a present duty, surely, and a real freedom—which mechanicalism gives, not takes away.

And now we may turn to the social will. Two things stand out clear before our view: (1) the social will can be neither a common will nor an aggregate will ; it must, on the contrary, be the will of individuals to whom society is essential, or of society that actually has its being in individuals ; and (2) the social will can be subject to no sentimental idealism of the sort that dreams of what is past or waits on the future ; it has, and must have, for its constant business only the actual social life, and to this end it is and must be one with that life, not outside of it nor ever peculiar to any isolated part of it.

The first of these assertions is evidently in sympathy with the idea that society and individuality are inseparable, if not so mutually inclusive as to be virtually identical. Subject to this idea, not only the social will, but also the social consciousness, which, as a matter of course, is not to be separated from the will, can be neither common nor aggregate. In theory and in practice, however, men have frequently treated the will and the consciousness of society now as common, it being imagined that to the members of society there belonged a common nature, and so a common life back of and independent of their differences, and now as aggregate, it being again imagined that a lot of individual wills could come to a sort of unity or equilibrium, say a state of armed neutrality, and so acquire a social character ; but, quite apart from the idea of society and individuality that has been emphasized here, it is idle to think of any really social life based either upon the aggregation of individuals or upon a common nature that could be only in individuals, not of them. Moreover—and this is an idea that will gain in meaning as we proceed—society is really to be thought of as dynamic in its

nature and so impossible either as community without differences or as mere aggregation of differences.

As to society being community, it is true that, if a number of people speak the same language and live under the same laws, and go, perhaps, to the same church and move in the same social circle, they will all seem to be having a common experience, and in terms of this a strictly social self which is quite independent of the accidents of individuality; but the seeming here is wholly due to a confusion of social life with the visible and only apparently unvarying medium through which it is expressed. Carpenters and brewers and merchants and college professors may all unite under one outer form of religious worship, and with the fact of their union may themselves associate, and even sentimentally enjoy, a common nature, which they regard unworldly or spiritual because so seemingly independent of carpentry and brewing and teaching. No common ritual, however, no common language, no common anything has ever either given men a common life or been developed by them to satisfy such a life. Community, in fact, were it ever realized, instead of being a basis of social life, would be and could be only its undoing. The brewer and the professor at church may sing the same hymns and recite the same prayers and hear the same music; but the brewer must have his envy or his feeling of superiority for the professor, and the professor, perhaps, for the merchant, while the wives of all three are watching each other's bonnets; and, without detracting an iota from the religious value of the meeting, the tension of these individual relations is no small part of that which gives zest to all those spiritual things that are said in chorus or done in unison. At the school or the church, at the concert perhaps, or in any place where you and two or three others are gathered together, are you not always conscious of your neighbor, say with sympathy or jealousy or fear or hope, in a way that shows your interest in him to have anything but a basis of mere spiritual community? Even sympathy feeds and has to feed on personal difference. The real function, then, of any social institution, of language or ritual, of law or property, must be something like that of the rules or forms of a

duel; in short, it must be the mediation of real and always active, sometimes very active, differences; and to deny to society the vitality that this gives would be to make the social life as empty and unreal as that of souls at church without competitive worldly interests and without clothes, or as attendance upon an exhibition of pictures with all the lights off. The social life, if real, whether as consciousness or as will, needs the mutual resistance as well as the mutual dependence, the rivalry as well as the sympathy, of individuals.

Then, what is the unity of society? What is that unity of the life of society that was even emphatically insisted upon but a few moments ago? To some I shall seem to have destroyed it. It is, however, *in the activity, the life itself.* Unity as static and unity as dynamic are two very different conceptions, and the former I do not myself find even thinkable. Unity is a spirit, not a material being; a principle, not a thing; a force, not a status. Make it material, make it thing or status, and what would become of the unity of human history or the unity of life today? Make the unity of life a certain status, capable of reduction to a certain fixed creed or formula, and you at once deny the life. So, instead of destroying social unity by retaining the differences of individuals and making them intrinsic to it, we are really turning the tables upon those who would identify it with some particular form or condition of life, for they become the real destroyers. Once more, then, unity cannot be fixed and static, it must be dynamic; in society it cannot be one person or being or one life among others, be this sent from heaven or not sent from heaven, the vice-regent or not the vice-regent of deity; rather it must be the tension or relating force in the adaptive activities of all; and in other things, too, besides society—in the solar system, or the human body, or a table—unity is of the same character—a force or principle, not a special motion, not a special organ, not a special part.

And in this nature of the unity of society we must see, if indeed we have not already seen, the nature of the social will. The will of society, neither common nor aggregate, is, or dwells in, the conscious adaptive activities of individuals, where in every

case the adaptation is, in general, to the environment at large, but of course especially to the environment as alive with other individual activities. Moved by such a will, the life of society is describable indifferently as friendly rivalry or jealous co-operation,[1] and in one's conception of it the corner-stone is the idea of adaptation. That this notion of the social will as consisting in the conscious, mutually adaptive activities of individuals is, to say the least, not without its difficulties, may be readily admitted, and the difficulties may be so nearly fatal as to be "metaphysical," or they may be only verbal; but, without attempting to analyze them too closely, I venture to content myself with considering some of the more important implications of the idea of adaptation nowadays so well accredited.

Adaptation is certainly meaningless apart from resistance, and yet, at the same time, whatever offers resistance must always have some positive participation in the activity resisted, or must, in words of no strange meaning, be developmental in its influence, not merely hostile and resistant. That what resists develops is a difficult paradox, which will nevertheless be generally accepted as true. It is the paradox of the social will. Another paradox, moreover, neither less difficult nor less valid, comes in its wake. Thus—and to this we may give first attention—not only does the social will consist in the conscious, mutually adaptive and mutually resistant activities of individuals, but also the unity and so the will of society involves a division of society. Society is a divided unity because, and in the sense that, it is a dynamic unity; it is a unity of individuals at once adaptive and resistant. Often we say of ourselves that we are at once our own best friends and our own worst enemies, and just such a condition of inner division and self-opposition, my contention

[1] In terms of emotional extremes it is a life that is moved by a mixed hate or a mixed love. Hate alone certainly does not make the world of society go around, nor does even pure, unselfish love. Love and hate, sympathy and jealousy, as if centripetal and centrifugal forces, make the revolutions. With the same meaning we human creatures are given to really hating only those whom we might and, as some have taught us, whom we ought to love most, hate being disappointed or uninformed, and so uninspired, love. Or, again, love is never a loss of individuality, but a rebuff that supports individuality. Hate and love are not two emotions, but the maintaining poles of one.

is, belongs to the unity, the dynamic unity, to the will of society.

No doubt, for all this talk about what offers resistance participating in the resisted activity, and about a divisible unity and about self-opposition, I shall get no thanks but that of the fly to the spider whose parlor was not more dangerous than my web of words. But the spider won finally by flattery, and, with the proper apologies for saying so, I mean to win too. These things to which I have given such uninviting names are really only mirrors in which all thinking people can see their own pet conceits. Thus the peculiar division of society which has been declared necessary to its unity shows itself in two quite familiar ways: first in the way of the single person standing in opposition to his fellows; and, secondly, in the way of such general distinctions as good and bad, rich and poor, ruler and subject, religious and irreligious, civilized and uncivilized, conservative and radical, with which in each case distinct and opposed social classes are always associated; and both of these ways of division are not only commonly recognized, but also commonly recognized as conditions of a really social life — of a social life that is social without being dull or empty, and single and consistent without being finished and dead. Nor is either my meaning here, or what I take to be the general meaning, that the opponents which these divisions make are parties to a social life only in a negative sense, that is to say, only as opponents; on the contrary, in spite of or *because* of the opposition, they live not with but in each other, determining and liberating, and even adapting and adopting, each other's lives.

The single person, for example, however apart from his fellows — nay, just for being apart from his fellows — is but a revelation, a defined overt expression of something hidden, or at best only imperfectly known or expressed in their nature, if not in their positive activity; and, being this, he cannot but have a real share in their life as conscious and voluntary. He is openly, publicly, what in general they are privately; and, however unlike or hostile he may be or seem, his social function in no small part is the self-consciousness that he thus awakens among them.

And an exposure not unlike his belongs also to each of any two opposed social classes. To recall a metaphor already used here in a narrower sense, each of the two is the day of the other's night, or each is the antipodes of the other, and such a relationship surely makes them more than mere external opponents. Anyone who has read history, and studied particularly the great revolutions of history or the great party strifes, knows how double opponents always are, or how — if I may change the metaphor, but not the sense — each has its enemy as truly at its back as in the open field in front. In general history, as in personal experience, it has often taken an opponent to develop in man and reveal to his consciousness the best or the worst that lies within himself. Once more, then, opposition, or the division which it implies, can be no discordant thing in society; on the contrary, it is an inner condition of the real unity, of the will, and, we can safely add, of the self-consciousness of society.

Opposition, furthermore, is positively social in its function because the conduct of it from sheer necessity must be through acts of adaptation. Cases of opposing parties virtually, if not openly, changing sides, their mutual adaptations being so eminently successful, are not so fanciful as might be imagined. To say no more, everyone has doubtless heard of the good man, a Presbyterian in religion, who married a Unitarian. The two loved each other; they loved their religion; they loved argument; and they died happily — each in the other's faith. And theirs was near to being an ideal social life. Through controversies, whether verbal or outwardly enacted, society, by virtue of the mutual adaptation of its parts, comes to recognize, and so to develop, the manifold possibilities that its life contains.

But no fact can be more suggestive of the presence of a really social will in the activity even of opponents than the very familiar fact that contemporarily with the progress of their conflict, whether they be the individual and his competing fellows or two warring classes or peoples, a regulative, but at the same time always changing, law is formulated, and by each side recognized and followed. Or, conversely, law — that is, natural law, as mediating between man and nature, or human law as mediating

between man and man, or even divine law as mediating between man and God—is very far from being the lifeless, wholly objective thing that it is sometimes imagined; it is, instead, a sort of poise of opposing interests, a *modus vivendi*, a sign and a program of an unstable equilibrium or of armed neutrality; in fine, the terms of an agreement to differ between contesting wills or powers. A law of any sort may be dead on paper, but, as a law in the consciousness of men, it is quick with the thrusts and counter-thrusts of strife. Every struggle must have its arena. Through the candle-flame, fixed and defined as it appears to be, there is ever passing in and out, out and in, the action and the reaction of what one has called the war of the combustible and the incombustible, and the law is a light of the same sort. In the law, then, as thus a vital incident of conflict, as an agreement to differ, or as the constant light that marks at once the poise and the interaction of opponents, we have a witness, not only to the fact, but also to the nature, of the social will, and, above all, to the division of society as a condition of the unity and the will of society.

But here we must pass to the second assertion about the social will, namely, that the social will has and must have for its constant business only the actual social life, and that to this end it is and must be one with that life, not in any way outside of it or peculiar to any isolated part of it. Like will in general, the social will is not to be "taken for the deed." Like will in general, the social will is adaptive activity that is at once conscious of its meaning and constrained by its consciousness; and because, as has been shown, even opponents are parties to each other's activity and to each other's consciousness, and so are the co-operating agents of a single life, the social will can reside only in this life *as a whole*, and it must reside there—being impossible as resident either in anything outside or in any special individual or class of individuals within. Briefly, whatever society does, or, rather, whatever is doing in society, society wills, and recognizes itself responsible for, and emphatically the will and responsibility belong to all. In the same sense that the personal individual is responsible for whatever he has found to be pos-

sible in his life, society as a whole must feel responsible for whatever transpires in any of its members. All are thus at bottom good and bad together, or master and slave, civilized and uncivilized, rich and poor, learned and ignorant, perhaps even alive and dead. All, whatever lines of difference may be drawn, are responsible parties to a single social life. If the paradox is still unintelligible, reflect further that, whatever may be true elsewhere, in society the differences that make rival social classes are always in the parts or phases of the individual as well as in the classes themselves, that the spirit, if not the letter, of Plato's famous analogy still holds. A religious class, for example, means a religious part, a thinking class a thinking part, a criminal class a criminal part, and so on; and the conflicts in society, accordingly, are never merely of class against class or of individual against his fellows, but always also, at least with as much truth, of each class with itself or of the individual with himself or of society as a whole with itself. But, if the conflict of society can be described indifferently in these several ways, the will of society, and particularly the location of the will of society, must be quite independent of the distinction between individual and society or between class and class. The will of society must dwell *at once* in the life of each part and in the life of the whole. The will of society is very far indeed from being a god that comes down from the mountains or the clouds and takes sides.

Throughout the recent discussion of the importance of division and consequent self-opposition in the social will, in this will as having both unity and indwelling character,[1] the most troublesome point has probably been the principle of participation through resistance, the direct consideration of which, it will be remembered, was postponed. Incidentally some light upon the meaning of this principle has been cast already, but more may be said with advantage. The principle is troublesome, not because it will not have some meaning to everybody, for all are quite familiar with the idea that resistance is a positive condi-

[1] "Indwelling character"—that is, of course, with reference to the will being one with the life of society, not in any way or degree external to it.

tion of development; but because it will not get its fullest meaning, whether in the development of the activity or in that of the consciousness of society, or because it will even be taken as altogether too philosophical to be practical. That resistance develops appeals to everybody; but, at least with any clearness, it is not so commonly recognized that resistance means real, positive participation. True, we know from physics that action and reaction —or resistance—are equal, and with this knowledge we associate also the unity of force: in a world of manifold independent forces the equation would be meaningless; but we are not in the habit of applying our physics to the conscious activities of society. And yet, if we will but keep sober, we may do so with great profit. True also that we know in a general way that, for individuals or classes or whole peoples, the mere knowledge that there is another life apart from their own, in the next yard perhaps, or across the mountains or seas, or even on another planet, makes that other life a party to their own; for there never was anything without that did not either tempt or repel, and that, in doing either, did not somehow implicate the other; yet, as a rule, we do not take even this knowledge seriously enough really to affect our interpretations of human life. But surely we ought to be serious here. The other man, the other class, the other nation, the other life, whether friend or enemy, whether spiritual or worldly, has a positive share in this life, in my life; and the rivalry or active opposition of the other, instead of weakening the partnership, develops it. To rely on the corner-stone again, can obstacles, real obstacles, ever be met except by adaptation to them? But—and I apologize for what is near to being repetition, yet venture also to say that no principle is more important to the thought of the day than this—adaptation is equivalent to singleness of activity among all who are parties to the process. The parties to the process, however, like the Presbyterian and the Unitarian, are conscious as well as active, and in the same sense with a single consciousness and a single activity; and their conscious activity can be nothing more nor less than will—*at once* their individual wills and a social will. Human history, therefore, or personal life, record that

each is of conflicts and adaptations, is but the development in will and consciousness of the single life that all have led and are leading. The social will, present in the conscious adaptive activities of all individuals and constraining them even when they are most at war, is at once the positive effort and the resistance of this development; in short, the expression and maintenance of the dynamic and divided unity of society.

If someone still insists, after the habit of many, that time and again the stress of special circumstances, for example in the case of great national danger, has brought out what seems unequivocally to be a group-will single and undivided, it is only necessary to say that this is perhaps creditably sentimental, but, like most sentiment, also almost inexcusably blind. *E pluribus unum;* in unity is strength; and other things equally stirring; but, as a matter of simple fact, which sometimes sentiment and sometimes distance conceals, stress of circumstances never involves either foreign or civil disruption without involving the other. In a foreign war attention may be proudly fixed upon the war itself, the people even wilfully shutting their eyes to the rising issues at home; but the *double* danger is not less real on that account, and at least the recent history of England or the United States suggests in an emphatic way that the very zeal of a war, to say nothing of its prior causes or of its effects, depends in no small measure on internal divisions. Moreover, any stress of circumstances involves also a more strenuous division of labor, and this, of course, is never free from jealous competition. So, conclusively, that "group-will single and undivided" must be set down as possibly a useful superstition in some quarters, say among politicians, who have a cause to uphold, or among propagandists of any sort with a thesis to defend, but as not even presentable among those whose concern is with real things. The most and best that can be said for it is that it stands for a real aspect of the social will; but any aspect, however real what it stands for may be, if taken abstractly cannot be literally real itself. Abstraction distorts and disguises reality. Thus the real social will is a unit, yet not an undivided unit; to its real unity division is essential.

And once more, if somebody insists that, in the fact of individual leadership in society, there is evidence of a real, of a really undivided group-will, it is quite sufficient to say in reply that leadership on the monarchical plan is the only leadership which could ever afford such testimony, and that on that plan leadership has been weighed in the balance and found wanting. Leaders are always individuals, and by nature individuals are partial and abstractly idealistic in both views and actions, seeing and doing everything under the glamour of their special standpoints. Such partiality, however, with its accompanying abstractions, needs, and always meets, a balance or a counteraction in kind, which asserts itself with some strength even in the life and consciousness of the individual himself or of his own immediate following, but always most effectively in the life and consciousness that is somewhat apart from his; for only so, that is to say, only by individuals and classes being in their partiality and abstraction mutually corrective or compensative, can the real life and the whole life of society be conserved; only so can individuals be parties to a *practical* life. Leadership, then, practical leadership, leadership all along the line, instead of giving evidence of a group-will, gives an almost opposite testimony; for it is, and it always has been, and it always must be, a divided labor.

But here the objectors begin to present themselves, and with replies to them I shall now in conclusion indicate more specifically some of the consequences of the present conception of the social will to human affairs. The historian, realizing the very broad conception of human society and the social will which is entertained here, is the first to speak, and his protest, as I hear it, is not so vigorous as it probably would have been even ten or a dozen years ago. Thus he has, and he still values, his interesting distinction between historic and prehistoric man, and more particularly he is still disposed to treat nature and man, or natural man and civilized man, as independent sources for the explanation of historical phenomena, and accordingly he hesitates to accept a view that is doubtful, even about the methodological worth of these distinctions. But certainly, to justify this

doubt at once, in the use of them only as methods there lurk real dangers, since they hide fact. Distinguish nature from man, separate prehistoric man from historic man, identify human life only with its records and institutions and visible signs generally, and you rob it of its very vitality. The prehistoric man, the natural man, the nature with which man is at one, lives now, not merely then, and lives in and with the human creature of history, not outside of him. Of course, the new history, so called, if I do not misunderstand it, resorting as it does to such sciences as psychology and sociology and anthropology, and to still more distinctly natural sciences, such as geology and meteorology and geography, may be said to be admitting prehistoric and natural man to history; but the new history is far from being every historian's history, and it is not itself fully awake to its own presuppositions.

So the historian may protest; but the cue for the right reply to him really comes from the recent developments in his own field. The proper study of history is man as man, not man merely as then or now, and man as natural in being human. Some may still choose history as a mere story, which is only better for being told artistically, of specific men and specific deeds; some may prefer history as a great museum of authentic facts from all times and places; but suffice it to say, without any slight to the interest of the story or the worth of the museum, that either an isolated man, a man cut off from his fellows or from nature in time or in space, or a disintegrated man and a scientific history will not mix.

Some historians, too, may still prefer the swinging-pendulum view, criticised perhaps too sharply already, and with this also those wonder-working battles between absolutely independent opponents that have made history, not a story, but a fairy-tale; but these are only details incidental either to the isolation of man — that is, the identification of him with some particular form of life — or to the disintegration of man. Limit man to only one side of himself, and the changes of his life must be both sudden and rhythmical. Divide him into separate parts, and his opponents must be independent and his battles miraculous.

But, secondly, closely related to the objections of the historian and probably helping to define the meaning of my reply to them, there are the rather more positive objections of political science, which finds my understanding of the social will at variance with its conception of sovereignty. Clearly sovereignty and will must be coextensive, but the political scientist is accustomed to think of individual peoples as possessing each its own independent and indivisible sovereignty, very much as in ethics independent, indivisible wills are often ascribed to separate persons; and to make the will of society one and all-inclusive, to seem actually to ignore the existence of separate and often conflicting states or nations or races, is to run counter to his well-set habit of mind. But habits of mind, however set themselves, have never yet unsettled real things, and a localized will or sovereignty, a sovereignty of specific area and duration, and so of specific power, cannot be independent and indivisible, as these terms seem to me to be used; rather it is limited, and it shares its authority and activity with other times and places and other powers. The only real sovereignty is that of the social whole. A localized physical force is not more seriously self-contradictory than a localized sovereignty. How several nations, for example, can be looked upon at one moment as each possessing an independent sovereignty and at another moment as parties under an international law, and possibly also at a third moment as politically as well as personally and practically nterested in so inclusive a thing as natural law, as if each of the nations had their distinct spheres to live in, I cannot see. Such divisions make only so many different states of subjection; they do not make independence.

The political scientist, however, insists, as his last resort, that practically he needs these distinctions and limitations; practically, with the lawyer, he must have his fictions. So are we again confronted with old friends, practice and theory, and yet it quite suffices for our purposes that "practice" is admitted to rest on the fictitious. And we cannot but ask that those who appeal to it take care that they neither hide fact nor waive responsibility, whether intellectual or moral. Moreover, they

have yet to demonstrate that any real disadvantage would come to their political science in any of its departments if they should openly avow their isolated sovereignties as only fictitious and then admit to the front part of their house the world-wide unity of real sovereignty. That this unity is—albeit in a special sense—divisible is not to be denied, and none so cordially as they would welcome its divisibility; but it remains a unity throughout. In ways that I have been at special pains to explain, it implies all the division and opposition that the most jealous of nations could ever covet, but the division is of the sort that fulfils instead of destroying, and an active internationalism, restlessly maintaining a balance of power and imperial in its scope, is the only program that any practical politician could ever honestly deduce from it.

And now, lastly, the historian and the political scientists are mild objectors when compared with the moralists and the theologians. A doctrine of the social will that appears to undermine the very foundations of morality by denying personal responsibility, making all men, as it does, indifferently parties to a single life, is distinctly offensive. To mix Greek and barbarian is to them of only slight moment, one way or the other; but to mix Christian and pagan, righteous and unrighteous, is intolerable. Yet who has really denied personal responsibility? Any person conscious of the meaning of his activity is personally responsible; and, although it may be true that all men are made parties to the social life as a single life, yet the distinctions that make morality are not disturbed one jot or tittle. Instead they seem to me to be more firmly established, for the only denial has been that the distinction of righteous and unrighteous or Christian and pagan can ever be made on purely party lines. All in society are good and bad, righteous and unrighteous, Christian and pagan, perhaps theist and atheist together, so that what we have here is no betrayal of the distinctions of morality and religion, but the simple assertion that such distinctions are as individually personal as they are social. No one is ever the one thing or ever the other thing to himself alone; no one is without his share of both things. But, still unconvinced, the insistent object-

ors argue that even in this way to make society a partner to each individual's success or failure most decidedly is to destroy individual responsibility. Again I say it is not, and most decidedly not. Responsibility depends on consciousness, not on independence or isolation. Is a man less sensitive or more sensitive, less conscientious or more conscientious, when he is working with another? That depends, you say. So it does. It depends on his consciousness, on his understanding of what is doing. A clear understanding always makes a zealous worker. No one, then, can ever waive responsibility because we tell him that society has worked or is working with him, for no man can escape the consciousness that his acts induce, and indeed the very fact of society sharing the responsibility with him is likely to intensify rather than to weaken his consciousness. Society may share his disgrace, but he also shares her honors, living and conscious as he is in and with her; and just in this double partnership of honor and disgrace lie his remorse and the source of his real responsibility. Could even the grace of God—perhaps only another name for the same thing—be more effective?

Of course, the professional theologians may have even more specific objections than any that have been directly touched upon so far. At least as a class—their corporate theology being much more conservative and perhaps much more assertive than their individual convictions—they are sure to detect here unwelcome hints of the divine will as immanent, not merely in nature, but also even in the personal and social life of mankind, in its failures as well as in its successes; and hints, or possibly more than mere hints, of man as a responsible partner in the creative life of God, as if creation were quite independent of the date which some over-zealous exegetists have dreamt of some day determining; and hints, finally, of a Christology not exactly in accord with their own, Christ appearing as a living force now, not merely a person then; a force involved in the peculiar dynamic unity of society, not merely the Jew of nineteen centuries ago; a natural life today, not a memory or foresight, or even a presence that is near us or around us or in us without being really of us; but special theological controversy, however

properly aroused, cannot be entered upon here. Let it suffice if the hints, however unwelcome to some, give additional meaning to the conception here presented, of human relations, of the dynamic unity of society, and of the single will dwelling even in the divisions and conflicts of society.

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THE EVOLUTION OF CONSCIENCE AS A PHASE OF SOCIOLOGY.

CONSCIENCE is usually looked upon as the crowning feature of evolution. But its history is interwoven by subtle threads with many other phases of our social or spiritual life. It is connected intimately with the development of political institutions, and it is very closely identified with the rise of the religious consciousness, or the story of religion. It is involved, too, with the growth of what is called the sympathy side of human nature.

Somehow the opinion has lingered on, and held its own with considerable tenacity, that in the growth of the moral sense there is a certain element of mystery. Many thinkers at the present time deny all this, and claim that the new standpoint of evolution not only describes the stages in the growth of conscience, but gives an explanation as to how it arose. They are not ready, in a word, to admit that anything essentially new has appeared in what we term the ethical impulses. As we are all aware, the schools in ethical philosophy are divided on this point, and may perhaps never come to an agreement.

For my own part, I am inclined to hold on to the element of mystery here, although not disposed to insist that others should accept it. All my study in evolution thus far has not convinced me that a full explanation has been found for the appearance or development of conscience. It is one thing to describe the stages of its growth or to trace the steps according to which it has manifested itself. But it is another thing to *account for its appearance.*

It strikes me that we have a full explanation of a process only when the mind is able to anticipate what is coming, by a knowledge of what has gone before, according to a series of laws or relationships already discovered. The "struggle for existence," in a sense, is such a law among organisms in the animal kingdom. By a knowledge of this law one could prophesy that the strongest and best-proportioned muscular system would triumph,

provided no new factor made its appearance. But by means of this law could it have been anticipated theoretically that *mind* would come in and give the triumph at last to a creature on an inferior plane so far as the muscular system is concerned?

Apply this to what we ordinarily call moral feeling. If, on walking along the street, we were to see a Chinaman fall down suddenly, from no manifest cause, we should step over and observe what had taken place, inferring that the man was seriously ill. The chances are that we are not fond of Chinamen, and our first impulse might be to go on and let him alone. Yet I venture to say that with most of us the course would be precisely the contrary. We should step to the nearest telephone and call for an ambulance — saying to ourselves: We ought to see that this man is sent to the city hospital. And the Chinaman will be taken there, looked after, nursed, and tended just about the same as if he were an ordinary white citizen of this country.

Why is that city hospital there? The answer would be that the people of each community feel that they ought to have a place for the sick who cannot provide for themselves. Any kind of a sick person? we ask; of any race, from any part of the world? Yes, it is said, there ought to be a hospital for any sick person, of any race, from any clime on earth.

So far as the investigations I have made in the theory of evolution are concerned, they do not explain that city hospital and the course we pursue in sending the Chinaman there. Hospitals, as such, may come by the laws of evolution. The struggle for existence requires co-operation, a high development of what we term social tissue in the organizations of clans or societies. Natural selection would develop sympathies between members of the same clan, leading to the appearance of asylums for the sick within the tribe, the clan, or a given society. But there it would stop. It is against natural selection, against the struggle for existence or the theory of the survival of the fittest, for such an asylum to welcome *any* human creature.

I fail to see how we have an explanation of the growth of sympathy between *all* human creatures. If anyone had undertaken in advance to anticipate what the laws of evolution would

work out along this line, he would have said that they would have led the individuals of the strong societies to crush out the individuals of the weak societies, to kill them off, leaving only certain races surviving.

A good deal of this has gone on. The mystery of it is why more of it has not taken place, and why at the most advanced stage of evolution it is not becoming more rather than less pronounced. The theory of evolution will explain the growth of sympathies between members of the same race or between individuals of the same social structure. But the last step, by which sympathy is extended to every human creature and a conception of a universal human social structure arises, does not seem to be in keeping with the laws or tendencies prevailing in earlier times. Yet conscience, as we now understand it, applies to *man as such*, and not just to the man with whom I have some special affiliation. It is even hinted that there is more than one *species* of human beings, considering them as animal organisms. If so, why this tie in spite of varying species?

Could any finite intelligence who knew what the theory of evolution meant, and what had been the tendencies or laws by which the process had gone on, have in the faintest degree anticipated the rise of the religion of Buddhism? We have there a religion founded on the sense of pity—not, however, pity for others as being of the same tribe, but pity for each other as fellow human creatures. Take again the lines in which Cardinal Wolsey gives a summary of the mistakes of his life: "Cromwell, I charge thee, fling away ambition." One asks: Could any finite intelligence have prophesied, throughout all the stages in the history of evolution, that any one living creature should have used language of this kind? As for the charge against ambition or self-assertion, why, it has been by such ambition, one may say, that the human race came into existence. The story of evolution is a story of what is alluded to in these lines as "ambition."

Yet I fancy that most of us in reading these lines approve them, regard them as ideally true, as the best or finest utterance of the human consciousness. But natural selection, a struggle

for existence, and the survival of the strongest, as we ordinarily understand those terms, do not explain such approval on our part. They do not account for the fact that any human creature should have uttered such words. In substance, we have what is called a "variation." But the why and wherefore of it we cannot explain. It just came. A variation has set in, leading to a moral sense, conscience, ethical impulses; and the higher or highest forms of these were not to be anticipated or foretold, so far as we can see, by what had gone before in the earlier stages of evolution.

This, too, would apply to the finest bit of ethical analysis we have, probably, in the world's literature — in the chapters from Victor Hugo's *Les Misérables*, where the hero Jean Valjean is debating whether he shall give himself up and go back to prison for the sake of saving a miserable, low-down, but innocent creature.

For my own part, I look for a reaction in ethical philosophy from its conciliatory attitude toward the conventional doctrine of evolution. It has yielded too much. For a time it was on the point of surrendering the spiritual element in human nature altogether. The discovery of the earlier stages in the appearance of conscience may have led us carelessly into assuming that in its final form it was a form of animal sympathy, only much enlarged. The time has come when we should reassert the fact of the spiritual element in human nature, and the new features which this element introduces.

Does all this mean, then, that evolution has nothing to say with regard to conscience or the moral sense? On the contrary, until this theory appeared, it has been practically impossible to have any intelligible understanding with regard to what conscience amounted to or what the sense of duty involved. This new standpoint has simply transformed ethical philosophy, just as it has given birth to the social sciences and transformed the science of biology. People have had the fact of conscience before them for a long while. It was talked about in the days of Rome. Men have been aware of it as a part of their spiritual experiences; but, owing to a lack of a theory of evolution, they have gone utterly astray as to what it meant.

We used to be told that every human creature had a moral sense by which he could distinguish right from wrong, just about as he has an eye enabling him to distinguish between colors, or between black and white; but if we were forced today to accept this standpoint, we should find ourselves in a very muddled state of mind. It would have gone on all right, perhaps, until the science of anthropology arose, up to the time when the investigations were undertaken into the conditions of undeveloped or savage races; although, as a matter of fact, the theory had given trouble enough even among developed minds, owing to what seemed to be a *conflict of duties* arising every now and then.

The rise of conscience in primitive times may have been something like the first appearance of an eye-organ in low types, where we observe a few pigment cells by which the creature may distinguish feebly between light and no light, between utter darkness and glaring sunshine. That is about all the moral sense we can discern in many savage races. The conscience we discern there would seem to be very closely identified with the rise of the first elements of fellow-feeling between members of the same tribe, restraining individuals in that tribe from killing each other or stealing from each other. Even on that score, it does not show itself there above the very lowest stage. It is customary, as we all know now, among certain races to kill off the old people. Children bury their aged fathers or mothers alive. I doubt whether in the strict sense of the term we can say that conscience appears there, any more than we can say that the pigment cells in a low organism are the same thing as an eye. We could not expect a full-fledged conscience in a half-fledged soul, any more than we could expect a complex eye in a simple, one-celled organism.

What evolution as a theory has done for ethical philosophy has been, therefore, to show us that the moral sense has come by a process of growth, like all other features or phases of mental or spiritual experience. It appears gradually. There has been, as we now realize, no fully equipped organ of moral sense such as the primitive human creature was supposed to be endowed with. In a word, conscience is coming, rather than

has come; it is evolving now, rather than completely evolved. There is more conscience in the average citizen of this country today, by a great deal, than was manifest in the average citizen of Athens two thousand years ago. It is still in one way comparatively feeble, in contrast with what we may expect it to become by and by.

The stories which have come home to us from travelers among savage races, telling us of the moral state of such people, are anything but pleasing or suggestive of a developed ethical sense. And it is such facts which have upset the old theories with regard to a moral sense. If it had not been for this new standpoint of evolution, ethical philosophy would have come to a standstill, or the whole doctrine of conscience would perhaps have been abandoned in despair.

I believe it is true that the moral sense *starts* in the feelings. But one clue to the confusion prevailing on the subject lies in the fact that people have not understood or appreciated that real conscience, in the truest sense of the word, does not come until self-conscious, independent personality appears. Until this later phase in soul-life develops, moral sense is sporadic; hardly, in the strict meaning of the word, a moral sense at all.

At the start it is a story of the rise of what we may term scruples. We can faintly conceive of animals having scruples, as we understand the word. The dog, for instance, may get it into his consciousness somehow that he must not take food from the table, even if he is left in a room alone. Yet with such creatures it is a sense of indefinite fear bred into them, rather than a picture of the act and its consequences rising before them. When the dog overcomes the fear, swallows the food, and then cringes seemingly in shame, I fancy that what develops in his consciousness is more an indefinite dread of punishment, taking on only the *appearance* of a conscience, rather than being the actual scruples I speak of.

But, on the other hand, when a savage, in a fit of violent anger, kills the dog he has been fond of, and which has been fond of him, and then has a gnawing sense of regret, as if wishing he had not done it, in this there may be the dawn

of what we should call a scruple. We have come to the point where there is a conscious relationship between conduct and result, between a definite act and a sense of responsibility for it. The savage at least knows what he has done, recalls the affection of the brute, and his own affection for the brute, and is aware that he might have avoided the act. He may not only feel uncomfortable over it, but clearly may be conscious of a wish that he had not done it. In that wish, that one had not done a certain act, we have the "scruple" showing itself, and the glimmerings of a moral sense. It would be more pronounced, for instance, if among members of the same clan or tribe two individual human beings, who have worked together and been of service to each other, fall into strife and one kills the other. Even where no punishment is to follow, or the slayer has no fear of consequences, there may still be the scruple in the wish that he had not done the deed. To be sure, such a wish is but an incipient phase, and does not amount to much — a vague sense of regret, nothing more.

It has reached a much higher phase, and launched the human creature on a very much more advanced stage, when the scruple comes in before the act, now and then keeping him from following out his first impulse or committing the deed of anger. When scruples act as a check on impulses, the higher soul is getting a start. And I suppose the moral sense may arise to this extent among the lower savage tribes —although it would prevail, of course, only between members of the same tribe.

We sometimes wonder that the primitive human creature is so low-down, vindictive, or "brutalized," as it were, with so little recognition of human rights, so feeble a sense of justice; with such a weak respect for himself, or for man as man, or for a fellow human creature. Why is it that in a large number of instances we find such distorted, perverted, monstrous conditions? How is it that it should be the glory among certain tribes of people to have committed murder? What is to explain the fact that among many races a man feels a sense of shame, positive humiliation, until he has butchered some other human creature? How is it that, among other races, stealing,

theft, robbery, of the most brutal kind, should be held in esteem, as an indication of manhood and prowess? What is to explain the extraordinary instances of cruelty which are told of savage races, the utter absence of what we should call the sense of pity or mercy? Fancy the state of feeling among people who take the keenest delight in torturing to death other fellow-creatures, and who may get their highest satisfaction by inflicting such tortures. How shall we account for the downright pleasure taken in cruelty, in murder, in the sacrifice of human blood?

And the pathetic part of it is that this is not the exception, but, if anything, the rule. Among savage races the peace-loving, peaceable tribes are the exception. There are such. They do exist. But, on the whole, I suppose it is true that one takes one's life in one's hands if one goes among savages.

Nature was many millions of years making the brute creature, and only a few hundred thousand years making the human creature. We know that the law of blood, as it were, is the law of brute creation; and it must be remembered that we are the heirs of all that has gone before. We have got the man in us now as a new phase, but also there is in us as an inheritance all the brute life which has preceded. Is it strange, then, that the human element should be, at the start and for a long while, comparatively weak? Is it astonishing that conscience should not shine bright and clear, be strong and controlling over the human creature? We must bear in mind that it is doing battle with hereditary tendencies established by millions of years of bygone history.

We should look, therefore, upon that primitive state of savage races, which was the state of our forefathers not many thousand years ago, rather with pity than with a sense of loathing. The manhood was coming, but not yet come; conscience evolving, but not yet evolved. If we are heirs of all the brutal vindictiveness of our animal ancestry, we are also heirs of the courage, the capacity for devotion within the tribe, of our human ancestors. If there is a holding together of the social tissue today, it is partly owing to the way our primitive, savage ancestors evolved a sense of loyalty to the clan or the tribe.

It is certainly a long, long distance from the primitive sav-

age who may be haunted with a wish that he had not killed his dog or companion in a fit of anger, to a Jean Valjean in *Les Misérables*, who goes back to prison in order to save from pursuit an inferior specimen of his fellow human creatures ; or to the mournful soliloquy of Wolsey over the mistake of self-asserting ambition. In fact, I doubt whether we can do anything more than construct a series of bridges as stages from the one phase to the other.

The advance of the human race has been marked conspicuously by the growth of intelligence. And a finite mind who had undertaken to prophesy by the laws of evolution what would have been the outcome through this growth of knowledge and increasing supremacy of intelligence, would have assumed, as man came to know more and apply his mind more fully to human conduct, while keeping the same human nature, that the tendency would have been for him to pursue a course of extirpation toward the physically weak. Sentiment would naturally have given way, one would suppose, to practical schemes for carrying out what we might call *nature's laws*. On the physical side, it is against the interests of the race for the weak to survive.

And, in point of fact, there is an indication of this very line of opinion appearing here and there today among those who adopt the theory of evolution as explaining the appearance of conscience, and who take the laws by which the human race has been evolved in the past as the lines according to which the human creature should be guided in the future. Here and there a philosopher of this type attacks most vigorously the whole system of the modern world in its care for the weaker specimens of the race ; in its philanthropy, its hospital systems, or its schemes for popular education. They assure us that this is all a mistake and fundamentally wrong, because against the laws which have brought the human race into existence.

But while here and there an instance of this kind occurs, the human race, as it advances in intelligence, has been pursuing precisely the opposite course. More care is taken of the weak than ever before. The tendency, which was so feeble in early times, to treat every man as an end in himself, is growing rather than declining.

On the whole, taking it as a fact of history over the last twenty-five hundred or three thousand years, we have reason to believe that with the growth of intelligence there has been an advance on the conscience side as well as on the side of the sympathies. And I fail to see how natural selection, acting by itself as a law of evolution, should necessarily work out such a result. The final statement of ethical philosophy has been that every man should be treated as an end in himself. This we take to be the culmination in the evolution of conscience or moral sense; and I cannot conceive how any of those tendencies which have been at work evolving life for the last ten million years should ever have led to such a conception. It establishes a new standard in the survival of the fittest, from what has been the standard up to the appearance of the human race.

At the last stage, when sympathy extends to *man as man*, there is a new ideal element appearing, suggestive of something more than sympathy. It is a spiritual law. Adding up units of sympathy will not necessarily give us the recognition of man as an end in himself, as a law of conscience, any more than adding up what we know about the various elements in chemistry will give us the new features appearing in the compound when those elements are brought together. The appearance of sympathy and the expansion of the circle to which it applies may be a necessary step in the process, but this does not imply that the new factor is the same thing as sympathy.

If all that we are today has been a product of the struggle for existence in the animal kingdom, then I fail to see why it is that the standpoint of Nietzsche should not have received a spontaneous and universal welcome as soon as it was put forth. Conscience is in the way, and we should get rid of it. This is precisely the attitude we should expect would have appeared, according to the doctrine of natural selection. Why is it, then, that this standpoint should affect many of us with positive loathing or disgust? We say: This will do very well for a brute, but not for man. How is it that we should have any such feeling? Natural selection fails to account for the fact that somehow, in spite of ourselves, we admire the standpoint of the Sermon on the

Mount as an ideal, even if we may not practice it. The struggle for existence surely would have tended to develop, if anything, a feeling of contempt on the part of human nature for such an ideal. It is only explainable on the supposition of the existence of a spiritual element in man, which does not exist in the brute.

There comes a time in the development of the subjective life when man begins to see his conduct in its relations. It is no longer wholly a matter of sentiment. He is not acting merely by instinct or habit. He reaches the point where he reflects on his conduct, and may ask himself what will be the influence of his acts on those around him, or on himself. At this point he is at the verge of reaching the conception of law, *ethical* law. And the strange part of it is that, when he does come to the stage of thought, and sees conduct in such relations, his sagacity does not lead him to cast aside even the scruples he may have had before. At first, what we seem to come upon in the primitive mind is just the faint consciousness of distinction between the two kinds of conduct, the bad and the good, with the most extraordinary confusion as to what kind is the good conduct and what kind the bad conduct. The rudimentary distinction shows itself perhaps long before there is any consensus of opinion or feeling in the way it is applied. In fact, what we observe is that custom or conventionality has a great deal to do in determining how this distinction between right and wrong shall be *applied;* and the story of the evolution of conscience or the moral sense is perhaps less a series of stages of advance in the *emphasis* on the distinction between right and wrong, than it is a series of changes in the method of its application.

We need only instance the respect for life which exists at the present day. If ever there was a race of advanced intelligence in early times, it was the Greek people. They were much given to debating about good and evil, and to analyzing the experiences of conscience. Ethical philosophy began at Athens. Yet those who talked most about conscience, believed in it most fully, giving it such importance, seem to have had no profound respect for life as such. It was usual, for instance, as we know, where a father had more children then he wished, for him to put

the new arrivals out to die. Scarcely any scruple prevailed at that time among the highly intelligent people of Athens concerning such conduct. It was done as a matter of course. The short interval of two thousand years has elapsed. And now, if a man were to take such a step, whoever he might be, a jury of his peers would sentence him to death forthwith. If the act were deliberately done, there would probably be no debate on the matter at all.

Conscience existed to an extraordinary degree *in certain respects* among the Greek people. The stage of Athens was a great ethical platform or school for ethical instruction. But scruples with regard to life, and respect for life as such, had not yet developed. I suppose that a man of ordinary moral sense or intelligence in this country today, who should act on a first impulse and throw away the life of his child, might be haunted with remorse to a degree we can scarcely describe. It would not be surprising if such a person after a while were to give himself up to the law and ask to be punished for his crime.

In an act of this latter kind we see developing, along with conscience as a sentiment, a certain peculiar element of authority which would appear to be wanting in the moral sense as it shows itself in its most rudimentary or incipient phases. It is this *compelling* characteristic or element of authority which is one of the most perplexing features to explain or account for. The man who has been guilty of a crime, and voluntarily surrenders himself to justice, would seem to be acting under an influence as powerful as that of hypnotic suggestion. He is taking a course from which he shrinks, and against which the ordinary self within him will loudly rebel; but by and by that force becomes so strong that he cannot refuse to listen to it, until at last he may give up and yield to an authority in himself which he is unable to account for and which he would be glad to repudiate.

It is in the effort to explain this authoritative element in conscience that the philosophical mind has displayed its greatest acumen. But I doubt whether the effort as yet has been successful. By some persons it is accounted for as the "voice of

God" speaking directly in human consciousness. The evolutionist may undertake to explain it by a process of "heredity and natural selection," claiming that this impelling force either grows out of the fear of punishment, or else appears as a phase in the development of the sympathies.

But, whatever may have been its sources, when the impelling force of conscience speaks or acts, it is one force or one voice, rather than many forces or many voices, that we feel within ourselves. At the time when the moral sense asserts itself I do not think we are conscious of its possible complex origin. We may writhe under it, shrink from it or welcome it. But we do not at such times analyze it or take it to pieces. The man who is goaded by remorse over a crime of which he has been guilty is not relieved very much by trying to reason away his conscience. When we are quite at peace within ourselves, we may analyze it, and fancy that we have caused it by that process to dissolve and vanish out of sight; but it is pretty sure to come back again, when the occasion arises which normally calls it forth.

At the point when the moral sense, after beginning in vague scruples, finally assumes the further element of authority as a single impelling force within ourselves, we may say that the story of its evolution takes on a new character. It then becomes essentially a department in the study of the science of sociology. We come now to the great subject of heredity. Whether or not acquired traits are transmitted in the individual texture of living human creatures, we are perfectly convinced that sentiments and opinions are handed down from age to age, that there is an inheritance through the social medium of what is done or said on the part of individuals.

It is just here, of course, where the human race stands head and shoulders above the whole animal kingdom. This is one cause which leads to such a marked contrast in the story of evolution among human creatures, and which may make the process of evolution far more rapid in its workings. With the additional element of thought as the endowment of man, along with the gift of language, there has been established a new medium through which the laws of evolution may work.

In a sense, therefore, after the element of authority once has become established in connection with conscience, the story of its evolution becomes a story of its growth in this social consciousness; because it is from this social medium of public opinion that we are more or less guided in the way we apply the authority of the moral sense to the problems of life. If we were to go into this story in detail, we should be obliged to sketch out the stages of change or advance in what people have come to look upon as good conduct or evil conduct from age to age.

We might illustrate in the feeling concerning war. It is said, for instance, that Julius Cæsar slaughtered at least one million lives in the country we now call France, when he was adding that portion of Europe to the Roman empire. I am not sure that Cæsar had any scruples as to what he was doing. I do not know that he even undertook to justify himself for the course he was pursuing. It was accepted as a matter of course that a strong, powerful country would try to conquer or swallow up the weaker countries. Had there been no offense whatever given on the part of Gaul against the people of Rome, and Cæsar had proceeded to conquer that country at the cost of a million lives, it is doubtful whether he would have taken the trouble to apologize for it.

Nearly two thousand years have gone by. It is not quite sure that conscience *on the inside* has advanced from what it was in the city of Rome in those days. At any rate, we do know that under the Cæsars there was in many persons a refined moral sense. Now, on the contrary, we notice what an effort the people of a country make to show a justification for a war they are undertaking — the reasons they give, the way they go aside to study up the history of the case, and prove that they are in the right, and that the moral sense authorizes the course they are pursuing.

Whether this is a growth in conscience as such, I am not sure. But it is an extraordinary advance in the *social* consciousness. Nations have come to the point where they cannot pursue a war of aggrandizement without somehow furnishing at least superficial reasons justifying their course. If they do not do this,

they will be hampered in what they are undertaking; there will be a minority opposing them at every step with moral scruples. In a word, there has been a colossal advance in the way the moral sense is *applied* to the problems of life. And it has come within the short space of two thousand years or less.

We have already instanced the advance in the same way in the social consciousness with regard to the respect for life, or in regard to the rights of any individual who may be stricken with disease and not able to provide for himself. Think, for example, again of the astonishing change in the course of two thousand years, by which the compelling force of conscience leads us to recognize it as a principle that a fellow human creature should not be allowed to die of hunger. Would the moral sense of Athens or Rome twenty centuries ago have been disturbed if the people had learned that thousands or millions of human creatures were dying of starvation in other parts of the world? Would they have gone out of their way to send food, or medicines, or clothing to such creatures? I doubt if such a thought would have entered their minds.

See, further, how delicate and complex the problem has become with regard to the applications of conscience, when we actually hesitate about helping a poor fellow human creature, lest by giving the assistance in the wrong way we do him more harm than good. Think what it means for a man to be troubled with twinges of conscience, because from an impulse of charity, by a transient misunderstanding of his moral sense, he had given money to an unhappy creature, and then realized that the man might go and spend it in the wrong way and be further demoralized.

At times it may strike us the other way—as if there had been a reaction, as if scruples were less strong nowadays than formerly. And, in a certain sense, this is true along special lines. It takes a long while, humanly speaking, to build up a public or social sentiment with regard to the application of the moral sense to certain kinds of problems. If the social structure is going through rapid changes, the evolution of conscience, in certain forms of its application, may lag behind for a time.

Hence it is that the authority of conscience is much stronger nowadays in the conduct between one and another individual, than between one individual and a group of individuals in the form of a corporation. It astonishes us to discover how necessary it is that street-car companies should keep such a check upon their employees who collect the fares. Not one man in ten thousand of those persons would perhaps steal from another or take money from any individual human creature. Yet now and then such men have to be discharged because they have appropriated to themselves a part of the proceeds which should normally go into the treasury of the company.

It means, in substance, that a public sentiment has not yet established itself with regard to the application of conscience on the part of the individual in his conduct toward an impersonal corporation ; because such corporations are comparatively new in the social structure. It may take half a century or a whole century before there has been enough sentiment accumulating and being transmitted by inheritance in the social medium, to establish a sensitive conscience in this new direction.

It is the same with many an individual who would have no scruple about not paying his street-car fare if the conductor passes him by and fails to collect it. Yet the same person might perhaps be haunted with positive remorse if he had bought something of his grocer and failed to pay for it because the grocer forgot to charge it on the bill.

What I am saying in regard to the application of conscience to impersonal corporations is even more striking in regard to the application of conscience to our conduct in relation to the government—the city, or state, or nation—to which we belong. At first one is appalled by the lack of scruple on the part of the citizens in regard to the duty of paying taxes. But we should not forget that a very rapid change has taken place in the social structure on this score. Not many years ago taxes closely resembled what we should consider actual theft on the part of the monarch in relation to the people. In regard to what they had to pay, the people had nothing to say on the matter. Under those circumstances it was perfectly natural that there should

have been no conscience about refusing to pay what was felt to be theft or robbery, as in many instances was the actual case. Now, on the other hand, with the growth of democracy, the people have a voice in saying how they shall be taxed. But we are still heirs of the former social sentiment, where conscience authorized a defiance of the tax collector, if it could be done. It will take some time for the development of a new sentiment in regard to this matter in the application of a moral sense to the problem of paying taxes. Yet I am inclined to think that at the end of another century people will begin to have sharp twinges of conscience at smuggling in goods at the custom house, or in paying a smaller share of the taxes than is due from them.

The sudden rapid change in political institutions and in the social structure from this standpoint within the last century has really caused a temporary weakening of the authority of conscience along such special lines. The sad part of it is that such a weakening may go farther, and shake the foundations of the moral sense at their very source. It is just this fact, more than any other, which should encourage us to do all we can to build up a higher public sentiment with regard to conduct between the individual and impersonal corporations, or between the individual and his city, state, or nation. Otherwise, the whole standard of moral character may collapse.

I have dwelt on the fact that conscience, *in its higher forms*, is a comparatively new phase in evolution. The evidence for this assertion is on the surface, in the quick relapse to primitive states of feeling when certain changes occur. In war, taking the life of a fellow human creature for the time being becomes a duty. But under the influences of such rapid shifting in the applications of the moral sense, soldiers from civilized races relapse oftentimes into a state of positive savagery.

We shall by and by come to see that, if the evolution of conscience goes on, and with it the advancement of civilization, it will come only by a positive *effort* in fostering the moral sense, and being on the guard lest society take courses that may cause such a temporary step backward. When the relapse has occurred

it takes a long while to bring public sentiment or the social conscience back to the same position it held before.

The final stage, however, in the evolution of the moral sense carries us a long distance from its starting-point. It strikes me as perplexing that, when speaking of moral conduct, this is assumed to apply only to relations between one and another person. Many people would fancy that morality has no meaning save as it refers to conduct between human creatures in their relations to each other. In telling the story of morality, its growth or evolution, it is usual to describe how respect for rights took shape, and to what extent men refrained from murder, stealing, or telling lies; as if lying, stealing, or murder practically made up the whole of what we call bad conduct, against which the ethical sense is supposed to set itself. In a word, the evolution of conscience is often supposed to be only another name for the evolution of what is termed altruism, fellow-feeling, mutual good-will, and the conduct which flows from such good-will. In discussing the origin of morality, we are supposed to try to explain why man is not wholly a selfish being, or how it is to be accounted for that unselfishness got root in human nature. If we can account for this, it is often assumed that we have covered the whole subject.

But this is only half the story. The last phase in the evolution of conscience is of another kind. We have built only half our bridges by sketching out the growth of altruistic sentiment and the recognition of the commands of the decalogue. Conscience at its highest stage would seem to take on a form of egoism instead of altruism, although of a peculiar kind. It would by no means be the same egoism which prevailed at the start, when the sympathies were first getting shape and fellow-feeling was arising. It would not mean the brute self-assertiveness, the struggle of might to conquer and absorb everything for one's self.

We must take into account that the soul or the spiritual life changes as the human creature goes on advancing, and as he is gradually emancipated from the social tissue or the social consciousness. When self-conscious personality arises, the experi-

ences of the soul have another character. So long as the human creature is just a part of the social tissue, the relations to be considered in the applications of the moral sense to conduct are those between man and his fellows. If we pronounce judgment, we should say that an act was wrong because it injured another man. On the other hand, when the soul has assumed its real shape, the judgment is pronounced from another standpoint. The act might be beneficial to a fellow-creature, and yet we might decide against it. In a word, the relation from that time exists between the act, on the one hand, and the motive, purpose, impulse, or ideal, within the man himself, on the other. It would be perfectly conceivable, as we have intimated already, for a man to be guilty of a crime, and become so haunted with remorse as finally to give himself up to the punishment of the law, even though he had no religious scruples whatever. Conscience would act in such a case with reference to a man's conduct in relation to himself. We say that such a man has broken a law of his own being, that he has acted in defiance of his best self, or his true self.

Suppose the case of a man lost in a wilderness, with no hope whatever of escape for the rest of his life; left there to spend all his days in solitude. What if such an individual, in the first despair over the outlook, should give himself over to a drunken debauch — assuming he had the means for this at command.

In such a case, would conscience have anything to say, as a subjective experience? We should answer, I suppose, that it would depend on the man. Yes, beyond a doubt. But it is true — is it not? — that after that debauch was over, the individual might go through an experience of intense shame. And why? He would have broken no command of the decalogue. He would have committed no offense against his fellow-men. Would it be the moral sense speaking there? Yes, I believe it would be precisely what we term conscience. But in such a case it would be a subjective relationship. The man had broken a law of his own being — apart from any religious law he may also have defied. In a moment of despondency he had allowed himself to relapse from his manhood to the state of the brute.

There had been a surrender on the part of the *man* in him, on the part of that something in his nature which lifted him above the animal kingdom, by a superior endowment making him one of a spiritual kingdom.

If we are able to trace the entire origin of conscience to what has been going on in the animal kingdom, and to see it as the compounding of instincts which have proved useful in binding creatures together in societies, then why is it that enlightenment and intelligence should not extirpate conscience, as a burden or a bore? The very man who believes all this, and has accepted it theoretically as a philosopher, may nevertheless find himself writhing under the pangs of remorse, which he cannot extirpate. It would imply that there was something in him which his doctrine had not accounted for.

As I conceive it, when our inner, spiritual life has reached a certain stage, when the soul has come to a certain degree of its high development, the gnawings of conscience because one has been guilty of theft, or a lie, or murder, may not be because one has been guilty of a breach of fellow-feeling, or done an injury to some other person, but because one has broken a law of one's own nature. As we should express it in common language, *he has gone back on himself.* And in such cases conscience would be the voice holding the man up to his level as a man, as a member of the kingdom of men, rather than as a member of the animal kingdom.

The kingdom of souls is not the same as the kingdom of physical nature. In every living human creature there is a potential element which cuts him off from the whole brute kingdom. We can never carry development beyond a certain point with the animal creature. At a certain stage we reach a condition of arrested development. All the effort we may make will not help us any further with that creature. With the human being we are not prepared to accept the doctrine of a necessarily arrested development. The potentiality there we look upon as unlimited. If there is mystery at this point, it is only the mystery we must face, and should be proud to recognize or accept, in believing in our superiority to the brute kingdom. The

moral sense or conscience, therefore, in the final stage of soul-development or spiritual culture, is what holds the soul to its high level, or what is goading the human creature on to reach or fulfil all the capacities of his nature, *to live his life out as a member of the kingdom of souls.* In an act of theft or murder, as much as in an act of drunken debauchery, he has broken the law of a spiritual kingdom. He has committed an offense against himself or his own soul.

Once more, it strikes me, we are in the realm of the unexplainable in the story of conscience. Does the struggle for existence account for the self-loathing at the loss of one's self-respect? Can it show why a man should feel haunted, almost as with remorse, if on looking back over the past week he is aware that he has lived, *but accomplished nothing?* The gnawing sense of regret over wasted opportunity or a wasted life, over the consciousness of having possessed gifts one has not put to use, the disappointment at having lived on an inferior plane instead of rising to the full height of one's being and capacities — this surely is a phase of the moral sense. But could the coming of all this have been anticipated according to the assumed laws of evolution? Humanly speaking, *it just came!* We fail to see just what *utility* function it serves in the economy of nature. On the intellectual side, as on the sympathy side, conscience would seem as yet in its appearance to belong to the sphere of mystery. Evolution does not explain a Sartor Resartus any more than it explains a Jean Valjean.

I speak of this as the final stage, not as if it were a stage which shows itself in all people, or even in every individual among civilized races. It is the direction toward which the evolution of conscience *is tending.* True, the remorse over an act of treachery, of theft, or of meanness toward a fellow-being, is probably greater than would ensue from surrendering one's self to a drunken debauch. In the last instance one may say that one has injured no one but one's self, and that no one but one's self is concerned. Yet I am not sure but that for a highly developed human being to be guilty of such an act of meanness or treachery to a fellow human being indicates a lesser relapse

than an act of drunken debauchery would imply. From the highest standpoint the voice of conscience would speak the same with reference to either experience.

It would seem, therefore, as if it were only in the middle period of the evolution of conscience that we must turn to the science of sociology for explanation as to its history. Our relation to a social medium has been an essential step in the process. But in its highest form ethical law is not dealing with social relationships. Its one exaction is that each man *shall keep his spiritual nature untarnished.* This is what I should understand by speaking of it as "the law of one's own being." In doing this we shall, as a matter of course, recognize and obey the codes of law which connect us with our fellows. In acting against one another, by injuring one another, we should be lapsing to the stage of the brute. Spiritual forces would act as one force; competition there would have no meaning. Among *souls*, brotherhood would be the natural thing.

If I am right, then the story of evolution would tell us, as the last, crowning feature of all, that the kernel or core of all religions points in the same way: To thine own self be true. In the highest sense of the word, it would mean the same thing as being true to one's God, and true to one's fellow-men; because it would mean being true to the soul or to the highest self.

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WORK AND PLAY IN ADJUSTMENT TO THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT.

NOTES ON GROOS'S "THE PLAY OF MAN."

GROOS, in accord with current theory, distinguishes work from play by the degree of freedom which the actor feels in the initiation and continuance of his activities. One who is constrained to the performance of a certain task, who has no option in the matter, who is compelled to co-ordinate all of his powers in attaining any end, is said to be working. It is essentially the same in effect whether this compulsion is enforced from without, as when the master forces his vassal to apply himself to any undertaking, or whether it originates within as a profound need that must be ministered to in the way of securing food or clothing or shelter. When a horse is forced to run under the lash of its rider, or when he runs to escape from enemies or to get food, he is working; but when he is turned into the meadow at night and speeds away at his liveliest gait, he is playing, for he could cease acting at any moment if he chose — he feels free to do or not to do — and he is performing just for the delight of the activity itself. Again, when a hungry cat is foraging for food, it is working; there is no spontaneity, no freedom in this act; it *must* hunt; but when this feeling of coercion is lacking, and the cat is going through all the motions of the chase with a ball of yarn on the floor, simply because it finds pleasure in being active in this way, and not because it is thereby attaining ends essential to self-preservation, then this is play.

It is generally recognized that the young of practically all animals, of the higher species at any rate, perform many activities that do not appear to be directly and immediately serviceable in self-preservation; and these, Groos shows clearly enough, are for the most part but a more or less exact repetition of the serious activities of the ancestors of the animals at some period in their evolution. Often these activities constitute a rehearsal for the life which the actors will be obliged to live in maturity. The

kitten playing with the ball is perfecting itself in those mental and motor co-ordinations that are involved in the peculiar modes of chase and capture of the feline tribe in its feral state, and so it is getting ready for the serious business of finding its own food when its parents will cease to provide for it. It may happen, of course, that under domestication the kitten will not need to employ the skill it has thus gained; but nature provides against all contingencies by leading the young to rehearse the activities of their ancestors, whatever may be the environmental conditions of the present. Nature seems to have instituted the developmental epoch in ontogenesis for the purpose of recapitulating ancestral development, even though some of the activities recapitulated alienate the individual from the environment in which he is placed at the time. In some cases, of course, an animal not needing to make use of ancestral activities in serious ways will play at them beyond the developmental period. A household tabby, well fed and cared for by the hand of its mistress, will play with a ball of yarn during its entire life; and this is but typical of phenomena that may be witnessed in the conduct of all animals in domestication, and to a lesser degree in that of animals in captivity.

But the point that I want to emphasize is that all activities that can be characterized as work are done under necessity, coercion; the performer does not feel at liberty to discontinue them whenever he chooses. But all that he does over and above what he has to do may be regarded as play. Viewed from the standpoint of the race, it may be that everything the animal does is necessary to the accomplishment of some ultimate end; but, regarding the matter from the standpoint of the individual, we see that he does some things simply because he finds pleasure in the doing of them, and he is not aware that he derives any profit from them. The child playing with the doll may be getting ready for serious activities in maturity, but she is not conscious of any such end, and she feels no necessity of keeping at her play, but continues in her activities merely because of the pleasure they give her.

Now, the situations in which an animal may be placed requir-

ing serious efforts in adjustment thereto are, according to Groos, only those in which the somatic well-being of itself or its young is at stake—those relating to the obtaining of food and shelter; and in the human species clothing becomes a necessity. Most of an individual's activities in respect to these necessities will be performed in the spirit of work, while all he does over and above what is required for such adjustment will be play. The activities of courtship, for instance, are not compulsory, as are those which are involved in securing food; so they come under the head of games and plays. In human life all that one does in his intercourse with his fellows for the purpose of obtaining their approbation or good-will or admiration cannot be regarded as work, for he is perfectly free to change his course whenever he elects so to do. Approbation, good-will, admiration are not deep, vital needs like nutrition, and the individual does not feel that he must co-ordinate all his powers in attaining them. If he has time and energy left after attending to serious business, he may amuse himself with these other things; but it is optional with him to do or not to do.

Now, it appears to me that Groos does not attach sufficient importance to the serious character of social situations, in human life at any rate. He fails to allow enough for the necessity of one's adapting himself to the customs and institutions of the society in which he is placed, no matter how little he may thereby gratify any physiological need. It seems that the activities in courtship, for instance, spring out of a necessity quite as profound, whether regarded from the standpoint of the individual or of the race, as that relating to nutrition or to defense against enemies. Looking at this phenomenon as we see it in animal life, we find that the bird, for example, puts forth as much energy, perhaps, in winning its mate as it does in getting its food; it co-ordinates its powers toward the attainment of an end as fully in the one case as in the other. In both cases there is a need, the gratification of which yields pleasure, and in the attainment of which the powers are co-ordinated. It seems probable that the young man goes awooing with something of the same seriousness with which he goes to his desk or his shop,

although the emotional tone of consciousness is not just the same in both instances in the performance of the immediate activities involved. If the young man could get food, clothing, and shelter ready to hand, he would put forth no effort to obtain them; as it is, he is driven by necessity to exert himself to get them; but he can be depended upon to go awooing without any other incentive than the pleasure of the thing itself.

Yet there is really not so much greater freedom in the latter than in the former case, as is illustrated in the instance where a youth is informed by the guardian of his fiancée that he must accumulate a competence before the wedding may take place. He gives himself now to hard labor, which is drudgery in itself, and which he would avoid if he could, just as he is willing to have his father or someone else provide him with food, clothing, and shelter. In neither case do the intermediate activities, the *means*, give pleasure; but it is the products of these activities that are desired. If certain activities bring valuable products directly, the activities themselves will be endowed with a certain amount of pleasure, and be undertaken in the spirit of play; but if one's efforts are rewarded only at some remote period, they do not partake of any of the pleasurable feeling connected with the rewards, and so they are prosecuted in the spirit of work. A hungry man will set out for his boarding place with as much of spontaneity and joy as he will go awooing, because food is right at the end of the journey; and so, if he could come into the presence of the one he loves without walking five miles of a night, or if he could gain her affections without going to great pains about his attire, it is certain he would give himself no unnecessary trouble. The point is that it is the reward alone in both cases that keeps the attaining activities going; but in desk work this reward usually seems so distant that there is little pleasure in the performance of the drudgery leading thereto; while in the matter of courtship the reward is gained, at least in part, upon the expenditure of comparatively little effort. If interest should be lost in the thing to be achieved, endeavor would cease in the one case as readily as in the other, showing that it is not the endeavor itself that gives the pleasure, but the end to be realized

by it. Again, one would abandon his search for food and shelter about as soon as he would give up his visits to his lady love. Men die for love, and they can do no more for things material. A man will sacrifice comfort at any time for love; he will economize in food and things to keep himself warm in order to purchase things that may make him acceptable in the eyes of one he loves.

Looking now at certain other activities concerned with social adaptation, we find that the author classes them all under play, because they do not minister to any vital need of the organism. Social adjustment in most of its phases is to Groos never as serious and mandatory as physical adjustment; all effort to appear beautiful in the eyes of one's fellows, for example, is looked upon as excessive and playful. Take the matter of dress; we see that much energy is expended by the majority of people in making clothing ornamental, and the author thinks this is all done in the play spirit. A woman puts a good deal more time into the making of her hat than is required to render it serviceable for protection. A very simple headgear would serve this latter purpose rather better than the elaborate affairs now commonly worn, and much of the effort expended on hats is spontaneous, and this gives it the aspect of play. Now, it seems doubtful whether in human society as it is a woman regards the earning of her daily bread as any more serious or requiring greater concentration of powers than the securing of appropriate attire—appropriate in the sense that it must conform to the æsthetic ideals of the community in which she is placed. It is highly probable that it is of greater consequence to have a dress æsthetic than to have it warm or hygienic; it would be easier to put up with cold than with ugly clothing. Who will say that a woman preparing for a ball does not work over her gown in as true a sense as does the woman whose only motive in making a wardrobe is to protect herself from the elements or to earn money? The one woman is not less serious and constrained than the other; the social demand is just as urgent, it seems, as the physical demand, and the individual knows that if he does not heed it he will suffer pains and penalties much as if he had

run athwart some natural law. The point is that in civilized human society the necessity for growing into harmony with the social environment in the matter of dress, as an instance, is about as pressing as the necessity of growing into harmony with the physical environment in the matter of food. Of course, there are those who can ignore their social environment in this regard and apparently be happy, but so are there those who can deny themselves food and offset the pains of hunger with the pleasure of being masters of the situation. The two cases are much alike; the man who does not conform to social requirements in matters æsthetic offsets the pain of isolation and criticism by the consciousness that he is doing his duty, or that he is preserving his independence; or in some way he finds compensation for the unhappiness he brings upon himself.

Look now at the person who "puts on airs" in any community; he will give more attention to his dress than anyone else about him, and it may be said that he is doing this in the play rather than in the work spirit. But here again he is seeking to attain a certain definite end toward which he co-ordinates all his powers in a serious manner. He is striving to gratify an instinct about as profound as that concerned with the getting of food. The states of consciousness accompanying the choosing of a dress and working in an office are not so different in respect of the feeling of freedom and the pleasure accompanying the activities. There is an underlying feeling of necessity in both cases; the one seems to be as binding as the other.

Groos seeks to put all the activities that relate to æsthetic production into the category of play. He sees that men put more time upon almost everything they construct than is required to make it *useful.* For instance, a chandelier is always ornamented in some fashion, when a rod of plain iron would have served as well to hold the lights. All this extra activity, according to Groos, would come under the head of play, because it is not absolutely required; individuals do these things because they find pleasure in the activities themselves. But this is certainly overstating the case. The author has ignored a certain very real and vital need which is gratified by artistic creation.

Psychologists say that some kinds of forms are more pleasurable than others, and those that are the most pleasurable exert the best influence upon the organism. Beautiful things elevate the tone of one's whole life, while ugliness depresses it. Then it becomes a need, hardly less urgent than that of getting food, to surround one's self with forms which will exalt life to the highest possible point. It is not optional with the individual to choose between the beautiful and the ugly; his choice will not be indifferent in its effects upon him; what he does will at once determine his well-being, and he chooses, of course, so as to obtain the greatest amount of pleasure. And the man who creates the beautiful things does so to gratify this need which all feel. He is not playing, nor is the patron who buys his work playing.

View it as one may, he sees that the relationships of human beings in civilized society are not the same in all respects as those of the animal living in the forest, and one will surely go astray if he seeks to make the principle of action of animal life explain all that is found in human life. The evolution of a social organism such as ours today has developed in the individual social needs hardly less urgent than his physical ones, and all the activities having for their aim the gratification of these social needs should be regarded as of a serious, workful character, though they may be performed in a spontaneous and joyous manner. The refining of the human organism so that it becomes more and more responsive to influences on the æsthetic side again gives rise to needs which the individual seeks to gratify by co-ordinating his powers in a serious way. And it seems highly probable that with the evolutions of the race social and æsthetic demands will be even greater relatively than they are now, and the organic demands of the average individual will occupy a less and less prominent place in his daily life. The feeling of compulsion in providing for these social needs is not precisely of a kind with that relating to the gratification of organic needs, but it is none the less real and insistent. Indeed, it is not unreasonable to say that the fulfilling of obligations in modern society involves greater strain and stress than attending to one's physical

wants. The average man, if left perfectly free to do as he chose, would go hunting or fishing rather than present himself at some social function, say a reception. And when one thinks of some of the more serious social activities which Groos would class as play, such as dressing in fashion, having as good a house as one's neighbor, educating his children as well, holding membership in as high-toned clubs, and so on, he can appreciate that these make as heavy demands upon the will as tilling the soil, keeping books, or directing a bank, or preaching, or instructing a class of students. In general, the latest activities in racial evolution are hardest for the individual; the lines of least resistance run in the direction of the primitive pastimes of the race, especially if these have persisted for a long time.

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THE HORSESHOERS' STRIKE OF PHILADELPHIA.[1]

LABOR has found the union its most effective weapon in wringing unwilling concessions from the hands of capital; while capital has, in turn, found association or agreement the most effective means of resisting what it deems the unreasonable demands of labor. But, in a competitive system, the temptation to disregard agreements for the sake of personal aggrandizement is much greater for capital than for labor. Although done with all outward show of good faith, such breaches of contract are sure to be discovered sooner or later, causing dissent among those who could otherwise unite for a common cause. Labor always profits by this dissent. Such was the situation among the horseshoers of Philadelphia in June of the present year, which resulted in a strike of the journeymen. Though purely local, this strike is, nevertheless, of much interest to all who are concerned with labor problems.

The strike was begun on June 9, 1902, by the Journeymen Horseshoers, Local No. 6, against the Master Horseshoers' Protective Association, Local No. 23. The strike lasted over a week, in which time both parties were in constant conference. Before entering into the causes of the strike and the demands of the strikers, it may be well to give a few words in explanation of the classes of men engaged in the horseshoers' trade. A complete shop includes a master, journeymen, and apprentices. The masters and journeymen are organized in unions, while the apprentices join the ranks of the journeymen as their term of apprenticeship expires.

THE MASTER HORSESHOERS' PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION.

The Master Horseshoers' Protective Association is an incorporated body which was organized under the laws of Pennsyl-

[1] For the facts contained in this article the writer is indebted to Professor John W. Adams, of the University of Pennsylvania, a member of the Master Horseshoers' Protective Association, and chairman of their committee to settle the strike.

vania in June, 1893, and reorganized in November, 1897. Now, a "master" is simply an employing horseshoer paying wages to men under him; but to be eligible to the association he must, according to the constitution, have worked at the trade and served the required term of apprenticeship. These qualifications, however, are not always strictly insisted upon; for a widow of a master horseshoer is allowed to continue his business by paying the regular dues of the association. Again, Professor John W. Adams, of the University of Pennsylvania, represents as a master horseshoer the "shop" of the Veterinary School, an institution which was obliged to join the association as the result of the adoption of a stamp by the National Horseshoers' Protective Association in 1898. The use of this stamp is regulated by the by-laws of the local association. Thus, the members of the association are not permitted to drive or tighten shoes that have not been put on and stamped by a member of the association. The stamp, however, can be put upon new shoes only at the time they are fitted, and a heavy penalty is imposed upon any member keeping stamped shoes in stock. In addition to the stamp of the national association, each member must stamp his own name on each shoe which is put on a horse in his shop. The object of the stamp is to be able to discriminate against non-union shops. Thus, if a horse shod in a non-union shop should lose a shoe and be taken by his owner to a union shop to have the shoe replaced, the union shop will refuse to do the work. But union men will gladly put on one or more new shoes bearing their own stamp.

The preamble of the constitution of the masters' association states that "one of the grand objects" of the association is to rescue their trade from the conditions into which it has fallen; to elevate themselves to that condition in society to which they, as mechanics, hold themselves justly entitled; to place themselves on a foundation sufficiently strong to secure themselves from further encroachments; and to elevate the conditions of their industry in Philadelphia and vicinity.

Further objects of their association are set forth in Art. II of the constitution, as follows:

OBJECTS.

SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting concert of action amongst our members relative to reforming present methods of competing for work and adopting a uniform scale of prices.

SEC. 2. To eliminate from our ranks all incompetent hands who bring discredit upon our trade, much to our injury.

SEC. 3. To assist and encourage each other in business necessitates ever being actuated by the peculiarities of brotherhood, which bind us together in a common cause.

SEC. 4. To enjoy the advantages of mutual improvement and aim to elevate the craft generally; to decide all differences that may arise in and between our members, and in general to determine and to decide upon all customs and usages affecting the trade or business interests of the craft. The decisions of this association thall be subject to an appeal to the National Horseshoers' Protective Association.

The real cause for the formation of the association was that stated in the preamble. For ruinous competition had so lowered the price of shoeing that there was little profit in the trade. The formation of the association did much to promote the objects of its incorporation, but the journeymen were not slow to see that, as employees, they could also materially better their own condition by concerted action in an organized union.

THE JOURNEYMEN HORSESHOERS.

Journeymen horseshoers are divided into two classes, viz., floormen and firemen. A "floorman" works on the floor, receives the horse when it enters the shop, removes the old shoes, prepares the hoof for the new shoes, and drives the new shoes. The chief duties of a "fireman" are choosing and fitting machine-made shoes, or making new shoes from the "bar" and fitting them.

In order to be eligible as a journeyman horseshoer one must have served an apprenticeship of four years and be able to command minimum wages. For the past two years the journeymen horseshoers in Philadelphia have received the following minimum wages by agreement with the masters as the result of a former strike: Floormen receive a minimum wage of $2.75 per day, and firemen a minimum wage of $3 per day. Men working both on the floor and at the fire, as they are compelled to do in

the smaller shops, receive a minimum of $3 per day. Furthermore, the masters agreed to employ none but union journeymen. This promise, the journeymen maintain, has not been kept by all union shops, and there has been some talk among them of adopting a stamp to be used on all shoes made or put on by union men. The effect of such a stamp would be to render the masters' stamp useless, for by its use the journeymen would at once be aware of the employment of non-union men in the masters' shops. They would then refuse to work on horses wearing shoes that did not bear the journeymen's stamp, regardless of whether they bore the masters' or not. Many of the masters feared that this would be the next move of the journeymen in case they should come out victorious in the strike here under consideration, and this partly accounts for the way in which the final settlement was made.

THE DEMANDS OF THE JOURNEYMEN.

The demands of the journeymen horseshoers in the present strike may be divided into major demands and lesser demands. The former are chiefly concerned with the hours of labor, upon which the journeymen refused to compromise. They demanded a nine-hour working day with a half holiday on Saturdays during the months of June, July, and August, and that the shops close at 4 P. M. on Saturday during the remainder of the year. They asked no increase in wages, but were content with their present wages at the reduced hours asked for.

Among their lesser demands they insisted that fifty cents an hour should be paid for all overtime work, for every hour or fraction thereof. They refused to do any overtime work during the hot months. Overtime work was to be allowed only during the time of "sharpening" (sharpening consists in welding sharp calks on the shoes, when ice and snow frequently render this necessary to prevent slipping). The journeymen also asked that they be allowed one day in each year (in common) as an outing day.

All that the Philadelphia journeymen demanded had already been granted to journeymen horseshoers in New York, Chicago, Baltimore, Cleveland, Cincinnati, and Columbus, O. And so the

local union of Philadelphia naturally felt that its demands were reasonable and just.

A month before the strike was ordered, printed notices were sent to all the masters in the city, comprising about two hundred and seventy-five shops, notifying them of the demands of the journeymen and giving them a month in which to comply with the same, or to meet them in conference and arbitrate their differences. All of the shops in the city, except about twenty-five, refused outright to consider the notice. Now, the journeymen's union controls about eight hundred men, or about nine-tenths of the men engaged in their trade. When the time expired, and their demands remained unheeded, a general strike was ordered, and all the journeymen were called out except in the twenty-five shops whose masters had signed the demands. The masters' union quickly convened and brought pressure to bear on these shops, under penalty of heavy fine, to retract their position. This brought all but one or two shops into line, and the journeymen in these shops were then quickly called out.

Thus the situation remained for a week, with all the shops (except the "scabs," which numbered about twenty-five) tied up, doing only such work as the masters and their apprentices could do, which was little enough, as some of them are unable to shoe a horse. The masters remained resolute in the belief that the journeymen would soon flock back to work, because of the fact that the highest-paid journeymen were averse to the strike. Their hopes were not realized, but they decided to hold out and import new men. An outside agent agreed to place forty new men in the shops under the condition that they should be employed permanently and not be turned off as soon as the strike was over. These men were not brought in, however, for the testimony of those who had employed men sent to them in this emergency was so unfavorable that the wisdom of a wholesale importation of new men was seriously questioned. The experience of those who had imported new men was like that in most strikes where the same expedient has been resorted to, viz.: the new men were either incapable or were quickly drawn into the union and the strike. The journeymen were busy proselyting, and even drew

many of the men from the local "scab" shops into their union; and, encouraged by their success when the strike was on, they refused to compromise, but insisted that their original demands be granted *in toto*. And the fact that the better shops were desirous of granting the demands of the journeymen at once caused dissent among the masters themselves. The majority of the masters, however, were averse to giving in, and the reasons ascribed for their holding out show that the masters' association has failed to carry out one of the chief objects for which it was incorporated (see above, sec. 1). Two years ago the masters adopted a scale of prices for shoeing, claiming that they were forced to raise prices because of the increase in the price of iron and the greater wages they were obliged to pay their men. The scale of prices adopted was as follows: work horses, full set of shoes (rough shoeing), $2; coach horses, full set of shoes, with or without heel and toe calks, $2.50; light driving horses, shoes, $3 per set; and special shoes, such as bar shoes, $0.75 each. These prices, however, have not been uniformly maintained. Rebates are quite general, being made in the form of cash rebates to firms or corporations having a large number of horses. Rebates of one-fifth to coachmen have also become so common that the coachman demands it as his just due. And if his employer should insist upon his horses being shod where the rebate is not given, the coachman employs every means possible to demonstrate to his employer that the workmanship in that particular shop is very inferior. He loosens shoes or actually goes to the extreme of rendering a horse lame to prove his point, until his employer, tired of being annoyed, tells him to take the horses wherever they can be shod right. This is only one of the ways in which the coachman exploits his employer. He does it everywhere—at the horse market, the carriage shop, the harness shop, the feed store, etc.

The better shops maintain the scale of prices, and were willing to concede the demands of the journeymen; and they openly accuse those who hold out of doing cheap shoeing or of giving large rebates. For, if they grant the demands of the journeymen, they will have to maintain the scheduled prices in order to

work at a profit, and they know that as soon as they refuse to give rebates much of their trade will go elsewhere. Thus it is evident that there is an outside and an inside force at work to compel the masters to live up to the rules of their own organization or disband.

After long discussion and debate the masters agreed in committee to recommend as a basis of agreement and compromise to settle the strike upon the following terms: The hours of labor should be ten every day but Saturday. The shops should close at 1 P. M. on Saturdays during the months of June, July, August, and September, and at 4 P. M. on Saturday the rest of the year. The men were to receive only *pro rata* pay for overtime for the first hour, and fifty cents for every additional hour or fraction thereof. No overtime work would be asked of the men except during "sharpening." The holiday demanded by the journeymen would be granted, provided that hereafter the journeymen would choose for their outing the same day as the one provided for the masters in the constitution of their association, in order that the shops would not have to be closed on two different days. This report of the committee was unanimously agreed upon by the masters in meeting. And the committee was instructed to appear before the assembled journeymen and present their recommendations as agreed upon. The committee appeared before the journeymen the next day, and, after presenting arguments in its favor, the recommendation was read and the committee retired.

In a few minutes the journeymen reported to them through a committee of five that the recommendations of the masters had been considered in detail and rejected *in toto*. The nine-hour day was the chief thing that the journeymen were determined to win. The committee of the masters, having power to act, proposed further concessions, which amounted to conceding all of the demands of the journeymen, but deferring the time when they should go into operation. They argued that their patrons would suffer much inconvenience unless sufficient time was given to acquaint them of the new schedule. Accordingly they agreed to settle the strike on the following basis: That the hours of

labor should be ten for the first five days of the week, with a half holiday on Saturday, until August 1, 1902, after which the hours of labor were to be nine daily, with a half holiday on Saturday during June, July, and August, and the shops to close at 4 P. M. on the remaining Saturdays of the year. All overtime was to be paid according to the demands of the journeymen. The annual holiday was conceded without specifying when it should be taken. These propositions were presented to the journeymen and rejected within fifteen minutes. The chairman of their committee suggested to the chairman of the masters' committee that if the propositions just rejected were made to go into operation July 15, instead of August 1, he was quite sure they would be accepted by the journeymen, as they deemed a month's time enough for the masters to notify their patrons of the new schedule. Upon this, however, the masters could come to no agreement. But the larger shops, anxious to concede the demands of the journeymen and begin work on Monday, June 16, decided to act individually. Nor were threats of penalty for so doing effective. Finally, to prevent a breakup of the masters' union itself, it was necessary to pass a resolution that no fines or penalties should be imposed upon those masters who wished to sign the agreement with the journeymen and begin work. But they were urged to do with as few men as possible, so as to compel as many journeymen as possible to remain out of employment. It was decided that the demands of the journeymen should not be signed by the president and secretary, but each master left to act for himself. The result was that the agreement was soon signed by all of the shops that had been in favor of doing so from the first; and a majority of the others soon found themselves obliged to do the same in order to hold their trade, as no shoeing had been done in the city for a week. Thus the short-sighted policy of those masters who favored holding out resulted only in keeping their shops closed without profit, whereas they might have gained a month at the old schedule, had they been willing to allow their own recommendations to go into effect July 15.

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AN INQUIRY INTO THE CAUSES OF THE DECREASE OF THE HAWAIIAN PEOPLE.

"Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth." These words, according to the philosophical writer of the first chapter of Genesis, the Creator addressed to the first parents of the human race. One of the most notable exceptions to the law of life here implied may be observed in the later history of the Hawaiian Islands. The Hawaiian people, after multiplying, and replenishing their islands in the Pacific, have been decreasing steadily for more than one hundred years.

When Captain Cook discovered Hawaii, 1778–79, he and Mr. King estimated the population at 400,000. When Vancouver, who had accompanied Cook, revisited the islands in 1792, "the depopulation throughout the group . . . . struck him painfully." The missionaries arrived in 1820. Three years later they estimated the number of inhabitants at 142,000. In 1832 the first official census was taken, and from that time the census returns are as follows:

	1832	1836	1850	1853	1860
Hawaiian and part Hawaiian -	130,313	108,579	82,203	71,019	67,084

	1866	1872	1878	1884	1890	1896
Hawaiian - - - -	57,125	49,994	44,088	40,014	34,436	31,019
Part Hawaiian - - -	1,640	1,487(?)	34,420	4,218	6,186	8,485
Total - - - -	58,765	51,481	47,508	44,232	40,622	39,504

The number of the native population is not given in the census returns of 1900 thus far available; it has been estimated at 38,000.

The decrease of the Hawaiian people has been dealt with in almost every book that has been written about the islands. Of these numerous treatments that of Professor Blackman in *The Making of Hawaii*, although in some respects defective—owing apparently to the author's overconfidence in his authorities—is undoubtedly the best. A number of interesting articles have also appeared on the subject, notably one by Rev. A. Bishop in

the *Hawaiian Spectator*, 1838; one by David Malo, the native historian, *Hawaiian Spectator*, 1839; and another by Rev. S. E. Bishop read before the Social Science Association of Honolulu in 1888.

As the causes of this decrease have varied at different times, I shall deal with them during two separate periods, taking 1820, the year of the arrival of the missionaries, as the dividing line.

In the first period, from the discovery of Cook to the arrival of the missionaries, the decrease was not so great as the figures just given would indicate. The estimate of King is now universally conceded to have been too high; 300,000 would have been more correct. When Vancouver returned in 1792, the natives did not gather around the ships in such numbers as formerly, partly because white men had somewhat ceased to be objects of curiosity, and partly because Vancouver, refusing to sell firearms, was not favorably received. Hence the difference in population seemed to him to be greater than it really was. Nevertheless, the decrease during the first period must have been excessive. The chief causes were three: infanticide, war, and pestilence.

1. Among every people, whether savage or civilized, infanticide to a greater or less extent has always existed—some small communities, perhaps, for short periods, excepted. But among the Hawaiians it became a social custom, for the following reasons: In former times the Polynesian race inhabited many small islands in the Pacific. Living in a state of nature, in a congenial climate, they were a vigorous people, peaceable, and practically free from disease. They soon stocked their island homes. The only alternatives then before them—being destitute of metals or the physical conditions of progress—were famine, inter-tribal warfare, or limitation of births. The first meant extinction. The second was tried, with greater or less success. And the third was generally adopted as the method best suited to the temperament of the people and to the conditions of their existence. It became a social institution, essential, in that state of society, to race-preservation.

It might be supposed, perhaps, that after the settlement in Hawaii infanticide would cease, on these islands, as being no

longer necessary. But it must be remembered that the immigrants had the new land to subdue, that they had very inferior tools — and no possible way, from their own resources, of acquiring better ones — and that they had a most oppressive system of government. Consequently the majority of the people would still find that life was by no means easy. Moreover, infanticide was now a long-established custom. It probably ceased among the chiefs at this time, for they could get the means of subsistence without difficulty. But among the lower classes, while its frequency might diminish, it would not be likely to disappear entirely.

The missionaries have usually estimated that among the common people about two-thirds of all the children were put to death, either before or after birth. But again it should be noted that when the missionaries landed society was in an abnormal, if not degenerate, state. The islanders had just emerged from the Kamehameha wars. Many thousands of the inhabitants had been killed by the weapons supplied by traders from Christian countries. Conquest was followed by confiscation. And war had brought forth its natural children — poverty, vice, and misery. It is not to be supposed that in the normal state of Hawaiian society infanticide was practiced to anything like the extent represented by the missionaries. Cook does not seem to have been aware of its existence; and regarding parental love he testifies: "It was pleasing to observe with what affection the women managed their infants, and with what alacrity the men contributed their assistance to such a tender office." The fact that infanticide was practiced is perhaps a proof of the fertility, peaceableness, and healthiness of the people, rather than of their indolence or wantonness.

2. In early times wars were evidently not frequent in Hawaii, or else not severe. The natives in disposition were extremely mild, like the climate in which they lived. Besides, they had practically no destructive weapons. But Cook's seamen taught them the effectiveness of firearms and the superiority of civilized warfare to savage. Always quick to learn, so far as they had opportunities, the Hawaiians soon adopted the new mode of

fighting. Then their wars became bloody, and helped materially to diminish the population.

3. Knowledge, like that acquired in the Garden of Eden, has ever been of two kinds, good and evil. In like manner, civilization has always carried death as well as enlightenment to primitive peoples. Besides useful metals and domestic animals, pestilence soon found entrance to the "Paradise of the Pacific." In what way this species of Satan on several occasions gained admittance, we are not fully informed. Rev. J. G. Paton, in his autobiography, tells how in 1860 pestilence was introduced to one of the islands of the New Hebrides. Three ship captains, after putting on shore at different ports of Tanna four young men ill with measles, invited a chief, Kapuku, on board one of the vessels, promising to give him a present. They then confined him for twenty-four hours, without food, in the hold among measles-stricken patients, after which they put him on shore with the disease as the only present. This gift was as fatal to the Tannese as was the wooden horse to the Trojans. "The measles thus introduced spread fearfully, and decimated the population of the island. In some villages men, women, and children were stricken down together, and none could give food or water to the sick or bury the dead." There is little doubt that pestilence has, at times, found entrance to Hawaii in a somewhat similar manner, and for a similar purpose—"to sweep [the inhabitants] away and let white men occupy the soil." In 1804 an epidemic, commonly thought to have been the plague, was brought to the islands by foreigners—though in what particular manner is not now known. An epidemic when it makes its first appearance in a community is most fatal, owing partly to the susceptibility of the people and partly to their inexperience in treating it. Concerning this one David Malo related: "In the reign of Kamehameha, from the time I was born until I was nine years old, the pestilence visited the Hawaiian Islands, and the majority of the people from Hawaii to Niihau died."

Under pestilence may be included venereal disease, because of its ravages and the rapidity with which it spread when first introduced. It was unknown among the natives until 1778.

Captain Cook commanded that "all female visitants should be excluded from both the ships," in order that "he might prevent, if possible, the importation of a dangerous disease into this island," which he knew some of his men then "labored under." But Cook was received as the long-expected and venerated god Lono; and the natives were enraptured on seeing the ships contain large quantities of iron—a metal they had already learned to prize more highly than silver or gold, from some small pieces that had drifted ashore haphazard on wreckage. A council having been held to determine how to obtain iron, it was decided that the best method would be to propitiate the "god." The Hawaiians offered the best of everything they had—"hogs, vegetables, kapa, and women;" and, according to all native accounts, Cook himself accepted as his companion for the night the daughter of the highest chiefess on the island. It was a costly sacrifice to the self-interested worshipers. Within a year the disease imparted by the guests to their too hospitable entertainers had spread from one end of the group to the other. Malo's statement regarding the plague of 1804 may be exaggerated, but there is no question that throughout this period pestilence and disease decimated the population.

During the second period, from 1820 to the present time, two of the causes above mentioned—infanticide and war—may be said to have been inoperative. The few revolutions and rebellions that have taken place were almost bloodless; and infanticide, owing to the disappearance of the economic ground for it, as well as to the teaching of the missionaries, has practically ceased. Some new causes, however, have arisen.

From 1820, or even earlier, to almost the present time, the decrease of the Hawaiian people has come about through the twofold process of a small number of births and a large number of deaths in proportion to population. Thus, according to Jarves, in 1839, on the island of Kauai, with a population of 8,853 (8,754?), including 3,070 adult women, there were only 65 women who had three or more children each; and in 1840, in the district of Ewa, Oahu, with a population of 2,792, there were 132 deaths, but only 61 births.

1. In an article in the *Hawaiian Spectator*, 1838, Rev. A. Bishop stated that "more than half who enter the marriage state do not bear children," and that "perhaps not one in four of the families now existing have children of their own alive." These assertions, although doubtless exaggerated, must be regarded as having a foundation in fact. Unfruitfulness prevailed, at least to a limited extent, previous to 1820, and seems to have increased for some time after that date. Its cause is unknown. Licentiousness is not a satisfactory explanation. Promiscuity along with disease will account for it only in part. It may be said of course that, under certain conditions, a low birth-rate is in accordance with a general law of life — applicable to plants and animals as well as to human beings: that when living organisms change, beyond a certain degree, their conditions and habits of life, their powers of reproduction deteriorate. Why this should be perhaps no reason can be given, except the very general one — which after all explains nothing — that the lack of adjustment which arises between the individual and its environment, consequent on its rapid transition from a natural to an artificial, or from a less artificial to a more artificial, mode of life, affects prejudicially its reproductive powers. The Hawaiians in a very few years came in contact with civilization at almost every point, and they were apt pupils. They took everything offered. In fact, it might be said that they adopted too quickly civilization, such as was presented to them. Thus the chiefs, that class of the people who first came under the influence of civilization and accepted it most fully, were the ones who became childless soonest, and who disappeared most rapidly.

2. The causes of the large death-rate are in brief two — vice and disease. For both of these, people of Christian nations are largely to blame. In 1839 Malo stated that licentiousness was one of the chief causes of the decrease of population. Disease arising from this vice, he asserted, "has become prevalent among the people, and even children, and all the people of the islands are miserably diseased; . . . . Foreigners have lent their whole influence to make the Hawaiian Islands one great brothel." This statement is borne out by the facts. In 1826 Lieutenant John

Percival, of the United States schooner "Dolphin," "the mischief-making man-of-war," arrived at Honolulu. When he learned that a law was in force which, he said, "deprived [the seamen] of an enjoyment they had always been in participation of when they visit this island," he demanded an interview with Kaahumanu, the queen regent, in order to have it abrogated. Not having been successful in his object, a few days later he returned and said to her, according to the account of Rev. H. Bingham, snapping his fingers and clinching his fists: "Tomorrow I will give my men rum; look out: they will come for women; and if they do not get them, they will fight. My vessel is just like fire." On the following day, Sunday, the sailors landed in force, attacked and partially wrecked the house of the prime minister, also that of the missionary, and would probably have beaten Mr. Bingham to death had he not been rescued by the natives. The chiefs were thus intimidated. Women were taken off to the ships. And Lieutenant Percival and his men remained three months in the harbor of Honolulu.

In 1838 the Hawaiian government passed a law forbidding the importation of "rum, brandy, gin, ale, and all distilled spirits whatsoever," except in small quantities, with the consent of the governor, for medicinal or mechanical purposes—the home manufacture of distilled spirits had previously been prohibited. But in the following year Captain Laplace of the French frigate "Artémise" arrived, and presented a treaty for the king's signature. Should the king and chiefs refuse to sign this document, Laplace declared in his manifesto, "war will immediately commence, and all the devastations, all the calamities, which may be the unhappy but necessary results, will be imputed to themselves alone, and they will also pay the losses which the aggrieved foreigners, in these circumstances, shall have a right to reclaim.' Soon the treaty was signed. Immediately Laplace presented another treaty, one of the articles of which provided that French merchandise, "and particularly wines and brandy, cannot be prohibited, and shall not pay an import duty higher than 5 per cent. *ad valorem*." This treaty was brought to the king at five o'clock in the afternoon, and he was required to sign it by break-

fast time the next morning. When the semi-civilized monarch protested against the wrong being done to his country, and pictured the evils that would result therefrom to his people, Laplace replied: "*Civilization eat up the savage.*" This treaty also was signed. A few months latter a vessel belonging to the French consul brought to Honolulu a cargo of liquor and, characteristically enough, a Roman Catholic bishop and two priests, thus helping to establish in the minds of the natives that peculiar connection between "the spiritual" and "the spirituous" which has so often been observed in the dealings of civilized peoples with uncivilized.

The English, too, have contributed their share to "eat up the savage." Lord Paulet, in command of H. M. S. "Carysfort," arrived in Honolulu in 1843, and, in keeping with other commanders of the time, immediately made out a list of demands. With these Kamehameha III. could not comply, and was obliged, in order to avoid war, to make a provisional cession of his kingdom to the crown of Great Britain. One of the articles of the treaty of cession declared that the laws then existing "shall be in full force so far as natives are concerned," until the receipt of communications from England. But, in violation of this provision, the law against fornication was soon abolished. "During the six months previous to its abrogation," said Mr. Damon, seamen's chaplain at Honolulu, "I am bold to assert that, in proportion to the number of seamen visiting this port, a higher regard for purity and morality did not exist in any port this side Cape Horn or the Cape of Good Hope. Since the force of the law has been restrained, the tide has changed. . . . . Boatloads of lewd women have been seen going and returning from vessels which have recently touched at this harbor for supplies. The law is prostrate—the arm of the law is paralyzed—the officers of justice permitted to witness iniquity, but forbidden to arrest the guilty offenders. The most disgusting scenes are to be seen at noonday in the streets of Honolulu and around certain places of resort. . . . . Landsmen as well as seamen have taken advantage of this state of public morals." I have mentioned a few of the acts of government officials only, when in the employ-

ment of their respective countries. The deeds of injustice done, the outrages committed, the crimes perpetrated by irresponsible seamen, when ten thousand of them annually frequented the islands, and when it was proverbial that "God did not rule west of America," would not bear recital. Foreigners had lent their whole influence, said Malo, who knew whereof he spake, "to make the Hawaiian Islands one great brothel."

Under such a state of things as that which prevailed generally in Hawaii, the diseases of civilization, when first introduced, made sad havoc among the careless children of nature. The pestilence of 1804 has already been mentioned. In 1848–49 measles, whooping cough, diarrhœa, and influenza carried off, it is estimated, more than ten thousand persons. And a few years later, in 1853, smallpox caused in eight months 2,485 deaths. To the inevitable evils — lack of care, poor houses, unsuitable clothing, improper food, ignorance of natural law, etc. — were added the artificial evils of civilization. These combined burdens were too much for the Hawaiian people to bear, as indeed they would have been too much for any race of human beings. Well might David Malo exclaim: "The kingdom is sick — it is reduced to a skeleton — and is near to death; yea, the whole Hawaiian nation is near to a close."

The evils of civilization, in so far as they have affected the Hawaiian people, have almost invariably been regarded as arising from commerce. This view, however, is very inadequate. Commerce and missions are the two great pioneer forces of civilization. But, while there is much good in each, there is also some evil. Each has been an instrument of progress and an instrument of decline; each, like the Levitical law, has contained blessings and cursings, bestowing life with one hand and dealing death with the other. But, while the evils of commerce have always been freely acknowledged, those of missions have invariably been ignored. To most missionaries, however, it might well be said: "Physician, heal thyself." The claim is not now made, of course, that the missions in Hawaii have been an evil, nor that they have done more harm than good; but merely that they were by no means an unmixed good; that in certain

respects they have contributed an element toward the decrease of the population. A few instances will make this sufficiently clear. The New England theology was not adapted to the Anglo-Saxon, much less was it suited to the Hawaiian. The civilization which the missionaries thrust upon the Hawaiians was the mongrel offspring of a fossil theology and a *laissez-faire* economics. And, as might have been expected, the result was disastrous to the simple-minded natives. The missionaries taught them by precept how to lay up treasure in heaven; and the missionaries' children taught them by example how to lay up earthly treasure. Unfortunately, however, while the field of operation in the former case was infinite, in the latter it was exceedingly limited. Hence it resulted that the pupils, ere they had their lessons properly learned, discovered that there was but little opportunity on their own islands to put the two sets of principles into practice, and still continued to hasten with painful rapidity toward the heavenly land.

And as the missionaries' theology and economics were not suited to the needs of the aborigines, neither was their theory of education. In the second quarterly report of the Boarding School at Wailuku, established in 1837 for the education of girls, we read: "The instructors feel that they have great occasion for gratitude to God for his special favors during the term. . . . . Near the close of the term the Holy Spirit was graciously sent down upon the seminary. Nearly all the little girls seemed to be more or less convicted of sin, of their ruined condition, and of their need of mercy." A few weeks afterward nearly all the little girls were seriously ill. Five died — 12 per cent. of the total number in attendance during the year — and many others were obliged to leave school. The educational process of convicting the children of sin seems to have been continued the next year, for according to Dibble, the missionary historian, there were "much seriousness" and "considerable sickness." During the third year "sickness made more alarming ravages than in any previous year. Five died. Twelve left on account of sickness, of whom a part died, but the greater number recovered." Dr. Judd, the missionary physician, was then called in; he recommended less

confinement and more exercise in the open air. But Dibble characteristically remarked: "It seems impossible to restrain [the pupils] from rude and romping behavior and to confine them to those exercises deemed more proper for females, without serious injury to health. To acquire at once habits of civilization, according to our notions of it, was evidently attended with great risk." A pious visitor who saw the boys eat dinner at Lahainaluna Seminary related: "The meal was taken in perfect silence—rather a difficult requirement for a Hawaiian, but only the more necessary to be observed from their extremely loquacious habits." Even Ellis, one of the most liberal and broad-minded of missionaries, after giving an account of the games and amusements of the Tahitians, added: "With the exception of one or two, they have all, however, been discontinued, especially among the adults; and the number of those followed by the children is greatly diminished. This is, on no account, matter of regret." In 1836 the king and fourteen of the high chiefs and chiefesses of Hawaii, in a petition to the A. B. C. F. M. asking for more teachers, said: "These are the teachers whom we would specify: a carpenter, tailor, mason, shoemaker, wheelwright, papermaker, typefounder, agriculturists . . . . ; cloth manufacturers, and makers of machinery . . . . ; and a teacher of the chiefs in what pertains to the land according to the practice of enlightened countries." Unnecessary to say, the request was not granted, "nor was a compliance deemed of vital importance" by Rev. Dr. Anderson, the foreign secretary of the board. When the Hawaiian people asked bread of their Christian brothers, they were not indeed given a stone, but food which was indigestible. Naturally they died.

Now it may be asked: What of the future? Will the "dying out" process continue to the end? Jarvis in 1843—and again Anderson in 1863—gave figures and reasons tending to show that the crisis was then past, and that soon the tide of life would return. These anticipations, however, were not realized. Nevertheless, at the present time, there are several circumstances which indicate, as never before, an enlarged and useful future for the Hawaiian people. Most significant is the fact that many of

the causes of the decrease in the population have now ceased, and almost all the others are gradually disappearing.

1. In the first place, the transition from the old conditions to the new have in large measure been effected; and, perhaps as a result of this, the birth-rate, as compared with that of sixty years ago—according to the testimony of observers at that time—has increased in a remarkable manner. In the table of maternity statistics for 1896 the percentage of mothers to females over fifteen years of age was: for Hawaiians 59.36, for part Hawaiians 52.34, for Americans 49.56, and for Hawaiian-born foreigners 34.68; and the average number of children to each mother was: for Hawaiians 4.82, for part Hawaiians 4.45, for Americans 3.20, and for Hawaiian-born foreigners 3.54.

2. Again, since the election of Kalakaua, 1874, but particularly since the revolution of 1893, the archaic theology of Ezra and Calvin has been losing ground. And with the accomplishment of annexation—when, it has been said, "the missionary had rendered his account"—the *laissez-faire* theory of economics received a double shock, through the abolition of the contract-labor system and the application to the islands of the Chinese exclusion law. Moreover, educational ideas are broadening. The kindergarten, manual training, domestic science, social settlement work, the boys' brigade, experimental work in agriculture, etc., are making headway. With better education, the people are becoming more efficient industrially, and give more attention to matters of sanitation, hygiene, and the laws of nature. thus improving life on the one hand, and lengthening it on the other.

3. Furthermore, the diseases of civilization are dying out. By the process of the "survival of the fittest," the Hawaiian constitution has become hardened, and is now not nearly so susceptible to disease as formerly. Hence, although smallpox visited the islands in 1881, cholera in 1895, and plague in 1899, they caused a comparatively small number of deaths. Leprosy, too, for some years past, has been steadily on the wane. It is true, among Hawaiians, particularly in Honolulu, the death-rate is still high. According to the mortality report of the board of

health for 1899, the last year for which figures are yet available, the death-rate in Honolulu was: for Hawaiians 42.81 per 1,000, for Japanese 28.93, for Portuguese 19.09, for Chinese 16.16, and for all others 13.75. These figures, however, are misleading. The death-rate among Hawaiians in Honolulu is unusually high because many of them, not yet accustomed to city life, have not learned how to rear children under urban conditions. And the death-rate among Chinese and some other classes of foreigners is unusually low because of the small number of women and children among them, in proportion to population.

4. Finally, it may be noted that civilization does not necessarily "eat up the savage." It may depress and devour a primitive people, or it may stimulate and strengthen them; everything depending on the character of the civilization and the qualities of the people. In this respect an interesting parallelism may be pointed out between the Maoris of New Zealand and the Hawaiians. Both are kindred branches of the same race. Their conditions of life and experience have likewise been similar. The former are under the dominion of one division of the English-speaking people, the latter is now under the protection of the other. In 1860 the Maori population was estimated at 100,000. But in 1885, on account of war, vice, and disease, it had fallen to about 45,000. Then war ceased, the other causes diminished, and population for a time remained practically stationary. In 1891 it was 41,993; in 1896, 38,854; and in 1901, 43,101—not including 2,407 half-castes who were living with, and were enumerated as, Europeans. Thus the Maori people are now increasing. The same is true of other races under British rule, and of the North American Indians—according to the last census returns—under American rule. Consequently it is but reasonable and natural to conclude that the Hawaiian race also will soon increase.

There is one dark cloud, however, on the horizon, which demands the attention of everyone who is interested in the future of a brave and affectionate people, the most kindly and generous in the world. In the last hundred years there have been three distinct periods of prosperity on the islands—that of

the sandal-wood trade, of the whaling industry, and of the sugar industry. Each period, while it has conferred its own peculiar and inestimable benefits upon the aborigines, has at the same time been highly injurious to them: the first through the oppression of the chiefs, the second through the licentiousness of the seamen, and the third through the rapacity of the planters. The sandal-wood trade slew its thousands, the whaling industry its ten thousands, and the sugar industry threatens to exterminate the remnant. The Hawaiians—not because of lack of natural ability, for physically they are extremely vigorous and mentally they are remarkably active; but because industrially and commercially they are yet undeveloped—are unable at present to compete successfully with Asiatics in the lower walks of life, and with Americans and Europeans in the higher. Hence they are being ground between the upper and the nether millstones of the present industrial system. This juggernaut, if unrestrained, would without doubt soon make an end, once for all, of the Hawaiian race. And as if to hasten the process, the government, now territorial and thus appointive, is persistently carrying out a wholesale policy of liquor licenses, inaugurated in the later days of the so-called republic—the number of liquor licenses has increased almost sevenfold during the last six years—as if to administer an opiate to the victim before the sacrifice.

Fortunately, the natives now have votes. The suffrage is their rock of defense. This, along with a good school system, it is to be hoped, will enable them, in due time, to take their legitimate place among the able and progressive races of the earth, and to contribute a distinctive and valuable element to American civilization. While the Hawaiian people have been injured and well-nigh destroyed by commerce and missions, they have been immeasurably benefited and helped by the same two forces; and in an ethical universe the good elements of civilization must ultimately prevail over the evil.

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REVIEWS.

Theology and the Social Consciousness. By HENRY CHURCHILL KING. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1902. Pp. 252.

PROFESSOR KING defines what he means by the "social consciousness" by analyzing the sense of the like-mindedness of men, the sense of the mutual influence of men, the sense of the value and sacredness of the person, the sense of obligation, and the sense of love. He finds the ultimate explanation and ground of the social consciousness in the immanence of God and his supporting will. Then he traces the influence of the social consciousness upon the conception of religion and upon theological doctrine.

What is the interest of the sociologist in such discussions? Professor King makes his own statement of the relation of theology to sociology (p. 5): the theologian interprets, but does not attempt to explain; it is sociology which traces the processes of phenomena in causal connections. The sociologist, as such, is interested in the inquiry of this volume first of all because religious factors are social facts. This is as obvious to the agnostic as to the theologian. Sociology must deal with all causal elements, even with those which are detestable. Religious ideas, feelings, purposes, actions, customs, and institutions are social phenomena and part of the causative facts in history. Society might be better or worse without religion, but it indubitably would be different.

Theological studies like the one under our notice tend to illuminate these regions of social consciousness, to reveal the nature of the contents of religious experience, and to measure the forces here at work. The book before us is a fine example of the perspicacity and subtle analysis of facts which are best known from the inside, facts which can be described only by one instructed by sympathy. But sociology does not stop with explanation and causal connections of social phenomena; that is, with theory; it is also and inevitably a practical science; it deals with practice. Practical social science transcends the merely mechanical and physical methods of reasoning, which are inadequate even in theory, and it treats of associations of persons who aim at ends on which they set a value and who put forth conscious

and costly efforts to further and realize these ends because they set a value on them.

In practical social science this valuation of ends is vital, for without an estimate of worth which may be used as a criterion there is no rational and solid basis for a judgment of any social arrangement.

Practical social science must consider two problems when it passes judgment, or arranges the materials for a judgment, on any social arrangement, device, movement, or tendency: Is the end valuable and the most valuable, all things considered? and, Are the proposed means most suitable and efficient? The latter, it is conceivable, might be studied somewhat apart from the former. The sociologist might reserve his verdict as to the end and merely say: "Assuming that the proposed object is socially valuable, what is the best disposition of available social forces to attain it?"

But, after all, human reason would regard such a solution as superficial and unsatisfactory. There is no way of avoiding a discussion of the worth of ends in a study of the value of institutions, systems, laws, customs, or tendencies. In the case before us the end is religious satisfactions.

At this point an attempt to study the meaning and value of religion and the theological implications of the social consciousness is useful to sociology, whether we are thinking of it as an explanatory or as a practical science.

The alternative of agnosticism, of course, is still open, and there is no absolute demonstration of the ism which would make unbelief impossible. Taste and preference may not be forced.

The case of religion is the same as that of friendship, or knowledge, or art, or moral character. The man who has personal experience of these values can bear witness to them, nothing more. They must be personally taken into consciousness by active and creative choice, and then they are seen in their true nature and "proof" is not asked.

What a skilful art critic or interpreter does for pictures, music, or verse, Professor King has done, with a high degree of success, for religion.

CHARLES R. HENDERSON.

Savings and Savings Institutions. By JAMES HENRY HAMILTON. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1902. Pp. 436.

THE economic principles of thrift are discussed under the head of "The Theory of Savings," but while the orthodox position is clearly

stated, the recent objections are given scant notice, since "the attacks upon the accepted principle of saving are not regarded as more than ingenious." In the chapter on "The Educational Aspects of Saving" a very important point is made (p. 53), that community provision of the means of culture will fail of their best results if the individual home cannot possess the means of æsthetic and intellectual satisfaction. "It can hardly be said that the priceless art treasures of Italy, which belong to the people, bring them to a higher plane of living. The highest art and the most wretched squalor are the closest neighbors." The savings bank is even more valuable as a means of education than as an agency of thrift. "Criminality largely flows from hazy conceptions of the character of property and proper methods of acquiring it." The author sees with clearness (p. 79) that the voluntary movement is utterly inadequate; the national government must be invoked to assist this potent agent of national education and morality. The postal savings bank, with solicitors among the people, is necessary to establish a universal habit of economy.

Having abandoned the theory of *laissez-faire*, one might expect from the author a favorable opinion of German compulsory insurance, which trains the wage-workers of the entire nation to save means to help in time of sickness, accident, and old age. But the author assumes a rather hostile attitude to these measures, and some of his assertions about them seem to require further reflection and inquiry. He admits he has no inductive proof (p. 424).

There are chapters on "Building and Loan Associations," "Savings Banks," "Trustee Savings Banks," "Co-operative Savings Banks," "Municipal Savings Banks," and "Postal Savings Banks." After making critical comments on each of these schemes, he concludes: "The savings bank as an institution represents the most conservative, the most logical, and the most hopeful scheme for bettering the condition of the laboring classes."

CHARLES R. HENDERSON.

Reformatory Education.

THE movement to establish juvenile courts, with probation officers, parental schools, and other allies, has gained great momentum in this country, from Massachusetts to Colorado and Louisiana. The absurdity and wickedness of trying mere children in ordinary courts have been discussed, and the proverbial conservatism of judicial traditions has been broken down for the sake of humanity.

The same movement is much discussed in Germany, and the Prussian law for guardianship and education, instead of compulsory discipline, is a subject of interest all over the empire.

Dr. E. Münsterberg, of Berlin, recommends especially the following books upon the *Fürsorge-Erziehungsgesetz* of 1900, passed by the Prussian diet: C. v. Masson, *Das preussische Fürsorge-Erziehungsgesetz vom 2. Juli 1900, und die Mitwirkung der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft bei seiner Ausführung* (Berlin: Nicolaische Verlagsbuchh., 1901; pp. 72); O. Noelle, *Das Gesetz über die Fürsorge-Erziehung Minderjähriger* (Berlin: Franz Vohlen, 1901); L. Schmitz, *Die Fürsorgeerziehung Minderjähriger, Preuss. Gesetz vom 2. Juli 1900, etc.* (Düsseldorf: L. Schramm, 1901).

It is no longer necessary to convict a child of crime before he can be brought under corrective and helpful guardianship. When family influence is inadequate to prevent moral ruin, the authorities can interfere before the habits of evil are deeply fixed, and the minor may be transferred from the depraving environment to a suitable family or institution.

An admirable feature of this new law is that it requires the co-operation of parents, teachers, pastors, poor-authorities, and benevolent societies, and has a tendency to enlist voluntary friendly service in the interest of the imperiled youth. The parents are not relieved of their responsibility, but must help meet the costs of treatment, as far as their means permit.

The essential principles of the Prussian law are as true for America as for Germany.

C. R. H.

La responsabilité pénale. Par ADOLPHE LANDRY. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1902. Pp. 196.

THE first part of this work is devoted to the rather thankless task of kicking the carcass of the dead lion of the "classical school" of criminalists, the advocates of an exact penal equivalent for each species of crime. The author will not tolerate half-way doctrines and will accept nothing but unadulterated "utilitarianism." He reasons his way in truly French deductive style, with acute and logical precision, to his principle that, from the point of view of "penal responsibility," offenders must be classified, and all members of each class subjected by law and courts to one treatment.

Mr. Z. R. Brockway or Mr. C. T. Lewis, whose discussions of the

"indeterminate sentence" seem never to have attracted our author's notice, would probably find this fine-spun theory of categories of convicts as impossible to apply in practice as the "classical" theory of expiatory sentences and equivalents decreed upon the basis of absolute distributive justice.

The result of the author's learned and clairvoyant discussion is summed up in this idea: In order to resolve the problem of penal responsibility, it is necessary to divide men into a certain number of kinds; each of these kinds will receive a definite treatment. In applying penalties a utilitarian estimate will be made of the balance of advantages and evils. Intimidation will be sought, so far as the individual can be affected by the penalty, and deterrent influence will be sought by considering the effect of the penalty on the group.

C. R. H.

The Government of Maine: Its History and Administration. By WILLIAM MACDONALD, LL.D., Professor of History in Brown University; sometime Professor of History and Political Science in Bowdoin College. New York: The Macmillan Co. Pp. ix + 263.

ALTHOUGH this volume has primarily none but local interest, the conception of the book, and of the series to which it belongs, marks a salutary change in ideas of what is worth studying. Until yesterday instructors in Maine colleges did not call the attention of students to the institutions of their own state. Probably they were no more delinquent than college officers in other states. College graduates have known more about the British constitution than about the structure of their own local government. Or, rather, they have had command of more formulas about the former than about the latter, but from long-distance survey of all governmental machinery, they have had very hazy notions beneath their formulas. The present book will enable students in Maine to become acquainted with their own legal and political machinery, and by means of this real knowledge they will be in the way of acquiring more and better knowledge of larger systems. A glance at the appendix of this book, containing the constitution of Maine, and other documents which should constitute the primer of political education for every resident of the state, causes one who had his schooling in Maine to protest in spirit against his instructors' sins of omission. The college instructor of today is not ashamed

to deal with the real and the commonplace, and he is a more genuine educator in consequence.

This book is a scholarly exposition of the subject. It is at the same time clear and attractive in mode of expression. It is to be hoped that every state in the Union will soon have a similar text-book.

ALBION W. SMALL.

Les syndicats industriels de producteurs en France et à l'étranger. Par PAUL DE ROUSIERS. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1901. Pp. 287.

M. DE ROUSIERS traces the influence of the modern systems of steam manufacture and transportation on the concentration of capital and trade management. He shows the limitations of this tendency in respect to industries whose products are not uniform and staple articles. In this part of the discussion the argument is not new. Perhaps his most suggestive contribution is the acute comparison of the American trust, the German *Cartell*, and the French *comptoir*. He gives interesting details from a first hand study of the Comptoir de Longwy.

The general conclusion reached is given in the last paragraph: "Neither producers, consumers, nor wage-workers are menaced by the syndicates when they retain their character as merely private associations. The political danger has been made clear. It is very real when any syndicate seizes a part of the public authority; when it corrupts legislators, or when it lays its hands on public means of transportation, as in the United States; when it is openly protected by a strong power, as in Germany; when it is favored by an extreme fiscal policy, as the refiners of sugar in France. On the contrary, the danger disappears when the authority of the state is not controlled by individuals, nor directed by the partiality of the sovereign, nor employed by the legislature to unburden the consumers of a product. In other words, there are political abuses which alone render the syndicates of producers dangerous and oppressive. In themselves the syndicates are a normal manifestation of industrial liberty and of the freedom of association."

C. R. HENDERSON.

The Economic Interpretation of History. By EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN. The Columbia University Press. Pp. ix + 166.

PROFESSOR SELIGMAN has packed into this little book a history, a bibliography, an interpretation, and an estimate of the economic clue

to human experience. He has made it easier for people who cannot believe that a socialist may have had, on other subjects, thoughts worth considering, to reflect in a judicial temper upon Marx's historical philosophy. He has shown that the theory is not necessarily fatalistic. He has strengthened the *prima facie* case for the theory by his frank exhibit of considerations against it. He has left the argument where it would be extremely difficult to maintain dissent from his conclusion. Professor Seligman does not attempt to reduce all stimuli of human action to terms of the physical environment, but he shows that this environment always furnishes primary conditions among which other stimuli must operate. The essay is almost a model of clear, dignified, thorough, and temperate historical and philosophical discussion.

A. W. S.

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS.

Authority — Its Origin, Establishment and Limits.—1. *The existence of Authority.*—Authority and anarchy represent the positive and negative poles of human association. Between these two extremes has oscillated the human race from its beginning. The transition from the wandering tribes without leadership to the civilized condition of more advanced peoples is the work of authority. Among these authorities I include not merely gods, leaders in war, chiefs, the oldest men of the group, the sachem, priest, and sorcerer, but especially the founders of religion (Confucius, Laotse, Zarathustra, Buddha, Moses) and lawgivers (Draco, Solon, Lycurgus), givers together with laws and institutions. Human civilization without these authorities is unthinkable. Without the control of the unbridled instincts and impulses of the individual there can be no order in society.

In the more primitive societies the rulers are tyrants, and control is through *fear* on the part of the subjects toward the ruler. With the development of a higher civilization follow more refined forms of authority. The second stage may be characterized as that of *belief*. In order that the subject may continue to be ruled by *fear*, the conditions must be such as to allow personal oversight by the ruler. *Fear* is a ruling motive only under the influence of the visible authority. With extension of the group comes the impossibility of direct oversight on the part of the ruler and *fear* gives place to a *belief* in the omnipresence of the unseen authority. Consequently, with the progress of civilization, the gods become more and more unseen beings, the kings more unapproachable, and institutions and laws more abstract. This middle stage of authority based upon *belief* characterized the patriarchal condition of church and state up to the time of the French Revolution. Authority resting upon *belief* was shaken by the revolution, and the third stage or modern period may be characterized by an authority based upon *insight*.

2. *Origin of authority.*—The tendency to the constructing of authority may be traced back to the animal kingdom. Wherever in the struggle for existence there is need of a common activity, there arises the function of leadership. This tendency is found among the more primitive human societies, though in some cases it resolves itself into mere authority of the oldest men.

The races which remain in primitive anarchism do not have the capacity for taking on civilization. In the struggle for existence they are overcome by others which are under the dominion of authority, for discipline is the soul of struggle and authority is the soul of discipline. Races do not remain in the stage of anarchy because they lack intelligence, but rather they have not attained a higher intelligence because they have remained anarchical. Reason does not create the state, but, on the contrary, the state creates reason. Isolated or roaming peoples nowhere reach a high degree of civilization. It was in the cities, or rather city states, that a higher intellectual civilization was first produced. The close intermingling of men stimulates especially the mental qualities. It is in this way that the proposition is to be understood that the state forms reason. Without the building of the state, without authorities, without a firm structure of superiority and subordination, we should not have passed beyond the stage of mere primitive life.

The principle of authority is permanent, but the motives upon which it is based change. The oriental ruler possesses absolute authority; he is feared because the subject believes in his power. In the Middle Ages there is blind belief in gods and men. In the modern civilizations of western Europe and America authority in religion and state is based upon reason, intelligence, and insight.

3. *The establishment of authority.* — There is no civilization historically known to us that does not have hierarchical divisions, superiority and subordination, organization by means of authority. The first ground of authority, therefore, lies in its natural

growth. Without reflection, and motivated only by the instincts of self-preservation and of preservation of the species, authorities have been established. But while Nature commands a subjection to the principle of authority, she does not proclaim the kind of authority to be established. The latter function belongs to history, which teaches that the nature of the authority shall conform to the stage of the civilization. The steps in the development of authority are as follows: for the savage and barbarous peoples it is a natural necessity; for religious natures and sincere believers it is a necessity of feeling; for the utilitarian it is the necessity of purpose; finally, for the idealistic philosopher it is a necessity of reason.

It is to authorities, political, religious, scientific, and artistic, that we owe our order and progress. The highest formula in the promotion of progress is found in the proposition: *No civilization without authority.*

4. *Limits of authority.*— The exaggeration of authority leads to as great evils as the absence of it. The former suppresses individuality, the latter means dissolution and disorganization. Egypt furnishes an illustration of the stifling effects of despotic authority in ancient history, Byzantium in the Middle Ages, Spain in the modern period. Absolute authority everywhere has led to intellectual death, the destruction of all individual initiative, and to the stagnation of civilization.

From the positive side the solution of the problem of the limits of authority has been found by the Germanic peoples in the reconciliation of the principle of authority with the principle of freedom in the securing of authority in connection with the highest possible degree of freedom. The peculiar characteristic of the Germans is represented in this impulse for freedom, in the struggle for individuality. They formed families, clans, tribes, but no state. It was through contact with Rome that there arose the idea of the state among the Germans. At first the universalism of Rome in both political and religious realms conquered the individualism of the Germans. Then began the struggle between individualism and universalism, promoted by the Reformation, the conflict between church and state, the discoveries of science, the advance in philosophy, art, and invention, resulting in the principle of the equilibrium between authority and freedom.— LUDWIG STEIN, "Autorität: ihr Ursprung, ihre Begründung und ihre Grenzen," in *Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reich*, Heft 3. E. M.

The Power of the Social Mind in War.—If one takes into considerati on the wars of recent times, such as the success of Germany, the brilliant victory of the United States in 1898, or the military progress of Japan; or if one attempts to penetrate into the spirit of the nations as portrayed in their different histories, he will find that the ruling force in these struggles has not been military fatalism or individual genius, but rather the *esprit de la nation* — a force as invisible as it is irresistible.

Wars have two different effects upon nations. In the one case, after the war the victorious nation sinks into a quiet condition again, while in the other it is aroused to a desire to continue the conflict. After the defeat of the Greeks in 1898 the Turks entered upon a peaceful and profound repose, whereas after the war of 1866 the Germans retained an ardent desire for war, searching for an occasion for its continuance elsewhere. The reason for this is that in the former type the excitation to war is from without, only a portion of the people being aroused, and that in a mechanical way; whereas in the second type inspiration for the war comes from the very heart of the nation, emotionally the whole nation is aroused, and a spontaneous reaction of the whole body of the people is the result. In the first category belong all the wars of the allies of Napoleon, in the second the barbarous invasions of all times.

Every event, public or private, is attributed by some moralists entirely to the will of the individual, by other writers entirely to fate. On the one hand we see a small number of very successful men who attribute their success entirely to personal characteristics; on the other hand we have the views of the great leaders of all times: Alexander, Hannibal, and Cæsar believed in *chance;* Gustavus Adolphus and Cromwell, in a *divine power;* Napoleon, in *his star;* all the faithful, in the *power of God;* and finally the oriental fatalists, in the *predestined lot* of man.

To say the will alone suffices in attaining an end is to exaggerate its influence. No effect has a single cause, but rather there is always present a complexity of causes. There is a chain of circumstances, a collective will, a social mind, an environment that

favors the individual or restrains and thwarts his plans. The action resulting from the will of the individual and his environment we may call *reasonable fatalism.* This is difficult to comprehend or explain, because the second term "the social mind" and its phenomena are at present little understood, and especially difficult to measure. This makes the evaluation of this influence upon the individual a difficult matter.

Historians often attribute the success or decay of nations to certain persons. Especially in case of wars do they attribute victory or defeat to the commander-in-chief, and upon the fortunate one is bestowed the name of genius. Upon what is this assertion founded?

In literature, art, and science we may say that the genius creates his work exclusively by means of his own ability; but are the troops of the commander-in-chief so docile or so much under control as the words of the author, the figures of the mathematician, or the reactions in the laboratory of the chemist? The phenomena of wars are so varied and complex that it is impossible for any human intelligence to control them. After the beginning of the battle the commander loses in large part the control of the conditions. He cannot follow the course of the movements, and in the tumult and smoke of battle even his orders are lost. Genius in war does not have the same significance as in literature or science. There is lacking the characteristic of absolute individuality both in conception and execution of the work. The execution is subordinated to the size of the armies and to a thousand circumstances, all of which may be summarized in the expression *the collective spirit of the two armies.*

There is then a greater force than that of man, whether general or emperor, and easier to study in the evolution of nations than an unknown fatalism. It is their mind, their spirit, with all the phenomena which it represents: intelligence, feeling, and will.

We do not desire to exclude the diverse external influences which act on the characteristics of this mind, such as the economic, religious, etc., but we are striving to establish the essence of this spirit which can determine the results independently of these conditions.

In the life of a nation, as in that of an individual, there is an evolution, a transformation, in which it gains a quality or a new property, or loses a characteristic of its personality. So, too, we see in certain epochs a nation seized with an irresistible desire to fight and giving itself up to a bloody internal revolution or to an aggressive external warfare. It is with this irresistible impulse that it is necessary to connect the expansion of the Macedonians under Alexander, the victories of the Romans under Scipio, the success of the French under Napoleon, etc. When this impulse leaves the people, this collective warlike spirit, then leadership, however strong, ceases to be successful in its efforts. Consequently the nation, being collective, in the evolution of its warlike feeling has an ascending course, an apogee, and a descending course; and the leader who does not follow this evolution of the collectivity will soon be punished. He will lose his influence and be crushed despite all his genius or his personal capacity. The most recent, as well as the most ancient, wars show that the social mind has exercised the primary influence; all other circumstances, including personal leadership, have been secondary.—Dr. CAMPEANO, "La force de l'âme collective dans les guerres," in *Revue internationale de sociologie*, October, 1902.

E. M.

Gas Leakage in American Cities.—There are very few American communities in which the facts of gas leakage in distribution, if known and comprehended, would not create a popular panic. Having studied this problem in every part of the United States and Canada, I am prepared to say that leakage ranges from 10 to 30 per cent. of output.

I will give the facts of one American city. The loss in distribution was about 11 per cent.; in round figures, three thousand millions of cubic feet. At 60 cents per thousand, this is $1,800,000 per annum, which the consumer must pay. This gas is known as water gas. It carries, on the average, 30.79 parts carbon monoxide, 30.14 parts hydrogen, 19.10 parts marsh gas, 10.69 parts olefiants; the remainder being nitrogen, carbon dioxide, and oxygen. This is a very formidable compound to go at large in a city. Most of the leakage is under measurably or absolutely impervious pavements. It cannot work its way up through the soil and escape, but most of it in one way or another gets into houses.

A large gas leakage is inconsistent with good pavements. If repairs are neglected, leakage quickly attains intolerable proportions. If necessary repairs are attended to, the streets are quickly scarred with patches. In the case of asphalt, the destruction due to gas leakage is rapid and complete. The binder of the asphalt is attacked by the olefiants and decomposed. The solution for this anxious municipal problem would appear to be in pipe galleries.

The fire hazard of gas leakage is incapable of exaggeration. It is enormously increased by the fact that gas which has passed even for a short distance through soil is thereby rendered nearly or quite odorless. A very large proportion of the unexplained fires in cities is due to gas. The inspectors of the Bureau of Buildings of New York lately began to look for gas in the air of theaters, music halls, and other places of public assembly, and rarely fail to find it in proportions ranging from 0.2 or 0.3 per cent. to 5 per cent. This is in summer, with all the ventilation possible.

The hygienic aspects are scarcely less serious. In the city under consideration the leakage carries between 35 and 40 per cent. of carbon monoxide, which is probably the most insidious blood poison known. Experiments upon animals warrant the belief that air containing anything more than 0.4 per cent. is capable of causing death in man, though anything over 0.2 per cent. would in many cases prove fatal. It has no smell or irritating properties. Oxygen absorbed by the lungs is normally taken up by the red matter of the blood, hemoglobin. Hemoglobin has affinity for oxygen, but it has enormously greater affinity for carbon monoxide—about 400 times greater. Hence, when the hemoglobin is saturated with carbon monoxide, oxygen can no longer be carried from the lungs to the tissues, and death ensues.

J. J. Concannon, M.D., of New York, who has very carefully studied gas poisoning, says: Few seem aware that carbon monoxide exerts its deleterious effect, be the quantity present ever so small. The principal cause of the anæmia and lowered vitality which sooner or later appears in all city workers is the illuminating gas with which the city atmosphere is heavily charged through leakage. When inhaled in large quantity, carbon monoxide causes a profound anæmia, often fatal. When the air contains but a small percentage, a less pronounced anæmia gradually but surely appears. Doubtless this will be recognized eventually as the cause of the readiness with which the city dweller contracts grippe, tuberculosis, pneumonia, and many other diseases. Chemical and microscopic examinations usually show the effect of prolonged city life upon the red blood cells.

Most of the evils attributed to "sewer gas" are due to carbon monoxide, which is not a product of organic decomposition in sewers, and which is there only because gas which leaks from mains into the soil tends to accumulate in just such pockets as the sewers offer. During April and May some very interesting experiments were conducted by the Committee on Hygiene of the New York County Medical Association. These pointed very clearly to the agency of unsuspected gas in causing types of persistent general malaise. When gas was found the patients were promptly removed to a different environment, with immediate recovery, only to relapse when temporarily returned. In each instance the access of gas was from the sewer, through the house drain, and its escape was from defects in the plumbing.

What is the remedy? If a remedy is not found, the time is not far distant when the gas industry will have to be suppressed as a public nuisance, dangerous to life and detrimental to health. Concealment of the truth is not a step in the direction of a solution of the problem. Let us know what we are dealing with, at least. To this end I advise an effort to secure the enactment of laws requiring gas companies to make their statistics public. Where leakage is found to be excessive, or where for any reason it entails or threatens danger to life or property, it should be the duty of the state board of health to investigate the causes and to take such steps to abate the nuisance as its powers may permit or the public interest demand. (The writer submits the form of a bill designed to meet the evil.)—JAMES C. BALES, M.E., PH.D., "Gas Leakage in American Cities," in *Municipal Journal and Engineer*, September, 1902.

R. M.

The Gambling Impulse.—The present study is an attempt to investigate the origin and nature of the instincts and motives involved in chance plays and gambling.

The Egyptians, Chinese, Japanese, Hindus, Persians, Jews, Greeks, and Romans,

with their dice on their lots testify of the indigenous and ubiquitous character of gambling. The French, Germans, and English are scarcely less given to the practice of gambling than the older peoples first mentioned. The prevailing forms are the dice of the old time and the more recently popularized lottery. The attraction of the chance seems to have continued throughout the history of man, and the desperate stakes placed testify to the spell this charm has over man. The American Indians will not only lose all their possessions, but also will stake their wives and children, and even their own liberty. The Senecas had a popular belief that a certain gambling game would be enjoyed by them in the future life of the Great Spirit. The Malays of Sumatra, the Javanese, the Sulus are all addicted to desperate playing of chance games. The passion is nowhere else so strong as among savage and barbarous races. But both the universality and the desperate enchantment of the passion are remarkable.

The universality and the gradations of this disposition toward chance, risk, are seen in the various forms of hazard, from the commonplace remark, "I will risk not taking my umbrella," to the fearful staking of one's very life. An analysis of the replies obtained from sending out a topical questionnaire throws some light upon the psychology of uncertainty. A curve representing the disposition toward chance seems to follow closely in direction and height a curve showing changes in the faith or in the fear one has in one's own personal safety. This gambling curve varies in direction and intensity, just as would be expected, according to the age, physical condition, previous experience, and sex. It fluctuates much for the ages from ten to seventeen years in both sexes, as uncertain as is this period of adolescence. Later the prevailing tendency is stronger toward chance among men than among women. The gambling impulse seems to be a sort of balance between faith in self and distrust of self.

The psychological theories of the gambling impulse are few in number and inadequate in treatment. Avarice and love of wealth are not, as many have suggested, large elements in the case. A desire for a stimulus to call forth the natural activity of the mind; indolence, vacuity being an unnatural state of mind; a desire to forget self and be rid of the commonplace — these seem to be the real causes or explanation of the impulse. Professor Thomas has summed it up in his article on "The Gambling Instinct" thus: "Gambling is a means of keeping up the conflict interest and of securing all the pleasure-pain sensations of conflict activity with little effort and no drudgery; and, incidentally or habitually, it may be a means of securing money." The race has been evolved in an environment of uncertainty, and such an environment has become indispensable to alertness of the faculties. Reflex action, muscular co-ordination, memory, imagination, and judgment times are thereby quickened. Does not the condition of uncertainty hold the mind in a tonic and unrelaxed condition? The addition of the stake brings in a whole train of added states centering about the feeling of power. Hope and fear, joy and sorrow, emulation, aggression, instinct of domination, love of humiliating one's opponent, pugnacity, jealousy, envy are some of the affective states exercised.

A study of luck reveals that it is regarded as more than mere chance. It is significant that the implements of gambling of the primitive man are the same as those used for divination; the same methods are used now for gambling, now for divination. This use-connection suggests one characteristic of luck, that it is a sort of connection with the god, the will, the ruler of affairs. Luck names the attitude, favoring or frowning, of some hovering spirit, some "guardian angel," some "evil genius." Were luck a pure accidental content, it would scarcely have persisted in the life of the peoples, and been found in so many expressions of "lucky days," "unlucky numbers," the "lucky box," the "fortune wheel," etc. But another glance at the historical interpretation of luck, and there is revealed a sort of paradox; it tells of the passion for certainty. Instead of indicating a love of the uncertain, it testifies of the longing of the mind for the certain, the sure. From this viewpoint it is easily seen as akin to the principle of all religions, and the scientific thirst for knowledge, the elimination of the element of the uncertainty. This last observation finds confirmation in the corresponding intensity of the gambling impulse and the religious sentiment in many races, and from a correspondence between this chance impulse and the scientific spirit in many peoples.

This study makes some contribution to ethics. "Conduct is the result of latent biological forces; much conduct being the forced expression of highly anabolic,

instinctive centers which have functioned through long previous periods in preserving the species. These resist for a long time regeneration, do not tend readily to become rudimentary, and hence are ever on the threshold of activity. Prohibition is impossible. If this activity is a menace to our present social conditions, substitutions must be offered. In other words, these instinct activities must be channelized into harmless courses."—CLEMENS J. FRANCE, in *American Journal of Psychology*, July, 1902.

T. J. R.

The Objective Necessity of Progress.—Whenever we go out of the narrow circle of our individual life to enter a larger life, we are struck by the great amount of suffering that surrounds us. In order to reconcile the need of happiness with the impossibility of happiness under existing conditions, mankind of today has elaborated a belief in progress, and this belief is a weapon in the struggle for existence. It may be defined as the certainty existing in us that the life of humanity moves toward an increase of happiness on earth, and toward a more complete and harmonious development of the individual.

The essential, eternal character, so to speak, of life is harmony between everything that lives and the environment. A living creature can exist only so long as the phenomena that pass within it are in a certain degree of harmony with those that pass without. If the environment becomes more complex, the organism must in turn become more complex or *perish*. Take an individual and suppose that some new factor appears in his narrow and simple sphere. The existence of the individual presupposes that his mind reflects with sufficient fidelity the objects that surround him, and that he knows how to react advantageously upon his environment. When a new factor appears, it must necessarily be reflected in his psychic life and produce some opportune reaction. *The complication of the environment necessarily entails the complication of the living being.*

The external world constantly tends to destroy the established harmony between the living being and its immediate environment. If the modifications which a new factor brings into the system of established relationships are too sharp, the organism perishes. If the conditions of existence change in a less violent manner, the organism, after a crisis more or less severe, succeeds in adapting itself to the new system of relationships. This necessarily causes a new complication in its organization. The more complex the organism, the easier it will be for it to avail itself of changes in the environment, and the better able it will be to protect itself against their harmful consequences. This is why, throughout the scale of living beings, the more elevated the organization, the better assured is the life of the organism, and the more independent it is of harmful changes in its environment.

It is in Spencer that we find the clearest and simplest definition of happiness: it is correspondence between the organism and its environment. Every organism tends to attain this correspondence. When this end is reached, life is pursued with the least possible expenditure of forces, without difficulty, without sharp interruptions. Subjectively, this correspondence expresses itself by the sentiment of happiness. It results, from this definition, that happiness can be realized under as many forms as there are species of living beings, or even individuals.

The simpler the organism, the more accidental and the more fragile is the combination of circumstances that permit it to live. This fact may be observed in the lower stages of human life. We can easily conceive of perfect harmony between primitive groups and their environment, that is to say, perfect happiness. But it is also certain that this harmony, this happiness, is always very unstable. For example, if the principal occupation is the chase, the harmony can be interrupted by the disappearance of the animal that affords nourishment.

Changes in the environment of man will always take place. It results from this fact that one factor, at least, among those that constitute causes of suffering will always be present. But, in revenge, the human personality, in its progressive growth, will always seize more readily the variations in the environment and become adapted without a profound crisis. A consequence of this will be the progressive growth of the human personality parallel to the increasing complication of the social environment.

What is comprehended in the expression "the growth of the human individuality"? It is, first, the development of the intellect, which permits man better to

understand his environment and to react upon it advantageously. It is, next, the appearance of more varied interests, and, consequently, greater richness and complexity of the entire life. In proportion as social differentiation progresses and the number of social circles of which the individual forms a part increases, the phases of life which appear interesting and important become more numerous.

While the modern civilized man is discontented with his existence, this is explained by the difficulties of the internal crisis that he is undergoing. It is not easy for him to become adapted to the new, more complicated conditions of existence. Civilized man is an unfinished type, yet in formation, *im Werden*, and consequently lacking harmony. This is why his reaction to the influences of his surroundings is so painful.

In résumé, the progressive complication and differentiation of society cause a growth and complication of the human individuality, at the same time that they create for it a greater stability. In this is the objective necessity for progress.—ALEXANDRE IAROTSKY, "Nécessité objective du progrès," in *Revue internationale de sociologie*, July, 1902. R. M.

Safeguarding Young Girls.—The international congress, which has just closed its sessions at Paris, proposed in the interest of public morality and for the protection of young girls important modifications of existing national and international law. *La traité des blanches* (the traffic in white girls) is the name applied in France to a secret method of importing girls from different countries through which to recruit houses of prostitution. From time to time, the sad history of individual girls recovered from houses of prostitution has shown what skilful methods of trapping were used to decoy them into the well-laid nets; but it is only since a number of earnest men and women in different countries took hold of the matter, coupled with official investigations, that the extent and systematic character of the nefarious trade have been apparent. The revelations made by an inquiry of the Home Office a few years ago were sufficient to alarm the societies organized for the protection of young girls, and to show them that new measures must be taken to meet an almost unsuspected condition. The organizers and promoters of this form of commerce adopt the most refined and plausible means of trapping their prey. A common method is to insert an advertisement in various foreign journals for governesses, teachers, domestics, nurses, or shop girls. Arriving at her destination, the young girl is met by the agent, who regrets to inform her that the place she had come to fill has already been taken, but assures her that there will be another opportunity in a few days. Meanwhile, he suggests that she go to a hotel which he can recommend. At the end of some days they let her know what is expected of her. If she refuses, she is presented with a bill for board and lodging and is told that she cannot leave until she has paid her bill. Of course, the bill is made larger than the small sum of money which the girl possesses. She is strictly watched; she is incapable of effecting her escape. Deception, threats, and, in some cases, force may be employed to complete her subjection.

Germany is the only country in which legislation covers this form of crime. Though governments have been inactive, private philanthropic and protective societies have done a great deal to warn young girls in their own countries against undertaking such emigration, and to protect them on arrival in a strange land. Thus in all the European railways one may now find notices to girls traveling alone warning them against confiding in strangers and informing them where they may find shelter and protection in the large cities. L'Union Internationale des Amies de Jeune Fille has been organized for some twenty years, and, with a central bureau at Neuchatel, has agents and committees all over Europe, and has established homes in various cities. A Catholic union for the same purpose was founded in 1896, and is also well organized. Both of these international organizations work in harmony. In London the National Vigilance Association has been more recently organized to study and apply means to furnish more perfect protection. However, it is evident that the authority and co-operation of the various governments must be secured for the repression of the traffic. This has been the character and the aim and the object of the congress just held at Paris.

The first two articles in the convention which have been signed by the delegates and are to be submitted to their governments for their ratification, embody important

changes in the criminal codes of the various countries. Article I provides that whoever, to satisfy the passions of another, shall allure, entice, or lead away, even with her consent, a girl who is a minor, with a view to effect her seduction, shall be subject to punishment, even though the different acts which constitute the infraction may have been accomplished in different countries. A second article provides for punishment of those who by fraud, menace, or the aid of violence, or by any other means of constraint, have enticed for immoral purposes a girl or woman who has reached or passed the age of majority, even, as in the first case, when the illegal acts may have been committed in different countries.

Students of international law will recognize the important elements involved in the provision that the different countries shall no longer be prohibited from prosecuting an offender because the different acts constituting the offense have been committed in different countries.

The congress has expressed the opinion that the age in which the law should consider a girl as major for the disposition of her physical person should be the same age as that fixed for civil majority.

The protocol has been signed by delegates of the governments of Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Fance, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Holland, Switzerland, Portugal, and Brazil. Much disappointment was expressed that the United States, though formally invited, had not sent an official delegate to the congress.—S. J. B., in *Evening Post* (New York). R. M.

The Condition of the Working Class in Russia.—A lack of information and of statistics makes complete knowledge of the condition of the working class in Russia impossible. But some notion of this condition can be had from the meager statistics and a study of how the laborers are living. In speaking of the industrial class in general, there must be noted two chief classes: first, those industrials that carry on small trades in their own homes in the country districts; and, second, those whose homes are in the country, but who go to the towns to work during the winter, returning to their farms at the beginning of agricultural work in the spring. The number of this second class is constantly decreasing, as the proportion of the population that owns its own home is decreasing. They remain in the towns working throughout the year. It is the primary purpose of this paper to study the condition of this second class of workingmen, as they have come to be employed in what Le Play has denominated *fabriques collectives.*

1. *As to the length of the workday.*—The two factors upon which the length of the work day depends are the development of the technique and the standard of life among the laborers. One may expect, therefore, to find the length of the workday to be long in Russia, for the technique is not highly developed and the standard of living is low. A severe political system has greatly hindered the development of this class by punishing with banishment or long imprisonment those trying to form unions or lead movements for the bettering of the laborer's condition. Despite these unfavorable surroundings, the Russian industrials are making some gains, and there are better days before them.

The law of 1897, following the great strike of 1896 in St. Petersburg, was a material and moral victory for the workingmen. The material returns, however, have been slight, because the efficacy of the law has been practically defeated by its malinterpretation and amendment. But the moral victory means much in that the workingmen have become conscious of their possible power, and both the government and the employers have been made aware of their claim to consideration. The fact that the law made eleven and one-half hours the length of the workday can only mean that men had been required to work very long hours indeed. This inference is verified by some statistics at command. In 1880 more than twelve hours were required in 20 per cent. of the factories; twelve hours or less were required in 80 per cent. In 1894 to 1895 twelve hours were demanded in 20 per cent. of the factories; more than eleven but less than twelve hours were demanded in 46 per cent.; while eleven hours or less were demanded in 34 per cent. But if the hours were long in the great factories, they were much longer in the home industry, ranging from fourteen hours to eighteen or nineteen. These excessive hours show their effect in the physical weakness of the laborers and in the high rate of mortality among them.

The law of 1897 attempted to regulate working overhours. But in its particularizing and its ambiguity it has effectually destroyed its value, and we find the normal day exceeded from one to three times per week, and increased by from three to eight hours in some places. The attempt to regulate night work is told in practically the same story.

2. *As to the wages received.*—No complete statistics are available for determining the average wages of the Russian working class. A comparison of the wages received in the province of Moscow and in the state of Massachusetts has some value when properly interpreted.

	WAGES FOR ONE MONTH.			
	Moscow.		Massachusetts.	
WORKERS.	Rubles.	Dollars.	Rubles.	Dollars.
Men	14.16	8.50[1]	98.19	59.90
Women	10.35	6.21	50.43	30.25
Youths	7.27	4.36	42.22	25.33
Children	5.08	3.48	31.56	18.94

The striking difference in favor of the Massachusetts laborer must be taken in connection with these facts; the Russian cost of food is much less, the standard of life is much lower, and the demands for expenditure much fewer, than the American. Yet it remains true that the Russian spends 57 per cent. of his income, while the American spends only 49 per cent. of his, for nourishment. The "truck system" is still enforced upon the Russian laborer, but against it and the other unfavorable conditions the intelligence of the working class is beginning to arouse them, and this means better days for the class.—W. RAKHMETOV, "La situation de la classe ouvrière en Russie," in *La Revue socialiste*, September, 1902. T. J. R.

Invention Considered as the Cause of Social Evolution.—The title poorly expresses my thought. When I say that social transformations are explained by the imitation of individual initiatives, I do not mean that invention is the only active force, or, to speak truly, that it is even the strongest force, but that it is the directive, determining, explicative force.

The direction of great, constant forces, of forces periodic in their action, is related to small, new, accidental forces, which, grafting themselves on the former, determine a new kind of periodic reproduction. In other words, a variation ingrafts itself upon repetitions and becomes a point of departure for new repetitions.

In the social world the element variation, accident, germ, is represented by the individual initiative, invention. The element repetition consists of climate, soil, race, as well as of tradition, custom, taught ideas, and acquired habits. Climate and race consist in periodic reproductions of movements. Periodic also are the successive generations of the same race that reproduces hereditarily the same characteristics, the same functions. On the other hand, tradition, custom, instruction, education, consist only in imitative repetitions, in the transmission of examples.

If periodic forces alone acted, there would be no social transformations. If individuals should resemble each other in all particulars, if hereditary repetition should be complete, without any individual variation, progress would be impossible. The question is how and why, in organized society, language, government, religion, morality, or art is modified at a given time.

To whatever category invention may belong, it has always the characteristic of being an intersection of imitative rays, an original combination of imitations.

The combination is always binary. Whatever may be the number of imitative rays required in order that from their intersection there may spring a new invention (itself destined to spread imitatively), they divide themselves into two groups, which unite as if there were only two elements to combine. Or rather, in a total invention we nearly always discover several acts of invention separated by some intervals, several elementary inventions, each of which is a binary combination, a coupling.

What is it which makes an original combination of imitative rays? Two things: (1) the characteristic mental state of the individual brain in which the meeting of rays takes place (this does not mean that the brain must be superior to others in all particulars, but merely that it must be different, more adapted to the kind of function it is to fill); (2) the direct view, in general of external reality perceived under

[1] The ruble is taken at value of 60 cents.

a new aspect, by the individual brain that has momentarily escaped the social hypnosis. It is thanks to this perception of external nature at a new angle that the meeting of imitative rays in the brain of the savant, the engineer, the artist, becomes fecund and is transformed into invention. Thanks to this direct and genial contact with nature, two known ideas, which hitherto appeared to have nothing in common, appear united in a causal relationship. Newton, seeing an apple fall, conceived the fall of bodies and the movement of the moon around the earth as two similar phenomena, results of the same cause, universal gravitation.

Whatever, on the one hand, favors the spread and interference of examples, and whatever, on the other hand, favors variety, inequality, individual originality, tends to increase inventiveness, to push on to progress. An enlightened democracy need not fear individual singularities and superiorities, since, thanks to diffusive imitation, the singular and superior individual works only for the whole. All that is best in the individual becomes socialized.

Will advancing civilization render less and less necessary these diversities and even these individual superiorities? No, for, other things being equal, the simplest inventions appear first. In proportion as society renders easier the imitative expansion of ancient inventions, the difficulty of new inventions becomes greater, for the same reason that the longer a mine is exploited, the greater also becomes the difficulty of extracting new minerals. The greatest geniuses are needed in order that new branches may spring forth on the old trunk of mathematics, physics, biology, etc. It is as impossible for the average civilized man to rise to new inventions as it is for a child of five years to collect with his hands fruit six feet above his head. But when a great man has gathered fruit high on the boughs of the tree of science, men of the lowest races may eat thereof.—Condensed from a paper read by M. G. TARDE before the Société de Sociologie de Paris, entitled, "L'invention considérée comme moteur de l'évolution sociale," and published in *Revue internationale de sociologie* for July, 1902. R. M.

Education and the Social Ideal.—When education is consciously regarded as a process of social transformation, the educational necessity of a definite conception of the social end to be attained through education becomes apparent. The school cannot consciously assist in transforming society unless the teacher has clearly in mind an ideal humanity into which society is to be transformed.

There are at least three elements that must enter into a rational and realizable social ideal: (1) a high degree of social intelligence; (2) an improved social organization resulting from social economy; and (3) the co-operative spirit.

Social intelligence is a manifestation of social consciousness, with which it develops *pari passu*. It denotes the ability of society to act in the interest of its members. The development of the consciousness of the individual is the natural outcome of his experience in looking out for himself. The similar experience of each social group warrants us in assuming that social progress may be depended upon to develop the consciousness of each group, and this consciousness will manifest itself in the gradual formation of the social intelligence, which has been defined as that "consensus of individual intelligence which forms a public opinion, a public conscience, a public will, and is manifested in law, institutions, and administration." The intensification of the social consciousness and the improvement of social intelligence seem to be the inevitable concomitants of further social development.

Social intelligence will result in the social employment of the principle of economy. "The history of progress," says Ritchie, "is the record of a gradual elimination of *waste*." The elimination of waste is a characteristic of intelligent action. Progress in individual or social intelligence may be measured by the degree of economy practiced.

The third indispensable element of the social ideal is the co-operative spirit, and this element is implied by the other two. Compulsory co-operation in the attainment of a worthy social ideal means either that the social ideal conceived is not a rational one, or that the individual is not intelligent enough to see that his interests are bound up in its realization. Voluntary co-operation alone can eliminate the waste characteristic of modern society. Competition, it is said, is the mainspring of human progress. Competition, however, may be divided into rivalry in securing individual

advantages, profit, social or political preferment, and the like, and a rivalry in promoting the common good. As a rivalry in the attainment of primarily individual ends, it is a transient phenomenon in society, and must give way to co-operation as rapidly as social intelligence is developed. Competition has indeed been a strong factor in social developmeut, but so also have tyranny, slavery, and cannibalism, and all the various forms of exploitation. Must these go on because, in the absence of social intelligence, they have served a purpose in social development?

Obviously, social organization is not directly the work of the school. As to social intelligence, the school is necessarily, with reference to knowledge, a distributing point. The mere distribution of knowledge, however, may not result in the development of social intelligence. A great function of the school is to socialize the knowledge distributed. The socialization of knowledge, however, is but a step in the transformation of the individual from the competitive to the co-operative type, and this the school should consciously attempt to do. Competition is now giving way to co-operation. Education should hasten the movement. It should strive to produce a different type of man; a man who employs his energy and talent in assisting his fellowmen to higher usefulness rather than in rendering their efforts nugatory or futile; a man whose motto is that of the English prince, "Ich dien'," and whose conduct illustrates his motto.

Modern education is chiefly engaged in developing the competitive type of individuality. The competitive man — the warrior, the "successful" man — is held up for emulation. Prizes, marks, honors, distinctions, take the place of functional pleasure in acquiring and using knowledge, and the gratification which always comes from successful co-operation toward a worthy end.

If the social ideal suggested is a practical and a desirable one, then the school should be consciously employed to realize it. It should never lose sight, of course, of its immediate aim of developing to the fullest possible extent the capacities and powers of the individual. But it must ever keep in mind the necessity of socializing these powers, of realizing a double aim. — IRA W. HOWERTH, "Education and the Social Ideal," in *Educational Review*, September, 1902. R. M.

Neo-Malthusianism in Australia.—The abnormal decrease in the growth of the population of Australia is one of the most serious and threatening conditions in relation to the future of that country. Earlier in the history of the country the growth of the population was extraordinarily rapid. The unprecedented economical development due to the great value of the natural resources of the country, the loans of English capital, and the indiscreet prodigality in dispensing of public lands, led to a rapid increase in the number of marriages and in the population.

Today the stratum of alluvium is exhausted, and the cultivation of the soil now demands greater capital. The yield of grains has fallen 40 per cent. When, in addition to this, one considers the devastation in grazing brought about by the continuous droughts and the fall of prices in the wool market, he can form a picture of the present economic conditions in Australia. The struggle for existence is no lighter there than in Europe or America. All kinds of occupations are overcrowded. This failing in the economical resources has exercised a strong influence upon the number of marriages and births in Australia, as, in fact, such a condition does everywhere.

Upon this question the official statistics speak with alarming clearness. According to Coghlan, the director of the Statistical Bureau of New South Wales, the number of births per one hundred marriages in the years from 1861 to 1898 fell from 30.61 to 20.21 per cent. in New South Wales, from 28.54 to 19.30 in Victoria. Since 1898 the percentage of births in Queensland fell from 28.80 to 20.80, in New Zealand from 28.16 to 21.42. This diminution in the percentage of births is found everywhere, and the conditions point toward a still greater decline.

Are there additional causes for this decline? The climate is healthful, and the death-rate is low, so that we must seek elsewhere for further causes of the condition. In the first place, it should be noticed that one-fifth of the women earn a living by means of their own work, and many employers will not hire married women. This tends to raise the age of marriage, and, therefore, to promote the decline in the birth-rate. Again, the families are, as a rule, small, especially in the cities. The theories of Malthus are followed. Almost everywhere the so-called *Zweikindersystem* of France is prevalent.

The decline in the birth-rate soon attracted the attention of the political economists of the country, who assigned three direct causes of the phenomenon: (*a*) that among all married women the number of fruitful marriages has declined; (*b*) that the birth-rate has fallen constantly and very considerably in the last twenty years; (*c*) that the women born in Australia are less fruitful than those immigrating from Europe.

In all the European countries, with the exception of France, the birth-rate is much higher. While in New South Wales, the most favorable division of the country in this relation, the birth-rate in 1898 was 28.42 per thousand, in England and Wales it was 29.4, in Scotland 30.8, in Germany 36.0. In the year 1890 in New South Wales the excess of births over deaths was 2.36 per cent., whereas ten years later, with a similar death-rate, the relation had fallen to 1.54 per cent. If this decline continues, the population can be maintained only through immigration. But the incentive for such a reinforcement is entirely absent at present, and it is difficult to see from what source it would come. In any case the increase will be very slow, and it seems very doubtful that the expectation according to which Australia ought to have eight million inhabitants within fifty years will be fulfilled.—EMIL JUNG, "Neo-Malthusianismus in Australien," in *Zeitschrift für Socialwissenschaft*, Heft 8/9. E. M.

Union of Canadian Municipalities.—The powers that are obtained by railway, telephone, and other companies, irrespective of the rights of the people, have shown the cities of Canada the necessity of combining for mutual protection. With this object in view, the Union of Canadian Municipalities was formed at Toronto a year ago. Definite objects of the union are declared to be: "the securing of united action for the protection of individual municipalities and municipal interests as a whole against legislative or other encroachments of corporations," the holding of meetings to discuss subjects of interest, and the improvement of legislation upon municipal questions. During the year past union representatives have appeared before the legislatures of the provinces and the Dominion Parliament. Before the latter they presented a memorial protesting against the encroachments of corporations on the municipal control of streets. Modification of pending bills was the result. Other bills before the legislatures have been either modified or thrown out because of the action of the executive committee of the union. Telephone companies were checked in their grasping schemes, and governmental regulations in regard to rates were placed upon them. The union has secured the promise of a general act controlling rates, compelling long service connections, and looking toward a cheap national system. The municipalities are all resisting the demands of private railway and other companies. It is the purpose of the union to assist and encourage this resistance, and, if necessary, to carry every case to the highest courts. Already the power of the union is respected by corporation lawyers and its wishes are sought on bills before they are presented.—*Municipal Journal and Engineer*, September, 1902. R. M.

British Ownership of Public Utilities.—Municipal ownership and operation of street railways is making rapid progress in the United Kingdom. One-half of all such railways are owned by the various cities and towns. A number of these are leased, but the tendency even here is toward having municipalities operate the roads. One hundred street-railway undertakings, with 689 miles of track, belong to the municipalities. The total number of such undertakings is 213, with 1,307 miles of road. The tramways owned by Birmingham, Edinburgh, Oldham, and twenty-four other towns are leased, but the tendency is toward municipal operation. Birmingham is said to be a good example of profitable leasing, but the corporation has decided to municipalize the service as the leases fall. Edinburgh, with total rentals of $288,300, has a surplus profit of $26,150 after sinking-fund payments are made, but is having trouble with the companies. Tramways are operated as well as owned by forty-one municipalities, and as nearly all own their electric-lighting supply, the introduction of electric traction is proceeding economically. The main objects of this policy are the reduction of fares, symmetrical development of the suburbs, and improvements in the methods of traction. But when the investments required for equipment, construction account, and purchase of private companies have been

liquidated by the operation of sinking funds, the tramway service will be a large source of profit for the relief of the taxpayer. Glasgow, Liverpool, Leeds, Sheffield, Hull, Southampton, and a host of smaller cities all make money out of their roads and have surpluses which are available for the reduction of taxes. Only one town is said to show a deficit in operating.—*Bradstreet's*, September 20, 1902.

The Need of Accurate and Uniform Social Statistics.—We can give a better account of the progress of the people of New Zealand and of some parts of India than of those of New Jersey and other states of the Union. There have been no well-directed efforts to bring about the necessary reform in the compilation and publication of statistics of the dependent, defective, and delinquent classes. Just in proportion as the facts of pauperism and crime, as the facts of health and well-being or ill-being, are honestly made public, a community will be governed honestly or otherwise. Wherever you find communities unwilling to give publicity to the facts in the case, you, as a rule, find a community which is badly governed, where public-health matters are neglected, where jails and almshouses are in bad condition, and where, of the annual revenue, but a portion is honestly expended for public needs. I believe that Massachusetts owes its commanding position as a well-governed state, and that the city of Boston owes its position as a well-governed municipality, to the fact that from almost time immemorial, commencing with the annual reports of town officers at town meetings, a precise account of the state of public affairs has been required of public officers in charge of public trusts.

Accurate statistics as to the extent of pauperism and crime could be collected through the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Without statistics, accurate and adequate, we do not know whether we are moving forward or backward. The book of Roundtree on *Poverty* is an illustration of what could be done if only there were a conviction of the social value of statistics.—F. L. HOFFMAN, in *New Jersey Conference of Charities and Corrections*, 1902.

Child Study in Chicago Schools.—Mr. Smedley has published *Child-Study Report No. 3*, the result of investigations during 1900–1901. Some very careful work was done to determine the height and size of desks best suited to the pupils of different grades and the proportion of adjustable desks required to accommodate the extreme cases.

In the laboratory pupils from over sixty schools have been examined with instruments of precision. Many parents and teachers have brought children to learn the nature and extent of sensory defects. Very bright children have been brought, to determine whether the phenomenal progress is at the expense of their physical well-being. Children who had failed to make progress in certain studies were presented to determine what the physical or mental cause of their special deficiencies might be. Children with very defective sight were examined and decision made as to whether the ordinary school or the department of the blind was best suited for them. Similar work was done with those with defective hearing, and dull, nervous, and frail children have been given advice and help.

Boys in the John Worthy (reform) School were examined to test the conclusions of the previous year, and those conclusions were confirmed by the measurements of 247 new subjects. These boys are inferior in all the principal measurements taken, and this inferiority increases with age.

After describing many tests and giving tables of observations, the report concludes with pedagogic suggestions, based on the results of the study.—*Report of the Department of Child-Study*, by F. W. SMEDLEY, Director.

H.

A Plan for the Study of Man.—Governments spend vast sums of money in charity to defectives, in education of normal persons, and in punishing criminals. This costly effort would be more economically directed if we knew more of the nature of human beings. Dr. MacDonald discusses a proposal to establish laboratories under federal patronage for the investigation of the criminal, pauper, and defective classes. The materials for such study may be found in school children, the inmates of reform schools, in prisons, shops, and wherever sufficient numbers may be examined to give a

solid basis for statistical conclusions. Examples are given of generalizations relating to the connection between physical conditions and mental traits and achievements.

The importance of study of defects of sight, hearing, and the incidents of development in arranging plans of education, is illustrated by many facts derived from study of children in Chicago, Washington, and elsewhere.

Instruments used in physical examinations are described and figured, and their uses explained. Several pages are devoted to examples to show the nature of hypnotism and the uses and dangers of suggestion in medical and pedagogic treatment.

Generalizations as to growth, sight, sound, memory, skin, taste, and smell, movement, attention, volition, and moral sense are given to show the value of results already reached. The notes on criminology are largely made up of former publications of the author. At the end is a bibliography of child study.—ARTHUR MACDONALD, *Senate Document 400*, 57th Congress, 1st Session. H.

Some Divorce Statistics.—Dr. Friedrich Prinzing, it the *Zeitschrift für Socialwissenschaft*, gives some interesting divorce statistics. The number of divorces in different countries depends, of course, largely on creeds and laws, as well as on national temperament and morals; but, on the whole, the proportion of divorces to the sum total of married life is remarkably small among the European nations, ranging from 0.42 and 0.11 per thousand married couples. In Japan divorce is much more common, and in the United States the negroes largely swell the number. Everywhere it seems on the increase. A significant feature in Germany is the growing number of divorces granted on the ground of mutual agreement. For the five years ending 1897 there were in Berlin alone 173, 302, 324, 416, 457. Children, as might be expected, are the best preventive of voluntary divorce. In Berlin, in 1897–98, in one thousand divorces the surviving children were as follows: no children, 54 per cent.; one child, 21.3 per cent.; two children, 13.8 per cent.; three children, 6 per cent.; four children, 2.6 per cent.; five children, 1.1 per cent.; six children, 1 per cent. —a strong argument for large families. Early marriages among the poor cause much misery in our large towns; they are also the least-enduring unions. The vast proportion of divorces is among those who married under twenty years of age. As marriage has grown later, the ratio of divorces steadily decreases. Divorce rules highest in the sixth or seventh year after marriage.—*Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation* (London), July, 1902.

Municipal Milk for the Children.—There are very few questions of a more serious nature than that of the great loss of life among infants. During the years 1891–1900, of every 100,000 births in London, 28,102—more than a quarter of the whole—died before reaching the age of five. So far, only one local body in London has particularly set its mind to deal with the question. The Battersea Borough municipal council has opened a depot for sterilized humanized milk, to combat diarrhœa, one of the chief causes of the death-roll. The experiment has proved a decided success. Customers come from all parts of the borough. During this year there have been only twenty-four deaths from diarrhœa among children, as compared with 150 last year, and only in one case was the child receiving milk from the depot. It cannot be said that the depot is entirely the cause of this drop, but we think we are thoroughly justified in saying that it has in some small measure been responsible for the improved death-rate.—*Municipal Journal* (London). R. M.

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AROUND THE ISLAND OF CEBÚ ON HORSEBACK.

Two of us made a trip around the island of Cebú recently on an observation and inspection tour in connection with the department of education. We left at night and on horseback. The glory of a tropical night, with the full moon flooding the great stretches of cocoanut palms and dancing on the sea, can never be described and never be forgotten.

The island of Cebú is one hundred and thirty-five miles long and only ten to fifteen wide. Down the center runs a mountain range of no great height, but making communication difficult from coast to coast. All the towns are along the sea. Owing to the condition of the roads and the absence of bridges, one cannot travel far by vehicle. Two-wheeled rigs called *quilezs* are met with in the towns, and the picturesque but painfully slow Caraboo carts along the country roads.

We traveled on American army horses. There is no more striking contrast in the Philippines than that between the great powerful American horse and the tiny little native pony. The natives admire and fear our horses greatly, and if they were as ugly in disposition as the native ponies, they certainly would be dangerous animals.

Cebú was the first of these islands discovered and settled by the Spaniards. It has a population of over five hundred thousand, and has the reputation of being one of the richest in the group. It produces sugar, capra, hemp, rice, corn, and tobacco.

It has, however, neither minerals nor timber, and, in spite of its reputation, the people, for the most part, are miserably poor. The native hut, built of bamboo, thatched with grass, set up on piles, consisting often of only one dirty room, devoid of furniture and decorations, is beggarly beyond description. In the

GOING TO CHURCH IN THE PROVINCES IN CARABOO, OR BUFFALO CARTS.

best houses, built substantially of wood or stone, are sometimes found pianos, books, and pictures.

Needless to say, the people wear the finest clothes possible. In the towns men wear trousers and shirt tail outside the trousers. In the country, the common *hombre* dispenses with both and wears a breech-cloth instead.

The hospitality of the native is very gracious. There are no inns on the island outside of the city of Cebú, and the traveler must, of necessity, go to the house of the *presidente*, or to the convent and put up with the *padre*. If he pays a social call, tobacco and drinks are invariably set forth. To decline both is

considered a rudeness. All Americans are supposed to drink whiskey, and much whiskey. The natives do not understand why a part of us should be total abstainers and the rest given to excess. They themselves are very temperate.

The table etiquette is Spanish in origin. All the plates are stacked up in front of one at the beginning of the meal. Meat,

TYPICAL SCENERY.

strange to say, forms the principal part of every course. Rice seems to be the only vegetable in everyday use, and it is served three times a day. What the master does not like he often spews out of his mouth to the cats and dogs on the floor. Women and children do not appear much in public. The host will accept nothing for his hospitality, and repeatedly assures you that the house and all it contains are yours.

In the organization of the provinces there is nothing that corresponds to our counties or townships. Under the provincial government — consisting of an elected governor and two Americans appointed to the offices of treasurer and supervisor — are

the pueblos. These towns, with their suburbs called *barrios*, cover all the territory. In a place of 30,000 inhabitants, the central division or pueblo proper may have only 3,000, the rest of the people being scattered over a dozen or more barrios covering a large amount of ground.

The officers of these pueblos are elected and consist of a *presidente* or mayor, and a *vicepresidente*, secretary, treasurer, and councilmen. There are also some school-teachers and police. In a town of 30,000 people the *presidente* will get something like $25 a month, the secretary and treasurer $20, the teachers $8, and the police $4. In the rural towns the police force is generally armed with spears and bolos.

Americanizing influences are at work in many of these places. One can see it in the manners and dress of the people, and also in such absurdities as "calle del Gen. Huges," "calle del W. H. Taft," "calle del Col. French," etc.

There are two men in every community who control it absolutely. They are the *presidente* and the *padre*. If you wish to reach the public in any way, you must approach it either through the representative of the government or of the church. Quite frequently these two dignitaries are at odds. If you are a friend to one you are perforce enemy to the other.

There is probably nothing concerning which more misapprehension exists than concerning church affairs in these islands. During the war the people rose in rebellion against the *frailes*, or Spanish priests, and drove them out. Native *padres* or *seculares* took possession of the parishes, and to every appearance give complete satisfaction. So far as I could see, the people have no quarrel with the church or the native priests, while against the *frailes* there is still the strongest feeling.

Under the Spanish régime the priests were a regular part of governmental machinery, and were paid by the government. Now they look to their parishioners. No collections are taken at service, but there are stories of extortionate charges in connection with the rites of marriage, baptism, and funerals.

Some of the churches are in excellent order and are somewhat impressive, though, owing to lack of art in them, there is not that

same appeal to the æsthetic feelings that comes from the old churches of Europe. Most of the churches are poor and barren. The people are very religious and attend a great many church celebrations. We were present at one of these on Corpus Christi day. There were almost no seats in the church—everyone knelt. The women kneeling all over the church made quite a picture

A RELIGIOUS PROCESSION.

with their dark skins, black skirts, and white headdress. The full village band assisted the choir. After high mass there was a procession around the churchyard. Booths were erected at the four corners to represent the going out of the gospels to the four corners of the earth.

The *padres* generally receive their education in the Spanish seminary in Manila, and it is almost entirely theological. The *padres*, as a class, are not broad-cultured men, but they are still capable of teaching their people, and are in close touch with them. They show a desire to learn English. In one large convent we found the New York *Police Gazette*, translated into Spanish, the sole representative of American literature.

The morals of the *padres* do not in all cases bear close scrutiny. It may be said in extenuation that the people here do not look at moral relations in the same way that we do. Fornication is common, adultery rare. It may also be said that the *padres* are from the soil and of the soil—they reflect social conditions as they actually are. There could be no greater mistake, however, than to attempt to tear the people away from their church connections; they would have, at present, nothing to fall back on.

It is interesting in going about the island to hear the stories told by the natives and by our army people. To most of the latter the Filipino is an animal on a decidedly low plane—a "nigger," or, at best, an "Indian." To show the natives' cruelty we were told how General Maximo killed in a most brutal manner a woman who did washing for the American soldiers. The duplicity of the native priests was set forth in a story about one of the well-known *padres*, a short distance from here, one who was always declaring his great friendship for the Americans. This man is said to have written a letter, now on record, in which he offered to the Filipino general to arrange a dance, take the American lieutenant—a man fond of balls and women—to the dance and leave him; the insurgent army could then appear and do the rest. They tell also of the murder of five Spaniards who had come in times of peace to Juberan to set school affairs in order. This commission was met by a brass band and every indication of friendliness, but as soon as they got well away from the shore a hundred *bolomen* rushed out of the tall grass and cut them down. The Spanish government burned the town to the ground. A funny story is told that throws light upon the organization of the insurgent forces. Two brothers—*presidentes* of adjoining towns—came out to join the insurgent army. One came dressed as a colonel, the other as a lieutenant. The colonel began to poke fun at his brother, and finally told him to go back and dress as a colonel. The brother did so and was accepted as a colonel. During the latter part of the war rank was determined almost altogether by the number of guns a man could command.

On the other hand, the natives that I heard had no love for our army. We were told that in one town the lieutenant in charge

and nine-tenths of his men had their native *queridas*. When the lieutenant left the place and came up to Cebú, peparatory to sailing to the States, the woman came and lived with him. In another place we were told that the women all took to the hills while the town was being garrisoned by a volunteer regiment. The results of this cohabitation are beginning to be apparent, and are deeply deplored by the best of the native people.

PLOUGHING A RICE PADDY WITH WATER BUFFALO.

One young fellow—a fine type of his race—told the following story: When a volunteer regiment came to his town, he was taken out and given a beating as being an insurrecto sympathizer. The next day he took to the hills, and joined the insurgent forces and became a captain. By and by he saw the uselessness of continuing the struggle, and, a regiment of regulars having succeeded to the place, he came in, surrendered, and was made chief of police, and succeeded in inducing a thousand of his countrymen to lay down their arms.

An ex-soldier told of helping one day to capture three *hombres*, who were suspected of knowing the whereabouts of the insur-

recto army. This soldier was ordered by the lieutenant in charge to shoot them one by one unless they gave the desired information. He refused to do so, and was threatened with being court-martialed, but, still refusing, the lieutenant got up and shot the first man himself. The other two promptly told all they knew. This soldier said that giving the water-cure was such an everyday performance that it excited no comment.

Our soldiers often indulge in the deadly native drinks to excess. We came across one lonely grave where the fellow had killed himself drinking twenty bottles of *bino* in one night.

The most hopeful thing about the situation at the present time is the attitude of all classes toward education. The American government has shown a desire to give the Filipinos, even while in arms, the best thing it has to offer—the free-school system; and the Filipinos, considering their condition, have shown a most commendable spirit toward this altruistic movement. Everywhere is shown a strong desire for the American teacher and his work. *Presidentes* and *padres* are eager to learn English, and it is nothing uncommon to find them working away at the books alone.

In the towns around this island there are usually not a half-dozen people who can speak Spanish. The native language is devoid of all culture, so it seems eminently proper that we should give these people a common language that contains the results of our progress for thousands of years.

We attended some of the native schools. The conditions were the rudest. A bamboo schoolhouse, a backless bench along the sides of the room, some children squatting on the floor, no chairs, tables, boards, or charts, a book containing the catechism in Vizágan—this was the school layout. All the children study aloud, and the best scholar is he who can make the most noise. The ignorance of the native country teacher is unfathomable, and when we found the salaries paid them we did not wonder at the class attracted, or rather driven, into the service. One woman—a fat old matron of fifty or more—received one and a half *pesos* per month—something less than seventy-five cents. From this amount the salaries range up to thirty dollars, the highest paid in Cebú.

The American teachers are trying to close these little *barrio* schools in which only the native dialect is taught, to train up assistants able to speak English and teach according to our ideas, and to concentrate the pay upon the really efficient teachers.

The American teacher has many discouraging conditions to contend with. He has difficulty in finding a house, and more difficulty still in finding food upon which he can live. He must try to persuade the town to build and equip a suitable schoolhouse. He must train his native teachers, and use all sorts of devices to get the children to attend after the novelty has worn off.

That the teachers have, as a class, gone at their work with characteristic enthusiasm and resourcefulness is unquestionable. That they are generally regarded by the natives in a very different light from the army people is likewise true. But that some out of the large body have fallen below the accepted standards of morality is equally true. One teacher owned his fighting cocks, and was a leading abettor of this favorite Filipino pastime. He was often seen coming from the pits of a Sunday afternoon —the usual time for the combats—with his clothes bespattered with blood. He contended that his conduct did not lessen his standing in the community; on the contrary, it heightened it—when his cock won. He also got drunk, but, it was said, "never ungentlemanly so." The division superintendent thought best, nevertheless, to drop him.

There is another case, that of a young woman whose indiscretion led an army officer to acts for which he was court-martialed and dismissed from the service. To send unmarried girls into towns in which they were the only white women, and in which they could not have the commonest conveniences, was all a mistake. The leavening effects, however, of the schoolmistress are beginning to be apparent, and there is no other agency doing more to win the people to our ideas than the school system.

SAMUEL MACCLINTOCK,
Principal Cebú Normal School.

CEBÚ, P. I.

A NEW IDEA IN SOCIAL FRATERNITY.

THE past century saw a mighty impulse toward bettering the condition of the weak. Slaves were liberated, women received recognition as rational beings, children were given rights other than those accorded by the whims of parents, and laborers were allowed to meet in self-respect, and to assert the dignity of their calling.

With this amelioration of social conditions, men of diverse classes approached each other at the close of the century in a different attitude from that which would have been possible at its beginning. Some of our most intelligent citizens not only theorized about social relations, but tried their theories by practical experiments. Settlements and clubs have gone into the heart of the crowded tenement districts and have made life assume a more roseate hue to many a heavy laden one. Yet the field is so great that every new case of genuine fraternity between those in different walks of life is worth while telling to the world.

In a crowded block in San Francisco, on Tehama street, between Fifth and Sixth, stands a house where representatives of all classes of labor, and of all social conditions, meet and discuss in the most friendly way all topics of human interest. The mistress of the house, Miss Octavine Briggs, is a visiting nurse, who established herself here to be in the center of her work.

Miss Briggs is a sister-in-law of Professor Bernard Moses, of the University of California, now absent as a member of the Taft Commission in the Philippines, and most of her life has been spent amid the advantages of a university community. Intellectual, witty, accomplished, with a charm of personality, and an unusual understanding of human nature, she seemed fitted best for society, in the limited sense of the word; and her friends were all surprised when she decided to win a diploma from the California Women and Children's Hospital rather than a degree from the university.

After graduation from the hospital, Miss Briggs worked for over a year as nurse under the Associated Charities, and lived at the college settlement in South Park. This life gave her an insight into the needs of the people of the district, and she felt that one of their greatest necessities was the influence of a home and inspiring friends.

HOUSE AT LEFT IS 452½ TEHAMA STREET.

With financial aid from some broad-minded men and women, she rented a house on Tehama street, No. 452½, and there made her home as artistic and dainty as any in the more favored districts of the city. In fact, there are many treasures in it that are enviously eyed by people of means and culture. In the living-room two of Keith's landscapes bring in the California sunshine, a sepia copy of Millet's "Shepherdess" gives an ennobling calm to labor, prints of children show the joy of action, and a Madonna reveals the exalting influence of love. In the bookcase Tolstoi, Spencer, Henry George, Mill, Ruskin, and other serious thinkers rather predominate over writers of fiction, verse, and travel. On the piano, instrumental and vocal music await their turn to delight the listening ears of the neighborhood. Good magazines lie invitingly on the table and in the cozy corner. Old brasses gleam down from a shelf, and here and there flowers add the culminating touch of refinement.

The only other room on the first floor is the kitchen, and because many of her neighbors have their kitchen as the only general living-room, Miss Briggs has expended some thought on hers. It is an especially attractive room, with its light-tinted

walls, its dainty white curtains, its window ledge of growing plants, and its open shelves of Canton dishes, which, by the way, were presented to Miss Briggs by some of her neighbors.

On the second floor are three small bedrooms and a bathroom, each a marvel of cleanliness, simplicity, and good taste. In the basement are some storing-places and a bathroom used by the neighbors.

KITCHEN.

If the house, with the spirit of freshness and friendliness that pervades it, is a pleasure to the neighborhood, the backyard is a constant surprise. The tiny inclosure, usually the receptacle of all sorts of unsightliness, is neatly boarded and painted, and is transformed into a refreshing greenery, with potted palms, geraniums, and ferns. At one side some boxes furnish houses for the animals or reptiles which a nature-study class are observing.

That Miss Briggs has been able to keep the home so attractive has been due to the co-operation of an efficient housekeeper, Miss Louise Schmidt. Between these two the conventional relations of mistress and maid are supplanted by a sincere friendship that finds its expression in a helpfulness, not only in matters of household convenience, but in the larger duties of life. It was not easy to find such service. In the first year Miss Briggs was on Tehama street she had eight different house girls, all but one leaving on their own account. Some of them were doubtful about the propriety of a young woman's keeping house alone, especially in such a neighborhood, and all objected to treating the neighbors as courteously as they did visitors from

more favored spheres. On this one point Miss Briggs is firm, that there shall be no class distinctions made in her house. With the advent of Louise the success of the house was assured. Grasping the true spirit of the work, she supplemented Miss Briggs, by being an example of cleanliness, kindliness, and true economy to the ubiquitous neighbors. Then, too, she took care

BACKYARD.

of her mistress's physical condition and made it possible for her to accomplish the work of several ordinary women. After two years' service as housekeeper, Louise has gone to study to be a nurse; but her spirit has descended to her successor, Miss Della Schultz.

To visit Miss Briggs came her old friends from other parts of the city, from Berkeley, and from Stanford; and here they met the new friends she had made in the neighborhood. Because this home is one of the most interesting places in the city, the first visit is always only the beginning of many, and one is con-

stantly meeting the same people there. From these meetings, friendships have grown up between her older and newer friends, and all are helpful to each other. If a university professor can discourse eloquently on economic problems, a factory lad can offer his own experiences as a practical example. If a college

BACKYARD.

woman can give some of her investigations along the lines of child study, a mother, who by her own hard work has supported and reared seven children to good citizenship, can testify to the mother's insight into the child's needs.

Aside from the hundreds of neighborly calls made at the house each week—and it is surprising how much time these people have for visiting—there are held there seven weekly organized meetings.

On Monday evening a woman graduate of the University of

California instructs a class of young girls in physical culture. The space is not large, and the apparatus is the least expensive, but the girls are growing straighter and less hollow chested, and show an interest in improving the sanitary conditions of their own homes and families.

On Tuesday afternoon a singing class of the tiny boys and girls

BACKYARD.

of the neigborhood makes the house lively. On Tuesday evening there is a choral society composed of the young men and women of the neighborhood and led by a prominent organist. The members each pay twenty-five cents per month into a fund with which they are planning to rent a house, not only for a meeting-place, but for a club, to be open every evening, as a rival to the saloons. This is their own suggestion, and the development is watched with interest.

On Wednesday afternoon is a meeting that in a measure corresponds to the mothers' clubs of the settlements, but whose

underlying spirit is different. The women form a circle of the Needlework Guild of America, and call themselves the "Visiting Nurses' Auxiliary," although only three of its members are nurses. It meets regularly once a week and makes hundreds of women's and children's garments during the year. These are carefully stored in the basement until November, when the San Francisco branch of the Needlework Guild of America holds its open exhibition of articles collected during the year and votes them to the various charities. The Visiting Nurses' Auxiliary has viewed with pride its own substantial contributions, and its store is voted to the poor outside its own district. Miss Briggs always receives collections from other sections of the Needlework Guild of America, and in time these garments often find themselves in the homes of the very women who have plied their needles so diligently to help others more needy than themselves. This sewing circle has made great strides of advance since its organization four years ago. At first it obtained all its materials for garments from donations; but in a short time it was not content to be so dependent, and formed a plan of purchasing its own goods. Each member now pays ten cents a month dues, and the circle gives a semi-annual entertainment at some public hall, with an admission price of ten cents. The talent is secured from all parts of the city, and the proceeds furnish sufficient material to keep the Visiting Nurses' Auxiliary busy throughout the year. During its first months Miss Briggs furnished both the tea and cake which close each weekly sewing; but then the women arranged that each member in turn should bring the cake and that they buy the tea out of the general fund.

At each meeting, while everyone is sewing, there is a short talk, now arranged for by a college graduate who attends regularly. These addresses are by women and men from different professions. For instance, during the past year a charming Chinese woman doctor has given talks on her native land; one of the probation officers from the juvenile court of Chicago has explained the evolution and working of that body; a noted woman suffragist has told the story of her life; a traveler from Brazil

and one from Germany have given descriptions of the social life in those lands; a specialist on wild flowers, and one on birds, have brought something of outdoor nature into their midst; a student of the American Indians has outlined the government's present policy as illustrated in its Indian schools. In fact, the topics have been those that would interest any intelligent audience and those that would lift these women out of their own narrow environment for the time being. There has not been any attempt in these talks to give the women what they needed for everyday utilitarian purposes, except what they get incidentally. That the talks are appreciated is shown in more ways than one. The topics are discussed afterward in the homes and on the street. Those women who at first could not listen five minutes without engaging in a side conversation of their own now pay strict attention to all that is said and afterward volunteer questions and remarks on the subject. This has all come about without suggestion from Miss Briggs, but rather through interest and imitation combined. When the last semi-annual entertainment was planned, the women themselves suggested that, instead of the usual varied program, they ask the Chinese doctor, whom they had elected an honorary member of their circle, to give them a lecture. They wanted their husbands and children to hear her, and all were delighted when she consented. After the lecture was over, some few of the neighborhood pronounced it "a bum show," but to this every member of the sewing circle retorted: "You are not educated up to enjoy lectures. Now, we've heard so many that we prefer them to the common songs and dances you can get anywhere."

The circle has a regular outing each springtime, when wild flowers are abloom, and occasionally it has been entertained in the homes of those having more worldly goods than its members. These have been pleasant diversions, but the real interest of the women is in accomplishing as much as they can in their regular meetings. Unconsciously their manners have been softened, and the spirit of graciousness reigns over each Wednesday afternoon

On Thursday afternoons, from twenty to thirty girls gather in their sewing class. This was started four years ago by Miss

Rising, the daughter of Professor Rising, of the University of California, but for some time it has been under the guidance of one of the neighbors. The lassies pay ten cents a month, and with this is bought material from which they fashion garments to fit themselves. Very proud is each girl as she takes home the new skirt or waist in which every stitch has been set by herself. The stitches are remarkably good, too, for it is the purpose of the sewing teacher to overcome the tendency of the shiftless poor to make garments that will not long hold together.

GIRLS' SEWING CLASS AT MISS BRIGGS'S.

Thursday evening the boys younger than twelve have their nature-study class, and play games and sing songs.

Friday evening is the jolliest time to be at Miss Briggs's. Then the boys over twelve and their friends come to their "at home." They became interested in animal life through the stories of Kipling and Ernest Seton-Thompson, and now they have a regular nature-study lecturer come to them each week to help them in their observations. The experiences they have brought to Miss Briggs with their snakes and other captives would make a first-class humorous book. And then their music! This is a weekly treat for the women of the block. Miss Briggs plays the accompaniments, and the boys' voices swell out surprisingly pure and clear in "Down among the Dead Men," "The Jolly Miller," "Gaily the Troubadour," and other old English songs. The mothers congregate on the opposite sidewalk and listen to every note until the piano stops and the boys come trooping out and

march down to their own homes, still singing their favorite "Down among the Dead Men."

All these social relations are but the overflow of Miss Briggs's activity. Her nursing, which is the true field for her energy, occupies her days, and, alas, too many of her nights. Some months she makes over one hundred and seventy visits to the sick and needy. These visits are not short little calls to leave a few friendly words, but hours spent in using up her own physical strength in alleviating suffering. After a day of bathing, rubbing, poulticing, dressing, and making a house more comfortable for the invalid, she may have just returned home to rest when the bell rings and she is called out to assist in ushering some little one into this world or to close the eyes of a man departing into the next. Probably, in the latter case, she has to prepare the body for the funeral herself. After a night devoted to such duties, she may seek sleep in the daytime, but that cannot be found at 452½ Tehama street, where the bell jingles from dawning until dark. Just because she does her life-work as a friend, and not as the representative of an institution, the patients receive her as a friend; and, in their affection, come to her on all occasions.

THURSDAY NIGHT BOYS.

The nursing grew so in demands that the third year a wealthy friend supplied the funds for the support of a second nurse, and in this, the fourth year, this same friend has given additional means for a third nurse. These live with Miss Briggs and are under her direction. Their presence, by relieving the great pressure of the sick, gives more opportunity to be helpful to the well.

Miss Briggs has no intention of increasing her household further. If more nurseships are endowed, she will open a new cottage in another congested district and have the benefits of two homes, rather than of one larger institution.

In viewing the result of Miss Briggs's work, one must consider the character of the people among whom she dwells. The nursing necessarily extends in all directions and to all people of need. The most intimate social relations are with the neighbors on her block, numbering over two hundred families. These people are mostly respectable, and disorderly characters are not welcomed to their midst. All are of the lowest wage-earning class and live from pay-day to pay-day. Some families of eight crowd into three small rooms, and a number receive help from established charities. There is nothing of the abject squalor that we hear of in the larger eastern cities, for the California climate, demanding less fuel and less clothing, and allowing more regular work, makes life easier for the laborer.

WOMEN'S SEWING CIRCLE.

When Miss Briggs first went among them, from the Associated Charities, she found that many people who accepted the nurse from an institution expected further help from it, as coal, food, clothing, and rent; and they had a slightly supercilious bearing toward its servant, the nurse. Since she has gone simply as a friend, ready to help, but with no financial reserve behind her, she has been received in a better spirit, and the people, instead of losing their independence, seem anxious to return what service they can.

On her block the improvement is noticeable. While the street was scheduled by the Merchants' Exchange to be swept once a week, sometimes over a month elapsed without it being touched. Miss Briggs interviewed the right people until the street-sweeping department was forced to live up to its agreements. Now she has the office telephone her just what evening the street is to be swept — for the department has not yet reached the perfection of regularity — and she warns all the neighbors in time to sweep their sidewalks before the machine appears. The front windows have boxes and pots of geraniums and begonias, "because they look so nice in Miss Briggs's window." Seldom now is a woman caught gossiping at her door with bare arms and hair unkempt. Whereas four years ago the children dropped out of school shortly after the term commenced, because it was too much trouble for the mothers to get them ready, now it is considered a social offense to have a child absent unless ill.

One might question: Is her house, with its cultured refinement, just as helpful to them as one whose art was at the stage they could introduce into their own homes? The answer, it seems to me, should be in the affirmative; because her home is sincerely part of herself, just as her work is. She has the same treasures around her on Tehama street that she would have in a home on California street. She lives on Tehama street because her life-work lies in that district. No attempt is made in her home to reduce her style of service to one that the neighbors could reach. She lives sincerely, as she is accustomed to, and lets the spirit of her life have its effect.

The support of this home is by subscriptions from some of the best thinkers in San Francisco and vicinity, from people who are satisfied to have their money work good without receiving printed reports. Miss Fanny Doyle, of Menlo Park, is secretary and treasurer, and by her untiring zeal makes the work possible. It may be remarked here that this young woman, coming into the work at first merely to furnish the finances, has assisted so much with the practical nursing that now she is as able to cope with most cases as is a graduate from a hospital. As the scope has increased, the need of more funds has become apparent.

The fact that no subscriber has as yet either reduced or withdrawn his allowance is a proof of their appreciation of the work in this its fourth year. The woman who has furnished the two extra nurses is one of the original subscribers, and still continues her monthly subscription to the general house fund. Miss Briggs receives only her mere living—her board and lodging—from the funds; even her clothes come outside of it. The two other nurses receive a salary and pay their board into the house fund.

One of the greatest evidences of the faith of those who know the work and who have means to assist it has been in providing funds for a summer cottage for convalescent children. In 1900, a home at San Rafael—a picturesque, sheltered town across the bay from San Francisco—was rented for August and September. Miss Briggs and Louise went over to manage the cottage, leaving others in charge at Tehama street. Only twelve children could be accommodated at a time, but during the two months thirty-six little ones were given a chance to recuperate in the country air. Some remained the entire time; others, one, two, or three weeks, as Miss Briggs deemed necessary. All rejoiced in the freedom, the warmth, the trees—some of which actually bore fruit; the pure milk—eight whole gallons a day; the hills; the bathing at the shore; and the kindness of the people of San Rafael. In fact, everything was a source of congratulation, and every boy and girl returned to the city feeling that this is a very beautiful world to live in. Visitors to the summer home remarked the lovely spirit of the children there. The stronger helped the weak; the older cared for the young; all were cheerful and thoughtful; and the only cloud was that the summer home could not be open always. One San Rafael matron was so favorably impressed that she offered to support the home three months during 1901, and this brought back health to one hundred children. During the summer of 1902 Miss Briggs herself was away on a much-needed vacation, and a summer cottage was not opened. It is hoped to have a country cottage open the whole year through, where children can be sent at any time, and where

vegetables, poultry, and eggs can be produced for the Tehama street house.

The success of Miss Briggs's work has proved it a practical venture along humanitarian lines. It is in no way a rival of "settlement" work, but proceeds along with it, offering the more intimate home influence rather than the wider institutional relations.

KATHERINE A. CHANDLER.

SAN FRANCISCO.

THE CRADLE OF THE TRUST.

We look to the political parties and the legislatures for remedies against every social ill. We are apt to forget the fact that political parties and persons, in the nature of things, are more or less demagogic, more or less inclined to flatter their constituents by the assertion that enactment of a law is sufficient medicine for the complaint, while the truth that hard, incessant work—eternal vigilance—is the only satisfactory remedy is overlooked or forgotten. We are forgetting that it is necessary, whenever important topics are under debate, to let the politicians' flattery pass by unnoticed, and instead of listening examine into our own—the nation's, the people's, the citizens'—responsibility as above and below the political struggle, to see if no serious defects there ought to be repaired before we can take time to listen to the stump speeches calling upon the federal government for treatment.

The trust, the all-absorbing social and political topic of our time, appears as a climax of our Anglo-Saxon individualism, social and industrial, and our efforts must therefore naturally be directed toward a regulation of this individualism, or its effects, in cases where these conflict with the interests of the people at large. Other nations also, outside the Anglo-Saxon world, have to contend with this same problem, but in a form less grave than ours. Their scant political freedom, their more communistic and less individualistic social conditions, have made it possible for them, less distracted as they are by political agitation, to follow the economical evolution with a keener sense of its importance as a base for the national life, and to support this evolution with constructive technical appurtenances when deemed necessary or desirable.

As the social value of the man, the individual, is higher in this than in any other country, and as this worth may be supposed to furnish the individual with a personal feeling of power, with practically unlimited field of work, it is but natural to con-

clude that it is the force thus obtained for the individual which has built up the country and carried it forth to its present eminence. Hence it must be with reluctance and the gravest feeling of responsibility that any new feature tending toward the limitation of the personal freedom is made a political or social, a commercial or industrial, issue.

Nevertheless the time seems to have come to have this done. We lack the curbing influence of European nobilitations, titles, or decorations, and must find other means for the legislative and executive divisions of our government to keep the social and industrial evolution within proper bounds. We have in the so far successful struggle for a reformed civil service a precedent that ought to show us the way to follow when a proper base is built.

Let us, therefore, for a time turn our mind from the higher political agitation for an abstract solution of the general trust problem, and let us sketch a picture of what other nations, less occupied by political activity, have done to deprive this question of its acuteness before we again give vent to political excitement.

By examination we shall find that the main difference between public or quasi-public institutions related to transportation and commerce of this and other countries consists in the ownership. While in Europe all these features, or bearers, of modern social life are owned, maintained, or managed as public institutions by state or municipality, or by corporations subjected to such strict control that they are reduced to financial or administrative middlemen, we have allowed these features to grow entirely into the uncontrolled ownership and management o private persons or corporations, and we have with the weakest or protests seen this done so thoroughly that the public in many cases finds itself situated like the miners to the corporation store. That is, the public has to pay prices for necessities and commodities of life as fixed by private interests, with but little controlling influence of competition, without any alternative but to pay the fixed price for the quality offered, or starve. In this fact lies the gravity of the trust problem.

There is, first, the *railroad* corporation. It is the owner of the one of our quasi-public institutions most closely connected with our economical evolution. Being the most important factor, it naturally dictates where it can, and, by monopolizing, leads the traffic into channels most profitable to itself, in spite of competition between the several companies. This phase of the trust problem, however, has a too long, eventful, and well-known history in this country to need more than a few passing remarks as to its relation to the spreading and the form of the national trust problem. Directly, the railroad company gives little cause for complaint, and is doing its best to further trade and traffic; but indirectly it is, and has always been, a nursery for the trust idea. Its officials are reared under the spell of an imperious discipline, and they subsequently demand from their subordinates a service whose nature is in absolute contrast to the spirit of our national institutions. This must be considered of grave consequence, because so great a part of the population is engaged in railroading or directly connected with this traffic.

The railroad problem is kept alive in the public mind by continuous scheming and efforts toward merging — by the larger road trying to gobble up the smaller and weaker one — in order to diminish competition. Efforts like these may, when successful, be fraught with dangers to the national commerce, but as a local problem they always tend to simplify the commerce and to benefit the industries by eliminating extra charges for running cars from one line into or over another. Hence the unwillingness of the industrial and commercial part of the public to become alarmed. If the question of governmental ownership could be solved as a local problem, if the cities could be the owners of tracks, lines, and yards inside a connecting belt line, maintaining them and charging a wheelage fee for their use, equal for all, then the same ends could probably be gained as aimed at by complete ownership, and the problem would thus lose its tremendous financial proportions. But, to leave the railroad problem, the attention of the general public is sufficiently centered to remove any fear of immature legislation.

The next source of extraordinary evolution of the trust can

be found in our *harbor* system. Our harbors have, as a result of the above-mentioned pronounced individualistic development, remained in the same condition as before the introduction of steam as a means of locomotion. While the nations of the Old World have introduced a new class of harbors providing proper facilities for modern vessels and adequate connection with the railroads, we have — save for some dredging, lengthening of piers, improvement of breakwaters, and the like — left our harbors just as they were when the first steamer and the first locomotive were built. Each corporation, railroad, or mercantile firm has a little harbor of its own—a dock line, a pier, a slip, or whatever name they happen to give to it; and thus the harbor of our modern metropolis in reality is a shorter or longer chain of small individual harbors, with the most limited facilities in direction of hoisting machinery, storage room, and railroad connection.

This form of harbor is good and sufficient for certain forms of traffic or industry; it accommodates the local consumption through the large wholesale merchants, and the several railroad companies for their coal and ore traffic, and it is properly maintained in every metropolitan city; but as an accommodation for the national commerce it is too expensive and time-wasting. Besides this form of harbor, or in addition to it, there has, in the larger commercial centers of Europe, grown up a new class of harbor, as different from it as the printing-press of our dailies is from the old-time hand-press. We may properly class the present form of our harbor as *industrial*, for it accommodates our factories and our lumber and coal yards, distributed over the town as they are; while the new and modern harbor may be classed as *commercial*. A short discription will suffice to show wherein they differ.

A commercial harbor consists of several large basins, directly open for admission of the vessels, permitting these, on the simplest possible sailing or maneuver lines, without need of towing, without passing of locks, gates, bridges, or any sort of obstruction, to run directly to the moorings. Moored here, movable steam, electric, or hydraulic cranes are placed directly opposite the hatchways; these opened, the unloading goes on

immediately. The cranes will place the cargo on railroad cars placed directly behind them, or send it across the tracks to the warehouse, in the shortest possible time. The railroad tracks have, as a matter of course, connection with all lines of the city; so it matters not which company will have to do the further transporting. As soon as thus loaded, the cars are removed, others with load for transshipment are taking their places, and their freight is transferred to the empty hold, together with goods that may be taken from the warehouses or from city trucks.

The governing principle of these harbors is not so much the time-saving, the skilled handling of the freight, or the unlimited connection with the country's railways, important as these advantages are; but *the fact that no private concern or corporation owns a foot of dock or ground in the plant.* It does not matter whether a firm has a single barrel of stuff or a whole shipload to handle, it will have the same right. There is the least possible charge to pay to the drayman, and goods can be left in the warehouses for a stipulated fee until wanted, and can with the issued certificate change hands without being moved. Such harbors have special basins for special substances, as ore, coal, oil, and explosives. It has grain elevators, and at a convenient place a large 100- or 150-tons stationary crane.

Harbors of this class are not so very new. The first basin of the sort was Sandthor Haven, in Hamburg, opened for traffic in 1866. It proved so successful that another basin was soon added; but as the German political unification just at that period threatened the independence of the old Hanseatic town, the development of the harbor was delayed some time, until she in the eighties, by surrendering her independence to the new German empire, got money for which the present mighty harbor plant was built. This was simultaneously made a free harbor and soon became the center for the rapidly growing German trans-ocean trade.

The harbor of Copenhagen is newer, and in fact an effort to offset and neutralize the effects of Hamburg's new plant. It is, though smaller, more interesting to the student of civics, for its modern improvements and the happy way in which it has met

MAP I.



Plan of modern part of Hamburg harbor, showing the layout of a modern metropolitan harbor with large basins. America quai, at the largest basin is 5,000 feet long, and basin 980 feet wide. The whole plan built 1866–92.

MAP II.



Plan of free harbor at Copenhagen, showing arrangement of tracks and warehouses, of jetty with grain elevators, and how public park, shore promenade, railway yard, and harbor may be worked together into a harmonious *ensemble*. Built 1892.

the demands for an amalgamation of artistic and technical features.

It will be seen at once that a commercial harbor offers a number of facilities for the shipping trade, and would practically solve important phases of our transportation problem, but it will at the same time be observed that it is in contrast to our commercial system, developed with the presumption that it should make competition and establishment of new firms as difficult as possible. The establishment of a new steamship line, to take an example, means under the present conditions the acquisition of harbors both for terminals and for stations on the route, and the firm that establishes it will know that railroad connections of only the most primitive sort can be had unless considerable capital is sacrificed. Hence a business venture of this sort will run into proportions that will prevent small firms or beginners from entering into it, and will when made be less beneficial to the public, which in the end must pay the expenses. If commercial harbors were the rule, any shipowner with ability to secure paying cargo could start a line and drop it again, incurring little responsibility. This ease of access soon furnishes the necessary daring to the commercial navy, without which competition with other seafaring nations is of little avail.

The fact that the two typical harbors named above, besides being commercial harbors, are also free harbors — that is, places in which goods from foreign countries can be taken in, worked over, refined, or repacked for shipment to other markets, without passing national custom lines — may have obscured their general commercial character and prevented this from becoming publicly known here. Their importance as promoters of commerce and industry ought to be thoroughly studied, not only as technical — as engineering — works, but especially as solutions of social, commercial, and industrial problems.

A third promoter of the trust is our lack of convenient and adequate *market-places*. We have so little idea of the uses to which a market-place is put that we seem to have almost entirely forgotten what it really is or what it looks like. We are ready to call any large retail bazaar or street in which a number of deal-

ers in the usual market products have located their "commission houses" a "market." The old continuous fight of our forefathers against the forestallers and regraters is forgotten, and the whole market delivered to these, to immense loss both in money and health, in price and quality of the market. No town in this country—as far as the author has been able to learn—has a market-place of size in any way commensurate with the size of the town; but some of our towns—and that is the most peculiar part of the condition—have had a place for that purpose, but have used it as a site for a retail bazaar, thereby squeezing the real market out into the abutting streets and alleys. It ought to be evident that there cannot be much of a market under such circumstances; but the denizens of these places do not see, and if they see do not understand. Just a few truck farmers, offering their vegetables for sale, appear under these circumstances, and these few have, furthermore, in order to secure a stand near the "market-place," to take station the preceeding day and sleep on their load until the market hour. You can meet these silent reproaches of our civic institutions any afternoon—especially on Sunday—on the highways leading into our larger cities.

Most well-established cities of the Old World have a number of market-places, generally under roof, one for each class of products, as, *e. g.*, vegetables, hay, meat, fowl and butter, fish, flowers, birds and dogs, cattle and horses. In the beginning there was always one general market-place, and then, as soon as the city's growth made this inadequate, classes of products have been separated and new places furnished for these.

Our market system, as we find it today, is that of the forestaller, and it is organized in the way that seems best suited for the building up of large private business concerns. Such a wholesale house as that of the forestaller always is has its agents out among the farmers and fishermen, making contracts with the producers, keeping these, if possible, in dependence by advancing money on prospective harvests. This wholesale house then furnishes the retailers of the city with the products, keeping these also, if possible, in bondage by a liberal use of the credit sys-

tem. That a system of this sort is in contrast to the market idea needs no further explanation. It tends to the building up of large private fortunes, for the benefit of which the citizens — the consumers — are taxed. Bad as this is, it is, however, not the worst feature of the system, for its degrading effect is accompanied by a lowering of the general quality of the products, thus menacing the city's health. Fruits, for instance, have to be picked in a half-ripe condition in order to withstand decay during the longer time it necessarily takes to reach the consumer through these sets of middlemen. It is not only the green banana that has to "ripen" in the cavity under the stone sidewalk of the commission house, but all other fruits have to be gathered before softness from maturity makes them difficult to handle.

If, then, in the city was a market-place through which a larger part of the producers could reach the consumers directly, we should have a means of regulating the standard, in regard to both price and quality, of our necessaries of life which would be of benefit to the community. The idea of a market-place is that the products offered here are disposed of immediately on a cash basis for what price they will bring; while the forestaller's idea is to keep the product in a salable condition as long as possible. It is not sold the same day it comes in, some of it not even the same week. What sort of a market price can we expect as a result of the limited competition among a number of business firms, keeping a part of their customers in the credit bondage? Of course, some remnants of the market idea will also be in evidence here; perishable products, for instance, will have to be disposed of before marks of decay are visible. But immature vegetables or fruits kept stored in warehouses until this stage is reached are not the sort of products on which the masses of a large city's population should be fed. The well-to-do classes have other, more direct, means of reaching the producer.

In spite of these precarious conditions, it must be admitted that there *is* a market in most of our cities and towns, in common farm products, as vegetables, poultry, butter, eggs, and certain

classes of fruit — an irrepressible remnant, frequented by the small farmer of the surrounding country. But what about our other necessaries? Where are our fish markets? Have any of our cities such a convenience, with direct access for the fishing boat and appliances for handling the day's catch? A few retailers on a street or other public place is no market. If a few packing-houses in the East, with branch houses in the inland cities, are named, the whole supply of this article is exhausted. Instead of fresh fish from the adjacent waters, the denizens of these places are supplied fish that has been kept in frozen condition no one knows how long.

Most inimical, however, to the interests of the people is the condition of our national meat market. On account of the large amount of money involved in this trade, on account of its connection with the markets of the world, and on account of the large industries, as packing, preserving, manufacturing by-products into soap, axle grease, and fertilizers—the whole trade has been brought under exclusive control of firms able to handle large sums of money, and any sort of a free market prevented or obliterated by these. The struggle against this condition — if ever there was a movement worthy of this name — has been given up long ago. The whole trade has been consolidated on private firms and the public mind perverted to the belief that this is a condition to be proud of.

If we, as they have in all important European cities, had a public meat market and public slaughterhouses or *abattoirs*, we should bring into the meat packers' calculations such a large amount of uncertainty that it would be impossible for them to control the prices, as they do now, and by export of surplus production keep these on a desired level. The time of the "cattle baron," one of the pioneer stages of our meat-packing and exporting industries, is slowly vanishing, to be replaced by the regular, surer, and less hazardous supply of meat from the cattle-raising farmer. In its wake ought subsequently to follow the institution of public ownership of all appurtenances to the meat market; not only in order to obtain a natural regulator of the market price of meat, but also to limit the swing of the trust idea in this important line.

Besides these above-mentioned necessaries of life, for the exchange of which regular markets are established in older communities, there are certain market conditions that bring every article from the factories under the law, or the effects, of proportion between supply and demand. One promotor of this law may be incidentally mentioned before the market idea is left, viz., the *department store*. As long as this was kept on a strictly cash basis, it served as a sort of market through which the manufacturer or producer could reach the consumer more directly than could the common retail store. By soliciting "account customers" they are now losing this claim to public recognition, and the city is thus losing one more of her market-places, though it may be said that this, as such, was a sort of makeshift. Far down as we are, its loss will be felt.

Try, now, after considering these conditions, to imagine the attractive feature we should add to our cities if a set of large market halls and places, with proper appurtenances for the transaction of business and transshipment from or to boat or railroad car, truck or grocery wagon, were established. Think of a large hall, like the one we knew at the Chicago World's Fair as the Manufactures and Liberal Arts Building—a large hall of 1,100 × 400 feet, filled with a throng of sellers and buyers of all sorts of food products fresh from land and water, while the monumental bronze clock by sonorous strokes tells you the time, and the air is refreshed by the spray from fountains sent 100 feet up into the air. When we get a system of market-places, they will, as a matter of course, be of a size commensurable to that of our cities, and will outdo everything hitherto known; and why shouldn't they? Market-places, like harbors and railroads, are paying investments.

But now the agitation against the trusts. Is there any sense in this so long as we are maintaining conditions from which harmful trusts must develop? We are trying to cure the top while it is the root that is sick. Would it not seem more sensible to roll up the sleeves and go to work with a spade, fertilizer, and watering hose, preparing the soil for a new and better growth, and not rely on a cutting or trimming of the top as the only remedy?

And one other reason should prompt us. We are putting great forces to work on the beautifying of our cities, on efforts to raise public and private taste, and on elevating our civic pride, while the city-body proper is still in the upper stages of barbarism —if we may make use of Lewis Morgan's classification. It may require some courage to stir up conditions out of which so many great private fortunes are built, but without this courage it will be useless to expect lasting results of our work, for the cause is such that only heroic means can save it.

To be honest, what is it that makes a great city so interesting, so alluring, and so apt to keep a soul in its bondage? It is not the improvement of the surrounding country or selected spots within, however important these may be as a fitting or flattering frame for the city proper; but it is the varied pulsating life, the many expressions of the unification of a million souls into a single personification, the visible, tangible, and audible embodiment of the social idea, named a city.

And where do we find these expressions? We find them in the places where the city is solving her transportation problem. We see the array of locomotives leaving the roundhouses filled with coal and water and with experienced hands on the throttle; some to make a sixty-miles-an-hour run, drawing the many citizens to their places of work; some to draw a thousand tons of articles to another market and fetch back a like amount for ours. We see the busy steamers enter and leave the harbor, load and unload their cargoes. We see the throng at the board of trade and at our quasi-markets. We see the long rows of intricate machinery in the shops, led by skilled hands, turn out wonderful articles. We see from the top of our skyscraper in one direction the clear blue sky over the thousand chimney-pots set in green of our gardens and home yards, over which doves and pigeons may be circling in the air; in another direction an endless mass of black smoke-spots dotted with white whiffs of steam and flashes from the skylights glistening in the sun. Here the eight hours of strenuous life in the business whirl; there sixteen hours of rest, home life, and education. We see and comprehend that we can as little be without the one as the

other. Try as we may to flee when the struggle seems too hard, yet we return knowing that outside is mere existence, inside is life.

Why, then, should we not have the best and most convenient agencies to make these eight hours of business as useful, and those other sixteen hours as restful, homelike, and enlightening, as possible? We shall get these agencies as soon as we have settled our minds as to the need of them. When the politician had gone too far in his quest for power, and when we found that where work was wanted and needed nothing but politics came forth, we had the civil service reformed and have now a fair prospect of getting the public service performed in an efficient way. When we understand that our captains of industry and princes of pommerce are monopolizing our social evolutions, we shall likewise have to ask these to step aside. They will do their duty toward the nation just as the politician did his; for they, like him, are first citizens of the country, and next business-men in quest of success, and have proved this as often as need be.

We want the day to approach when the Old World will have to look to this country for ideas and models as to railroads, harbors, and markets, and every other feature of the city layout; for the base on which our cities are built is broader and deeper than anything before seen. Therefore we pray that the day may not be too far off when the stream going from our shore to theirs may be reversed.

A. J. Roewade.

Chicago.

WHAT IS A SOCIOLOGIST?

THE American public in general, and the Chicago public in particular, has had a recent spasm of interest in locating the genus "sociologist." Our respected president gave the cue by appointing to the Coal Strike Commission, in the place proposed for "an eminent sociologist," a railroad employee experienced in organizing railroad men. The newspapers very naturally raised the two questions: first, Is the appointee a good man for the place? second, Is he a sociologist? Before the echoes of this discussion were quiet, the distinguished president of an eastern college took occasion, in an address before leading Chicago citizens, to associate the name "sociologist" with the terms "freaks" and "faddists," and he is reported to have said that sociology seemed to him to have nothing to do except to gather up what is left after political science and economics have done all that is important with the facts of society. Thereupon the Chicago papers reopened the question, "What is a sociologist?" and some of them showed intelligence about the subject which clearly outclassed that of the learned specialist who went out of his way to exhibit his limitations.

We do not care to ask whether a railroad operative is a better man than a sociologist to arbitrate a labor difficulty. He may or he may not be, according to a variety of circumstances. Nor do we care to ask how high the sociologist deserves to stand in the esteem of other people. This is a matter that will adjust itself in time. Meanwhile it may be well for the sociologists occasionally to state to themselves and to the public just what their part in the world's work seems to them to be. The sociologist may or may not be, in the eyes of his fellows, an important member of society, but his place may be so defined and his work so described that even college presidents might learn to talk intelligently about him.

In general, then, a sociologist is a man who is studying the facts of society *in a certain way*. Not every man who deals with

facts of society is a sociologist, any more than every tinker and blacksmith is a physicist, or every cook and soap-maker a chemist, or every gardener and stock-breeder a biologist. There is a sense in which each of these practical employments is a phase of the science to which it is most closely related. In that sense, and in the degree in which the workers enter the scientific ranks, the laborer might be called physicist, chemist, biologist, etc. If there is any propriety, whether much or little, in such loose application of terms, there is precisely the same propriety, in the same sense and in the same degree, in the case of ordinary social workers and the term "sociologist." A printer may incidentally be a statesman, but we do not for that reason call typesetting statesmanship. In the same way the organizer of a labor union may be a sociologist, but organizing labor unions is nevertheless not sociology. Whether a man is a sociologist or not depends on the extent to which he uses the "certain way" of studying social facts, to be more particularly described in a moment.

This is, of course, a matter of more and less. It is not a distinction between things that are absolutely unlike. We cannot draw an arbitrary line, on the one side of which men are statesmen, or scholars, or artists, and on the other side of which they are not. Every one of us is a small fraction of statesman and scholar and artist, even at our everyday work. The same thing might be illustrated in all the occupations of life. There is no way to guard the term "merchant," for instance, so that it will distinguish a rank or a class. The vendor of shoestrings or peanuts on the street corner is a merchant, so far as he goes, as truly as the directors of the East India Company. The boys who speculate in "extra" editions of the newspapers are "financiers" in their way not less than Mr. Morgan in his larger operations. All differences of this sort between men are matters of degree. The gradation of the layman into the scientific man simply falls under a universal rule.

The sociologist is, further, a man who is studying the facts of society *in the spirit of a philosopher*. Doubtless the majority are with one of George Eliot's types in the sentiment: "A philosopher is the last sort of animal I should choose to resemble.

I find it enough to live, without spinning lies to account for life." With due deference to the majority we must insist that the estimate lacks precision. The philosopher is the man who is not satisfied with knowing anything in itself. He wants to find out how each thing fits together with other things. Here again all things are relative. Hamlet's grave-digger and Sam Weller and Maggie Tulliver are Bacons and Kants and Hegels on a small scale, yet it is only in a humorous sense that we call them "philosophers." A great many people are philosophizing above the heads of these types, yet without grasp of enough things to give their thoughts a rating among philosophers. They are finding the times out of joint in a thousand ways. Some of them are trying to mend things. They may be acting wisely or unwisely in their places. In either case there is just as much and just as little reason for calling them sociologists as there would be for calling the inventor of a voting machine, or a promoter of the Torrens system of registering land titles, or the captain of a precinct, a "political scientist." He may be, and he may not. The particular work that he is doing proves nothing. Then there are men who put still more things together in their thinking, and show the philosophic spirit in larger ranges. They deal with facts that go together in sciences. These may be sciences of things, on the one hand, like astronomy or geology, or they may be sciences of people, like history or economics. To deal with these sciences requires a relatively high degree of philosophic power, but men may and do cultivate these sciences as though the abstractions which each chiefly considers are sufficient unto themselves, and do not need to be adjusted to less interesting aspects of the whole from which they were abstracted. There have been historians enough, for instance, who were content to find out just what occurred. They have taken such a narrow view of their work that learning just what occurred seemed to them more important than discovering whether it was worth learning. There have been economists enough who have added to knowledge of the rules which nations must follow in order to increase wealth, and have assumed that they have thereby taken account of all that it is worth while for nations to consider.

There have been political scientists enough who have worked out principles of government, and have been content to explain political machinery as an end in itself, without disturbing themselves to inquire what the ultimate ends are to which all government is merely a means. Thinkers of these types deal with some of the same facts that the sociologist studies, but they display so little of the philosophic spirit that they are properly only craftsmen. On the other hand there are historians and economists and political scientists who try to find out what the connections are between the facts which they particularly study and all the other facts which occur in human experience. These men are philosophers, and it is only an accidental division of labor, not an important difference in kind, that separates them from the sociologists.

The name "sociologist" belongs, then, to all students of society who think of human life, past, present, and future, as somehow bound together; and who try to understand any particular fragment of human life which they may study by making out its bearings upon and its being-borne-upon-by all the rest of human life. A great many people have the notion that sociology is merely a pretentious name for slumming. They suppose it is concerned at most with some of the least successful, or least desirable, elements in society. They take it to be absorbed in plans for improving the condition of wage-earners, or for dealing with paupers and criminals. This notion has been encouraged by people in prominent academic positions who ought to have known better. There is just the same fraction of truth in it that there would be in the idea that chemistry is devoted to poisons and putrefactions and foul smells. Every human calling, from tilling the soil to writing epic poems or founding ethnic religions, has for the sociologist an interest in exact ratio with the importance of the part which that particular calling plays in the whole drama of life. The sociologist is the man who tries to fill the place in our scientific age which the old-fashioned philosopher occupied in the ages of metaphysical speculation. If we remember that the older philosophers varied from Socratic commonplaceness to Platonic idealism, we shall not be surprised at the different sorts of sociologists to be mentioned below. The

sociologist tries to look upon life from a point of view which commands all that science permits us to know about the total facts of human life; and, whatever his special division of labor, he tries to adjust it to the whole of life as seen from this point of view.

The genus sociologist includes, then, a great many species. Some of them are dealing exclusively with the largest generalizations that can be derived from discoverable facts of human society. They are working away upon a positive philosophy of visible human experience, as a substitute for all the philosophies built upon preconceived notions of life. In so far as they succeed in bringing the facts into focus they will presently make life easier and better for everybody; but they are of practically no immediate use whatever to the average man, and it would be much better for all concerned if in professional matters this type of sociologist and the average man could be content to go their several ways and never bother themselves about each other. Everybody will be happier a hundred and a thousand years from now because Charles Darwin serenely pursued his studies for a generation without asking the public to applaud his work, and without turning aside to do anything that the public could understand. Meanwhile hundreds of men every year learned to apply in practical ways what was known about the physical conditions of life, yet without contributing to the development of biology. Both kinds of men have their place, and there is work in like ways for both general sociologists and practical social workers who have but a vague notion of society in general, and who consequently cannot properly be called sociologists.

Then there are sociologists who are working on some minute phase of social activities, let us say some problem in the psychology of social action. Their general idea of life unites them with all the rest of the sociologists, but their division of labor is concerned with some detail of the machinery of life. These men again will in the end make every farm and home and shop in the world a fitter place for human beings; but meanwhile they have practically nothing to do directly with the public, nor the public with them. Their work, like that of the former type, must filter

out into general use through the modifications that it will gradually make in all branches of social science and practice. A few years ago I called with a friend upon Professor Virchow. My friend thought that he was suffering from a disorder for which the celebrated pathologist would prescribe. When our errand was explained, Professor Virchow lifted both hands above his head in vigorous protest. "Why," he said, "I haven't written a prescription in twenty years, and I wouldn't dare to." Yet not a thoroughly educated physician or trained nurse in the world had received a diploma in those twenty years whose conduct in the sickroom had not been foreordained by Professor Virchow's work. If the sociologists of these two types realize any fraction of their hopes, the results will have a similar relation to social practice. They will be carried to society at large through applications made by workers of other sorts.

Again there are sociologists who prefer to call themselves psychologists, or historians, or economists, or political scientists, but their proper classification is indicated by the fact that they, consciously or unconsciously, work from a point of view that is strictly sociological. Others frankly call themselves sociologists, but they work chiefly upon psychological, or historical, or economic, or political, or other problems, yet with sociological organization of their work always in mind. The former are particularly interesting to the professed sociologists, for in spite of themselves they are vindications of the sociological argument. They admit more or less consciously every principal claim which the sociologists have made. They begin to assert with the zeal of new converts that the phase of social activity to which they give chief attention can be correctly estimated only when viewed as a part of all the rest of life. This is the strategic point of the sociological position. Use of this perception as a corrective of all surveys of social facts is the advance in thought which sociologists first of all demand.

Then there are sociologists whose immediate interest is in some concrete religious, or educational, or industrial, or political, or charitable, or criminological improvement. They want to find out what is worth doing, and how to do it. They want to pro-

mote more success in everything that belongs to complete life, and they select some definite division of practical activity for their special effort. This species is very widely contrasted, in its peculiar traits, with the first and second; but the common generic trait of all the types is that they do their work in the spirit and from the point of view described above. The general sociologist does his generalizing with a view to its bearings at last upon all particular cases, and the concrete sociologist does his particularizing under control of regard for all the general truths that the social philosophers may formulate.

It is possible to counterfeit each of these types of sociologist, but the same thing is true of all specialists. We have no way in this country of patenting scientific titles. Every slack-wire acrobat and every chiropodist is at liberty to dub himself "professor." Every snake-charmer or fortune-teller may make gain of the title "psychologist." Every peddler of cure-alls for governmental corruption may glory in the title "political scientist.' Every inventor of a panacea for poverty may announce himself an "economist," and alas! each of these, if it suits his fancy better, may advertise himself as a "sociologist." It will probably be a long time before the general public, or even all college presidents, can draw as fair lines between spurious and genuine sociologists as are drawn between quacks and scientific workers in older professions. Meanwhile it is our business to live up to our own scientific standards, and to make the quality of our work distinguish itself.

Within each of the sociological groups referred to, as distinctive problems are under investigation, the methods are as critical, the results are relatively as creditable, as in any older division of science. To assert or to imply the contrary is a provincialism which scholars in other fields will be more and more anxious to avoid.

The public discussions alluded to above raised another point that deserves notice. Some of the most intelligent editorials upon the work of sociologists vigorously belabored the jargon in which sociologists express themselves. They complained that sociologists use language which common people cannot

understand. Letters frequently reach the editors of this JOURNAL voicing the same complaint. It must be admitted that there is a measure of justice in these rebukes, yet there is another side to the case which laymen do not appreciate, but investigators must not allow themselves to be confused about it. Scientific discussion is by no means a mere matter of rhetoric. It is not simply expressing something. It is often an essential part of the process of getting something to express. It is an attempt to formulate a real problem where the layman has no suspicion that a problem exists. It is hazarding a thesis to be tried against the attacks of competent critics. It is an hypothesis to be tested. It is a tentative generalization. Simply because it is a generalization, whether it proves valid or not, it is beyond the usual range of ordinary reflection. That is, the subject and the predicate extend beyond the horizon of everyday vision. No matter how precisely they are expressed, therefore, they do not present a clear image to minds not accustomed to that outlook. If the proposition were expressed so that it would mean more to the layman, the language might lose the very elements that contain its peculiar meaning for the specialist. Of course, it is an affront to omniscient democracy to intimate that every man is not as competent a specialist as any man upon such a familiar subject as human society. Of course, if the average man does not take in the full meaning of a sociological proposition, it is the fault of the sociologist who utters it. Nevertheless, it will be necessary for a good while to come that men who are actually advancing knowledge shall talk to each other a great deal in language that says little or nothing to the layman. On the one hand, the layman has no business to find fault with this, and, on the other hand, if he does, the specialist has no business to mind it. Whatever may have been their sins of abstruseness, American scholars have committed more and greater sins through overambition to impress the public. Premature plays for popularity are much more deplorable than mysterious technicality. In the end scientific tasks are performed sooner and better if scientists address themselves exclusively to their kind, till they convince each other that they

have something to say. It is time enough then to throw away the technicalities and put the new knowledge into general circulation.

The really flagrant sins that have been committed in the name of sociology in recent years have been inflammatory utterances, in terms that found quick response in popular feeling, while there was no proper social knowledge behind them. They conveyed definite impressions, but they were simply audacious appeals to prejudice. Serious sociology is a deliberate plan to discredit that sort of thing and to find a basis for social opinion in a sufficient analysis of social facts. The details of this analysis will not be edifying to the multitude. They will seem academic and pedantic. No doubt they will be, to a considerable extent, as this has been the case in nearly every other field of knowledge. In the end, however, sound learning will be promoted sooner and faster by discussing unsettled problems in the technical language appropriate to problems, than by a parade of simplicity which encourages the public to assume that open questions are settled.

The necessity for this professionalism varies in different divisions of sociology. It is greatest among the first two types named, and least in the fourth group. Members of the latter are less likely to offend the public by excessive obscurity of terms than by the moderation of their conclusions. Popular impatience craves what the serious sociologist can never furnish. There is always a brisk demand for social specifics, but relatively languid interest in social hygiene. One could get tooted as a social prophet any day by publishing a scheme to do away with government. If one merely points out a practicable way of improving the workings of government, it may be a generation before he gets a hearing. A new way to abolish private property would command wide attention at any moment. A feasible plan of juster taxation would have a long and thankless struggle for a chance to explain itself. A crusade to smash "trusts" is always in order, and there is never a lack of spectators eager to see the fun. Serious analysis of inequities in the workings of corporations, and proposals of sane remedies, meet

indifference at best and contempt as a rule. The man who promises to end crime, if society will only adopt socialism, counts as a statesman and a seer with the contingent always ready to accept visionary promises at par. The man who points out an available means of removing temptations to crime, or of heading off criminal propensities before it is too late, is too commonplace to spur the radical imagination. Ten thousand people will swallow a cure-all to one who will think. The sociologist who asks the public to reflect, instead of flattering the demand for quick and complete remedies for social ills, sends himself to Coventry for a long term.

The conclusion of the whole matter for the sociologists is that, when we reach results which are ripe for popular consumption, we should spread the news as widely as possible, and in the plainest terms. On the other hand, while sociology is good for nothing unless it can enrich average life at last, our primary task is to work out correct statements of social problems and valid methods of solving them. We ought not to be distracted either by popular clamor for quick results or by ignorant misrepresentation of our aims. Our main business is to study society by methods which competent judges must indorse.

The worst enemy of the sociologists is defect of scientific patience. Itch to be talked about, without having made any real contribution to knowledge, is the stigma of the pseudo-scientist. Genuine research, no matter how slow in reaching results, and no matter how minute the result in each case, will in due time win for the real sociologists, as for all others scientific workers, their fair share of appreciation.

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INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY.[1]

PART III. GENERAL STRUCTURE OF SOCIETIES.

CHAPTER I. PROLEGOMENA AND DEFINITIONS.

I.

In the first volume of my *Introduction to Sociology*, published in 1886, I proceeded to the analysis and classification of the constitutive *elements* of societies; in the second volume, published in 1889, I entered upon the study of the social *organs* and *functions* considered alone. It remains for us to study societies in their *general structure* and afterward in their *general life* or totality. *Structure* and *life* correspond to the terms *statics* and *dynamics*, applied especially to Auguste Comte. It will appear later why we prefer the former expressions to the latter.

Many years have elapsed between the present publication and the appearance of the two preceding volumes; these years have been consecrated almost entirely to inductive researches. Some of the results of these researches have been published; others have formed the subjects of uninterrupted lectures upon social economy and the history of social economy, which I have given at L'Université Nouvelle de Bruxelles. During this period, now somewhat long, I have been constantly elaborating the present work, which, in conformity with the positive method, is therefore only the philosophical synthesis of my previous patient observations, résumés of which were given in the different lectures, numbering in all about twelve hundred, which I have delivered from 1889 to 1902. I expect to publish hereafter those concrete data of my abstract sociology of which my works upon taxes, upon coal-mining, upon the representative system, upon the evolution of beliefs and doctrines in the ancient civilizations of Egypt, Peru, Mexico, India, and China, upon commercial credit, upon money, upon credit and banks, etc., are fragments. I insist upon this point only in order to

[1] Translated by Robert Morris.

recall to mind, if need be, that, faithful to the positive method, the present work rests essentially upon the widest observation that it has been possible for me to make, in addition to the numerous materials furnished by the learned specialists whose works I have followed attentively. In the third volume of *Abstract Sociology*, documentation will therefore appear only in an explicative way, and not at all as demonstration; that is, as in the *Transformisme social*, a detached portion of the last part of my work devoted to the *life of societies*.

In the *Structure générale*, no more than in the *Éléments* and *Functions et organs sociaux*, or in *Transformisme social* and *Lois sociologiques*, do we claim, like Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer, to have constructed an abstract sociology in its entirety. At present such an attempt would surpass the individual capacity of the sociologist and the corresponding and preliminary maturity of the special social sciences. As heretofore, we shall have mainly in view the indication of the methods and plan which may doubtless lead to the construction of this sociology in the future. Yet we shall trace, as far as we can, some outlines calculated to indicate some principle features which maturer sociology will contain.

After the great synthetic, but premature, effort of Quetelet, of Comte, and of Spencer, it seems to me that the work ought to be renewed with the more complete co-ordination of the special social sciences, particularly of political economy, ethics, and law, which are in course of transformation.[1]

In *Materialisme historique*, I have already pointed out the danger to which we are exposed by a certain part of contemporaneous sociological literature with its particular points of view. I refer especially to the exclusively psychological school. It is producing a very brilliant, even useful, literature, but one-sided, and therefore quite divested of that consideration of the *ensemble* which is and must remain precisely the sociological

[1] I expected to devote an early chapter of the work to a theoretical and critical exposé of the statics of Quetelet, of Comte, and of Spencer, an exposé which has been the subject of a three-years' course at L'Université nouvelle, but this chapter has itself become a considerable volume, which I hope to publish soon as a complement of the present work.

point of view. But this present inferiority is only relative; it prepares for future progress; it is precisely like that equally natural phenomenon the attempt of the founders of sociology (with the possible exception of Quetelet) to create a social synthesis at a time when the social sciences, and even the sciences directly anterior to sociology, such as biology and psychology, were yet insufficiently developed. The result has been the biologic and psychologic interpretations, and then also the later materialistic or economic interpretations—all of which indicate precisely the necessity of reconstructing sociology upon *all* the facts of each of these sciences. Likewise, we see one school contending that the social question is a moral question, another that it is a juridical question, while the majority still consider it essentially political.

Transition from the study of social elements, functions, and organs to the study of the general structure of societies necessitates both a few definitions and a few retrospective surveys.

We have defined "sociology" as the general philosophy of the special social sciences. These are:

1. Economics, or the science of social nutrition.
2. Genetics, or the science of population.
3. Æsthetics.
4. Collective psychology: religion, metaphysics, positive philosophy.
5. Ethics.
6. Law.
7. Politics.

Each of these sciences has its special philosophy. It is the abstract *ensemble* of these philosophies that constitutes the domain of sociology.

This classification represents to us the totality of the social sciences according to their natural, logical, historical, and dogmatic order of increasing specialization and complexity, or of decreasing generality and simplicity, in conformity with the classification of antecedent sciences established by Auguste Comte. This order of classification is abstract, for in concrete reality every economic phenomenon, for example, implies a

genetic, æsthetic, psychic, moral, and juridic aspect, to say nothing of a political aspect; and in the same way every psychic phenomenon, to give another example, is inseparable from the series of the other points of view.

This leads us to recall that the sciences in general are concrete or abstract; concrete when they look upon the phenomena, the relations, the properties, the laws in the bodies themselves whose study constitutes their domain; abstract when they consider, on the contrary, these phenomena, relations, properties, and laws independently of the bodies and aside from the variable conditions of the same in time and space.

Thus mathematics, mechanics, and rational astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, and abstract psychology, are to be distinguished from such kindred sciences as calculus, mineralogy, crystallography, botany, zoölogy, human psycho-physiology, pedagogy, medicine, including psychiatry, etc. Likewise, the social sciences are concrete in so far as they relate to particular civilizations, societies, and institutions considered in their entirety; from this point of view they are essentially descriptive and based upon observation and experience.

The abstract sciences in general have the concrete sciences as their foundation, and this is true with regard to the social sciences. The abstract social sciences advance to general, universal laws from the special historical laws developed by the concrete social sciences. This is true not merely of those parts of the social sciences which have as their special object the quantitative study of the constitutive elements of societies. Although statical analysis may be applied to these elements aside from the forms in which they concretely appear, it nevertheless remains concrete and historical as long as it does not rise to general relations common to the *ensemble* of civilizations. In its turn, concrete and descriptive sociology is transformed into a general and abstract philosophy, whose laws, more and more reduced, are the co-ordinated expression of the relations common to all societies from the simplest to the most complex, without regard to their variable conditions in the past, present, or future. Abstract sociology attempts also to reduce these temporary or historical variations to a regular order, to laws.

The possibility of establishing an abstract sociology has been strongly contested by the different schools, which recognize only historical laws, that is to say, laws applicable solely to determined periods and civilizations. Naturally, it had to be thus, since, in sociology as elsewhere, concrete knowledge precedes abstract knowledge, and since the different attempts to establish an abstract sociology, from the fact that they were premature, seemed by their very feebleness and imperfection to confirm the condemnation pronounced by the representatives of the purely historical school. Yet, this condemnation will not be perpetual; the very progress of the concrete social sciences will result in lessening its severity and duration. It was also necessary that this conflict blaze out with greatest force precisely in the domain of economic science, the first of the social sciences in order of formation; but, for the same cause, it is also in this science that it will soonest come to an end. The passage to an abstract social economy will be facilitated by the works of Wagner, Roscher, Rumelin, Schmoller, and, among the socialists, of Karl Marx, as well as by the more and more profound studies relative to population, family, art, to scientific and philosophic doctrines, and to moral, juridic, and political institutions. Even the facts of social life make for this result; in proportion as the vast, world-wide society is organized with its superior centers of co-ordination above the particular societies, it will be recognized that common, constant, and universal laws have always governed in the formation and evolution of historic societies, apart from and beyond their accessory variations. This unity of sociological philosophy will appear plain with the world-wide unity of reality. Then, thanks to the progressive narrowing of the amplitude of social oscillations in a more and more co-ordinated world-wide civilization, it will be recognized so much the easier that, notwithstanding the more ample and apparently more disordered oscillations and variations of particular antecedent civilizations, in reality the same order is always imposed, although with purturbations, which, however, have never succeeded in altering its general character, structural as well as evolutive, static as well as dynamic.

The possibility of constructing a general, abstract sociology remains a most important problem; it is one of the principal points upon which we shall have to throw light, by the very fact of our new endeavor, although failure of our effort can never be invoked against the possibility of a more happy result in the future. This failure should be attributed only to the incapacity of the author, and in every case partial failure will be inevitable on account of the insufficient elaboration of the particular social sciences, and especially because of the incomplete development of the unitary, world-wide organization, which, by itself, is destined to facilitate the establishment of sociological monism in the collective consciousness. So, nearly all our efforts will bear especially upon the method to follow in order to succeed in the organization of an abstract sociology, rather than upon a more or less complete realization of this organization.

Thus, by a process both natural and logical, concrete and descriptive sociology is transformed into an abstract philosophy whose laws, more and more reduced to unity, will be the co-ordinated expression of relations common to all societies from the smallest and simplest to the largest and most complex, without regard to their variable conditions in the present, the past, and the future, except from the point of view of the constancy and regular order of these variations themselves.

If the conclusions of the different schools which admit only historical laws were well founded, positive philosophy itself would be condemned and decapitated, for this would admit that there does not exist an abstract philosophy of the social sciences, which are, therefore, different in this respect from the other sciences; in a word, there would not be any sociology except that of a discriptive and historical character. It seems to me that this narrow point of view must be abandoned; it was itself a simple, temporary, and relatively necessary reaction against the old absolute and metaphysical conception of so-called natural laws and orders of societies. This justified reaction has served to show that these laws and these orders, far from being complete and immutable, are in constant evolution. It is now necessary to make another step by recognizing that the divers

historical periods (a truth which is admitted especially by Karl Marx) are bound together in such a way that the periods in question, not being closed to each other, necessarily have common relations and laws which permit us to reduce them to a unitary structure and life.

II.

Abstract as well as concrete sociology is either *static* or *dynamic*. We prefer in place of this terminology that of general *structure* and general *life* of societies. In fact, we conceive of society as superorganic, and sociology has more direct relations with the sciences of life than with mechanics. The terms "static" and "dynamic" may be re-employed some day, provided that social phenomena as well as organic phenomena are reduced to a purely mechanical and mathematical interpretation, from the monistic point of view of general philosophy; until that time the use of these expressions must be rejected, as it implies that the social facts are of less complex nature than the organic, or even the chemical and physical, facts, when, on the contrary, they are both quantitatively and qualitatively superior.

The expression "social statics" was borrowed from mechanical science. The first social theorists who observed that societies are mobile naturally interpreted social phenomena at first by the laws of mechanics. Then, in the case of those with whom the immobile aspect of societies was predominant, a still simpler and more general explanation was demanded from mathematics, the science of magnitudes, either arithmetic or geometric. The first legislators or social organizers were true architects, working according to pre-established plans traced conformably to lines and materials entirely susceptible of being reduced to a unit of measure or of number.

It is thus that, by an application of the law of apparent return to primitive forms, abstract sociology of the future, although under entirely different conditions, will perhaps succeed in expressing sociological laws in mechanical formulæ which are themselves reducible to a general mathematical theorem or formula. Humanity appears to have traversed a scientific circle,

and it seems that its point of arrival is the same as its point of departure; in reality humanity, like a sound-wave in the ear, will have travesed a spiral, that is to say, a plane curve which continuously departs more and more from the point about which it revolves.

Necessarily, the mathematico-mechanical conception of the social order had to be the primitive conception. In fact, the fundamental scientific idea is that of measurement. Without measurement there is no comparison, no science unless it is qualitative and descriptive; knowledge of phenomena is exact and complete only when the statements of these phenomena express quantitative relations which can be represented by equations. Extension, the basis of geometry, movement, the basis of mechanics, together with the idea of quantity, the bases of the sciences of calculation, constitute the abstract mathematical sciences, and are applicable to all bodies in nature, even the social bodies. Nevertheless, as Poinsot[1] so well said: "Let us guard carefully against believing that a science is constructed when one has reduced it to analytical formulæ. Nothing can exempt us from studying the things themselves." Thus, not only is one unable to deduce a sociology from mathematics, mechanics, physics, chemistry, or even from biology and psychology, but also the analysis which we have made of societies in the preceding volumes cannot suffice; it must be completed by the study of societies themselves.

Rational mechanics is founded upon principles which spring from the very nature of movement, which is a primary and general idea, like that of matter and form. The mechanical relations of magnitudes of movement may themselves be expressed in algebraic and geometric formulæ, reducible to units of measurement such as space and time, which are functions of each other. It was mainly the mechanical interpretation of societies which led to distinguishing in them the static aspect and the dynamic aspect. It was a natural step in the organization of sociology when later rational astronomy, physics, chemistry, first inorganic and then organic, repeatedly introduced more special points of

[1] *Théorie nouvelle de la rotation des corps*, pp. 30, 31.

view until, in the last of these points of view, the biological factor appeared and then the psychic factor in particular, the last of which completed the series of sciences whose co-ordination, not isolated, but encyclopædic, is at the basis of sociology. Now, it is only after these divers interpretations, at first exclusive, but later more and more combined, that, following the principle of Poinsot, we shall be able in time to begin to study societies in themselves as phenomena in part distinct from antecedent phenomena, although they are but the more complicated continuation of the same.

As in mechanics we call the causes of movement *forces*, without inquiring into the nature of these causes, in the same way we call the causes of social movement *social forces*. There are social forces as there were before them vital, physical, chemical, and astronomical forces.

The general problem of rational mechanics is to determine the effect of different forces acting simultaneously upon a given body, the separate effect of each of the forces being known. Mechanics is, then, the science of the combinations of forces. So long as social science was in the domain of empiricism, and so long as statesmen were able to imagine that they were the mechanicians of the societies whose forces they combined in view of certain results, the mechanical conception lent itself admirably to their illusion; besides, it was a first step toward truth. In politics, as in mechanics, it was observed that the meeting of forces may result either in their reciprocal neutralization, the consequence of which is repose, equilibrium, or else in movement. Mechanical science and political art had, therefore, this object in common: the investigation of the conditions or circumstances of equilibrium and of movement; the only difference was in the nature of the bodies constituting the subject of research.

The definition of forces implies the law of inertia; a body remains in repose so long as no exterior force acts upon it; or, if it is in motion and no new force intervenes, its movement will be uniform and in a straight line. The statesmen applied this law of inertia by isolating their peoples, by protecting them as

far as possible from foreign influences; and, being unable to suppress movement entirely, they at least maintained the unity of its direction, knowing very well, in general, that when a movement is arrested by an obstacle the force manifests itself by a pressure or a traction upon the obstacle.

In reality, up to the eighteenth century political science was based mainly upon mechanics, and through mechanics was united to geometry and arithmetic. In fact, forces may always be expressed in units of weight which in turn are convertible into units of length. The law of Newton was one application of this valuation which was extended to political science: action is equal and opposite to reaction, the body of impact is itself always the object of an equal but contrary pressure exercised by the body of resistance.

In like manner the mechanical law of *independence of movements* dominated politics; whatever the development of the state might be, the relations of the citizens to each other, the social system, need not thereby be altered. From the simplest point of view, this law expressed the general fact that a uniform, rectilinear movement, exactly common to all the bodies of any system, does not modify the particular movements of those different bodies with respect to each other; these movements continue to take place just as if the whole of the system were immobile. Thus, in the case of a moving ship, whatever may be the swiftness and the direction of its motion, the relative movements of the objects and the persons on board take place as if the ship were immobile, although to outside observers these movements form part of the whole movement. It appeared to be the same in the case of the voyagers upon the ship of state.

Moreover, it was an eminently scientific point of view to extend to societies the mechanical principle that forces are always proportional to the accelerations of motion that they produce.

Social statics was, then, a mechanical statics. Like the latter, it treated of the conditions of equilibrium of a system; in it the element of time was not considered. A phenomenon was considered as fixed, the variations which the forces of the sys-

tem might undergo being disregarded, since these belonged to the dynamic point of view. The conditions of equilibrium of the social system, as of every system, can therefore be represented by equations — a fact which indicates that the system is susceptible neither of translation in any direction whatever nor of rotation in any manner.

Although perhaps this assimilation of social statics with mechanical statics has been nowhere set forth in all its rigor, yet it represents the dominating conception of the oldest and most learned sociological school, and this school has exerted its influence up to the present time in all the social sciences from economics to politics.

In the history of the sciences, statics was naturally developed before dynamics; in fact, the first is only the simplest, most general, and most abstract part of the second. It is, therefore, not astonishing that in sociology, as in mechanics, the dynamic point of view appeared and was developed until at last (with Herbert Spencer, for example) it became almost the exclusive point of view.

Auguste Comte has fully shown that the distinction between statics and dynamics extends to all phenomena whatever; for example, to biology, in which one rationally distinguishes between the anatomical point of view, relating to organization, and the physiological point of view, properly speaking, relating to ideas of life. He added, however, that there would be danger of neglecting the indispensable permanent combination of those two general points of view, which, in reality if not in analysis, are as indissolubly united as are order and progress.

Sociology being abstract or concrete, social statics will likewise be both abstract and concrete. It will have for its object the study of societies considered in a state of repose, either in a determined period of time and at a given place in space (concrete statics), or independently of time and space (abstract statics). As for dynamic sociology, it has for its subject the science of the evolution of societies, which is likewise considered from this double point of view.

After many others, Corte, in *L'expérience des peuples*,[1] denies

[1] P. 41.

the utility, if not the possibility, of establishing an abstract sociology, and, consequently, an abstract statics also. Appealing to the example of Auguste Comte, he asserts that —

> In order to formulate such a social metaphysics, it would be necessary to deal with data so general and so lacking in precision that one could not draw from them either any explanation of existing facts or any prevision of future phenomena, still less any practical conclusion. For example, it would be necessary to limit ourselves to showing, like Auguste Comte, that, in addition to the preliminary condition of language, the bases of social order are family, property, and religion; but giving to the word "family" a sense so general that it includes government; to the word "property" a sense so extended that it embraces all possible forms of appropriation, including property in common; finally, to the word "religion" so unaccustomed a sense that it includes polytheism and monotheism, determinism or scientific atheism, along with fetichism. Thus generalized, sociology would be without framework, it would have neither form nor consistency. Inoffensive as it would remain in its indefiniteness, it would have the serious disadvantage of inclining minds irresistibly disposed to reach conclusions to the belief that the fundamental institutions of all society are everywhere identical and immutable.

The author concludes:

> I think, therefore, that it is necessary to limit ourselves to a semi-concrete, schematic sociology, generalizing the data furnished by selection from history, giving preference to the great civilized nations.

Indeed, since the attempt (including that of Auguste Comte) to construct, *de planu*, an abstract sociology without concrete, verifiable foundations, it has been the general practice to make sociology both incompletely abstract and incompletely concrete by making a selection of historical facts. The result has been a double failure, both scientific and philosophic. It is necessary to begin, on the contrary, with the study of social elements considered especially from the statical point of view; then to advance to the particular historical institutions in which these elements are blended; then to study the particular societies in their *ensemble;* then, finally, but only then, to look among these elementary and concrete facts for the general relations which they have in common, independently of their transitory forms in space and time. Such is the only scientific method, the only method capable of avoiding the difficulties pointed out with rea-

son by the author, and especially the only one capable of escaping the double error into which he falls, in turn with many others —the error, on the one hand, of making an arbitrary historical selection, and consequently a bad concrete sociology, and, on the other hand, of at least partly disclaiming to found an abstract philosophy of societies, under the vain pretext that the concrete bases are insufficient. The true method, that of all the sciences, that also of their particular philosophies as well as their general philosophy, *requires that these bases be sufficient.* The illustrative schematic methods, the methods of historical sampling, are only the palliatives of a demi-science. How does one dare to recommend these methods for sociology when the scholar who would permit himself to recommend the same in the antecedent sciences would by that very fact be disqualified? That the rigorous method is one of extreme difficulty no one denies, but this is always the case. Besides, the work to be undertaken is a work of co-operation, and the *specialist in abstract sociology* will have the privilege and the duty of borrowing the materials which will be furnished him by the specialists, properly so called. At the very least, it is necessary that he be acquainted with these materials, in order that the facts may not contradict the theory. Abstract sociology, even in its exemplative and schematic capacity, may be excused from recalling the facts to mind, but on condition of disowning any abstract law which is at variance, not merely with the concrete, but also with the elementary facts of science. Nevertheless, from the point of view of clearness and of demonstration, abstract sociology will state with advantage the particular laws upon which it founds its general theory, and, as far as possible, the principal data underlying these particular laws.

Moreover, abstract social statics is connected with concrete sociology in this, that, although the latter studies societies in certain parts of space and time, yet it also seeks to disengage the social facts relative to particular civilizations from relatively general, constant, and necessary relations, neglecting the accessory variations. In brief, concrete sociology is an intermediate step between history, properly speaking, and abstract sociology.

Yet it is necessary never to lose sight of the fact that in reality no society is in a state of repose, that is to say, a state of fixed, absolute equilibrium; absolute repose would be the cessation of social life, absolute death. But, whatever the movements may be, there always exist constant and necessary conditions of equilibrium for these movements. The term "structure" is also more appropriate in this connection than the term "statics," because the former takes account in a more obvious manner of this continued equilibrium of organized bodies in movement. It is the investigation of these constant and necessary conditions of equilibrium, which are common to all social states, that constitutes the domain of abstract social statics, or, to use a better term, of the general structure of societies.

Just as concrete sociology is always relatively abstract, so likewise abstract social statics is in part descriptive and concrete, since its bases necessarily present these latter characteristics. It is therefore apparent that sociology, and consequently abstract statics, are a regular development of the inductive method.

Again, abstract social statics is in part descriptive for another capital reason; it embraces in its domain, not merely a study of elementary phenomena considered independently of the social tissues, organs, and bodies in whose formation they unite, according to the analysis that we made of them in part I, but it likewise includes the study of these tissues, organs, groups of organs, systems, etc. Now, the study of these aggregates is, in reality, necessarily descriptive. Thus, observation of the social elements will give rise especially to the consideration of quantitative relations and quantitative laws founded upon statistical data, while observation of forms, of special as well as general social structures, will in the main furnish the material for qualitative relations and laws. This distinction supports another consideration, namely, that quantity is itself one of the first constituent elements of qualitative differentiations; an increase of mass is not only favorable to differentiations, but it, by itself, constitutes the simplest of differentiations. The sociological laws are, then, abstract or concrete; the quantitative laws are naturally more

abstract than the qualitative sociological laws. Any science may be considered as formed when it is in possession of its special methods, when the boundaries of its domain are well marked, and when the formulæ of its abstract laws can be quantitatively expressed. Thus the law of gravitation has a completely positive formula: all bodies attract each other in direct proportion to their mass and in inverse proportion to the square of the distance. In sociology, an example borrowed from circulatory phenomena may be given; the useful effect is in inverse proportion to the dead weight and in direct proportion to effort.

The most exact abstract sociological laws are, then, both qualitative, or descriptive, and quantitative; hence the necessity of statics—that is to say, the analytic study and the classification of the social elements—as a basis. The method of observation with its numerous inductive processes, variable in different sciences, but identical at bottom, is the only possible method. Deduction can be applied only in sciences already formed, and from one science to another; in the latter case, great caution must be exercised in order to avoid error, especially in passing from biology, with its psychic dependence, to sociology.

Sociology, even abstract sociology, was naturally descriptive in the beginning. At least this statement seems to us to be true in the case of Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer, to cite only the most eminent founders of social science. But positive sociology will be established in reality only when it shall rest upon the statistical and concrete facts of all the special social sciences, particularly economics. Auguste Comte was in error when, inverting the order of the positive method, he contended that in sociology and biology the whole is *known* before the parts. This pretended knowledge of the whole before that of the constituent elements was uniquely empirical, superficial, and plausible. It is to this deplorable error of method that we must ascribe his tendency to attribute essential and permanent characteristics to transitory historical forms. His entire hierarchic and absolute conception of societies has for its point of departure this error in method, the consequences of which have been further amplified

in the case of most of the sociologists of our epoch, who have not hesitated to approach general sociology with an insufficient preparation in the special social sciences. As a consequence, they have fatally neglected the essential and original characteristics of social phenomena, and have *deduced* the laws of these phenomena from the laws of the antecedent sciences, especially in recent times from the laws of biology and psychology, which are themselves imperfectly understood by the *literati* of this class. Yet it is necessary, in spite of the defect which they have in common with these other writers, to render full justice to the works of Lilienfield, Tarde, G. Lebon, and others, whose biologic and psychic deductions have very usefully, and even brilliantly, pointed out the relations and analogies—that is to say, the real similarities—which unite sociology to the two directly antecedent sciences; *integral* sociology will always have to take account of their *points of view*.

The empirical method is just the opposite of the scientific method. The latter starts with the consideration of the simplest and most general facts in order to advance methodically to the more complex and more special. Empiricism proceeds from the consideration of the external and superficial *ensemble* to the consideration of the deeper elements. It is only then that it works its transformation into science and, retracing in an inverse direction the first route traversed, advances methodically to *knowledge*, properly speaking. At the most, one may say that empiricism, by proceeding from the whole to the elements, opens the way to science, and that in this respect, by placing itself at a very broad point of view, it is a natural process in the advance of the human mind. In fact, the empirical method was employed in the infancy of all the sciences; but in no science is the whole *known* before the elements and the parts. As well say that a person upon another planet who distinguishes the earth knows our earth; he does not know it, in reality, any more than we know the planet Mars, for example.

In the first part of our *Introduction à la sociologie*, we proceeded to the most complete analysis possible of the constituent elements of social bodies; we have shown that all these elements

can be reduced to two factors, which we may consider as simple to the extent that they are sociological facts: land and population. In the first we have included the entire environment, the inorganic as well as the vegetable and the animal, excepting the human species; the latter constitutes the second element of every society.

Land and population are both composite. However, the analysis of their elements is not within the domain of sociology, but belongs to that of the psychical sciences, the biological sciences, or the physical sciences in general. Sociology rests upon all of these sciences; societies themselves are the combined products of the phenomena corresponding to these sciences; but sociology has precisely for its subject only the results of these combinations; it is neither physics, biology, nor psychology; it is a science whose domain extends to particular combinations and even to all these combinations added together; it is a combination of their combinations.

Thus, by constituting itself a new foundation outside of its direct subordination to psychology and biology, sociology connects itself with the *ensemble* of inorganic philosophy. In the sociology of Comte, man and his environment are considered as if one were the author and the other were the theater of the social drama; in our sociology, the environment and man enter into a superior *mélange*, whose product is society; in our view, without the theater, no humanity; without humanity, no theater. The dualistic conception of social structure and social life advanced by Auguste Comte has resulted necessarily in a persistent antagonism between two principal schools, one of which accords more importance to environment, the other to man, especially to intellectual man. It is thus that the distinction between body and soul as a continuation of the distinction between nature and man tends to the consideration of man as the king of creation and the soul as the sovereign of the body. Our sociology is different in this respect from that of Comte; it is essentially monistic.

Societies are, then, the product of a higher combination of these two elements: land and population. This combination,

this intimate blending of inorganic and organic factors into structures which are necessarily larger and more complex than organisms properly speaking, permits us to confer upon even the smallest and simplest societies the name *superorganisms.* Yet this appellation need not imply, *a priori*, any absolute identity, either quantitative or qualitative, with organisms. The question of resemblances and differences is answered by direct observation of social facts, and by their comparison with organisms. It would be a capital error to proceed by simple assimilation and to seek thereby to deduce the laws of sociology from those of biology and psychology; sociology has its own characteristics and its own laws. It is only by making an abstraction of these special characteristics that sociology can perhaps be correlated gradually with the simpler and more general laws of the antecedent sciences. This operation is not within the proper domain of sociology, but belongs to that of the general philosophy of the sciences; the single philosophic ambition of sociology should be to reduce its own laws to a single sociological law, if it is possible to do so. Nevertheless, this most general sociological law, by its very nature, will be in direct contact with those of the antecedent sciences, and therefore with the most general law of philosophy as a whole.

We have recognized that the combination of the two elementary factors constitutive of every society (land and population) reveals itself, upon analysis, in *phenomena*, or, if one prefers, in *properties* or in *forces*, *sui generis.* We have classified these phenomena on the basis of their common and distinctive characteristics, and we have drawn up this classification in a serial and hierarchic order, according to the increasing complexity and speciality of the phenomena, just as Comte classified the phenomena relative to the antecedent sciences.

In conformity with this methodical classification of social phenomena, which is at once logical and dogmatic, natural and historical, we have constructed a hierarchic series of the special social sciences, concrete as well as abstract, of which sociology represents the general philosophy:

1. Economics. 2. Genetics. 3. Æsthetics. 4. Collective psychology. 5. Ethics. 6. Law. 7. Politics.	Sociology.

The natural character of this classification appears especially in social embryology and in organography, in which we treated of the formation of societies and of their organs or institutions by means of differentiations. All the phenomena relating to the social sciences enter into this classification. Not only are they superior in mass, complexity, and plasticity to the analogous phenomena which we may encounter even in the most advanced antecedent sciences, such as biology and psychology, but they manifest a superiority which we may call qualitative, in contrast with the differences enumerated by Herbert Spencer, which are mainly quantitative. This characteristic peculiar to sociological phenomena, especially in its clearly conscious and well-developed forms, is encountered nowhere excepting in social bodies, although it appears in germ in certain animal societies. It is this quality which enables societies to organize collectively and to function according to contractual modes, with the result that contractualism becomes a special and superior form of social adaptation, a true method of common structure and common life. Although these forms and modes of social activity are met with in all societies, even in the simplest and most primitive, they are naturally to be observed mainly in the higher social types of humanity. They are transformed continually into an unconscious organization and activity, which in turn become the point of departure of new contractual relations. Neither in general psychology nor in biology do we find contractual phenomena, but only spontaneous cellular associations and combinations. Nowhere except in societies are aggregates, organs, groups of organs, systems of groups, associations or colonies made, unmade, dissolved, and transformed according to contractual modes, until it seems, when the more and more

regular relations which are established between the divers particular societies tend to the establishment of a vast, world-wide internationality, that contractualism becomes at a certain point the principal connective bond between the divers members of the humanitarian superorganism. Not only is contractualism the basis of the system of political federations and confederations, but it will be especially prominent in the economic federations and confederations of the future. It is the process *par excellence* of collective co-operation, which is the positive aspect of the division of social labor. In fact, this division of labor is applicable, not only to individuals, but also to the social forms in which they are incorporated.

Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer have observed in an imperfect manner the essential characteristic of societies. According to the former, this characteristic is that they are conscious. Herbert Spencer explained this fact by saying that they are conscious because the units composing social bodies—that is to say, men—are conscious. But these are only analogies with organisms rather than differences; at most, they are only quantitative differences. Societies are more conscious than organisms, but by what property, by what new force, does this superior degree of consciousness manifest itself? Our response is: By the contractual force or property.

Accordingly, by virtue of the principle that the distinctive characteristics of divers orders of phenomena are clearly apparent, especially in the highest forms of the phenomena, although they appear in the lowest, we can proclaim that contractualism constitutes the distinguishing characteristic of society, both from the structural and the functional point of view; it is their superior and special mode of adaptation and life. In brief, it is the original characteristic which alone justifies the formation of the social sciences into distinct sciences and the organization of sociology into a general philosophy of these sciences.

This contractualism appears in all the stages of social history; it first manifested itself in the phenomena relating to representation, deliberation, and the execution of the collective will in political affairs; today it tends to predominate even in

economics. Moreover, this organic contractualism has absolutely nothing in common with Jean Jacques Rousseau's theory of the social contract; it is also the antipode of the contractualism of Yves Guiot and of radical liberalism in general; in implies the constant intervention of the collective body in its own organization and reorganization; it is a social, and not an individualistic, contractualism.

Societies in general are distinguished from individual organisms by their greater mass and their superior complexity; every society, even the simplest, is larger and more complicated than a zoölogical organism.

This double difference in the quantity of the social mass and in the variety of its combinations corresponds to this general phenomena of nature, that the more a substance is extended the more it is subject to variations; it being impossible for the environment to act in the same manner upon each of the parts of the mass because of their different situations.

We may say also that the quantitative differences are the profound source of the distinctive qualitative characteristics of social bodies and of their successive differentiations, as will become more apparent in the chapter devoted to social aggregates.

The variations of the social body are also favored by the fact that it is more discrete or diffuse than individual organisms; its constituent units are less intimately bound together. Its structure is less symmetrical than zoölogical structure, and inorganic or intermediary structures, and than organisms such as crystals. These characteristics imply the greater plasticity of society, and this plasticity has in turn the corollary of modifiability.

From the point of view of the interpretation of the natural structure and functioning of societies, a capital phenomenon here appears. Social bodies are not merely the result of the combination of inorganic bodies and of inferior organisms; another factor enters into their organization: the human species, *population.* This second factor, by virtue of its own constitution and its action and reaction upon the first, consists of sensible

units. All societies are superorganisms, endowed not only with a general sensibility, as are all other organisms, or a special sensibility, as are some other organisms, but they advance from the simplest forms of the latter to the highest, to a reasonable and even methodical collective life. Therefore, as societies are plastic and modifiable *par excellence*, they are able to interfere methodically in their own constitution, in their own government. On the one hand, the social organs become so much the more sensible, so much the more reasonable in each category of organs, as they assume superior forms. Thus in the economic system, the boards of conciliation, the councils of labor, of industry, and of agriculture are superior forms of sensibility and adaptation; on the other hand, the highest social functions are also the most sensible; they are so much more intelligent than the primary functions that the sociologists have wrongly divided social facts into two classes, material and ideological. Thus, the juridic sensibility, especially the political, is more intense than the economic sensibility. The superior social forms are the most conscious, the most rational. This superior sensibility is especially the accompaniment of new forms. Moreover, it is a relative superiority, for the earlier forms have lost, in part, their conscious characteristic only because of their ancientness itself; they also were superior and conscious at the time of their development. The service of posts and railways has lost its conscious contractual characteristic and has become automatic.

Social contractualism is, then, the distinctive and most important sociological phenomenon, from the qualitative point of view. It is anterior to the division of labor and appears as soon as there is homogeneous co-operation. It is the conscious method *par excellence* of the collective life, although it may manifest itself unconsciously, and although it may be transformed into unconscious and automatic modes of activity; that is to say, the organization and activity of societies are not merely the spontaneous products of their constitutive elements, but they may be likewise the results of their conscious action upon themselves. It is precisely by their methodical activity

and by their methodical self-direction that societies manifest their organizing power in its highest degree. And, what is remarkable, this contractualism appears more or less perfectly in every stage of all civilizations, as we shall have occasion to show in our exposition of the great law of homogeneity of social phenomena. Hence, it results that the property of organizing and functioning according to contractual modes is the essence of social aggregates.

We find contractual forms nowhere excepting in social bodies. Contracts may be made in regard to inorganic or organic bodies, but these bodies cannot themselves combine contractually. Thus, aside from the purely quantitative differences observed by Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer, societies possess a special property, a characteristic mode of activity, which gives rise to equally characteristic forms: a contractual activity and contractual forms.

Therefore, sociology is not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively, distinct from the antecedent sciences; it has its own domain composed of the co-ordinated *ensemble* of the special social sciences, an *ensemble* characterized by particular phenomena. As it also has its own method, the historical method in the broadest sense, including statistics, it can and should be organized into a distinct but not independent science.

In the first volume of the *Introduction*, we proceeded to the analysis of the social phenomena resulting from the combination of their two constituent elements, land and population. After this analysis, we proceeded to the hierarchical classification. As it stands, this classification is in reality a co-ordination, a first sociological synthesis, at the same time subjective and objective, if we view it from the point of view of knowledge of phenomena and their order, not merely their logical and dogmatic order, but also their natural order. This classification corresponds, not only to the movement of human thought, which always proceeds from the simplest and most general facts to the most complex and most special, but it is also in harmony with the natural relationship of social phenomena, which become differentiated in proportion as they become organized.

Yet this first synthesis, which is based upon a hierarchic classification of the phenomena originating from the elementary social factors, is still very simple; it constitutes a co-ordinated series, which is mainly lineal. It has been criticised because of this fact, particularly by MM. Worms and Tarde, who fail to consider that this first part of our work was essentially analytic; that the great laws of continuity, universality, homogeneity, simultaneity, correlation, and interdependence of social phenomena could be set forth only at a later time, and that they would be especially considered in our announced synthetic volumes devoted to the *general structure* and *life* of societies.

M. G. Dewelshauwer, in *L'idéalisme scientifique*, pp. 77–83, likewise criticises our classification. He condemns it as being exclusively lineal, and consequently as not corresponding to reality. Like the other critics, he does not see that each of the superposed classes of phenomena is divided into a great number of branches, and that this elementary and analytic classification, because of the fact that it is abstract and elementary, is only provisional. In fact, it is in the general structure and the general life of societies that we are able to accord to the organic correlation and to the interdependence of societies the importance which they deserve; the hierarchy of elementary phenomena is added first to their concrete synthetic aspect, then to their general and abstract synthetic aspect.

In his turn, M. Worms, in *Revue internatoinale de sociologie*, No. 5, 1893, criticises our classification by saying that social phenomena are in reality synchronous. This is true only in the homogeneous and confused state of primitive societies; progress consists precisely in their successive *organic differentiation* and their successive appearance, but all the social functions take place synchronously in the amorphous and undifferentiated state. M. Worms also contends the *genetic phenomena* make double use of the constitutive factor, populations. This is an error; the factor of populations is exclusively biologic and psychic, in so far as it is a factor, while combined with the second factor (the land) into a society it *becomes* social and assumes special forms, giving rise to institutions or organs, groups of organs, systems,

such as marriage, paternity, filiation, adoption, guardianship, and so on, which are not forms organized by the biologic factors, but are social phenomena. In brief, whatever M. Worms thinks of it, my classification of social phenomena is complete, and, further, the number of classes cannot be reduced without causing useless confusion.

Already, in the course of our work, the fact has appeared that in *social morphology* the logical and lineal classification is more and more subordinate to the simultaneous and correlative quality. Even in the first part of the *Introduction*, we showed that the repetition of the same social activities in directions which become more regular and constant gives rise to *social functions* which become integrated into *social organs* or social institutions. In the constitution of these organs there exists the same order of logical and natural filiation as for the phenomena, but with this difference, that the organs are already the particular syntheses of all the social phenomena; the lineal, hierarchic series is here mingled with a general combination of all the elements in the hierarchic order, and is therefore attenuated and reduced by an order of equivalence, each element concurring in the service of the whole, to which all the agents, *especially the simplest and most general*, are useful and indispensable.

Let us repeat here again that it is not necessary to attach to these expressions, functions, and organs any strict biological sense, or especially to deduce sociological conclusions from certain analogies. Nevertheless, these expressions facilitate our comprehension of the true nature of social institutions. Although there is no reason here for an absolute assimilation, the super-organisms are not totally distinct from ordinary organisms. Thus, as the more and more regular passage of nervous excitation by the same path explains the formation of nerve, so the more and more regular transportation of men and utilities serves to explain the formation of routes, from the natural foot-path to the railroad. Yet the route is not a nerve. The latter does not serve especially to transport elements of nutrition, although it transmits the offers and the orders; the post-office and the telegraph, with their many stations, are in this relation more analagous to a nerve than are roads.

In the second volume of the *Introduction*, which is devoted especially to *social functions and organs*, we have proceeded, therefore, to a new but incomplete synthesis. We have especially described the structure and the functioning of each of the social organs considered separately; however, we then strongly insisted that first the organs, next the groups of organs, and finally the systems of groups, always and necessarily present a correlative and simultaneous organization and functioning, and that all of these, including the systems of groups, which are the most extensive and the most complex forms of special social organography, are always agencies with a view to the service of the *ensemble*, which regulates their particular activity and acts upon their individual structure.

In our study, which has been at once both static and dynamic, of the organs, of the groups of organs, and of the systems of groups relating to the different classes of social phenomena, we have also recognized a certain order, which is both logical and natural. We have based this classification upon the degree of complexity and of specialty of the organization and functioning of the phenomena, and not, as in former classifications, upon the complexity and specialty of the phenomena themselves.

Accordingly, the economic system in its entirety is divided into three distinct but connected branches. The simplest and most general of these is that of circulation; next in order is that of consumption; last, most complex and special of all, that of production. This is an important fact; for if, as we believe, the economic life is the foundation of the entire social life, it is the circulatory system that constitutes the lower story, the foundation, the basis of the entire structure—and not production, nor the technique of production, as the school of Karl Marx maintains.

The circulatory branch of the system, likewise, according to a natural and logical order, includes: (1) the transportation of men and of utilities—(*a*) land, (*b*) maritime; (2) the transmission of offers and orders; (3) the circulation of signs representative of values; (4) the circulation of public and private instruments of credit.

It follows that, in last analysis, all social life can be reduced to a movement, to a change of place of the human units and of utilities, that is to say, of the more or less numerous parts of the two factors combined by land and sociology.

This observation, supposing it to be as exact as I think, should be of the highest importance for the general philosophy of the sciences, because it should permit us to perceive more or less clearly that sociology itself will some time be related to a universal mechanical law well understood from the purely philosophical point of view. This philosophical monism will not be able to treat social phenomena simply by themselves, according to their distinctive character and their particular laws.

The fact that in last analysis all social life can be reduced to movement, to a change of place of human units and of utilities, corresponds to the fact that every social structure can be reduced to a displacement, a movement, a new combination of land and population. It is this that we actually observe in the economic activity of the most rudimentary populations, which live by hunting, fishing, and gathering fruits, nuts, etc. All their economic activity consists in a movement, in approaching natural utilities, in bringing these utilities together. Here circulation, consumption, production are only one; they are blended in a single movement, in a circulatory movement which involves at the same time the two other phenomena, consumption and production, which are not differentiated until later. However, consumption and production in their distinct forms, in the highest distinct forms they are subsequently able to attain, nevertheless always remain as the two poles of the same sphere. At the same time, this statement explains a fact which I think no one disputes, namely, that the circulatory phenomena always tend to become organized, that is to say, socialized, before the phenomena relating to consumption, and especially before the phenomena of production, which are the most complex and the most special of all economic phenomena. Among productive phenomena those activities relating to industry, properly so called, become organized before agricultural industry.

The objection has been made that hunting, fishing, and

gathering are likewise forms of production. This is true — and they are also forms of consumption. It has also been said that all production is only a combination, that is to say, a displacement of elements. This is likewise true, but in gathering, hunting, and fishing consumption and production are still involved in the pre-eminently simple form of a displacement, of a transportation, while in production, properly speaking, there is a new combination of the raw materials which serve to form a new product.

While our logical and dogmatic classification is impregnable when we consider economic phenomena in the abstract, it seems even more valid from the historical and natural point of view, when we consider them in their social forms, in their organization. Thus all the sociologists, including the socialists, point out that the circulatory phenomena of societies, represented by roads, canals, railways, postal systems, telegraphs, telephones, money, credit, banks, are much more advanced in organization and in socialization than the phenomena of production or even of consumption. There is even one universal organ — the international Postal Union. There are commercial museums. There is a universal code of marine signals, and the same thing is true of music and science. The unity existing in the majority of the treaties of commerce, in the most-favored-nation clause, has the same meaning as international expositions. There is a bibliography planned according to a common method, and even universities with international scope. In addition to all the concordant observations which I have presented elsewhere upon the relative advancement of the circulatory forms, as compared with those of consumption, and especially of production, particularly in my *Essais sur la monnaie, la crédit, et les banques*, I have found confirmation in this not less interesting fact emphasized by M. Polléans in his creditable book on *L'accaparement*, viz., that

not only economic facts, but the words for them, have had their evolution. One could not speak of monopoly of production so long as concentration of the means of production did not exist. Speculative or commercial monopoly, which for a long time was the only kind in sight, is entirely eclipsed at

present by the power of productive monopoly (P. 7). . . . . The legal notion of monopoly [*accaparement*] is strictly determined by the monopoly of speculation. This is to be explained by the legal code, and by the object which Art. 419 had in view. . . . . That article was promulgated at a time when understandings between producers were not yet born. Its intention was to protect freedom of trade and to secure respect for an individualistic conception of the relations of exchange. At that time isolated production on a small scale, divided by competition, was essentially individualistic, and there was nothing to fear except speculative commercial manœuvres (P. 10).

Thus, up to the most recent economic phenomena, the order of formation and of constitution, proceeding from circulation over to production, is confirmed in a constant manner.

We have likewise shown that there is a natural order in production itself; thus industrial production, properly speaking, is much more perfect and in reality more ancient in its social forms than agricultural production. Progress of the first has always preceded that of the second, not merely from the technical point of view, but also from the point of view of socialization. In spite of belief and even appearances to the contrary, industrial production, like agriculture, not merely requires a sufficient development of the mechanical, physical, and chemical sciences, but it also requires a development of biology. So in the countries most advanced in civilization, agriculture, in contrast with manufacture, is still essentially empirical; it has been of this character to such an extent that its tools, with few exceptions, have been but little modified for centuries. Further, the industrial organization has already assumed much higher social forms; industry has been freed from the feudal régime and from paternal sbsolutism to a much greater extent than agriculture. Yet it may be objected that just as in industry the manufacture of cotton was emancipated before the manufacture of wool, precisely because the former is the more recent, and was therefore established with fewer restrictions, so likewise industry as a whole is more advanced than agriculture, because it is more recent. However, in fact, we encounter a certain development of industry among all peoples, even in cases where there is no agriculture; agriculture is a special differentiation of general industry.

In Part II, we have proceded to a similar classification of the organs and groups of organs: genetic, artistic, scientific, moral, juridic, and political. This classification is a second synthesis, at once subjective and objective, for it organizes our knowledge, and at the same time it rests upon observations conforming to concrete reality. One of the most constant laws which we have recognized at this point of our studies is that the social functions and organs thus considered by themselves assume a structure which is less rigid and despotic as their organization becomes more developed and perfect. With evolutionary progress, in the place of order resulting from commandment there is substituted order resulting from the perfecting of the organization itself.

A third positive synthesis, which is still special, shows that the numerous social functions and organs are only the result of sociological differentiation from a primitive homogeneous state, out of which they emerge by way of natural filiation. We have shown that, by the very fact of this filiation, the functions and the organs are related to each other in such a way that the highest forms in each class, and the highest forms of the *ensemble* of the classes of functions and organs, are interrelated as the divers branches of an immense genealogical tree. Thus the circulatory function, which is the simplest and most general economic function, not only gives rise to a whole series of organs which jointly perform the work of circulation, but it also gives rise to an uninterrupted line of functions and organs relating to consumption, such as private and public markets, wholesale and retail commercial houses, etc., and to an analogous line of functions and organs which participate in the work of production. Further, the economic functions and organs give rise to domestic, artistic, scientific, moral, juridic, and political institutions, all of which are related to the economic functions and organs, and to each other as direct and collateral descendants of common ancestors.

Let us recall, for example, that from the æsthetic point of view a natural classification arises, which is based at the same time upon the relations of the arts to our senses, to the exterior

world, to logic (to which it is related because of their greater or less degree of complexity and speciality), and also to their historical order parallel to their logical order.

The arts concerned with our most general relations with the exterior world, clothing and ornament, the dwelling and architecture, are the simplest. Next come those relating to our senses, beginning with the most general senses, the muscular—the sense of movement and the tactile—from which all the special senses are derived. Harmony of movement was first represented by dances, whose most ordinary manifestations are war dances, pastoral dances, imitations of the hunting of man and of animals, imitations of peaceful occupations and of love. The arts relating to our general sensibility, which is mainly tactile, especially represent the pleasure arising from contact with smooth, soft, and pleasing forms. Then come the arts which are related to our lowest special senses, and which aid in the formation and development of the same—the culinary art, perfumery, etc., which correspond to taste and smell. Moreover, all the special senses are a progressive differentiation of the most general and elementary senses, the muscular and the tactile; they combine the sensation of movement with that of static simultaneity resulting from contact. Hearing and sight are the highest of the senses. They imply movement and touch, which, however, do not necessarily imply sight and hearing. Architecture, sculpture, painting, are the successive forms of art in relation to life. As for music, it is the emotional art *par excellence*, the highest and the most complex emotional art, in spite of its sentimental diffusion in the nervous system. Literature is the most complex and the most special art, the most precise of the fine arts. Like architecture, it erects the noblest edifices; like sculpture, it creates the most beautiful forms—inorganic, organic, and, above all, human—and gives to each a color living and brilliant or somber or gray as the reality; its language is musical. At the same time, literature serves as a medium and opens to us the highest in ideation and in scientific knowledge, first concrete knowledge, and finally abstract. It embraces in its descriptions all the sensations furnished by the inferior arts, subordinating them in part to the

ideal, just as music does. Music, in spite of its vaguer character, nevertheless also succeeds in represening our most complex sentiments, and in expressing the emotional tonality always inherent even in our most abstract ideas. Literature, with its double instrument, speech and writing, in a word, by means of language, places art in direct relationship with the intellectual aspect of the collective psychology. By means of literature, oral and written language, whose point of departure is gesture and mimicry, and mimetic or picture-writing, whose point of arrival is the apparently purely conventional signs derived from the same, language joins art to science and to the collective intellectual psychology. Language is, then, an eminently social organ. Auguste Comte, in his *Static Sociology*, has accorded to it an important place, and if, as represented by adverse criticism, I have spoken of it only incidentally in my first two volumes of the *Introduction*, this was because, in the first place, it seemed to me to be included as a constitutive element in the description, like that above, which I there made of literature; and because, in the second place, to tell the truth, the philosophy of language does not appear to me to be as yet sufficiently elucidated. This second reason is partly, and perhaps wholly, due to the imperfection of my own linguistic attainments, which do not permit me to treat specially this important problem, Besides, from the point of view of the general structure of societies, it is sufficient for me to point out, as I have just done, that literature, both oral and written, is a connective organ joining art to scientific knowledge, which is the essential subject of collective psychology, properly speaking.

So far as collective psychology is concerned (aside from the consideration, too often overlooked, that no social phenomenon, not even an economic phenomenon, is exclusively either material or idealogical, and that, consequently, everything related to sociology, by the very reason of its constitutive factors, is inorganic, organic, and physic), we may accept the grand divisions adopted by Auguste Comte (religion, metaphysics, and positive philosophy) as representing the successive and progressive stages of the co-ordination and the evolution of social psychism.

In the social psychism I include oral and written language, which, as I have shown, serves as a means of transition between art and science. But, as we shall see later in the general structure of societies, every phenomenon implies all the others; thus an economic phenomenon always has a genetic, æsthetic, scientific, moral, juridic, or political character. Now, although Comte's law of the three stages may be applicable to the last four classes or phenomena, it is particularly necessary to recognize that it cannot be applied either to economics or genetics or art, which are of a superior generality. We are obliged, then, to reject at once not only what is called historic materialism, but also all biologic sociology; and in particular psychic sociology. Beliefs, morals, law, and politics are material, as are all other social phenomena; the contrary is conceivable only in the abstract, analytical part of sociology; but in the real social structures, that is to say, in so far as the phenomena are incorporated in organized aggregates, each social fact is at the same time economic, genetic, æsthetic, moral, juridic, and political. This composite character, already apparent in special social organography, will appear to us as a fundamental law, especially in the study of the structure of societies as a whole.

The recognition that social organs are co-ordinated into groups of organs having a common function is, then, a further step in synthesis. Thus, the means of transportation, the banks of deposit, of issue, of credit, and of payment, money, etc., form the circulatory apparatus; the latter combines with the organs of the apparatus of consumption and those of production to constitute the economic system. The last, in its turn, will appear to us in the general synthesis as one of the grand subdivisions of the social structure as a whole.

Thus, in proportion as we advance from the elementary study of social phenomena to their organic co-ordination, which increases in extent and complexity, the hierarchic character of the primary analytical classification gives place to a correlation, and therefore to an equivalence, so that all idea of superiority, and even of anteriority, becomes very attenuated. This is true in the sense that in reality the highest forms may claim a certain

pre-eminence because of their special functions, while the forms called inferior may boast, not only of their utility, but of their fundamental necessity.

The organs, groups, and systems relating to the seven distinct classes of social phenomena represent what are commonly called the social institutions. In the special work which we intend soon to devote to the static theories of the three principal representatives of sociology in the nineteenth century, Quetelet, Comte, and Spencer, we shall have occasion, even while pointing out the immense value of their works, to observe the faults of method which have too often vitiated their conclusions. The organs or institutions of societies are indeed syntheses, but they are also particular syntheses. At present, let us merely point out that Quetelet confines himself too much to the observation of elementary social facts, that is to say, to statistics. Yet, his point of departure is better and his method more exact and more certain than that of Comte and Spencer, although in sociology his theory of probability and of averages is comparatively erroneous. His profound statistical studies have saved him from error in synthetic principles, which are insufficiently verified and proved by the two masters of the French and English schools of positive sociology. Although the foundations of his structure are more solid, on the other hand Quetelet almost entirely neglects the study of social institutions—of which the statistical phenomena are only the materials. On the contrary, Comte and Spencer take no account of statistics, of elementary facts, especially economic facts, which are the most important of all. They begin at once with the consideration of social forms or institutions; in the case of Comte, even the latter are sacrificed to the consideration of the *ensemble* of humanity and are deduced from the same. Between the method of Quetelet, who represents, so to speak, molecular sociology, and that of Comte, who especially represents synthetic sociology, Spencer takes the mean, which, although it is without the qualities of the first, is also without the dangers of the second. It is only by combining, according to a methodical order, their three distinct points of view that we can hope to trace the outline of concrete sociology, then that of the abstract.

The sociology of Quetelet is mathematical, mechanical, and physical; his theory of averages is mainly static; with him, evolution is accessory; with Comte and Spencer, dynamics predominates; in the work of the latter it almost entirely absorbs statics. The sociology of Spencer, in spite of the fact that it may be reduced to the most general laws of energy, is mainly descriptive; that of Comte is mainly abstract, and is wanting in statics or descriptions; thus Spencer is the mean between Comte and Quetelet; they complement each other; however, united they still remain incomplete.

In short, it is necessary henceforth to subject ourselves to the rigor of slow but sure scientific methods. The general statics and dynamics of societies and of humanity should have for their bases correct statistics of all the facts relating to the seven classes of social phenomena. Statistics, whether represented by diagrams or not, show quantitatively the condition and the movement of societies. It is true that, by themselves, they do not permit a perception of qualitative value, except for determined periods and civilizations. Statistics, by itself, is not able to construct an abstract sociology, nor is it able to construct any of the particular abstract social sciences which are the foundation of abstract sociology. Nevertheless, the quantitative factor is not a negligible element of the qualitative factor; it is even a first and fundamental condition of all qualitative differentiation. There is no discontinuity between the quantitative and the qualitative aspects; but the first is mainly historical, the second, abstract and universal. The one implies the other; they are not contradictory. From the error of believing the contrary springs without doubt the fact that many of the most eminent economists, demographers, æstheticians, moralists, jurists, and political scientists acknowledge only historical laws. However, this error is less fatal than that of the metaphysicians who venture to conceive of natural laws not founded upon generalization from particular historical laws, and from the elementary social facts which constitute the basis of the latter.

To sum up: In the first place, statistics are necessary for enumeration and quantitative knowledge of all the elements of

the special social sciences—the more general institutions and structures in whose composition these elements are combined being disregarded; next, there is necessity for a knowledge of all the special social institutions; then there will exist the possibility of a general sociology, first concrete, then abstract. This is the methodical order, which is at once logical, dogmatic, and historical or natural.

Such are the successive steps in the study of social science. However, as in all the other natural sciences, the human mind successively learns to descend from superficial consideration of the whole to deeper and deeper consideration of its parts. After the preliminary and the indispensable study of the two great social factors constitutive of every society, land and population, which are the subjects of the antecedent sciences, the first step in social science is, then, the statistical or quantitative evaluation of elementary social phenomena. These phenomena may be studied either apart from the organs, groups of organs, systems, and societies in which they appear, or in connection with the structures in which they are incorporated. Even in their abstract study, certain relationships appear among the phenomena. However, abstract statistics is not an adequate method, since the statistical elements are comparable only under similar circumstances. In proof of this, the theory of averages, for example, has value from the point of view of population only for members of the same variety of the human species. The arithmetical mean of the height of Laplanders and Patagonians considered together would not correspond to the average height of either race considered separately, nor would it correspond to the real general mean of both races. However, when we proceed from the midst of elementary statistical facts to the study of the social institutions in which these facts are combined, we then succeed in distinguishing in the arrangement and in the development of these institutions certain constant and necessary relations, which are independent of all transitory historical forms. Statistics alone cannot furnish us with a general conception of the organization and evolution of all human societies and of humanity. To enable us to approach and understand this

organization and evolution is the function of history—the history of particular social organizations, and, finally, the history of societies themselves in their *ensemble* as true institutions in the service of the great universal society. Thus in genetics the statistics of marriages and those of legitimate and illegitimate births initiate us perfectly into knowledge of the genetic elements of a given society in a given historical period; but the laws which we are able to derive by these observations are never applicable except to societies having the same institutions as those in connection with which the tabulated unions and births (some legitimate, others illegitimate) take place. Even the most general statistical facts, those relating to births and deaths, are comparable only in connection with institutions. In fact, what is the use of announcing pretended general and abstract laws if it is necessary to add *all conditions being equal*, and if these equal conditions do not exist? It is only by demonstrating the existence of a constant order of structure and evolution in the particular organs of the societies, and in the societies themselves, that it can be completely shown that there are laws of natality and mortality. It is, then, by studying genetics, not only in its elements, but also in its institutions, and as an integrating factor of societies, that we shall succeed in discovering constant and necessary relations, static and dynamic laws, common to all societies. Although sociology is given a first form by elementary statistics, it is, so to speak, the particular institutions and societies themselves that become the direct materials of sociology. For example, we shall show that a regular order of evolution exists among primitive promiscuity, polyandry, polygamy, the matriarchate, the patriarchate, and the androgynous couple who are politically equal, or rather equivalent, and who are recognized as such in the institutions. From these different special historical forms we shall be able, therefore, to deduce special laws, at first concrete, then abstract. Likewise, taking a further step, we shall advance to the consideration of the static and dynamic conditions of various co-ordinated institutions, at first in particular societies, and finally in societies considered as a whole. Thus we shall also succeed in discovering the general

laws, at first concrete, then abstract, which are applicable to all social types, past, present, and even future, including that grand social type which is in course of formation, the cosmopolitan type. Thus, disregarding successively the accessory variations in order that we may better consider only the constant aspect of societies, including even the constant aspect of the variations themselves, we shall be able to conclude, for example, that the constant genetic function is the preservation and development of the individual by the species and of the species by the individual, with the least possible waste of energy. Moreover, so far as concerns the distribution of wealth, and its special organ, commerce, we shall show that, in spite of all historical variations, its constant function is and will be to lead utilities to the point where they are necessary, with the greatest economy. Contrary to an imperfect view of the case, the commercial function appears accordingly to be as eternal as that of the entire social life of which it is a particular agent.

An attempt like that of Herbert Spencer or that of Auguste Comte to found a social philosophy or sociology without preliminary preparation in statistics, that is to say, in what may he called molecular sociology, or an attempt like that of Ad. Quetelet, with statistics alone, is an undertaking which has been upheld only because sociology is the last-born of the abstract sciences. Unless we deny the unity of scientific method and the existence of social science itself, it is necessary that sociology be brought under this inflexible and necessary discipline.

Does this mean that those who wish to treat of general and abstract sociology must necessarily devote themselves to all the preparatory statistical and historical studies? No; the lives of many generations, much less the life of an individual, would not be sufficient for this. But general abstract sociology can and must constitute itself a scientific specialty, the specialty of abstract generalizations, but on the express condition, as in the case of all the other scientific specialties, that the specialty in general sociology utilize in the most conscientious and methodical manner the reports and materials roughhewn by statistics and fashioned by the historians of the divers social institutions

and of the particular societies. The division of scientific labor forces itself on each generation, and even among the successive generations; in reality, this division of labor, whose negative aspect is most apparent, represents a continued, affective co-operation and collaboration, a single collective work, from the social point of view; it has always existed; the problem is merely to render the work more methodical and coherent by an appropriate organization.

Such is the course that we have followed up to the present time, and that we expect to pursue — considering, however, our individual effort, which has been especially facilitated by the whole of the anterior work, as only a very small contribution to the general contribution. After having studied in the second part of the *Introduction to Sociology* the social functions and organs by themselves, from the point of view of their structure and functioning, we now have to advance to new syntheses, those of the structure and the life of the *ensemble* of societies, considering first their structure. We have to investigate the general abstract laws of this structure, that is to say, the laws common to all civilizations at all times and in all places.

Let us recall, then, that this general, abstract structure is based upon knowledge of concrete social structures, including knowledge of their institutions or special organs, and that in both cases the materials are furnished by elementary statistics.

This is why, in conformity to this method, I have for a long time carried on numerous statistical studies, and have given many lectures (some of which have been published) upon certain great civilizations, particularly ancient Peru and Mexico, Egypt, India, China, Iran, Persia, and ancient Greece; this is why I have delivered and published many lectures upon advanced political economy and upon the detailed history of social economy. In short, my readers, and especially my pupils, have been the spectators, and at times the collaborators, of my preparatory studies and the critics of my method. This method advances continually from the simple to the complex, from the general to the special, from the concrete to the abstract; thus

abstract sociology appears to us as the positive philosophy of the inductions of all the social sciences.

It is these inductions, for example, and not simple biological analogies, which will lead us to recognize and to point out that the structure of all society is primarily determined by its economic organization; but in the concrete sociological synthesis this law will lose its absolute character by the very fact that every economic phenomenon is inseparable from the genetic, æsthetic, scientific, ethical, juridic, and political elements; the separation does not exist in abstract analysis. It is thus only that the fundamental character of the economic branch of the social structure is common to all civilizations; we can generalize and make an abstraction of all the local and temporary variations. In concrete reality no social phenomenon is free from mixture; the general abstract laws rise above this concrete character, but without losing sight of it. Let us here recall our definition of a law: *A law is a constant and necessary relation between any phenomenon and the conditions under which this phenomenon appears.* When the conditions remain the same, the phenomenon remains constant; this is the static aspect of law. When the conditions vary, the phenomenon varies; this is the dynamic aspect of law.

In last analysis, all relations can be reduced to relations of similarity or of difference, either in time or space, or else in time and space together. Laws must not be confused with causes; thus weight and gravitation are not causes. In the scientific sense, causes are the conditions which regularly accompany or precede the appearance of a phenomenon. We especially call the conditions which precede a phenomenon the causes of the same; for example, the *ensemble* of the conditions constituting springtime is called by us the cause of the blooming of the lilacs, Likewise, we consider low wages as a partial cause of illegitimate births; they regularly precede and accompany the latter. Therefore, the knowledge of causes—that is to say, knowledge of the conditions which precede, pave the way for, and favor the appearance of social phenomena—permits us to foresee the return of these phenomena. Hence, by modifying or suppress-

ing these conditions we may modify a phenomenon or even eliminate it.

These previsions have a character which is clearly scientific. Examples appear in my *Lois sociologiques*, pp. 46–52, 112. The previsions which we have expressed in each of the successive editions of this work have in each case been verified. Yet they might not have been verified. Then it would have been necessary to investigate the new conditions which may have modified the phenomenon. However, the modifications can be only variations of intensity, that is to say, quantitative variations, so long as the conditions, although variable, are the same. This point of view, which is mainly qualitative, becomes predominant in the study of the synthesis of the functions of the social organs, groups of organs, and systems of particular societies, and in the study of civilization considered as a whole, independently of time and space. Thus, although in the examples cited in my *Lois sociologigues* the apparent advance of nominal wages might easily have corresponded to stationary wages, or even to a real fall of wages resulting from an increase of the price of commodities necessary for the subsistence of the coal-miners, in abstract sociology the question of illegitimate births or of wages can no longer arise, since these phenomena are purely historical forms of natality and of reward for labor; but there will always remain the corresponding abstract law that the relations of parents and children are closer as the standard of life of the former is elevated.

Knowledge of the causes or conditions favorable to the appearance or disappearance of certain social phenomena is the basis of the experimental method in sociology and in political science. The individual *savant* can in general only point out, observe, and describe the experiments, and show how certain phenomena may be modified; but the real modifications in the social world must, in the main, be accomplished by collective forces.

Social variations and accidents are always confined to limits which become narrow in proportion as our observation extends over a long period of time, over a great extent of space, and to a great number of cases. In this connection, the theory of proba-

bility and the theory of averages, so well set forth by Laplace, J. Fourier, Ad. Quetelet, Cournot, and others, will always be the best preparation for the positive conception of the social order. While the variable accidental causes or conditions neutralize each other by repetition, the constant conditions (also variable) act with an intensity more and more pronounced. Besides, constancy and necessity are relative rather than absolute ideas, except in the abstract sciences, in which the relative aspect remains understood. From the concrete point of view, the physical environment is the most constant; the organic environment is constant to a less extent; the social environment shares the conditions of both the physical and the organic environments.

I shall not essay in this part of my *Introduction*, any more than in the preceding parts, to set forth a complete theory, a system. It is still necessary for us to limit ourselves for a long time to perfecting methods, tracing outlines, and indicating directions. My entire sociology is derived from observation of the facts and from the social experiences of history; it is therefore subject to constant criticism and revision.

The true scientific unity, the unity that is sufficient even in theory, is the unity of the positive method; it is with the help of this method alone that I attempt to trace some of the principal outlines of a general, abstract theology. Therefore, the present problem is not that of imagining and sketching a plan for the best of republics, or even that of indicating practical reforms to be realized in modern societies. The *Republic* and the *Laws* of Plato cannot serve as models for us. I propose simply to investigate how every society is made, constructed, or rather organized, and what are the constant conditions of its equilibrium and structure. Science and art are distinct; biology and anatomy are not medicine and surgery, that is to say, therapeutics; nevertheless, social science, like all the other sciences, seeks even among the extreme collective perturbations for the confirmation of the necessary and constant order of human aggregates.

Nevertheless, the first result of an exact conception of the

constant structure of societies is to destroy other conceptions which are less exact and even false, and which are in themselves, by their obstructive force, an obstacle to reforms; such, for example, is the conception that the social order is immutable and that human intervention is impotent to modify the same, or else the inverse conception, that there are no other social laws, no other social order, than those imposed by the legislator.

G. De Greef.

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[*To be continued.*]

THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF THE EIGHT-HOUR DAY.

In these days of industrial concentration and wealth-getting, the impression is apt to prevail that the whole industrial machinery is organized for the mere sake of production and the profit incidental thereto. Workers, under such a conception, are regarded as the parts of a machine system instead of members of a society. But even from a viewpoint of this kind, the eight-hour day, in so far as it affects the productive power of the worker, becomes a question of great importance. When it is stated that the future culture of the laborer depends upon this movement, that poverty is to be driven from the industrial world and industrial depressions held in check, everyone, skeptical or otherwise, must pause to listen to the arguments presented for such a cause. It becomes, when attached to the philosophy of trade-unionism, the great question, the most important with which labor has to deal.

The introduction of machinery at the close of the last century, with the attendant high cost of capital, forced longer hours of labor than existed under the old domestic system. Human endurance was for many years the sole check upon a day's labor. The whole tendency of modern industry, even with the shortening of hours, is in the direction of increased exertion. The essential element in the machine organization is the human one, the most precious and the most difficult to replace. The energy of a worker in any industry should always be equal to that of the day before. If the pains of labor are heavy, the tone of the workman is lowered, and his surplus energy disappears, while he tends to become a mere automaton valuable to society for the net surplus he creates for others. The round of production of energy into goods, goods into utilities, and utilities into energy is broken down by any such heavy burden. We must, therefore, hail, certainly from the viewpoint of the community, any movement likely to increase its working power. Whether the eight-hour day is able to do this is the question with which we must deal.

The eight-hour day is not a new question. As early as 1842, and still earlier, in England such a working day was agitated, but so far in advance of the hours then worked was the demand that little attention was paid to the movement. The agitation for the eight-hour day has been materially affected by historical and industrial events. The Civil War postponed the whole question of shorter hours for several years, and the movement was just gathering strength when the panic of 1873 again postponed its consideration. In the next twenty years the railroad strikes of 1877, the industrial depression of 1883, the Haymarket riot of 1886, and the panic of 1893 kept the question in the background; but after the long series of difficulties, during a time of great prosperity, the eight-hour day again made its appearance for serious consideration.

The basis of this extraordinary movement is a philosophical one, strongly stated and widely believed. It may be briefly put as follows: Economic ills come from poverty, poverty in turn is due to overproduction and the presence of the unemployed in large numbers in society. Society can be relieved from this burden by larger wages and shorter hours of labor. Shorter hours in turn mean an increased standard of living, wider consumption, and in consequence a larger demand, causing the creation of goods at a lower price and the continuous employment of labor in order to meet the demand and furnish the supply. In such a philosophy the standard of living is governed by wants, and wants are determined by the social opportunities of the masses. All of this can be accomplished by reducing the hours of labor. Wages under such system, it is argued, will be increased in two ways: by reducing enforced idleness and by creating new wants and raising the standard of living.

The arguments back of the philosophy of the eight-hour day may be grouped under the three heads of economic, social, and human necessities. It is demanded by economic necessity, for the reason that the modern factory can turn out more goods than are needed to supply the wants of people. Machines and inventions are continually introduced, resulting in no higher wages for the worker and the piling up of goods for which there is no

market. The increased purchasing power of his wages may be lost at any time by the competition of the unemployed who tend to force the employed to take a lower remuneration. The worker is thus confronted by lower wages to balance lower prices.

The employer, too, is compelled to keep in the procession of low cost, producing cheaply when he needs the supply, closing his mills when the demand falls and his supply is sufficient. This condition of affairs produces the unemployed.

It is the presence of the unemployed that creates the social necessity for the eight-hour day, so it is urged. A large body of unemployed increases the burdens of society, and enlarges the ranks of criminals and those dependent upon charity. The trade unions are jeopardized by the greater difficulty of keeping up their organization and their rates. Union wages fall, demand for commodities declines, the weaker concerns fail, and consolidation of interests results, bringing another social problem for solution.

The wear and tear upon human life steadily increases under modern methods of production. This is the third reason urged for the adoption of the eight-hour day. If men are to stand as heads of families, as electors, and even as operators of machines, they must have time for rest, for education, and for family life. The responsibility of government increasingly falls upon the working classes in a democracy. Shorter hours of labor alone can give the worker the leisure for careful study of the present-day problems thrust more and more upon the electorate for decision.

The stanch followers of trade-unionism believe that in the philosophy just enunciated they have a solution of the question of the unemployed, and consequent fluctuation of wages; but to this the great socialist element in the trade-union movement replies that the reduction of hours is a necessary feature of a labor program, but that it is unsatisfactory and reactionary as a substitute for the socialist program. Nothing but the latter can overcome the blighting influence of overproduction under the machine régime of private property. To the socialist the introduction of new machinery, higher speeds, and reorganization

will always displace more workers than can be employed by a reduction of hours. In other words, to them the eight-hour day is a palliative, not a solution, of present-day evils. To this the reply is sometimes made: "If eight hours will not bring the desired result, then six, certainly four, hours a day will employ those out of work."

It is at this point that we may turn to a careful examination of the eight-hour-day philosophy and the questions kindred to it. Fundamentally there can be no objections to the desirability of the eight-hour day; but to the philosophy and basis of the argument very serious objection may be taken. Under the eight-hour-day movement is an abiding belief in the power of the standard of living to increase wages, and that demand for commodities constitutes the principal employing force of labor. From this point of view, shorter hours mean increased standard of living and wider consumption, leading to a larger demand for commodities, and as a consequence to extended employment of workers. But "want" and "demand" are not synonymous terms. Want does not develop into demand unless accompanied by purchasing power. Hence we must come back to the source of wages upon which the whole question of the eight-hour day hinges. The wage-earner does not influence the market and produce the results noted in the philosophy of the short-hour movement, except as he is the possessor of material things. Undoubtedly the rate of wages does depend upon the demand for labor, but in turn the demand for labor rests upon the aggregate capital of the community, which is determined by the gross production and the demand for commodities, while the gross production is governed by the productivity of labor. Wages are thus ultimately paid out of product.

In this statement of the source of wages it will be noted that the demand for commodities determines the amount of capital that will be used for productive purposes, but in no sense does an increase of wages rest solely upon the cost of subsistence. Increase of wages, as well as reduction of hours, is limited by the producing power of labor. Whether the laborer gets all he is entitled to does not materially affect the arguments advanced

for the eight-hour day. Employers will pay for production, and no more. It is a most dangerous fallacy that looks upon work as definite in amount, that must be done regardless of wages or number to be employed. Employment must rest ultimately upon the amount of wealth created. Consequently, the eight-hour-day question resolves itself into this query: Can as much work be done in eight hours as in ten? It is evidently presumed in the philosophy of the movement that this is impossible, since a great army of the unemployed are to re-enter the ranks of industry when such a day is secured.

As a means of solving the unemployed problem the eight-hour day has no value except as it abolishes overtime and all its kindred evils. The phenomenon of non-employment is due in a large measure to sickness, shiftlessness of individual laborers, and the fluctuations of commercial credit resulting in the closing of mills and the discharge of workers. Upon the first two the eight-hour day has no visible effect; upon the third, by abolishment of overtime, it may have a most important bearing. Employment and production would be rendered more stable, and periods of non-employment and overtime would be displaced by continuous employment of the worker. Objection to overtime as a usual thing is more on the ground of the destruction of seasonal trades and the failure to supply press orders. In some instances the abandonment of overtime would not materially affect the season of employment, but there is no reason why press orders may not be anticipated by buyer and seller, causing a more equitable distribution of work throughout the year. On the other hand, it is urged that to cut the hours of the day will give greater opportunity for overtime, but this may be adequately answered by the vote of trade unions upon this point; although individually the members may favor such practice, in the long run it means a lowered rate and a contracted area of employment.

The vast majority of the advocates of this movement favor it because they hope the blighting competition of the unemployed may be removed by the reduction of hours of labor. Such experience as has been had in various lands where the eight-hour

day has been in vogue hardly bears out the hope for such a result. In Victoria the unemployed are still evident in great numbers. The organization of the "New Unionism" in this Australian state is proof of the inability of the eight-hour day to absorb those out of work. It may be boldly stated that no provision such as the one under discussion is able to solve the difficulties which have their root in the whole economic basis of industry. Nevertheless, the eight-hour day has its reward and is worth seeking.

Not, then, as a means of employing the "reserve army of industry," as the unemployed are sometimes called, is the eight-hour day to be advocated, but rather as a means of giving to men a wider interest in life, the possibility of greater culture, and the surety of education commensurate with the problems now forced upon our democracy for solution. It is not, then, as a private measure that this movement is acceptable, but as a public necessity. More important still is the query: Can such a day be attained? Remembering that wages depend upon the productivity of labor, it remains to be seen how far an eight-hour day is likely to impair production and in consequence injure the wealth-producing power of the country. Experience, however, furnishes an answer, for in many manufacturing plants it has been shown that in the long run the men are able to produce as much in eight as in ten hours, while the proprietors add such eloquent testimonials as "less drunkenness," "greater regularity of attendance," and "better class of men at work." If the eight-hour day is productive of higher intelligence, it must bring better results. In the English coal mines the eight-hour day has been the rule for some years, with no special diminution in the output. This mysterious result, defiant of the "rule of three," is due to the power of greater intensity of work during a shorter time — evidence of the fact that the energy of the worker has not decreased from day to day from the long hours of labor.

In the various occupations where no products are created, but exchange alone carried on, there is no reason why trade might not be confined to shorter hours than at present. The

fear of loss of custom and the reluctant advantage to a neighboring merchant keep men from cutting down the hours of clerks. In reality there is no reason why buyers could not easily conform their purchases to the hours set by the eight-hour day. But in the railway and street-car service the public demands trains and cars at all times. The eight-hour day in such instances would mean increased expense of operation; but the public would get a better service by the use of two shifts of men in the case of street railways than at the present time. More than that, the general adoption of eight hours would confine travel to more limited time, reducing comparatively the expense over the present lack of concentrated travel. The present system keeps men at work for long hours, endangering the traveling public by possible carelessness due to sleepiness and fatigue. On the railroad systems even worse conditions prevail, but with much better excuse. The state has from time to time attempted to interfere, but without marked success. The eight-hour day is possible in many divisions of railroad work, and when attainable should be insisted upon by the public for its own protection.

The interests of the individual and the community are by no means identical in the establishment of the eight-hour day. The community desires the highest good and greatest energies of its workers through long periods of time. This can be accomplished in most industries without any accompanying loss of productive power by shorter hours of work, as has been proven in the experience of many industries. On the other hand, in specific instances and in the operation of railroads and street cars the shorter day will increase expense of operation considerably, though not by any very large percentage. In some industries where labor is not employed continuously, but periodically, and gathered from any and all sources, the employer finds it to his advantage to push the hours of work to the longest possible limit. Human energies can stand a pace of this kind for a time, and as the employer does not worry about a future supply of workers he expects to win an increased profit by such a policy. These industries have come to be

called parasitic. The eight-hour day would mean the death of the sweating system and of such industries as are dependent upon excessive hours.

The variation with which this movement may be introduced will have much to do with the social effects resulting from it. If universally adopted, there will be one result; if by industries, another; and if in one district and not another, still others. It may be presumed that general adoption of the eight-hour day is virtually impossible, whether forced by legislative action or trade-union ukase. Some industries will be slower than others in the adoption of the measure, but it may be taken for granted that the movement of the best laborers will be from the ten- and eleven-hour districts to the section where the eight-hour day is the rule. In the more unskilled trades this may result in causing a still greater dearth of workers in the rural districts, the attractions of the eight-hour day and the city being too much for the laborers in the agricultural districts. This would tend to increase the ranks of the unemployed in the larger cities.

Perhaps the one great bugbear in reference to this movement is found in the fear that exports will decline in amount, affecting the foreign trade of the nation. In contrast with this position is the repeated statement that the long hours of foreign workers assist materially in checking their competition with us. That, however, was in the days when ten hours' work was the rule. It must be kept in mind that other nations have materially reduced their hours of labor and are fast approaching our standard of factory sanitation and direction. In the words of another: "High wages, short hours, and the resulting mental and physical development facilitate the introduction of more effective methods, and thus reduce the cost of production." There must be a limit to which the principle of short hours can be pushed, but undoubtedly the eight-hour day is within the limit, as is evidenced in the successful mercantile position of England, where the eight-hour day has been in vogue for a number of years.

Nevertheless, the eight-hour day must cost somebody something in loss of profit, greater exertion in a short period of time, or smaller wages. If, however, wages are maintained and the

productivity is kept up, it must be by the increased speed of machinery, the use of poorer material, and finally by the substitution of machines for laborers. The greater uniformity of production of new inventions and new methods ought to prevent any loss to profits. But if such a diminution does actually occur, the loss will fall upon interest, since the wages of superintendence and insurance against risk cannot be affected. If there is a lower rate upon interest due to the eight-hour day, is capital likely to migrate and savings fall in amount? To this it may be replied that the increasing amount of capital in other lands seeking investment indicates the impossibility of any larger amounts leaving the country. The great danger to this movement is in the trade unions themselves, for by limiting output, restricting apprentices, and cutting down the average rate of work the general product of the community is lessened and the wages reduced in consequence. Trade unions in specific instances have been able to do these things and still maintain wages and have the eight-hour day. To reason, however, from the individual to general cases is full of fallacies. In such successful attempts of trade unions the burden has been borne by the remaining industries, but a general reduction of hours with such tactics followed by all trade organization can result in but one thing: a smaller output and in the end less wages.

What, then, are the social effects of the eight-hour day? It is first of all difficult to predict what would be the actual effects upon the product of labor, but the evidence is sufficient to maintain the belief that there would be no material reduction in output. Undoubtedly individual firms might suffer in the transition, but the newer methods and better-adapted laborers would more than make up for this difficulty. In the retail and clerical occupations nothing but good would result from such a day, while some added cost of operation would be incurred in the case of street-railway and transportation companies. Even this burden would be lightened by increased travel within shorter hours. In some instances the industry would be destroyed, it no longer being worth while to produce goods in the old way. In a few industries wages would drop, but in most of them no material

change would occur. In some respects the foreign trade of the country would be changed, but not in the aggregate, while the permanent results are likely to be a lowered rate of interest, a more intelligent body of workers, and a higher taste in buying, resulting in many changes in demand.

One more question remains to be considered, and that is the best way to secure the shorter day. Three methods are open to the advocates of shorter hours: legislative statute, trade-union action, and voluntary act of employers. Any bill providing for shorter hours must be strictly mandatory and make no exceptions. The conditions of overtime must be defined and the law rigidly enforced. Its constitutionality virtually limits such action to public works and to contract factories. Shorter hours by legislation serves as an example on the part of the state or federal authorities, but where attained outside of government circles by legislation the trade unions are often not strong enough to maintain the hours at the old wages. The shorter days can be an abiding possession (where not granted by the voluntary action of employers) only when maintained by public opinion and strong trade-union organization. It would be far better, however, if the shorter day could be secured gradually, through the voluntary acts of employers. The eight-hour day attained in this way is a reasonable request that, from the point of view of selfish interest, employers would do well to grant. Give labor a generation more in the organization of the workers, and great changes will be wrought that will produce marked results in the ownership, direction, and management of industry. Reasonable requests granted now will make the transition less difficult and severe.

The eight-hour day will promote contentment and cheerfulness among the working people of the world. The economic value of this change is yet to be appreciated, but there can be no doubt of its great productive power when applied to industry. Under its influence the old rate of daily production will be maintained, with little or no effect in the long run upon wages, profits, the unemployed, and foreign commerce.

FRANK L. MCVEY.

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA.

THE STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY IN INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING IN THE UNITED STATES. IV.

CATALOGUE OF COURSES IN SOCIOLOGY—*continued.*

NEW JERSEY— PRINCETON UNIVERSITY.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIOLOGY.

PROFESSOR WYCKOFF.

5. History of social theory. A historical and critical analysis of the principal theories of social reconstruction from the early utopias to the various forms of modern anarchy and socialism.

6. Private property rights. The origin of private property rights and their subsequent modifications in civilized society, with special reference to present problem of land tenure and to public ownership and management of monopolies.

9. Genesis of the industrial order. An ethnological study of industry, including the earliest forms of the division of labor, the domestication of animals and plants the rise of slavery, the use of money, etc. Seminary course.

10. Development of industrialism. This course will treat of the rise of a new ndustrial order as an outcome of the industrial revolution, of the factory system, its development in the growth of capitalism and in the organization of labor, involving combinations, trusts, monopolies, and trade unions. Seminary course.

SETON HALL COLLEGE.

MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

8. Sociology. Society in general; domestic society; marriage and divorce; education; origin and nature of civil society; forms of government; international law. Professor Hedges.

NEW YORK— ALFRED UNIVERSITY.

PHILOSOPHY.

PRESIDENT DAVIS, MR. SORENSEN, AND MR. W. A. TITSWORTH.

4. Sociology. A study is made of the sources of sociological data. The family, the community, the city, the social functions, organs, and especially social ethics, are investigated. The aim of the course is to direct the student toward a practical and amicable adjustment of the present sociological questions. The seminary method is pursued, and a large amount of written work is required from members of the class.

ADELPHI COLLEGE.

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND POLITICS.

DR. FRADENBURGH.

46. Social history. The origin and growth of society as disclosed in the development of the family and civil and religious institutions. Text-books: Tylor's *Anthropology* and Morris's *Aryan Race*, with readings from Lubbock, Tylor, and Giddings.

49. Sociology. A study of social institutions, with special reference to American conditions. Social problems and their proposed solutions. Among the subjects discussed are immigration, problems of city life, employment of women and children, factory legislation, defective and delinquent classes, socialism. References: Ward's *Outlines of Sociology*, Fairbanks's *Introduction to Sociology*, Wright's *Practical Sociology*, Blackmar's *History and Sociology*, Spencer's *Principles of Sociology*, Giddings's *Elements of Sociology*, Smith's *Statistics and Sociology*.

BROOKLYN POLYTECHNIC.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE.

Sociology. Outline study of social evolution, involving analysis of past and present societies, of projected ideal societies, and a determination of the requisites of social survival, social efficiency, and social control.

COLLEGE OF ST. FRANCIS XAVIER.

Special ethics includes private ownership, communism, socialism, agrarian socialism, Henry George's theories. The combination of capital and labor organizations.

Domestic society: Matrimony, divorce, celibacy, education. Civil society: The nature and scope of civil society. Hobbes, Rousseau, the schoolmen. Aim and scope of civil government. Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant.

CANISIUS COLLEGE.

Special ethics includes, *int. al.*, the following topics: society in general — nature and constituent elements of society, social activity; the family.

ST. LAWRENCE UNIVERSITY.

SOCIOLOGY.

PROFESSOR FISHER.

Elective. Students interested in social science and already well grounded in the principles of political economy may, on application approved by the instructor, be admitted to the course in sociology.

(See also Canton Theological School.)

CORNELL UNIVERSITY,

PHILOSOPHY.

14a. Social psychology. Dr. Washborn. In the first part of this course the psychological aspect of the development of the human race, including the growth of language, the origin and development of myth, of custom, and of art and science, will be considered. In the second part the psychological character of civilized society will be studied.

HISTORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE.

The course in elementary social economics aims to show the significance for the students of economics and social life of the theories of evolution. Attention is centered upon the social group rather than upon the individual. The family, as the simplest and most important social group, is first studied in its historical development and its present organization and life. The study advances from this to the elementary study of the more complex and ill-defined social groups, such as races and the several

classes of social dependents. Emphasis is laid upon the statistical method as an aid in the study of social groups and the measurement of social forces.

The course in elementary statistics is an introduction to statistics as a method of studying social groups and social life. Emphasis is laid upon the results reached by this method in the simplest fields where the chances of error in observation or interpretation are least. Special attention is given, therefore, to the simple statistics of population and the elements of vital statistics. The methods of the United States census office will be presented in detail, and a critical analysis made of the results of the twelfth census. The statistical laboratory is furnished with nearly all the electrical and mechanical devices to facilitate statistical work which will be found in a modern census office. Two hours a week of laboratory work will be required, in the course of which students will gain some familiarity with present methods of statistical work.

The course in advanced statistics gives greater attention to statistical theory, and aims to introduce the students to writers like Galton and Pearson, whose work is of especial importance as laying the statistical basis for the theories of evolution.

D. POLITICAL ECONOMY AND POLITICS.

36. The modern régime. An analysis of the present industrial and social order as contrasted with that of the eighteenth century.

(*a*) The industrial reorganization, the centralization of wealth, the growth of corporations, the development of credit, speculation, etc.

(*b*) The effect of these changes on morality, intelligence, social and political ideals and institutions.

(*c*) Socialism and other plans for social reconstruction. Assistant Professor Powers.

37. Social interpretation of art. A study of the evolution of art, particularly painting and sculpture, with a special reference to the conditions, social, political, and economic, prevailing during the periods of exceptional art activity. Assistant Professor Powers.

40. Seminary. The evolution of society. A study of the principles of organic evolution as manifested in the formation of groups.

(*a*) Causes determining the formation of groups and the conditions affecting their efficiency and permanence, social organization, the nature and function of social classes, group selection, etc.

(*c*) Modifications effected in individual character as the result of life in a social state, social sensibilities, social instincts, the moral sense, conscience, etc. Assistant Professor Powers.

E. POLITICAL ECONOMY AND STATISTICS.

41. Elementary social economics. An introductory course upon the relation of evolutionary theories to the social sciences, with applications to the study of the family, race relations, immigration, etc. Professor Wilcox.

48. Elementary statistics. An introductory course in statistical methods, with practical work in investigation and tabulation. Special attention is given to census statistics and vital statistics. Two laboratory hours a week. Professor Wilcox.

49. Advanced statistics. Open to those who have taken the elementary statistics or can show that they are qualified to enter the class. Readings and discussion of various books in statistical theory and results. Professor Wilcox.

F. POLITICAL ECONOMY AND FINANCE.

55. Methods in modern philanthropy. To acquaint the student with the character and extent of charitable, correctional, and certain other social problems, and the methods employed in dealing with them. Not technical, but intended for the general enlightenment of the citizen. At least two days each semester will be spent in visiting institutions. Professor Fetter.

35. Municipal government in Europe and the United States. A study of the governmental, financial, and social problems presented by the modern city. Lectures, assigned readings, reports on selected cities. Mr. Brooks.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.

SUBJECT A — ECONOMICS.

Economics 12. Theories of social reform. Professor Clark. This course treats of certain plans for the partial reconstruction of industrial society that have been advocated in the United States, and endeavors to determine what reforms are in harmony with economic principles. It treats of the proposed single tax, of the measures advocated by the Farmers' Alliance and of those proposed by labor organizations, and the general relation of the state to industry.

SUBJECT B — SOCIOLOGY AND STATISTICS.

Sociology 15. Principles of sociology. Professor Giddings. This is a fundamental course, intended to lay a foundation for advanced work. In connection with a text-book study of theory, lectures are given on the sociological systems of Aristotle, Hegel, Comte, Spencer, Schäffle, De Greef, Gumplowicz, Ward, Tarde, and other writers. Students are required to analyze and classify sociological material of live interest obtained from newspapers, reviews, and official reports.

Sociology 16. Racial demography. Dr. Ripley. Two hours a week, second half-year. Being an analysis of population on the basis of geography and physical anthropology; comparing racial phenomena with those of a sociological character. It is primarily concerned with the anthropology and ethnology of the civilized peoples of Europe and America. It is intended to subserve three purposes, viz.: (1) as an introduction to advanced statistical and demographic research; (2) as an outline of the racial and cultural history of Europe during the prehistoric period; and (3) as an essay in social geography. With this, practical demonstration and laboratory work in graphic statistics will be combined: beginning with the technique of cross-hatching by hand and machine; the application of color-shading in both small scale and wall maps; the preparation and interpretation of curves, diagrams, and shaded maps of all kinds; and the description of processes of reproduction, by photo-engraving and lithography.

Sociology 17. Statistics and sociology. This course is intended to train students in the use of statistics as an instrument of investigation in social science. The topics covered are: relation of statistics to sociology, criteria of statistics, population, population and land, sex, age, and conjugal condition, births, marriages, deaths, sickness, and mortality, race and nationality, migration, social position, infirmities, suicide, vice, crime, nature of statistical regularities.

Sociology 18. Statistics and economics. This course covers those statistics of most use in political economy, but which have also a direct bearing on the problems

of sociology. These include the statistics of land, production of food, condition of labor, wages, money, credit, prices, commerce, manufactures, trade, imports and exports, national wealth, public debt, and relative incomes.

Sociology 19. Theory of statistics. This course studies the theory of statistics, averages, mean error, law of probabilities, rules for collecting, tabulating, and presenting statistics, graphical methods, the value of the results obtained by the statistical method, the possibility of discovering social laws.

Sociology 20. Social evolution. Professor Giddings. The advanced study of general sociology is begun in this course. It includes three parts, namely: (1) a brief preliminary account of the scientific position, scope, concepts, problems, methods, and empirical laws of sociology; (2) a study of origins and early history of society, with special attention to the early forms and later development of the family; to the origin, structure, and functions of the clan; to the organization of the tribe, and to the rise of tribal federation; (3) a study of the origin, establishment, and nature of civilization, with special attention to the influence of ethnic elements, to developments of social feeling and prevailing beliefs, to the policies by which civilization has been extended, and to the conditions that have produced arrested civilizations.

Sociology 21. Progress and democracy. Professor Giddings. The phenomena of progressive as distinguished from stationary civilizations are the subject of this course, which includes three parts, namely: (1) a study of the causes and nature of progress, with special attention to the rise of discussion, to the growth of public opinion, and to the policies by which continuing progress is assured; including measures for the expansion of intellectual freedom, for the repression of collective violence, and for the control of collective impulse by legality and deliberation; (2) a study of the genesis, the nature, and the social organization of modern democracies, and of the extent to which non-political associations, as business corporations, labor unions, churches, and associations for culture and pleasure, are more or less democratic, with special attention to the rise of an ethical consciousness and of philanthropic endeavor, and to the democratic ideals of equality and fraternity in their relations to social order and to liberty; (3) a study of the conditions and laws of social survival, with special attention to the influences of character, occupation, mental and social activity, that are shaping the destinies of the American people.

Sociology 22. Pauperism, poor-laws, and charities. Professor Giddings. This course begins with the study of the English poor-law, its history, practical working, and consequences. On this foundation is built a study of pauperism in general, but especially as it may now be observed in great cities. The laws of the different commonwealths in regard to paupers, out-relief, almshouses, and dependent children are compared. Finally the special modern methods of public and private philanthropy are considered, with particular attention to charity organization, the restriction of outdoor alms, and the reclamation of children.

Sociology 23. Crime and penology. Professor Giddings. The topics taken up in this course are the nature and definitions of crime, the increase of crime and its modern forms, criminal anthropology, the social causes of crime, surroundings, parental neglect, education, the question of responsibility, historical methods of punishment, the history of efforts to reform prison methods, modern methods, the solitary system, the Elmira system, classification of criminals, classes of prisons, reformatories, and jails.

Sociology 24. The civil aspects of ecclesiastical organizations. Dr. Bayles.

The purpose of this course is to define the present relations of the ecclesiastical institutes to the other institutes of American society; the state, the government, marriage, family, education, and public wealth. An analysis is made of the guarantees of religious liberty contained in the federal and commonwealth constitutions; of the civil status of churches in terms of constitutional and statute law; of the methods of incorporation; of the functions of trustees; of legislative and judicial control; of denominational polity according to its type; of the functional activity of churches in their departments of legislation, administration, adjudication, discipline, and mission; of the influence of churches on ethical standards; of the distribution of nationalities among the denominations; of the territorial distribution of denominational strength; of the relation of polity to density of population; and of the current movements in and between various organizations tending toward changes of function and structure.

Sociology 29. Laboratory work in statistics. In connection with Courses 17, 18, and 19. The object of the laboratory is to train the student in methods of statistical analysis and computation. Each student will pursue a course of laboratory practice dealing with the general statistics of population, the relation of classes, the distribution of wealth, and the statistics of crime, vice, and misfortune. He will be taught how to judge current statistics and to detect statistical fallacies; in short, to become an expert in judging of the value of sociological evidence. Each year some practical piece of work on an extensive scale is undertaken by the class.

Sociology 30. Seminar in sociology. Professor Giddings. Discussion and papers, theses, and dissertations presented in the seminar may be upon any of the following topics:

1. Population: The distribution, density, and growth of population in the United States; including studies of birth-rates and death-rates, of immigration into the United States, of the migration of population within the United States, and of the composition of the population by age, sex, nationality, and color.

2. The social mind: Studies of like response to stimulus, *e. g.*, to a call for volunteers, or an awakening to some common interest; studies of mental and practical resemblance, including types of mind and of character, and their geographical distribution; studies of the consciousness of kind; studies of conflict, imitation, and the progress of assimilation; and studies of concerted volition, including examples of spontaneous co-operation, of panics, crazes, mob violence, and insurrection; examples of deference to tradition and to authority; examples of the growth of public opinion, of the formation of social values, and of deliberate social action.

3. Social organization: Historical or statistical studies of family organization, and descriptive or historical studies of peculiar, exceptional, or otherwise noteworthy communities or sections, especially essays in the sociological treatment of local history. Studies of voluntary organization, including religious and other cultural associations, business associations and trades unions, juristic organizations and political parties.

4. Social welfare: Studies of the growth of public security and of social order; of the development of liberty and equality, of the formation and the distribution of social economic classes, and of the social life and organization of the self-supporting poor; of the distribution of culture; historical studies of the origin, growth, and forms of pauperism; statistical studies of the extent and causes of pauperism; historical and comparative studies of poor-laws and public relief; historical and comparative studies of the methods of private charity; historical studies of the origin, increase, and forms

of crime; statistical studies of the extent and causes of crime; critical studies of criminal anthropology or criminal sociology; historical and comparative studies of punishment and reformation.

STATISTICAL LABORATORY AND SEMINAR.

29. Two hours. Fortnightly, five members. The work of the year devoted to developing the mathematical theory of statistics with practical exercises.

SEMINAR IN SOCIOLOGY.

PROFESSOR GIDDINGS.

30. Two hours. Fortnightly, twelve members. The following papers were read and discussed: "Types of Mind and Character in Colonial Massachusetts;" "Types of Mind and Character in Colonial Connecticut;" "Types of Mind and Character in Colonial New York;" "Types of Mind and Character in Colonial Pennsylvania;" "Types of Mind and Character in Colonial Virginia;" "Types of Mind and Character in the Early Days of North Carolina;" "Types of Mind and Character in the Early Days of Kentucky;" "Types of Mind and Character in the Early Days of Indiana;" "Types of Mind and Character in the Early Days of Wisconsin;" "An Analysis of the Mental Characteristics of the Population of an East-Side New York City Block;" "A Statistical Study of the Responses to Lincoln's First Call for Volunteers;" "The Charities of the Five Presbyterian Churches in Harlem;" "The Poor-Laws of Connecticut;" "Parochial Settlements in England;" "A Critical and Statistical Study of Male and Female Birth-Rates."

WORK OF FELLOWS.

THOMAS JESSE JONES.

Mr. Jones worked under the direction of Professor Giddings upon his doctor's dissertation: "A Sociological Study of the Population of a New York City Block." Professor Giddings reports that this dissertation promises to be one of the most minute investigations of modern city life yet undertaken. Mr. Jones also made the annual revision of the list and description of social settlements in New York city which is regularly expected of a fellow in sociology.

MANHATTAN COLLEGE.

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SCIENCE.

Sociology. Psychology of social and historical aspects of social organization, ancient and modern. Study of concrete social problems.

HISTORY DEPARTMENT.

English social history. Organization of early English society, and subsequent changes in social development.

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE — DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.

Principles of sociology. Professor Johnson.

UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL — DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY.

PROFESSOR RUSSELL.

1. Introduction to sociology. An introduction to social science, with an elementary course in the origin of civilization and the early history of institutions, in prepa-

ration for the scientific study of political and social economics. Spencer's *Study of Sociology*, Sumner's *Social Classes*, Peschel's *Races of Man* as text-books.

2. Principles of sociology. In part a study of the Spencerian philosophy of evolution in the sociological aspects. A monograph on an appropriate theme required of each student.

Professor Johnson's course is with the sophomores, and is intended to give some conception of the meaning of social laws and progress, and of the scope and methods of modern relief and reform agencies.

Professor Russell encourages research and original investigation, particularly along the lines of housing of the poor, moral tenements, correctional and charitable plants and enterprises, lodging-houses, tramps, etc. Local strikes have been investigated, and something has been done, but not much, in this direction.

SCHOOL OF PEDAGOGY.

DR. MONTERER.

Sociology in relation to education. The aim of this course is to lead the student to view society as a vast and complex organism, to study in a general way its structure and functions, and to see the relation of education to the other great divisions of social activity. Some of the topics treated are: the need of a social science, especially from the teacher's point of view; preparation for such a science; the school as a social institution; the organic concept of society; in what sense is the school an organism? the family as the primary social group, its history, functions, and pathology; social aggregates; structural significance of the public-school system; the school as a social communicating apparatus; its relation to the other communicating channels, as the press, public platform, and social psychology; social reform; care of the dependent, delinquent, and abnormal classes, with special reference to the treatment of children.

Throughout the course the observation of the student's own social environment is stimulated, and history, as well as current events, is largely drawn upon for illustrations, with a view of giving the student a clear and concrete grasp of the fundamental principles of the science. Dewey's *Pedagogical Creed*, which gives an excellent statement of the nature of education and the school, viewed from the social side, is read and discussed. Spencer's *Study of Sociology* and Small and Vincent are also used.

Social Psychology, Professor MacDougall.

UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER.

2. Special topics in economics.
5. Capital and labor.
10. Economic functions of the state.

"The sociological point of view is largely adopted in connection with the historical studies, especially in connection with the study of the Roman law in its genesis and growth."

UNION UNIVERSITY.

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY.

The mutual relations of men in society examined historically to learn how present conditions have resulted from past experience. Present social forces and needs considered with the purpose of training the student for good citizenship. Lectures, collateral reading, and practical sociological investigation.

SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY.

SOCIOLOGY.

PROFESSOR HAMILTON.

The following courses in sociology are designed to introduce the student to both the theoretical and applied phases of the subject. They are open to juniors, seniors, and graduate students.

I. 3. Practical sociology. The more important of familiar social questions — as immigration, the integrity of the family, relations between labor and capital, and devices for the encouragement of provident habits — are examined in the lectures, and collateral reading is required.

II. 3. Degenerate social classes. Problems of pauperism and crime are studied. The lectures are supplemented by collateral reading and visits to institutions.

III. Introduction to social theory. Lectures and elementary reading.

IV. 3. Literature of sociology. Critical reviews of publications by the best-known writers. Students who desire to do so may elect this course for two semesters, *i. e.*, in both the junior and senior years.

V. 3. Research. Students who have had sufficient preparation may have research work with the instructor. Among the subjects investigated in recent years are: the consumption of liquors in the United States, and the charitable institutions of the city of Syracuse. The work for the next year will be announced at the beginning of the first semester.

POLITICAL ECONOMY.

MR. HAWKINS.

V. 2. Socialism and social reform. This course presents the various schemes for reforming modern society, and attempts to examine each one in the light of economic and political science. The topics discussed are: the origin and development of property; wealth distribution under slavery, serfdom, wagedom; the modern theory of wealth distribution; inequality in wealth; the social problem and the different solutions; socialism, its leaders, history, and economic statement; criticism; how to solve the social problem.

PEDAGOGY.

PROFESSOR STREET.

IV. 1. Social phases of education. A study will be made of the relations that exist between the school and the community and the state. During a portion of the time Dutton's *Social Phases of Education in the School and the Home*, Vincent's *Social Mind and Education*, and Dewey's *School and Society* will be read.

NORTH CAROLINA—

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA.

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE.

PROFESSOR BATTLE.

1. History and principles of political economy and sociology. Text-books and lectures. Theses on assigned topics.

2. Current questions. Seminary methods in the study of economic and social questions.

DAVIDSON COLLEGE.

"Much work is done in sociology in the department of biblical instruction, which is a three-years' course in the English Bible, with three recitations a week. Much work is also done in the course of economics."

TRINITY COLLEGE.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE.

PROFESSOR DOWD.

1*b*. Giddings's *Principles of Sociology*.

2*a*. Lectures on practical sociological problems, such as charity, the saloon, sanitation, tenement houses, child labor, etc.

2*b*. Same continued, covering such subjects as crime, social influences of art, civilization of present and past contrasted, etc.

4. *History of Political Economy*, Blanqui; *Tariff History of United States*, Taussig; *History of Currency*, Shaw; *Socialism*, Ely; *Social Statics*, Spencer; *Taxation*, Seligman. Original papers required on topics assigned.

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY.

PROFESSOR BASSETT.

9. Social development in America. This course will begin with the colonies and come down to the present-day conditions. It will be the purpose to consider with some detail the chief forces which have entered into the development of American society. The colonies will be studied separately, and then the process by which they were knit into one nation will be followed out. Special attention will be given to the conditions of southern life.

GUILFORD COLLEGE.

"We are doing nothing in sociology except such reference to it as grows out of political science, psychology, and ethics, and an occasional lecture on the subject."

NORTH DAKOTA— FARGO COLLEGE.

POLITICAL SCIENCE.

E. Sociology. Principles of social evolution. A study of the development of the various forms of human association, with some attention to such practical problems as pauperism, crime, the slums, and divorce. Professor Knowlton.

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH DAKOTA.

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE.

PRESIDENT MERRIFIELD, PROFESSOR PETERSON.

Sociology. A scientific and historical study of social forces and phenomena, with analytic treatment of institutions and origin and progress of civilization. Giddings's *Elements of Sociology*.

Social problems. A critical study of American social conditions, with special reference to existing dangers and evils, as pauperism, crime, immigration, the concentration of urban population, etc. Wright's *Practical Sociology*, and Henderson's *Dependent, Defective and Delinquent Classes*.

OHIO— BUCHTEL COLLEGE.

POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIOLOGY.

PROFESSOR ORTH.

(*b*) Sociology. An elementary course designed to introduce the student to the elementary principles of human association and to develop the power of observing and analyzing social facts. Fairbanks's *Introduction to Sociology* is read; essays and library work.

OHIO UNIVERSITY.

HISTORY, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICAL SCIENCE.

History is regarded as a record of the social, economic, moral, and political life of the people.

Immigration and its effect upon the country. Professor Higley.

PHILOSOPHY AND PEDAGOGY.

2. Ethics. Sociology or social psychology. This work is intended to supplement the individualistic point of view assumed in Ethics 1. Professor Doan.

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI.

SOCIOLOGY.

Assistant Professor Hubbard.

1*a*. The dependent and defective classes. The causes of poverty; the English poor-law; public relief of destitution in American cities; alms-houses; homes for the aged; old-age pensions; the care of dependent children; modern organized charity; the blind; the deaf; the insane; the feeble-minded; the epileptic. Text, Warner's *American Charities.*

2*b*. Criminology. Criminal anthropology; punishment and reformation; prison systems; Elmira Reformatory; convict labor; juvenile courts; care of discharged prisoners. Text, Wines's *Punishment and Reformation.*

3*c*. Remedial measures. Social settlements; tenement-house improvement; rapid transit; parks and playgrounds; vacation schools; substitutes for the saloon; the immigration problem; organized labor; factory legislation; the eight-hour day; the negro problem; treatment of tuberculosis; the protection of the family; marriage and divorce; the church and the social problem; and other topics.

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY.

Ethics includes, *int. al.:* ethics and socialism; ethical doctrine in its bearing on the conception of society, in the several divisions of home government, and religious observance.

There is also a university settlement.

WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY.

ADELBERT COLLEGE. PHILOSOPHY.

Professor Curtis.

7. Graduate courses. Sociology in the light of anthropology. The main problems and bearings of anthropology will be discussed in systematic order and their sociological import noted in such works as those of Morgan, Brinton, Quatrefages, Taylor, Pritchard, Darwin, Wallace, Ranke, and Ratzel. Then a course of lectures will outline a more systematic treatment of sociology based upon anthropology, after which certain aspects of the works of Comte, Buckle, Spencer, Schäffle, Lilienfeld, Stein, Ward, and Giddings will be discussed.

HISTORY, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE.

Associate Professor Walker.

17. Statistics. Theory and method. General survey of the field of economic and sociological statistics, with a study of important statistical documents.

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY.

ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY.

The university, through the efforts and generosity of its friends, is possessed of a unique equipment for study purposes in these lines. This equipment comprises a large collection of railroad, municipal, and school bonds; of stocks of all kinds; of letters of credit, drafts, foreign bills of exchange, bills of lading, checks, inclosures, statements, insurance policies, trust certificates, notes, mortgages, and all the necessary forms of business paper; also collections of coins illustrative of various periods in our monetary history, foreign coins, and scrip; also sets of maps and charts, and a Kiepert-Commercial globe 80 cm. in diameter. Ample facilities for statistical work are provided, and a seminary room set apart for the use of laboratory material, documents, etc., is always open to advanced students. It is the policy of the department to make the statistical investigations and research work of advanced students contributory to the permanent equipment of the department, thus enriching the facilities from year to year with material of scientific and pedagogical value.

DEPARTMENT OF DOMESTIC ECONOMY.

PROFESSOR STONER, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR SOUTHER.

5. Lectures on the industrial and artistic evolution of society. History of the early races considered with special reference to the development in culture gained through handwork. Practice work: Preparations of a series of models comprising the different stitches used in plain hand-sewing; ornamental stitches and simple embroidery. One lecture and three practice periods each week.

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY.

PROFESSOR CLARK, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR HAGERTY.

SOCIOLOGY GROUP.

2. The history of industrial society. A general view of the evolution of industrial society; involving a study of the manorial and guild systems; of the rise of class interest; the formation of trading companies; land-holding; the development of capitalistic enterprise and the economic legislation and theories that grew out of these conditions, with special reference to England. Lectures and assigned readings.

3. Industrial and financial history of the United States. A complete survey of American industries, financial resources, and policies.

4. Transportation. A study of the development and present economic status of roads, canals, and railroads in their relation to industry and to the state.

5. Practical problems: immigration, money, land.

6. Practical problems: railroads, tariff, crises.

7. Practical problems: of labor and capital.

11. Sociology. Text-books, lectures, and original investigations. Through the kindness of the various officers of the Godman Guild-House, opportunity will be provided students in this course of doing practical work at the guild. The course, as to time and subject-matter, will be arranged to suit those in the city who may wish scientific training along the lines of charity and philanthropic work, and the state board of charities as well as the officers of the Associated Charities of the city are enlisted in the work of this course. First term: Giddings's *Elements of Sociology*. Second term: Henderson's *Dependent, Defective and Delinquent Classes*.

12. The history and theory of socialism. A complete study of the subject in its historical, economic, and critical aspects. The socio-economic doctrines of the philosophers, the utopias of Plato, More, Campanella, Cabet, etc., and the theses of the various German, French, and English schools of socialists, will be treated. The origin of private property, the right to labor, rights of industrial classes, and the fundamental principles of industrial society will be analyzed. Syllabus, lectures, and collateral readings.

13. Sociology and statistics. Lectures and laboratory work.

16. Thesis work. In this work, as far as possible, only original sources are used, and investigations made from real life. The aim is to set before each student the accomplishment of the task of extending in some degree, however slight, the boundaries of economic and sociological knowledge. Meetings are arranged with the instructor throughout the year.

21. Growth and development of social thought and institutions. Assistant Professor Hagerty.

GRADUATE COURSE.

17. Advanced economics. The aim of this course is to offer the student an opportunity to specialize to any degree he may desire along the various lines within the field of the department. Elections will naturally fall under one of the following heads: (*a*) Theoretical problems. (*b*) Historical problems. (*c*) Practical problems. (*d*) Finance. (*e*) Commerce. (*f*) Sociology (theoretical or practical). (*g*) Statistics (*h*) Teacher's course and training for fellowship.

When several students elect the same line of work, they may constitute themselves a group, and a seminary will be organized as a nucleus for such work. A seminary in sociology (17*f*) was announced for the year 1901–2.

22. Primitive society. Assistant Professor Hagerty.

OHIO WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY.

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY.

D. Sociology. An introductory course to the study of sociology. The various schools will be presented in lectures. Both theory and practice will receive due attention. Professor Stevenson.

HIRAM COLLEGE.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE.

"In course we require only one term in sociology. However, other studies, as industrial history of England, are made to bear much on social study, and text-book work is supplemented by lectures." Professor E. B. Wakefield.

In sociology and political science the problems of the day in municipal government and the various reform movements are studied in the light of historical illustrations and the social phenomena of the past. Lectures are given on the pathology of society, communistic ideals, and other topics.

MARIETTA COLLEGE.

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY.

Introduction to sociology. A study of the principles and methods of the science, with consideration of some of the practical problems of social reform. Small and Vincent, supplemented by readings, reports, and essays. President Perry.

OBERLIN COLLEGE.

I. Sociology. Two hours. Associate Professor Bogart. A study of the elementary principles of human association and the development of the different forms of association. The purpose of the course is to develop in the mind of the student the power to observe and analyze social facts, and to enable him to trace these facts to the elementary social motives and forces, laws, and causes. Different writers are studied each year; last year Fairbanks's *Introduction to Sociology* was used, and in 1901–2 Spencer's *Principles of Sociology* was read. A comparative study is also made of other works.

II. Socialism and social reform. A study of the fundamental characteristics of industrial society, and an examination of the proposed plans of social reconstruction: (1) those that propose a reconstruction of society on a fundamentally different basis from the present; (2) those which are merely palliative in their aims and tendencies; (3) those which propose the progressive improvement and rehabilitation of society without destroying its present foundations. Morely's *Ideal Commonwealths* and Ely's *French and English Socialism* will be used as texts, supplemented by lectures.

12. Practical sociology; charities. A study of the problems of pauperism and its relief; causes of poverty, methods of treatment, charitable institutions and agencies. Visits will be made by the class to institutions in the neighborhood of Oberlin. Warner's *American Charities* will be used as a text, supplemented by lectures and papers.

Practical sociology; criminology. A study of the problems of crime, punishment, reformation, and criminal anthropology. Wines's *Punishment and Reformation* is used as a text. Lectures and papers.

OTTERBEIN UNIVERSITY.

ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE.

5. Sociology. Some attention will be given to the historical development of society. The greater part of the term will be given to the consideration of social conditions and problems. Small and Vincent's *Introduction*. Professor Snavely.

WITTENBERG COLLEGE.

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY.

PROFESSOR PRINCE.

5. Sociology and socialism.

UNIVERSITY OF WOOSTER.

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY, MORALS, AND SOCIOLOGY.

I. Sociology. Special attention will be paid to the history and principles of socialism, to various questions of reform and administration, and to the amelioration of social conditions. Text-books, varied according to the growing literature of the subject, will be used. Text-book work will be varied by lectures. Professor Scovel.

ANTIOCH COLLEGE.

PHILOSOPHICAL DEPARTMENT.

Sociology. The numerous social questions that are now claiming attention make this study one of great importance.

OREGON— ALBANY COLLEGE.

Professor Charles J. Bushnell gives courses on social economics and sociology.

UNIVERSITY OF OREGON.

ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY.

PROFESSOR YOUNG, MR. WHITTLESEY.

Group V. Society is confronted with great problems that challenge a reconstruction of the social organization and a revision of the fundamental conclusions in all the social sciences. These problems are appropriately made the subject of university investigation.

1. General introductory course. The theory of evolution in its applications to society; the process in connection with the new elements in the human sphere; the genesis of social life, mind, and institutions constitutes the scope of this course. Lectures and readings.

The general introductory course gives the student the point of view of modern thought in the economic, political, and social sciences, and outlines the general course of progress in each line of social achievement through the lower stages of civilization.

2. Modern industrial organization. The tendency toward corporate organizations of industry and centralization, with resulting modifications of the conditions of competition.

1. Economic problems. Labor and capital, profit-sharing, corporations, socialism

1. Elements of society. Society is an organization analyzed for a determination of its characteristics. Text-book and collateral reading.

1. Principles of sociology and theory of social forces. As conceived of by leading modern sociologists.

2. Anthropology. An introduction to the methods and conclusions of anthropology and ethnology in their relations to the social sciences.

3. The social debtor classes. Studies of questions connected with charities penology, and criminology.

4. Democracy. Its characteristics and tendencies.

PACIFIC UNIVERSITY.

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE.

Sociology. Introduction and study of some leading problems, such as charities penal institutions, etc. Giddings, Small and Vincent, Spencer, and others.

McMINNVILLE COLLEGE.

"Introduced sociology into courses three years ago. Elective in senior year of college courses, two credits. Use C. R. Henderson's *Social Elements* as a class guide and outline of the work. Work limited in amount, but of great interest and value Class of five this year. Subject grows in interest and popularity. Teach it in connection with political economy and ethics. Cover the ground covered by Professor Henderson's book."

WILLAMETTE UNIVERSITY.

SOCIAL SCIENCE, ECONOMICS.

Course 125. Second semester. Sociology, a study of the general principles of sociology. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*.

GRADUATE COURSES FOR THE DEGREES OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY AND MASTER OF ARTS.

Group I: Tylor, *Anthropology;* Quatrefages, *The Human Species;* Le Fèvre, *Race and Language;* Lubbock, *Origin of Civilization;* Starcke, *The Primitive*

Family; Westermarck, *History of Human Marriage;* Lubbock, *Prehistoric Times;* Fontaine, *Ethnology;* Peschel, *Races of Man and Geographical Distribution;* Demker, *Races of Man.*

Group II: Cox, *Mythology of the Aryan Nations;* Tylor, *Early History of Mankind;* Maine, *Village Communities;* Laveleye, *Primitive Property;* Giddings, *Principles of Sociology;* Spencer, *Principles of Sociology;* Mayo-Smith, *Statistics and Sociology;* Wright, *Practical Sociology;* Ward, *Dynamic Sociology.*

PENNSYLVANIA— DICKINSON COLLEGE.

SOCIOLOGY AND ECONOMICS.

Sociology. One hour a week in sociology is elective throughout the senior year. The subject is taught in its broadest and most practical aspects. The text-book is essentially the text upon which the body of the work is based. Monthly lectures upon the most important factors of the subject are given by the head of the department, and these are open to the public as well as to the class. Concrete problems in social science are assigned to members of the class for investigation, development, and report. Professor Pilcher.

HAVERFORD COLLEGE.

POLITICAL SCIENCE.

Economic problems. The labor problem, socialism, and monopolies. A study is made of the factory system, labor organizations, labor legislation, courts of arbitration, etc. The history of socialism, and the aims and methods of socialistic organizations are investigated. The growth of industrial combinations, affecting labor, capital public control and management, is considered. Professor Barrett.

10*b*. Ethics. This course considers current questions in practical ethics and sociology, such as politics, temperance, war, charity, and prison administration, the labor question, etc., on their moral side. President Sharpless.

FRANKLIN AND MARSHALL COLLEGE.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE.

General sociology. An elementary course dealing with the structure and function of contemporary society and the conditions and forms of social progress. Designed also to acquaint the student with existing social problems. Giddings's *Elements;* lectures and collateral reading. Professor Hiester.

(See also Theological Seminary of the Reformed Church.)

BUCKNELL UNIVERSITY.

DEPARTMENT OF LOGIC AND SOCIOLOGY.

PROFESSOR WILLIAM EMMETT MARTIN.

7. Sociology, principles and theory.
8. Charities and reform.
9. Criminology and penology.
10. Sociology. A course of lectures on sociology from the Christian point of view is given each year by Lemuel Moss, LL.D., to the whole college.

ALLEGHENY COLLEGE.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE.

In social science the main attention is given to the study of the development

of economic life and institutions, American conditions being specifically analyzed. Students are encouraged to individual research.

Sociology. This is a continuation of economics. The text-book work is based on Giddings's *Elements of Sociology*. Lectures and investigations of various social problems. This course will be alternated with one on socialistic theories. Professor Smith.

ALBRIGHT COLLEGE.

Sociology.

CENTRAL PENNSYLVANIA COLLEGE.

"In sociology we use a text-book, following with it immediately after political economy, and taught by the professor of economics. Sociological matters are also largely taken up by him with the history of civilization. So, also, with the study of general ethics."

CENTRAL HIGH SCHOOL, PHILADELPHIA.

"In this school I teach sociology to the senior class, numbering this year about 140. It gets four months of lectures on social ethics. Then come four months of social economics, based on my *Political Economy for High Schools.*

"To the senior class of our department of pedagogy I give four months of historic sociology and four months of ethical sociology, the latter devoted especially to current ethical problems. Both by lectures." President R. E. Thompson.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.

SPECIAL COURSE IN SOCIAL WORK.

3. Social history of England. A study of the organization of society in early England, and of the subsequent economic changes and social development. Lectures and required readings.

7. Development of English civilization. A study of the social progress of England during the last three centuries. The facts in regard to each great industrial epoch are presented, and their influence on national life, thought, and activity considered. Special attention is given to those phases of English development which throw light upon the trend of American civilization.

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR LINDSAY.

20. Sociology. I. Study of ancient and modern social ideals, and of the projected types of an ideal society. Social elements and history of sociological theories; modern theories concerning social organization. Plato's *Republic*, Aristotle's *Politics* and *Ideal Commonwealths* constitute part of the required reading of the course. II. Study and analysis of historical and existing societies. Special reference to the general stages of social evolution, to the factors in social psychology, to the requisites of social survival, social efficiency, and social control. Lectures follow *Manual* and *Outlines*. Assigned readings.

23. Charities and correction. A study of social failures, and of the efforts to restore social debtor classes and individuals to social efficiency. The causes of poverty; the problems of pauperism; the development and administration of charities; penology; public and private agencies in dealing with pauperism and crime.

24. Social reform in the nineteenth century. A study of the writings of four groups of social reformers: (*a*) the utopists: Saint-Simon, Fourier, Owen, Bellamy, Hertzka; (*b*) the moral and ethical group: Kingsley, Maurice, Carlyle, Ruskin,

William Morris, and Henry George; (*c*) the proletarian socialistic group: Blanc, Proudhon, Lassalle, Schultz-Delitsch, Marx, Engels, Bebel, and Liebknecht; (*d*) the governmental meliorists: Shaftesbury, Nicholls, the Fabians, and others.

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR ROWE AND MR. SCOTT.

12. Local and municipal institutions. A comparative study of city government in Europe and the United States. The course is divided into two parts. Part I: The problems of city life in ancient and mediæval times. Rise of the modern city; changes in political and social conditions accompanying its growth. Part II, Municipal government in the United States as compared with England, France, and Germany. Required readings in Shaw's *Municipal Government in Great Britain*, Goodnow's *Municipal Problems and Municipal Home Rule.*

9. Modern legislative problems. Relation of the individual to the state, in Europe and the United States. Limitations on legislative action. Contrast between American and European ideas concerning the functions and powers of government. The development of individual liberty in modern times, as illustrated in our political system by the rights of citizenship, state and federal.

10. Government and state activity. Comparative study of the nature and extent of powers or government. Relation of the state to industrial actions. Resulting relation between the individual and the state. Citizenship in the United States as compared with England, Germany, and France. Protection to civil and political rights. The individualistic and socialistic movements of the present century.

TEMPLE COLLEGE.

EVENING CLASSES.

Sociology. A study of the organization of society, and of the character of social forces based on Giddings's *Elements of Sociology*, followed by field work in particular localities of the city.

SUSQUEHANNA UNIVERSITY.

SOCIOLOGY.

PRESIDENT HEISLER.

Wright's *Practical Sociology* is used as a text-book, two hours a week, in the second term of senior year. This is supplemented by lectures and collateral reading, Each student is required to prepare a thesis on some practical sociological topic, which is counted as part of the class-room work. The purpose is to acquaint students with the great factors entering into our social life, and to develop in them, as intelligent citizens, a profound and patriotic interest in social and economic problems of today.

THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE COLLEGE.

ETHICS.

Conduct, the laws of duty, moral obligation, and ethical judgments are treated as the activities and normal processes of the social self.

"The Pennsylvania State College does not maintain a department of sociology, nor has it yet been possible to introduce that study distinctively even as a separate branch.

"All students, however, are required during the sophomore year to take an outline course in general history; and during the senior year the entire class is required to take political economy, constitutional law, and international law, as one strand or course throughout the year. The instruction in these subjects has always tended to

emphasize their sociological rather than their strictly technical side, and thus a good deal of interest is kept alive in current as well as permanent sociological questions."

SWARTHMORE COLLEGE.

HISTORY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY.

PROFESSOR WILLIAM I. HULL AND DR. GUSTAV A. KLEENE.

Course 1. Elements of economics. Industrial problems of today, including labor organization; strikes and arbitration; co-operation and profit-sharing; industrial betterment; laborers' insurance; immigration; the unemployed; the eight-hour day; women and children in industry; monopolies and trusts.

Course 3. Socialism; its history and claims. Industrial reformers of the nineteenth century. Municipal problems. One hundred and forty-four hours.

Course 4. Elements of sociology. Social problems of today, including crime and punishment; the insane and feeble-minded; pauperism and charity; tenement houses; womanhood and the family; the children of the poor; social settlements; intemperance and methods of temperance reform; the Salvation Army's social work; the negro; the Indian. In connection with the work in social science visits are made to neighboring charitable and correctional institutions.

RHODE ISLAND—

COLLEGE OF ST. THOMAS OF VILLANOVA.

PHILOSOPHY.

5. Sociology. Definition and origin of the social questions; the elements of natural justice and morality in the acquisition of property; socialism defined; different schools of socialism; social democracy in Germany; critical examination of the origin of socialism; social order from a Christian standpoint; the labor question and other questions of the day.

BROWN UNIVERSITY.

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE.

PROFESSORS WILSON AND DEALEY, AND DR. WILLETT.

12. Elementary course.

1. The principles of sociology. Nature of society, social forces, and environment.

2, 3. Social problems and conditions. Relating to charity, criminology, etc.

4. Social philosophy. Aims and ideals in social life, social well-being.

5. Development of social theory. Tracing important theories, ancient and modern, in regard to social conditions and development.

7, 8, 9. Current social theory and practice. Throughout the year. Elective for graduates. Practical sociological investigations.

10. Social institutions. Their development, forms, and importance. The family, church, state, etc.

11. Demography. Dispersion of races. A social study of race characteristics.

13. Socialism. Ancient and modern, with especial attention to present phases of the theory.

14. Social statistics. Method of gathering and handling data in the study of social problems and conditions.

SOUTH CAROLINA— COLLEGE OF CHARLESTON.

1. General sociology. The organic character and physical basis of society; the social mind; the courses and modes of social activity; processes of social development, etc. Fairbanks's *Introduction to Sociology*, or Small and Vincent's *Introduction to the Study of Society*.

NEWBERRY COLLEGE.

Introduction to sociology (Fairbanks). Two hours a week, three months, in department of political science — about same work as we require in political economy.

SOUTH DAKOTA— UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH DAKOTA.

SOCIOLOGY.

PROFESSOR YOUNG.

I. Theory of sociology. A study of the principles of social organization, history of social theory, elements and structure of society, historical evolution of society, function of the state, together with a consideration of some of the more important social problems of the present, as the labor question, co-operation, charity organizations, the liquor problem, etc.

II. Criminal sociology. A study of the psychology of criminality, with a psychological definition and analysis of criminal types. The data of criminal anthropology are reviewed, with an analysis of criminal statistics from which deductions are made relative to crime, its punishment, and its remedies. Practical reforms in the treatment of criminals are discussed, and recent experiments and modern theories examined. Critiques and reports upon library work are a feature.

III. Charities and corrections. A study of the defective and dependent classes, and the problems of social organization for their care and relief. The causes of pauperism are discussed, together with an attempt to discriminate between proper and improper methods of relief. The various forms of charity organizations and their methods are reviewed. The history and theory of public philanthropy investigated by extensive library work. Observation and study of local institutions so far as time and opportunity permit.

YANKTON COLLEGE.

DEPARTMENT ECONOMICS, POLITICAL SCIENCE, AND HISTORY.

Elements of sociology. An introduction to the scientific study of society, designed to furnish a basis for the intelligent investigation of social problems, especially on the part of those who propose to enter the ministry or the work of organized charities. Small and Vincent; Crafts; and Bascom, *Social Theory*.

TENNESSEE— UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE.

ECONOMICS.

PRESIDENT CHARLES W. DABNEY.

5. Problems of economics, including questions arising out of the relations of capital and labor, industrial arbitration, and conciliation, profit-sharing, and co-operation.

9. Principles of sociology. The social theory, methods, and problems of sociology; the structure of society; the evolution of society; civilization; progress; democracy; the social teachings of Christ; the nature and end of society.

ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY.

DEPARTMENT OF CIVICS, SOCIOLOGY, AND ECONOMICS.

REV. PETER BUELL GUERNSEY.

Sociology. Presenting a general outline of the subject, with special study of the social condition of the negro race in city and country.

CUMBERLAND UNIVERSITY.

PHILOSOPHY.

6. Sociology. An introductory course in the subject. Professor Weir.

VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY.

HISTORY AND ECONOMICS.

PROFESSOR MOORE AND MR. DYER.

II. (*a*) An introduction to sociology. The object of this course is to give the student a synthetic view of social phenomena, and to acquaint him with the current theories of social interpretation. Text-books: Small and Vincent's *Introduction to the Study of Society;* Wright's *Practical Sociology.*

(*b*) Democracy in the United States. Text-books: Hyslop's *Democracy;* Godkin's *Unforeseen Tendencies.* Second term.

Two courses in economics were conducted during the year 1900–01, which together counted for one three-hour course.

1. More than half the time of the class was devoted to a group of problems which may be conveniently indicated by the titles of the text-books used: Goodnow's *Municipal Problems*, Shaw's *Municipal Problems in Great Britain*, and Bemis's *Municipal Monopolies.* The work consisted of lectures, the study of the texts, and the investigation of one or more questions by each student under the direction of the instructor. Where possible, local questions were selected.

SOCIOLOGY.

Introduction to the study of sociology.
Half course in Christian sociology.
See also under Theological Schools.

UNIVERSITY OF THE SOUTH.

SCHOOL OF HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE.

1. Principles of sociology. Ward's *Sociology.* Dr. Ramage.
(See also under Theological Schools.)

TEXAS— BAYLOR UNIVERSITY.

ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE.

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR ROBERT HOUSTON HAMILTON.

E. Social science. An introductory study of society, the origin of civilization, and the growth of social institutions. Map-drawing, illustrating social growth, required. Small and Vincent.

In the various courses offered in the department of history the use of the sociological point of view is very pronounced.

UTAH— UNIVERSITY OF UTAH.

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY.

PROFESSOR CORAY.

Economics 5. Industrial problems. Study of the social questions pertaining to modern industry, including socialism, trades unions, machine labor, woman and child labor, corporations, trusts, pools, subsidies, private monopolies, public utilities, land tenure, speculations, stock and produce gambling, etc.

Sociology 1. Principles of social science. Study of prehistoric, uncivilized, ancient, and mediæval societies, with special reference to the moral and intellectual progress of the race, and the development of social law as now comprehended and enjoyed by the higher types of civilization. One thesis required.

Sociology 2. Modern society. Study of modern social life. One thesis required.

VERMONT— UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT.

SOCIOLOGY.

PROFESSOR EMERSON.

1. Social theories. Examination of various social schemes. Plato's *Republic*, Cicero's *De Republica*, Augustine's *Civitas Dei*, More's *Utopia*. Modern theories: Comte, Spencer, Kidd, Gumplowicz, Fouille, Giddings; collectivism, communism, socialism.

2. Industrial era. A study of modern society under the phase of industrialism. Industrial revolutions, inventions, factory, transportation, trade, the modern city; reaction upon state, culture, religion; consequent reconstruction of society.

3. Social institutions. A historical investigation of their origin and development; primitive and ancient society; family, slavery, property, marriage, civil government, law, rights, classes, religion, philosophy, agriculture, industry, commerce. Lectures, with extensive collateral reading, research, and theses.

VIRGINIA— HAMPTON INSTITUTE.

RICHARD M. ILYAINE.

Sociology. The second half of the year is spent in the study of the general principles of society and economy upon which our American civilization depends, with especial reference to such principles as condition survival and progress in the negro and Indian races. Fairchild's *Rural Wealth and Welfare*, Giddings's *Elements*, DuBois's *The Philadelphia Negro*, and Washington's *Future of the American Negro* constitute the principal reading of the course.

WASHINGTON AND LEE UNIVERSITY.

ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE.

Advanced course. (*a*) Elements of sociology. An outline of the theory of society as most recently advanced.

(*b*) Limit of state activity. A study of the relation of the state to the organization of society and industry.

WASHINGTON— UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON.

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE.

PROFESSOR SMITH.

The work in this department emphasizes the duties and reponsibilities of citizenship. Its object is to inculcate worthy social ideals and lay the basis for sound and independent thinking on political and economic questions.

IV, V, VI. Industrial problems. Competition; labor; monopolies and trusts; socialism; taxation. Lectures.

VII. Elements of sociology. Lectures.

The work in this department is mainly economic, though an effort is made to present it from a sociological point of view.

Pedagogy. Social pedagogy. Professor Yoder.

WEST VIRGINIA— UNIVERSITY OF WEST VIRGINIA.

SOCIOLOGY.

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR CLARK.

Students taking sociology as their major are required to have nine courses and a thesis in this subject. Their minor of six courses may be taken in economics or political science or history or philosophy.

1. Anthropology. An elementary course on man as the unit of society, and on the evolution of society and social institutions. The general purpose of the course is to point out how man has developed into his present social state, what the influences were which caused this development, and how these influences themselves have evolved. The general subjects discussed are: first, the antiquity of man, and the place man occupies in nature; second, the origin and early development of institutions which have made man what he is, and upon which contemporary society is based, such as language and writing, the arts of life and of pleasure, religion and science, mythology and history, the family and social structure. Tylor's *Anthropology*, supplemented by lectures and assigned readings.

2. Elements of sociology. A course on the structure and functions of contemporary society. Existing society is studied as an objective reality, the student's own world being his laboratory. The course begins with a series of elementary lectures on the methods of scientific social study; the relation of the individual to society; the social organism; the physical and psychical bases of society; the social forces; the field of sociology and its relation to social reform. Meanwhile the individual members of the class have been assigned certain social institutions for personal observation and study, upon which they report fully in the class. The purpose is to bring out prominently the leading features in the associated life of human beings as it actually exists. Lectures, assigned readings, and reports.

3. A historical survey of sociological thought. This course traces the gradual development of sociological thought from antiquity through the Hebrew, Greek, Roman, and mediæval writers down to our own times, the larger part of the course being devoted to the teachings of the most important modern sociologists. Lectures and assigned readings.

4. Contemporary charities. The causes and conditions of poverty, methods of relief, historical and contemporary; special classes, children, the aged, unemployed, defective; charity organization. Lectures, research work.

5. The treatment of delinquents. Causes of crime, criminal anthropology, history of methods of treatment, preventive measures, juvenile delinquents, legal factors. Lectures and assigned topics.

6. Social movements of the nineteenth century. A study of organized efforts for social betterment, their principles and results. This includes the investigation of movements affecting every phase of social life, hygienic, economic, artistic, educational, religious. Lectures, readings, and the development of assigned topics.

7. The family. The historical development of the family; its significance as a social institution; its organization; pathological conditions and suggested remedies for these. Inductive studies, lectures, and library work.

ECONOMICS.

6. Practical economic problems. A study of proposed schemes of social reform and methods of social improvement. Trades unions, building and loan associations, insurance associations, profit-sharing and co-operation. Relation of the state and municipalities to monopolies. History of the socialistic movement and a discussion of the principles of socialism. The economic influence of education and Christianity.

8. Methods of social reform. A study of the fundamental characteristics of industrial society and an examination of the proposed plans of social regeneration: (1) Those which propose the reconstruction of society on a fundamentally different basis from the present. (2) Those which are merely palliative in their aims and tendencies. (3) Those which propose the progressive improvement and perfection of society without destroying its present foundations. Lectures and library work.

9. Economic legislation. In this course each student is expected to study one concrete problem thoroughly, and to present to the class a bill drawn up as if for legislative enactment. Upon presentation, each bill is to be criticised, and the framer is to defend it against all comers. After thorough criticism and discussion a vote of the class is taken. Among the subjects so treated will be trusts, railway pooling, banking, the standard of value, employer's liability, factory inspection, tramps, strikes, etc.

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY.

4. Ethics. A review of the mental processes that control conduct; fundamentals of morality, the moral faculty, ground of obligation, moral standard, moral law, moral sanction; moral culture; practical morality, personal and social duties. Recitations and notes by the instructoi.

5. Applied ethics. A study of the relation of ethics to religion, politics, economics, and individual and social culture. Lectures, recitations, and collateral reading.

WISCONSIN — LAWRENCE UNIVERSITY.

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE.

PROFESSOR FREEMAN A. HAVIGHORST.

6. Municipal problems.

9. Sociology. This course treats of the fundamental principles of social organization and the laws of progress. Giddings's *Elements of Sociology* is used as text.

10. Applied sociology. Seminar in sociology or politics.

BELOIT COLLEGE.

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE.

PROFESSOR CHAPIN.

c. Sociology and social problems. The principles of social organization as seen in its historic forms, followed by a consideration of current social problems, such as the wage system, monopolies, pauperism.

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN—SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE.

SOCIOLOGY.

PROFESSOR ELY, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR MEYER, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR SHARP, MR. DOWD, AND SPECIAL LECTURERS.

1. The elements of sociology.

2. Modern sociological thought. A critical discussion of the works of the principal sociological writers from Comte to the present time.

3. The psychological sociologist. This course deals with that group of sociologists who approach sociology from a psychological point of view.

4. Charities and correction. The course will include lectures by specialists and excursions to state and local institutions. This course should precede Courses 5 and 6.

5. Public and private charity. A comparative study of poor-relief in the United States, England, and the principal continental countries.

6. Charity organization. A study of poverty in American cities, with special reference to the work of charity-organization societies.

7. Social ethics. This course treats the philosophy of legal institutions, with special emphasis on the ethical point of view. It is accepted as a study in the political-science group.

8. Seminary in sociology. Designed particularly for graduate students and others of suitable preparation. Topics in theoretical and practical sociology will be selected with reference to the needs and interests of the student.

9. Field work. Students are encouraged to study charitable and correctional institutions in Madison and vicinity, and opportunity is afforded for continuous work during the summer months. During past years students from the university have engaged in field work, and several of these students have taken up work of this kind as a career. It is believed that this method of continuous study, followed by field work, yields the best results. It is the aim of this department to furnish secretaries of charity-organization societies, and other trained workers.

ECONOMICS, PUBLIC FINANCE, AND STATISTICS.

PROFESSOR ELY, PROFESSOR SCOTT, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR MEYER, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR JONES, DR. KLEENE, MR. YOUNG.

5. Economic problems. Special attention will be devoted to the problem of labor. Such topics as the sliding scale, hours of labor, sweat-shop and tenement-house production, trades unions, co-operation, profit-sharing, and labor legislation will be considered. Text-book with class reports and lectures.

12. The economic functions of the state. This course consists of a series of lectures, historical and critical, on the state in its relation to industry, trade, and the professions, with special reference to pharmacy.

18. The distribution of wealth. Part I. This course deals chiefly with the fundamental institutions in the existing social order and their relation to the present distribution of wealth. Open to graduate students and undergraduates who have had suitable preparation.

19. Distribution of wealth. Part II. A discussion of the separate factors in distribution, such as rent, interest, and wages, and monopoly gains; the equilibrium of the factors in distribution; individual fortunes and differential gains; modifications in the distribution of wealth, actual and proposed, including a discussion of socialism;

the distribution of wealth and social progress. May be taken by those who have not had Part I, Course 18.

22. Theories of production and consumption. Theories of social prosperity, of population, and of capital, and the theories which concern the operation of physical forces, and the influence of the consumption of wealth on production and distribution.

23. Theories of rent, wages, and profits.

32. Government statistics. The activity taken by various governments in the collection of statistics will be studied, special attention being given to the growth of the United States census.

33. Social statistics. The study of the structure and the movements of the population will be followed by a summary of the data contributed by the statistical method to the solution of social problems.

34. Laboratory work in statistics. Facilities will be provided for the pursuance of original work under proper guidance, with the aim of securing experience in the construction and criticism of schedules, the arrangement of statistical proofs, and graphic illustration.

SPECIAL TRAINING COURSES IN THE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE.

In order to offer opportunity for careful and systematic training in practical pursuits, the studies offered by the school, together with a number of allied subjects, have been arranged so as to form four special courses in economics and political science, viz., a course in statistics; a course in practical sociology; a course in preparation for public service; and a course in preparation for journalism.

The course in statistics will give special training in the use and collection of statistical material, with a view of fitting the student for practical statistical work in connection with public administration or with the business of railway and insurance companies. Numerous statistical experts are at present employed by the government and by large corporations. Consequently the completion of a thorough and consistent course in statistics may be made the starting-point of a successful and influential career in these lines. It is also intended that the students in this course should familiarize themselves with the leading social, political, and industrial institutions and conditions which furnish the material for statistical work.

The course in practical sociology consists of studies in modern social and economic problems, social theory, and practical charity and reform. The class work of the student is to be supplemented by the direct study of social conditions, and reformatory and charitable institutions. The course is primarily intended as a preparation for pastoral work, and the activities connected with organized charity and other ameliorative agencies.

THE COURSE IN STATISTICS.

Junior.—Economic statistics, social statistics, analytical geometry and calculus, drill in numerical work, economic geography, American industries, economic problems, money and banking, elements of administration.

Senior.—Railway and insurance statistics, government statistics, theory of probabilities, expert accounting, insurance, railways, social and economic legislation, state and federal administration, markets and securities.

Graduate.—Actuarial science, distribution of wealth, public finance, economic seminary, seminary in administration, laboratory work in statistics, railway economics, public accounting.

THE COURSE IN PRACTICAL SOCIOLOGY.

Junior.—Charities and crimes, field work, elements of sociology, history of education, municipal government, physiology, psychology, ethics, moral education.

Senior.—Social ethics, social statistics, psychology and sociology, modern social thought, field work in charities, charity organization, communicable diseases, biology of water supplies, American history.

Graduate.—Seminary in sociology, advanced ethics, anthropology, abnormal psychology alternating with comparative psychology, distribution of wealth, history of political thought, social and economic legislation, economic and social history, laboratory work in statistics.

UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING.

SOCIAL SCIENCE.

PROFESSOR MERZ.

The aim of the department is to familiarize students with the history of social development, and to encourage investigation of the principles on which social progress depends. After a thorough grounding in the fundamental facts the student is expected to observe the social phenomena about him and to study the various problems in an independent manner. Inasmuch as sociology is a study of recent birth, and its theories are constantly expanding, much of the class work will consist of lectures and theses.

1. Principles of sociology. Small and Vincent, Giddings's *Elements*, Kidd's *Social Evolution*. Recitations, readings, debates, and theses.

2. Social problems. Study of crime, punishment, and reform; poverty and charities; the labor movement—wages, strikes, co-operation, trusts, socialism. Lectures, readings, discussions, and theses.

Social philosophy. Lectures on social theory, old and new, and on the aims of society. Discussions and theses.

ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

ARKANSAS— UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS.

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY.

PROFESSOR MILLIS.

9. Principles of sociology. This course considers the elements and conditions of social growth and progress. Recitations, lectures, and readings of assigned chapters from Spencer's *Principles of Sociology* and Giddings's *Principles of Sociology*. Text-book: Fairbanks's *Introduction to Sociology*.

10. Problems of social growth. Trade-unionism, arbitration, and conciliation; communism, co-operation, and profit-sharing. Lectures and reports. For reference: Ely, *The Labor Movement in America*, and Ely, *French and German Socialism*.

Courses in genetic sociology, and in charities and correction, will probably be offered later.

CALIFORNIA—

LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY.

ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY.

Courses 6 and 8 are withdrawn and the following courses added:

7. Socialistic theories. History of the socialistic doctrine and agitation, and of socialistic experiments; criticism of the doctrine, especially in the light of received

economic theories of value and distribution; history and theories of private property; study of the extension of state activities into the realm of industry; reading from leading socialists and their critics. Associate Professor Howard.

9. Problems of American democracy. Discussions of the ballot, direct legislation, proportional representation, the machine, political parties, etc. Associate Professor Howard.

PSYCHOLOGY.

6. Psychology of the social relations. Assistant Professor Martin.

EDUCATION.

Education and society. The function of the school as related to the home, church, and other educational institutions and agencies of the community. Special phases of education in large cities and in rural communities, and special problems in connection with social education, as related to defective and criminal classes, foreigners, negroes, etc. Mr. Snedden.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA—

COLUMBIAN UNIVERSITY.

Social integration and disintegration in mediæval and modern Europe.

HOWARD UNIVERSITY.

TEACHERS COLLEGE.

The science of education is recognized as having its basis in psychology, ethics, biology, logic, and sociology, since each of these sciences has significance for education in so far as it throws light upon the nature of man both as an individual and as a member of society. Pedagogy, therefore, is treated not simply historically, nor simply systematically, in a general course, but special courses and lectures are provided in each of the important branches which lie at its foundation.

History of education includes also an account of the political and social theories of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, in so far as they affected education.

Sociological pedagogy.

COLLEGE DEPARTMENT.

Sociology.

FLORIDA— FLORIDA STATE COLLEGE.

ETHNOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY.

2. Sociology. A study of the evolution of society and its present state. Professor Williams.

FRANK L. TOLMAN.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

REVIEWS.

Human Nature and the Social Order. By CHARLES HORTON COOLEY. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902. Pp. viii + 404.

IN terms of his own thesis Dr. Cooley has transformed the social materials of his times into a personal product; his mind has reorganized and reproduced the suggested material in accordance with its own structure and tendency. All will agree that the result is a "new and fruitful employment of the common material." This common material has been accumulating rapidly during the last two decades. James's notable chapter on "The Consciousness of Self;" Royce's papers on social consciousness; Dewey's insistence on the essentially abstract nature of both the individual and society conceived as separate ideas; Tarde's system with its trinity of imitation, invention, and opposition; Baldwin's dialectic of personal and social growth; Ross's vivid presentation of the ways in which society cleverly cozens its members; Giddings's consciousness of kind and analysis of the social mind — these and many others are the current ideas upon which Dr. Cooley has freely drawn. The result is not, however, an "imitation," but an "invention."

In a style which often suggests Professor William James's picturesque conversational methods, the author sets up a thesis by the aid of which he restates many of life's most puzzling problems. There is no academic formality or scholastic strut about the performance. From title-page to *finis* one looks in vain for a new and eccentric terminology. The book abounds in brilliant *obiter dicta.* Although the work has a distinct unity, the reader often gets the impression of clever and discriminating essays covering a wide range of human experience. The volume is something of an anomaly in sociological literature, but it is none the less welcome for its very nonconformity. A number of illustrations are drawn from a study of the author's children, but the doting parent is successfully subordinated to the scientific observer.

Dr. Cooley's basal proposition is that human life is the real unity, of which individual and society are merely aspects which have been wrongly set in antithesis. This has led to a series of equally inde-

fensible antitheses; *e. g.*, individualism and socialism, free-will and determinism, egoism and altruism. The second of these antitheses is discussed under the heading "Suggestion and Choice." It is asserted that richness and variety of social suggestions compel choice, which thus becomes a true social force, although it is far from being the independent, unconditioned thing of the extreme free-will school. The person is not controlled by an external social will, but through his own will, in working up or synthesizing social suggestions.

Coming to closer quarters with the person, the author traces the process by which intercourse builds up personal ideals. All persons are declared to be imaginary or constructed in the mind out of the materials received through intercourse and interpreted by experience. Society is defined as "a relation among personal ideas." The vagueness and ambiguity of this phrase are guarded by the warning that the unquestioned independent reality of a person is not to be confused with the ideas entertained about him; these ideas, however, constitute the immediate social reality.

Sympathy or communion is next discussed, not as a form of pity, but as an imaginative extension of one's life by the interpretation of other persons. A man's range of sympathy thus becomes a measure of his personality. Society, on the other hand, is the totality of the acts of communion by which the person is related to others.

Two chapters are devoted to an analysis of self-feeling or the meaning of "I." The sense of appropriation, the "my feeling," is accepted as an empirical fact and is conceived of as extending itself to things and persons in such a way as to break down the hard-and-fast distinctions between *ego* and *alter*. The "looking-glass" self, the image of the self conceived of as entertained by persons, is analyzed and its reaction upon conduct pointed out in detail. Self-assertion is declared to be respectable, unless it is inconsistent with personal or social moral standards, when it is stigmatized as egotistic. To be selfish, then, is to fail to appreciate the social situation as it is generally conceived. The proper antithesis of selfishness is not altruism, but rather right, justice, or magnanimity. A person may act out a narrower or a wider self; there lies the distinction, rather than in a setting off against each other the really interpenetrating self and other. The various personal qualities, pride, vanity, honor, self-reverence, humility, freedom, are interpreted in terms of the "looking-glass" and other types of the self.

Hostility is described as a personally protective activity which at

the same time performs the useful social function of preserving type and eliminating degenerate variation. It is conceived of as developing from an instinctive to a rational, ethical form. Emulation is treated consistently from the personal point of view and is subdivided into conformity, rivalry, and hero-worship. In the case of so-called non-conformity there is not so much a personal protest against all social control as a conformity with some social group or set of ideas other than those immediately, physically present. Hero-worship is an imaginative construction of personal ideals which become true and effective social forces.

Leadership is characterized, not as the creation of original ideas, but as vivid definition and organization of vague tendencies already existent. The leader must have the power to construct in imagination by sympathy the personal lives of his followers. The leader is a true social cause, as independent as a cause can be which is a part of a living whole; "impersonal tendency" is a mere abstraction, and while the phrase may be used, the examination of such tendencies will always disclose personal nuclei.

Conscience in final analysis is always a group thing actually existent in persons. The right is the rational in the highest sense; it is not individual as opposed to social, but rather the social as contrasted with the sensual. The social and personal conscience grows as the result of combining personal influences into higher and higher wholes. Thus personal authority, immediate or indirect, plays the chief part in the moral life, yet this very idea of the person is built up through intercourse, is a social thing. The group standard as a conception resolves itself into ideas about concrete persons.

Personal degeneracy is a variation from type due to failure to achieve personal synthesis. Here again to put heredity and environment in opposition is to misrepresent their relation, which is one of intimate union and co-operation. It is a mistake to attribute remorse and other sentiments to degenerates who are usually at peace with the low grade of social conscience which they have achieved. Crime assumes another aspect when contemplated in this way.

Freedom is "opportunity for right development." Restraint is narrowing or contraction of personality. The person is seldom in conscious conflict with his social *milieu* because he realizes his higher personal ideals by means of it. Growth of freedom involves certain stress and strain with incidental degeneracy which can never be wholly eliminated, but may be indefinitely reduced.

This brief summary is meant merely to give an idea of the scope and method of Dr. Cooley's book. It affords no adequate view of the argument; it sadly misrepresents the style and form of treatment; and wholly omits the illuminating observations, the sane philosophy of life, and the genuinely stimulating moral tone which enrich and pervade the volume.

As a destructive criticism alike of the artificial individualism which we have inherited from the last two centuries and of the sociological concepts which Mr. Spencer and the "social forces and tendencies" school have popularized, this book renders effective service. The old hard-and-fast distinctions, the clean-cut logical counters "individual" and "society" are badly blurred and fused. Under this concrete, detailed study of the person new complexities emerge and the old, simple labels seem pitifully inadequate.

As a reconciliation of extreme views of individuals and society Dr. Cooley's work is of first-rate importance. In "pouring out the bathing water of individualism he has not spilled out the baby, individuality." In fixing attention upon the life-process as a whole, turning now to the personal, now to the collective, aspect, the author produces the effect of unity with marked success. While his results are stated in less eccentric and peculiar terms, they do not differ fundamentally from the formulations of others. For example:

> Society, like every living advancing whole, requires a just union of stability and change, uniformity and differentiation. Conformity is the phase of stability and uniformity, while non-conformity is the phase of differentiation and change. The latter cannot introduce anything wholly, but it can and does affect such a reorganization of existing material as constantly to transform and renew human life. (P. 274.)

This seems to be putting in other language what Professor Baldwin more ponderously sets forth in his dialectic of social growth as the interplay of the particularizing (*i.e.*, differentiating, non-conforming) individual and the generalizing (*i.e.*, stable and uniform) society. There is much, too, which reminds one of Professor James. To both James and Baldwin Dr. Cooley expresses indebtedness.

To the habitual inveterate individualist much of the analysis of the person will be far from convincing. The author is by no means a mystic, and he protects himself cautiously, yet one might easily get the impression that "you" and "I" are practically identical, that there are "no fences in this field"—a favorite phrase—and that the "self" is a somewhat elusive, not to say amorphous, thing. In dis-

carding the old labels "egotism" and "altruism" there seems danger of missing certain vivid realities of "my-feeling" as pretty definitely set over against the thought of other people. The reaction is thoroughgoing and at times plays havoc with traditional ways of thought and speech, which the conservative will for a long time regard as corresponding to certain realities.

In spite of such incredulity, this sort of analysis will bring the student to close quarters with actual social facts. Dr. Cooley has made an important contribution in both matter and form to the growth of social theory. But even more valuable is his practical application of this theory to the problems of personal development, of self-realization through living a common life with and for one's fellows.

GEORGE E. VINCENT.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties. By M. Ostrogorski. Translated from the French by FREDERICK CLARKE, M.A., with a preface by the Right Hon. JAMES BRYCE, author of *The American Commonwealth.* 2 vols. New York: The Macmillan Co. Pp. lviii + 627 and xliii + 793.

THIS work will occupy a place like that of de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* or Bryce's *American Commonwealth.* It must not only be consulted by all students of the actual workings of democratic political machinery, but it will have to be used as their point of departure by all serious students of the subject.

The subject-matter is not the constitutional history or the legal structure of democratic peoples, but the form, spirit, and workings of political parties, the "government outside the government." As Mr. Bryce observes (Preface, p. xxxix):

> No one has, so far as I know, produced any treatise containing a systematic examination and description of the structure of parties or organizations governed by settled rules and working by established methods. Even in the United States, where party organization early attained a completeness and effective power unapproached in any other country, I could not find, when in 1883 I began to study, and was seeking to portray, the institutions of that country, any account of the very remarkable and well-compacted scheme of organization which had been at work there for forty or fifty years; and noted that among even the best-educated men there were few that had

mastered its details. . . . . There was no book on which one could draw, and the persons whom I interrogated usually seemed surprised that a stranger should feel interested in inquiries of the kind.

M. Ostrogorski devotes the first volume to England. His aim is to show how British democracy has attempted to exercise public authority through "extra-constitutional organizations of the electoral masses." Vol. II carries out the same program for the United States.

The quality of the author's thought may be indicated by a few sentences from his concluding section (Vol. II, pp. 607–741):

When we take a comprehensive glance at the phenomena which have been successively brought under our notice, and try to find our bearings among them, nothing is visible at first but confusion. Going back to the starting-point, we see the state, in the hands of a class, and society, embodied in that ruling class, dominating the individual, and overwhelming him with the whole weight of social, religious, and political convention. But this threefold tyranny gives way and collapses under the pressure of manifold forces of a moral and material kind. The enthusiasm of self-revealed religious faith, the criticism of reason triumphantly asserting itself, the new appliances of industry, all combine to free the individual from his bonds. In vain do dethroned authority and relaxed social discipline call to their aid the religious tradition, social tradition, the emotions of the heart, the distress inspired by the future, in order to stop the progress of the individual. Everything conspires in his favor, obstacles vanish before him. The autonomous individual is finally proclaimed sovereign in the state. Left to himself in the political sphere, by the emancipating process of individualism, and powerless in his atomistic isolation, he fastens on the old party groove, and makes it his base of operations. Jealous of his new power, he is not content with being invested with it. To prevent a fresh attack from the old influences, which appear to him more odious than ever, the individual, weary of the moral action of man on his fellow-men, which has kept him for centuries in a state of dependence and submission, strives to regulate even this action, to make its effect subject to formal conditions. He tries to refer directly to himself, as to their source, all the relations in public life, within and without the legal sphere. On the other side of the Atlantic, where he became his own master sooner, he presses forward in this direction with exceptional energy.

But — strange phenomenon — the nearer he advances the nearer he appears to draw to the starting-point. In fact, after he has gone on for a time, it is seen that the rôle of the individual in the state dwindles to a small affair. He wields only a shadow of the sovereignty which is laid at his feet as pompously as it is hypocritically. He has, in reality, no power over the choice of the men who govern in his name and by his authority. The nation and its

rulers are separated. Government is a monopoly. It is in the hands of a class, which, without forming a caste, constitutes a distinct group in society. It is even often wielded by a single man, who relies on that class and enjoys the powers of an autocrat in spite of the republican forms of the state. The bulk of the community endure this yoke with indifference or passivity, as in the old times when concern for the public welfare was forbidden them on pain of being treated as rebels. Government is at the beck and call of private interests and their designs on the general interest. Legislation and administration are bought and sold. Public office itself is virtually put up to auction.

It would, in truth, be difficult to find, in the history of human societies, a more pathetic drama than this ruin of so many generous aspirations, of so many noble efforts, of such high promise and expectations. But the tragic gravity of this spectacle, extorting cries of distress or of joy at the failure of democracy, cannot detain the scientific observer. What he has just seen simply suggests to him the very elementary reflection that if society, which set forth to realize a new ideal, finds itself after a time near its starting-point, it has evidently moved in a circle, or entered on a side-path, which has brought it straight back to the starting-point. The inference, then, is that the paths which have been taken to reach the goal were not the right ones. As for the goal itself, it is neither condemned nor justified by experience; the seekers turned their backs on it. Consequently, to arrive at a practical solution, the all-important point is to single out the paths which have misled society in its pursuit of the new ideal, and then to note those which appear more certain to lead to the goal. Our lengthy investigation has but accumulated the data which will enable us to distinguish, as from a vantage-ground, the one set from the other.

Space does not permit analysis of the data which the author presents in the body of the work, nor of the argument which the conclusion maintains. It will suffice to say that the author has made an invaluable contribution to knowledge of democratic institutions. This does not mean that his statement is free from serious defects. Indeed, if the author were an attorney for absolutism he could hardly present a more scathing indictment of democracy than some portions of his argument contains. They remind one of Dorman B. Eaton's summary of the sins of the spoils system in municipal government. One who did not know how to supply the silver lining would conclude that the outlook is all black clouds. As an exhibit of one phase of the party system, however, the book is magnificent, and it will probably be a long time before an equally able critique of the other phases of the democratic situation appears.

ALBION W. SMALL.

The Coming City. By RICHARD T. ELY, PH.D. LL.D., Professor of Political Economy and Director of the School of Economics and Political Science in the University of Wisconsin. Thomas Y. Crowell & Co. Pp. 110.

THIS little book, the expansion of a lecture, is in Professor Ely's best vein. It gives a bird's-eye view, not of visionary plans, but of a movement that is visible in our urban life. Not all factors in the movement are well represented in every city, but enough is going forward to convince Professor Ely that he used a misnomer when he called the original lecture "Neglected Aspects of Municipal Reform." They are observed and calculated upon to such a degree that he believes it is more strictly in accordance with the facts to speak of "The Coming City." He does this in a most hopeful and stimulating way. The argument is not that the better urban conditions are coming no matter how indifferent good citizens may be, but that there is a fighting chance to make a good rate of progress. The line of argument is suggested by the phrases: "Expert knowledge required for successful municipal administration;" "municipal government a profession rather than a business;" "the ideal of the city as a well-ordered household;" "the city as a work of art." Including an appendix containing useful illustrative material, the book provokes interest in nearly every phase of the modern movement for better cities. The closing paragraphs would doubtless strike the typical ward politician as somewhat perfervid. To anyone who feels the seriousness of the subject, their note is none too high:

> We have to prepare for the coming domination of the city, and for an extension of urban conditions even to rural communities. We have to adjust ourselves to some extent to a change of ideals. What shall we say to this? Certainly there is no ground for despair. The spreading out of cities and the extension of urban conditions to country districts may mean, and must be made to mean, a combination of advantages of city and of country. Our ideal in this country has been the domination of the rural community rather than of the city. But if we look back upon past history, and ask ourselves whence the sources of the highest achievements in the way of culture and civilization, we shall find much to give us hope in the prospect of the domination of the city in the twentieth century. As we think about the city during human history, we recall Jerusalem, Athens, Rome, Florence, London, Paris, Berlin—sources of religion, learning, and art. Is it without significance that the words "polite" and "urbane" are both derived from words meaning "city"? Is it without significance that Christianity became known in a city, and that

the word "pagan" means a "dweller in the country"? Or is it without significance that the apostle John saw a redeemed society existing as a city? — "And I, John, saw the holy city, New Jerusalem, coming down from God out of heaven, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband."

I think all of these things are deeply significant, and the significance is perceived in the expression "civic church," which, like the expression "the city a well-ordered household," gathers up ideals which are animating those who are giving shape to the twentieth-century city. The city is destined to become a well-ordered household, a work of art, and a religious institution in the truest sense of the word "religious."

The great Italian, Mazzini, said long ago: Every political question is becoming a social question, and every social question a religious question. Until our religion can take in municipal reform, we shall not achieve the best of which we are capable in the way of the city. We must come to have that feeling which the Psalmist had for the great Jewish city, and the promise and power of the present efforts making for civic righteousness are found precisely in this fact, that we are coming to have just that sort of a truly religious feeling. You remember the words of the Psalmist: "If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her cunning. If I do not remember thee, let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth: if I prefer not Jerusalem above my chief joy." So we may learn to say—indeed, are learning to say: "If I forget thee, O Chicago, O New York, O St. Louis, let my right hand forget her cunning. If I do not remember thee, let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth: if I prefer thee not above my chief joy." And because we are learning to say this, we may look forward with the brightest anticipations to the future of the twentieth-century city.

A. W. S.

Americans in Process: A Settlement Study by Residents and Associates of the South End House, Edited by Robert A. Woods, Head of the House, North and West Ends, Boston. Houghton, Mifflin & Co. Pp. ix + 389. $1.50.

In the language of the preface:

The indifference of the so-called good citizen is largely because his best effort to produce a mental picture of his city in its essential human aspects results in something altogether vague, scattered, out-of-date. Many of the efforts toward better things reflect this lack of mental furnishing in being piecemeal, casual, and beside the mark. The purpose of this volume, as of its predecessor (*The City Wilderness*), is to contribute toward building up a contemporary conception of the city, as the groundwork of a type of municipal and social improvement, which shall be accurate in its adaptation to detailed facts, and statesmanlike in its grasp of large forces and total situations.

The authors have done their work well, and the book certainly makes in the direction which they intended. It takes its place with that growing body of literature which everyone must read who has a real part of any sort in the making of social life. It is not merely of local interest. Of course, a book about Boston, and especially about the oldest part of Boston, is attractive to thousands who care nothing about social problems. On the other hand, few whose chief interest is in civic amelioration, though they be in Minneapolis or San Francisco, will resist the temptation to indulge in the dissipation of a look into the old town of Boston as pictured in the opening chapters. Not a line of the book is dull to one who has the rudiments of civic consciousness. Every chapter, with the possible exception of the first two, would help citizens in nearly every large town in the United States to understand their immediate situation and the problems that it presents. They could not assume that details are mixed in just the same way in their own city, but this book would show them factors that are everywhere in some form and proportion.

The book as a whole is a panorama of the process of racial admixture and assimilation which is taking place under varying circumstances throughout our country. My first thought on reading the title was that credit must be due to Mr. Riis for having suggested it in his phrase "the making of an American." If one chapter may be named as more instructive than another, it is the sixth, on "Traffic in Citizenship." Amateur political reformers would know better what sort of campaigning they must prepare for if they would read this chapter attentively. Every American who wants to understand his surroundings, and especially everyone who wants to do some of the public work that our situation demands, would find it profitable to read the book from beginning to end.

A. W. S.

Our Benevolent Feudalism. By W. J. GHENT. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1902. Pp. 202.

THE general view presented by Mr. Ghent has already been developed in Professor Veblin's *Theory of the Leisure Class* and in the writings of socialists. The familiar story of combinations, trusts, and centralization of industry and commerce is retold, and a very dark prospect is presented. We are drifting, he believes, toward a social state in which a few magnates will practically control the nation, dictate legislation, own the judges, time the sermons, crack the lash over

editors, and not only govern us all, but make us actually think it is all right, the best possible world. Feudalism has come again, tempered with benevolence and somewhat by fear of assassination and mobs.

Perhaps it is a fair inference that the author hopes to make us so disgusted with all the candidates in sight that we shall be ready to accept the "dark horse" which seems to be concealed just around the corner, whose name is socialism. And if, contrary to Lincoln's belief, we are all so stupid, morally corrupt, and besotted as we are here represented, and can all of us be fooled all the time by a clique of Wall street speculators, we should certainly be ready for almost any experiment which promised escape. President Roosevelt thinks we shall try "publicity" for a time, and keep our other surgical instruments in their case until this blade has tried its edge.

The book is a trenchant pamphlet; many of the illustrations of corruption and oppression seem to be based on knowledge; and, if this were the whole case of our American democracy, and the whole truth of our condition, some of us would prefer to see the nation wiped out of existence rather than realize his dream of its future.

It is rather suggestive of further inquiry, however, that these venomous accusations against a society which is said to be suppressing radicalism should find one of the greatest publishing firms to push its circulation. If our comfortable people are "tired of hearing about the poor," weary of being goaded, then this rather one-sided, but incisive and stimulating, appeal may again stir the sleepy social conscience and quicken compunction.

C. R. Henderson.

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS.

The Race Problem in International Industry.—Prominent thinkers have expressed their belief that the condition of international economic activity and the result of industrial competition between nations are due largely to race peculiarities. With the growth of a world-market the economic superiority or inferiority of nations has been made more prominent, and the problems arising therefrom are among the most important subjects of investigation for the economist and sociologist.

Are there inferior and superior races, or are the supposed inferiorities and superiorities equilibrated when all circumstances are considered? In the time of early Christianity and by the preceding schools of philosophy, the moral and ethical equality of men was proclaimed. In Greece a distinction was made between Greeks and barbarians until the Sophists and Stoics came forward and taught equality. In the modern period, with Rousseau at the head, philosophy declared the equality of races, and in still more modern times Darwin asserted that the backward peoples possess the capacity in time for reaching the achievements of the higher races.

Nothing is more false than this. In economic activity the difference between races and peoples in productive capacity is enormous. Bagehot has said that in productive ability twenty normal Englishmen would be incomparably greater than a thousand Australian black fellows. This is true of all kinds of work. Where mixed and pure races exist in the same state, the leading rôles fall to the mixed, especially if they have white blood in them. With the removal of slavery in the United States the pure negroes have come into a most lamentable situation and have shown themselves incapable of any large undertakings and of anything more than a very low level of economic activity.

In the extraordinary meagerness of wants and the untiring industry of the Mongolian race there exists a certain kind of economic superiority, but the final determining factor here also is race endowment. The Chinese seem to be a people without nerves. They can work continuously from early morning till late at night with little food or rest. They lack inventiveness, are very imitative, and work with machine-like routine. The Japanese laborer is similar to the Chinese, though a little more inventive and less imitative. The so-called danger of industrial competition from the yellow race is limited by race characteristics, and a sound industry has little to fear from the competition of eastern Asia. These people lack bodily strength and endurance, one Englishman being able to do the work of three or four Japanese.

Coming to the European peoples, it is clearly seen that the position of the nations in the world-market is determined chiefly, not by natural resources, geographical situation, or political power, but by endowment due to race characteristics. Leroy-Beaulieu ascribes the lack of originality and creative power of the Russian principally to the barrenness and monotony of the land. But he has overestimated the influence of natural environment. The difficulty rather arises from the mixture of Mongolian blood. Their industrial workers who are leaders in the factories are imported from western Europe. For the same work it requires more laborers than in England or Germany, and the cost of supervision is also much greater.

While there are several factors that are important in determining the place a nation will occupy in competition for the international market, race or blood is the decisive one. This is also shown clearly by commercial history from the ancient Phœnicians to the modern British.

When the race historian glances back over written history, he will be astonished at the changes in political and economic dominance from one people to another. First was the period ruled by the Semitic people; second, the Græco-Italian period; then the so-called Romance peoples, but with the aid of a mixture of Germanic blood; and, finally, the Dutch, British, Germans, and North Americans, belonging in larger

measure to the Teutonic peoples. In the face of these changes in control from one race to another the objection may be raised that it is not a race endowment that accounts for the superiority. In answer it may be said that the loss of influence has been due in part to mixture with inferior races and in part to certain phenomena of degeneration which can be observed also in the animal and plant kingdoms.

The modern world is controlled by the Teutonic peoples. Which will be the most successful? Great Britain has declined somewhat, Germany is becoming a greater rival, but all the industrial nations are being threatened by the competition of North America. England won the title of "mistress of the seas" from the Netherlands, and owes her commercial and industrial supremacy to certain personal characteristics of race. The Englishman is a realist and an individualist. It is for this reason that socialism has never played an important rôle in Great Britain. These characteristics have made her also a great colonial power. But the Englishman's lack of accommodation to the demands of the consumer is one of his weaknesses in the international market in comparison with the more accommodating and flexible German.

More rapid than the ascendancy of England has been that of Germany, and still more rapid than either has been that of North America. Very astonishing, however, has been the economic growth of Germany, for it is apparently as if by a revolution, and not as the result of national characteristics. The change in Germany from idealism to a more practicable activity as the first condition of effectiveness in industry is connected with the name of Bismarck and the events of 1870–71. The two characteristics which have led to this competitive ability on the part of Germany are the feeling of duty and the faithfulness to a purpose once undertaken. That Germany is on the point of winning, in many ways, advantages over England is certain, but we do not agree with those who claim that England has already been surpassed by Germany.

It was out of English and German elements that the ability of the United States was born. The rise there from industrial inferiority to industrial superiority has been rapid. Ten or twenty years ago the cost of production of American manufactures was usually considerably higher than the German and English, but now in the most important departments it is lower. American progress is due largely to enormous race energy, tenacity, courage, and initiative. These race peculiarities manifest themselves in that most dangerous form of American competition—the trusts. It is estimated that three-fourths of American exports are the products of trust organizations. The trusts are the creation in general of great undertakers, and business enterprises of such extent are little known outside of America. Doubtless the political and social freedom in America and the great natural resources have made the opportunities for the business initiative; but without this initiative, which is rooted in blood, America would never have become what it is.

The industrial position won by England and Germany is endangered by the strength of the United States, and one of the problems of Europe in the near future will be to find some means of defense against that state whose greatness has grown out of a mixture of English and German blood.—DR. JULIUS WOLF, "Das Rassenproblem in der Weltwirthschaft," in *Zeitschrift für Socialwissenschaft*, January, 1903.

E. M.

The Three Primary Laws of Social Evolution.—In accepting Darwin's theory of "the survival of the fittest" as a good and self-sufficient explanation of the phenomena of social progress, the historical school has been betrayed into the very same error as that of which they have convicted the orthodox economist. Like the latter, the historical school has assumed that a theory of progress which is true only for certain stages in social development is necessarily true for all stages, or has universal validity. The historical school has seemed to content itself with the theory of evolution proposed by Mr. Darwin. Now, in the introduction to his *Origin of Species*, p. 3, Mr. Darwin says that "the struggle for existence among all organic beings throughout the world, which invariably follows from the high geometric ratio of their increase . . . . , is the doctrine of Matthus applied to the whole animal and vegetable kingdom." It is strange, to say the least, that economists should have accepted a theory of progress which is confessedly based upon a long-since discarded economic doctrine. And again, on p. 60, Mr. Darwin says: "It is the doctrine of Matthus applied with mani-

fold force to the whole animal and vegetable kingdom, for in this case there can be no artificial increase of food and no prudential restraints upon marriages." We have here Darwin's tacit recognition of the fact that, while this theory fits in so well with biological phenomena, it may be largely offset, so far as human society is concerned, by the intelligent volitions of mankind. And yet, not a few economists have continued to insist upon the theory of "the survival of the fittest" as a good and sufficient explanation of all social progress; and this despite its signal failure to explain the more complex phenomena of a modern society.

As a matter of fact, progress depends as much upon pressure from below as upon pressure from above. Instead, for example, of the upper industrial classes crowding the lower down and out, it quite as frequently happens that the lower crowd the upper up. Mr. Darwin's theory of evolution does not attempt to account for such a complex social situation, while Lamarck's theory of a more or less conscious adjustment of the organism to the environment finds its fullest application in such a society. The historical school is convicted of assuming universal validity for the Darwinian theory, which is only true in any complete sense for the earlier stages of social evolution.

Social progress must take place, if at all, under the law of decreasing returns, under the law of increasing returns, or under the law of constant returns. In a society progressing under the law of diminishing returns, population presses hard upon subsistence, and those below are apt to be pressed down and out by those above. Such progress as takes place in such a society is probably due to "the survival of the fittest." In a society progressing under the law of increasing returns, the struggle for existence is not so severe, population no longer presses so hard upon subsistence, and the lower classes here crowd the others up. The explanation of progress is no longer found in Darwin's theory, but in Larmarck's conscious adjustment of the individual to his environment. In a society progressing under the law of constant returns every increase in the productive power of society results in a corresponding advance in the standard of life of the whole society. Production and consumption here tend to keep pace with each other. There is a tendeney to uniform improvements in method and technique throughout the entire field of industry; this tends to eliminate monopoly advantage and to effect a more equitable distribution. This brings about a progressing equilibrium between production and consumption, and so substitutes a constant rate of increase for the alternating periods of boom and depression. Under the "law of decreasing returns" the welfare of others is completely ignored; under the law of increasing returns a pseudo-altruism is forced upon the *entrepreneur;* while under the law of constant returns further progress is made toward altruism. The welfare of society becomes a condition precedent to the success of those who would exploit that society.

Society seems to have progressed from the domination of a landed aristocracy to the domination of the bourgeoisie, and the further evolution of society will probably see the fourth estate coming into its own. These forms correspond quite closely with societies progressing under the laws of decreasing, increasing, and constant returns, respectively. While a modern society may be *dominated* by any one of the three laws of progress, according to the stage of its development, it is not probable that it will ever be entirely free from the action of the other two laws. This means that in any modern society all three forms of evolution are in operation at one and the same time, and it is this that must always render the study of social evolution such a difficult problem. A recognition of these three forms of progress and their mutual interaction will be found necessary to any hopeful investigation in the field of social evolution.—CHARLES W. MACFARLANE, in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, September, 1902.

T. J. R.

The Prophylaxis and Treatment of the Recidivist Criminal.—At the last two congresses of criminal anthropology, two distinguished jurists gave opinions that criminal recidivists should be excluded from society for an indefinite term, according to the nature and repetition of the crime, or according to the psychic disturbance or degeneracy which necessitates their sequestration. Psychiaters upheld the validity of these opinions. The question of the delinquent recidivist will in the future fall entirely into the hands of the alienist.

A question compendium should be edited by psychiaters and jurists for the use of the bench. The examination should apply not only to the delinquent, but to his parents, grandparents, and collateral relations, with the view of finding a clue to the degeneracy of the accused. This history should be collected in every detail. The medical report of every delinquent recidivist should make part of his history.

In the prophylaxis against criminality we should try to check alcoholism. In all countries the growth of viciousness and of aberration of the moral sense goes hand in hand with the growth of alcoholism and of other poisons. Why are so many crimes committed under alcoholic influence? Why are so many criminal recidivists of inferior intellect and morality? Experimental physiology and psychology give us the answer. Alcohol produces a progressive degenerative effect on the cortical nerve cells, as well as on the other nerve elements which take part in the intellectual and moral functions. Continuous indulgence in alcoholic drinks reduces the general as well as the special vitality of the tissues; the faculties are impaired, and abnormal character and acts result. This takes place in normal beings. Should the subjects be hereditarily predisposed, the result is still worse.

Statistical investigation shows an intimate relation between recidivism and almost complete absence of education. This lack of education is so much the more important because the subjects had attended school for a number of years, thus showing the hereditary taint that exists.

Out of 168 recidivists receiving minor sentences, 72 had received no education; 46 had received rudimentary education; 50, primary education; 89 were given to alcoholic excesses; 57 had an alcoholic father or mother; 47 had near relatives among other prisoners; 61 belonged to insane, hysterical, epileptic, or suicidal families; some of the same number had been inmates of insane asylums, or were abandoned by their parents, or were orphans. Out of 158 recidivists sentenced for ten or more years, 30 had received no education; 52 had received rudimentary education; 76, primary education; 92 indulged in alcoholic excesses; 55 had alcoholic parents; 37 had near relatives in prison; 40 showed signs of degeneracy. In the second class, recidivists receiving long sentences, there are fewer illiterates, because the members of this class received a complementary education while serving sentences. The number of alcoholic and criminal ancestors is about the same in each class. This fact is most striking, and I believe with Dr. Naecke that there is among criminals a hereditary taint of from 50 to 60 per cent. Pauperism is found almost universally; almost all come from the lower strata of society, having been subjected to worse physical and moral hygiene, and having suffered more from disease than others; from their very birth they differ from others anatomically and physiologically, having alcoholic parents who lead either vicious or lazy lives, abandoning their offspring, who, in turn, emulate their parents' lives. The recidivists are sufferers from psychological conditions of a pathological nature, besides the defects above mentioned.

For the benefit of the public health, the government should care for the young degenerates and take them away from the evil influence of their parents. When these degenerates attract attention by their acts or conduct, they should be investigated and reported on officially, as well as professionally. As far as possible, they should be placed in medico-pedagogic institutes, directed by competent authorities. Parents should have the privilege of placing in medico-pedagogic institutes children whose low intellects require special care; the children should be cared for up to the age of eighteen years. The question of vengeance should give way to that of ameliorating the conditions of the offenders. The degenerate cannot be held responsible, but should be cared for by society.— Condensed from a paper read by Dr. Jul. Morel, chief physician State Insane Asylum, Mons, Belgium, before the Fifth International Congress of Criminal Anthropology, Amsterdam, 1901, entitled "La prophylaxie et le traitement du criminel récidiviste," and published in *Journal of Mental Pathology*, November, 1901.

R. M.

The Pretended Inferiority of Woman.—Woman has been deprived of a large amount of happiness which should have fallen to her lot because, since time immemorial, she has been considered inferior to man from both a physical and psychical point of view. If it were demonstrated that this supposed inferiority were

not real, woman would take a place in society equal to that of man, and it would greatly increase her happiness.

Among prehistoric peoples there was no difference intellectually between men and women, and the same is true of modern savages. The difference between men and women is not one belonging to the physical or psychical order, but it is a social fact. The subordination of woman is the result of the difference in occupations; it has its origin in social ideas. For a long period the chase and war were considered the most important functions of society. As such they assumed a special character of dignity and honor. From the fact that woman was excluded from these occupations she was underrated in the eyes of men. Confined to the despised occupations she shared in the lack of consideration for this work, and from this fact the idea of her physical and intellectual inferiority was enthroned in the social mind.

The proposition which asserts the inferiority of woman will not bear criticism from any point of view. Superiority or inferiority in the human species is not the result of sexual differences. If the difference in regard to muscular strength or courage is considered, it is found that there are a large number of women who are as strong physically as many men, and, indeed, as courageous, while in both respects men are often inferior to women.

In regard to intellectual ability it can only be said that the science of psychology has not advanced far enough to warrant any scientific conclusions here. In countries like America, where woman has been granted conditions approaching equality, as in some of the schools, it has been demonstrated that her work compares favorably with that of men. It is impossible to form a correct judgment as to the physical qualities, for even in the most advanced countries woman is still subjected to many disadvantages when compared to man. It is not necessary to emphasize the fact that she has done little in the intellectual realm, for, perhaps, if all the difficulties which she has had to surmount were taken into consideration, the results might be vastly different.

Our conclusion is that, in consequence of the predominance of brutal force in the period of primitive savagery, woman became the possession of man, his slave, his property. When savagery gave place to a regime allowing a certain amount of justice and security, woman should have been enfranchised, but the habits and traditions of man were opposed to it. A day came, however, when the injustice of certain institutions became evident to all. It was then that the attempt was made to justify the subjection of woman by declaring that she was intellectually inferior to man. This discovery was made for the purpose of making legitimate an iniquity which the conscience of man had begun to condemn.

Woman has been kept in this subordinate position because she was placed there centuries ago by our coarse and ignorant ancestors. I may give an example of the form of reasoning often used to prove the inferiority of woman. When woman suffrage happened to show some bad results in countries where it has been established, the claim is usually made that it is due to the ignorance of the voters, their indifference or immorality. These same critics forget to note that manhood suffrage also often gives bad and very unsatisfactory results, but no one attributes this to sex qualities. Admitting, for the sake of argument, that woman is inferior to man, it is an injustice to speak of it constantly in that way, for it is not her fault. There are men manifestly below the normal in ability, but they are not deprived of their civil and political rights. Why should this be done in the case of woman? If she is really inferior, it would be better to assure her those favors and privileges that would tend to lessen her disadvantages.—J. NOVICOW, "La prétendue infériorité de la femme," in *La Revue*, November, 1902. E. M.

Social Teleology and its Mechanism.—Is there a fixed end for society? This question can be answered only by tracing the laws of social evolution, and the only side of this process that is scientifically observable is its mechanical side, its mechanism. On this side are observable three stages, characterized by three distinct laws:

1. The law of mental inertia and least effort. All our social institutions have been created little by little through many generations, each adding some small innovation that required a very small mental effort. Social evolution is accomplished

through small successes and small progress; it is made up of small partial adaptations, by no means co-ordinated at their origin, of small expedients always imperfect and provisional. This law is entirely instinctive, and though the solutions it proposes are designed for the immediate difficulty, these ends soon become means in solving the next problem.

2. The law of activity directed toward the maximum social utility. The effects of this law are first the increasing mediatization, and, second, the increasing depersonalization of social values. Things formerly sought as means have come to be sought as ends, *e. g.*, riches, comfort, power. Along with this mediatization comes the depersonalization of social values, the loss of the imprint of the individual who created them; *e. g.*, property, labor, art, literature.

3. The law of activity, directed toward the maximum of individual life and beauty. Industry and art are in some measure now turning toward this perfecting of the individual. This tendency, though not easily defined, is none the less actual, and probably all the more likely to prevail because it is subtle.

Evolution thus works out the social ends. They do not come to consciousness until they are realized, or at least are in process of being realized. And the social teleology is nothing more than the sum-total of a multitude of small actions. Social teleology, in so far as it is scientifically observable, seems to admit of neither a single end nor an unchanging standard. There is no absolute social good any more than there is any absolute social value. The hypothesis of an absolute moral value in societies that confers upon them a sort of sacred right to exist is an invention of those scholastic teleologists who try to justify everything by some social principle. There is no *one* social teleology, there are social teleologies. In fact, in the history of mankind that which has been called good and bad are changeable contents ever being broken down and ever forming anew. The good and the bad imply each other. The rôle of the instincts called bad, of those of cruelty, of barbarism, and even of torture, is incontestable in the moral education of mankind. In vain do some posit universal harmony as the end of society, while others give this place to perpetual opposition. The contest between the partisans of division and opposition, on the one hand, and of adaptation and harmony, on the other, is a question without meaning. The truth is that the one set of terms implies the other. It is better to recognize that there is a circle, and, since we are in the squirrel's cage, continue to turn the wheel.—G. PALANTE, "Etudes sociologiques; La téléologie sociale et son mécanisme," in *Revue philosophique*, August, 1902.

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The Professional Criminal in England.—If we wish to diminish the professional criminal class, two definite steps must be taken. First of all we must narrow the recruiting ground of this class by preventing juveniles between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one from swelling the ranks of the professional criminal. This can to a large extent be accomplished by giving greater elasticity to existing laws relating to the treatment of juvenile offenders. The industrialization of corrective discipline should not cease, as it now does, at the age of sixteen; it should be extended, if necessary, to the period of civil maturity. This method of treatment, if conducted on popular lines by competent and sympathetic officials, would cut off the supply of professional criminals by converting a large percentage of delinquent juveniles, who would otherwise become professional criminals, into industrious and law-abiding citizens. In the next place we must prevent the prison from being, what it has been in the past, a nursery of habitual crime. This can be done only by the complete industrialization of prison treatment, and by bringing the reforming and rehabilitating forces of industry to bear on the individual prisoner. But the prisoner will not become industrious without the strongest possible incentive. That incentive is the desire for liberty. This desire should be gratified and this incentive developed by offering a reward for consistent and habitual industry in the shape of conditional liberation on a much more extended scale than now exists. The industrialization of prison treatment and the extension of conditional liberation would counteract and perhaps nullify the deadening and degrading atmosphere of prison life. It is this atmosphere which turns the occasional criminal into the professional and confirms the professional criminal in his sinister career. I do not say that when these two steps have been

taken we shall make professional criminals as rare as wolves. It will be many a long day, no matter what measures are devised, before this happy stage of progress is reached. No delusion can be greater than to suppose that it can be reached by resorting once more to the rusty, barbarous, and obsolete weapons of our ancestors. But I do believe, if we put our penal law, as Lord Roseberry would say, on an efficient and business-like footing in the matter of juvenile offenders and in the matter of prison treatment, that we can largely reduce the proportions of professional crime.—WILLIAM DOUGLAS MORRISON, in *International Journal of Ethics*, October, 1902.

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Language and its Words: Their Sociological Factors.—Man is the product of an automatic evolution. But articulate language does not owe its marvelous development to any such unconscious principle. Its development has been very complex: the word and the gesture naturally going together enforce each other, but they also at the same time oppose each other. Their association is in reality a struggle for their individual existences. In this contest the word has the advantage, due no doubt partly to its intrinsic superiority—for language is above all things vocal; the gesture exists, it is true, but merely as an accompaniment of the word—but due also, and especially, to the pressure of "social" necessities. That is to say, articulate language is, no doubt, partly the work of nature, but the work of man much more. This laborious birth and development has been neither mechanical nor deliberate, neither conscious nor unconscious, because it has been neither biological nor psychological; but it has been at once both the one and the other, because it has been sociological. In the social process man makes the instruments of progress, yet he himself is an instrument; he passes from the pursuit of ends immediate and perceived to the pursuit of ends remote and unperceived. Thus it is with all social development; thus it is with language; it becomes both means and end, makes and is made, and passes from the stage of immediate, unreflective use to the removed, mediated, deliberative character.

If we study all the different kinds of language we shall find unmistakable evidences of this "social" character or origin of language. The words of a language fall into three groups that name social facts or relations, viz.: (1) those of intercourse, from primitive group organization, group-contests, to modern commerce and thought transmission; (2) those of labor, from immediate food-getting by the primitive man to the highly-organized industry of our present century, from the labor of war to the occupations of peace; and (3) those of ceremony from the early worship of all "moving" things to the worship of the one Hebrew God; from the earliest instinct of dependence to the Jewish sacrifice and the present memorials. Intimate connections bind these three into groups together, and bind them into a language.—L. GERARD-VARET, "Le langage et la parole: leurs facteurs sociologiques," in *Revue philosophique*, October, 1902.

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INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY. II.[1]

PART III. GENERAL STRUCTURE OF SOCIETIES.

CHAPTER II. THE ANTECEDENTS OF SOCIOLOGY.

BETWEEN 1815 and 1830 A. Loria, in his excellent book *Les bases économiques de la constitution sociale*, wrote that, with the mechanical progress of industry and under the protection of a somewhat peaceful régime, a revolution, both economic and political, was taking place, characterized by the concentration of movable wealth; that in almost the whole of Europe a division of capitalistic power between agriculture, on the one hand, and trade and manufacture, on the other, coincided with a corresponding division of political power between the conservative party and the liberal party. We may accept the description of this phenomenon in its main outlines. Marx has also stated it, placing it in a more remote period, and, in reality, it appears in the most ancient civilizations, although under partly different conditions. In fact, the error of Marx and Loria is in not having observed that from remotest antiquity even the minor civilizations have passed through an analogous evolution, which, however, was different in secondary points, and less extended.

This economic and political concentration and differentiation had at that time (as always[2]) as its consequence, as a true reflex action, the concentration of the industrial laboring forces, on the

[1] Translated by Robert Morris.

[2] See my studies on the ancient civilizations: Peru, Mexico, Egypt, India, China, Iran, Persia, and Greece.

one hand, and the separation and dispersion of the agricultural laboring forces, on the other. According to our view, this phenomenon appears even in slave societies—for example, in the Grecian and Roman civilizations, as well as in the old southern slave states of the United States.

In the present, as in the past, this situation gives rise to the principal affluent of positive sociology, socialism, whose most illustrious modern precursors are Robert Owen, in England (1771–1858), and Charles Fourier, in France (1772–1837).

This socialism becomes more and more conscious of itself; it proceeds to the criticism of society and *constructs* plans for new societies, which are now no longer mere Utopias, but which already appeal to the sanction of observation and experiment. Socialism culminates with the school of Proudhon, in France (1809–67), and that of Marx in Germany (1818–83). Beginning with these writers, it applies the inductive and historical method to the study of social phenomena. With César de Paepe and Benoît Malon, the too exclusively economic concept of Marx, although retaining its fundamental basis, is transformed into an integral socialism, that is to say, into a complete view of the whole of society considered as a systematic and truly organic arrangement of co-ordinated parts. Further, socialism no longer refuses to accept the positive methods, especially the experimental method; it proceeds from the particular to the general, from the simple to the complex. For this reason it submits its ideal structure to the proof of successive experiments. Therefore it is ready for amalgamation with positive sociology. The most eminent contemporary sociologists are socialists; likewise, the socialists are sociologists.

The second current of positive sociology was essentially scientific. Up to the present time, it has been too much neglected by historians of social science, but its importance will continue to increase. In the seventeenth century, it was represented by Pascal, Fermat, Leibnitz, Huyghens, the Grand Pensionary De Witt, Hudde, Halley; in the eighteenth century, by the Bernouillé brothers, d'Alembert, Euler, Buffon. This scientific school began as a true science of the state. At first, it was

concerned only with calculations of probabilities, with tables of mortality which were to serve as the basis of loans in the form of life annuities. With Halley (1693), and especially with Buffon, it was for the time applied to all the phenomena of life and death. Finally, by the end of the eighteenth century, and especially in the beginning of the nineteenth, with La Place and Joseph Fourier, it was extended to social phenomena, especially to social mechanics and statics. The same movement took place in France, England, Holland, Germany, and Italy. Nothing proves better than this fact the organic character of this scientific movement, as I have shown in the numerous lectures which I have devoted to the critical exposé of the theories of this school, of which Ad. Quetelet was one of the most eminent representatives (1796–1874).[1]

Quetelet is to be associated with these immediate precursors, the majority of whom, like himself, were mathematicians, astronomers, natural philosophers. They belong in a common group because of the same atomistic and mechanical conception of society; and by this conception they are also connected with the principal founders of political economy. Quetelet did not distinguish society from the state. According to him, all deviations result from natural or artificial disturbances; progress consists in following the average of these deviations; the social structure is the most complete equilibrium possible. The center of this equilibrium is the average man. "The average man is to a nation what the center of gravity is to a body; it is by this consideration that we are led to an understanding of all the phenomena of equilibrium and of movement."

In antiquity, Aristotle and Archimedes were the precursors of this conception; the former extended it from mechanics to the moral and political sciences. Quetelet, however—and it is this which distinguishes scientific determinism in general from fatalism—considered social phenomena as modifiable and perfectible. In the first place, he likened society to an immense

[1] The critical essays on the static theories of Ad. Quetelet, A. Comte, and Herbert Spencer should have formed part of the present work; but, as the latter is already somewhat long, I am obliged to publish the essays separately.

living creature. According to him, this body is subject to a law of evolution similar to that of individuals: birth, youth, maturity, old age, and death. He investigated the distinction, so important from the static and dynamic point of view, between the constant causes, variable causes, and accidental causes. This distinction enabled him to show that the most variable factors are the social factors. He connected himself with socialism, as well as with positive sociology, by observing that the economic factors are the most general, those whose variations have the most direct influence upon all the other social phenomena. Thus variations in the price of rye and wheat influence natality, mortality, and criminality.

The conclusions are: first, that governments ought to diminish all the causes which produce great variations in the price of grain, consequently to reform institutions; second, that criminality in particular is a regular effect of our social organization. "It is society that prepares the crime, and the criminal is only the instrument that executes it."

Kant, the metaphysician most nearly approaching positive philosophy, held this physico-mechanical conception of societies. Moreover, all social economy, aside from the socialistic schools, still remained individualistic. Aside from the state, there were only individuals, molecules, a human dust. This dust the state prepares and combines in its laboratories, except that, with the liberal school, the social chemistry has no other law than liberty; no other order than its natural order.

An intermediate group between the latter school and the biologic school is that which no longer emphasizes the individual, but the group, the race, etc.; basing its studies wholly upon statistics. In fact, this point of view appears in the work of Quetelet, is developed in the school of Le Play, and is emphasized by Gumplowiez in a way that is unhappily too narrow.

The third current of positive sociology is represented by the different schools whose social conception is mainly biologic and organic. With Turgot, Condorcet, Cabanis, Dr. Burdin, Saint-Simon, Auguste Comte, Schäffle, and Worms, we see the idea of a social *structure* gradually superseding the static and dynamic

conception borrowed from the physical sciences; yet even Comte continues to use the latter expression. In Germany, Herder and Krause represent an analogous philosophic transformation.

In this passage from the inorganic conception to the biologic conception of societies, the preponderant place is still accorded to the idea of order; progress is considered as the development of order. In fact, moreover, with Comte this is just what dynamics tends to mean. In the bio-social doctrines, the static point of view and the dynamic aspect are equally important. The first is more simple, but more fundamental; the second, more characteristic, but subordinate. In biology the simultaneity of phenomena is more important than their succession.

It was otherwise as soon as the progress of psychology completed the point of view of the biological school. Already, even with Comte, ideological sociology, his law of the three states, is psychic, but psycho-collective, and even his social statics is of the same nature.

Eventually, as in the case of Herbert Spencer, the successive aspect of psychology becomes more and more predominant. The evolutionary conception dominates to the extent of almost completely absorbing the static aspect. It is no longer the organ that determines and explains the function, or the structure society, but the function determines and explains the organ. This is evolution itself. It is also proper to notice here the exaggerated and too exclusive tendency of a derivative sociological school which assimilates the life of societies to an entirely psychic life, either recognizing a real resemblance between the nervous system and the social system (Lilienfeld), or developing in a one-sided way both the resemblances and differences between collective psychology and psycho-physiology (E. Tarde, Lebon, Sighele, Simmel, L. F. Ward, Giddings, Baldwin, Izoulet).

This evolution of sociology was, however, both logical and natural. Integral and confused in the beginning, it endeavored successively to explain social phenomena by the laws of the antecedent sciences, keeping pace with the advancing organiza-

tion of these sciences. Next, it demanded the answer to the enigma from the particular social sciences. Finally, after having concluded, with Karl Marx and A. Loria, for example, that the most general interpretation must be economic, it arrived, by a true law of apparent return to the origin, at the knowledge that the interpretation of the social world must be sought from the whole, both of inorganic and organic nature, of which the societies are the spontaneous development; and, at the same time, from the *ensemble* of the seven classes of social phenomena, in the order of importance which their hierarchic classification has revealed to us. In short, sociology can be only an integral conception of the highest combination formed by the inorganic and organic factors, land and population, in the many social forms.

Our work would be incomplete if we did not also mention, as the fourth and last affluent of positive sociology, the contributions of the scientific specialists who have consecrated their labors to the study of one or more of the seven classes of particular sciences, including the elementary and abstract as well as the formal and concrete. Among these contributions, before all others, are those of the economic scientists, who belong to the sociological school because of their method, and because they never lose sight of the correlation of economics with the whole of social science. In particular, it is necessary to recall the works of A. Thierry, disciple of Saint-Simon, those of John Stuart Mill, de Laveleye, Fustel de Coulanges, Wagner, Mommsen, Paul Viollet, Morgan, H. Sumner Maine, Max Müller, etc., etc. All, in their different specialties, are sociologists; it is chiefly by their works, which serve as an intermediary between elementary sociology (represented by comparative and coordinated statics) on the one hand, and general sociology on the other, that the latter science is destined to be perfected through the continued progress of studies relating to the structure and evolution of particular institutions and societies.[1]

[1] In our *Elementary Sociology* there is a methodical list of many works whose study we recommend to those who are preparing themselves for the study of general sociology. (Bruxelles: F. Larcier, 1894–95.)

If at this point we cast a retrospective look upon these tributaries which have contributed and still contribute, in spite of their errors and their apparent detours, to increase the vast stream, sociology, we shall no doubt be struck by the small place which social pessimism occupies in this general evolution. In fact, this doctrine troubles only the surface of the majestic and limpid flow of the broad river which carries civilization toward the great intercontinental oceans. There is no scientific pessimism, no pessimistic socialism. On the contrary, all the efforts of the scientists and the workers predicate a continued reaction of humanity against physical and social miseries, a more and more perfect adaptation to the terrestrial and collective environment. Pessimism that throws off all constraint is the portion of decadent aristocracies; neither science nor work has ever despaired of the future.

As we have to proceed to the methodical investigation of constant and necessary relationships — that is to say, to the investigation of the general abstract laws of the structure of the *ensemble* of societies — it is advisable to recall these preliminary considerations in order that we may not lose sight of them. Therefore we repeat here, what we have developed in *Les lois sociologiques*, that each science has its own method, but that each method is applicable to sociology, because the latter is the science of the highest combination of inorganic and organic factors. Likewise the method appropriate in sociology is retroactively applicable to all the antecedent sciences, as is shown by the historical studies relative to these sciences, especially since the advent of sociology.

SCIENCES.

Mathematics, mechanics, astronomy: method, direct and indirect observation.

Physico-chemical sciences: the same as the preceding plus the experimental method.

Biology: the preceding methods plus the comparative method.

Psychology: the preceding methods plus the logical methods, deductive and inductive, of concordance, difference, residuums, and concomitant variations, the four processes which are an artificial or rational prolongation of the experimental method.

Sociology: the preceding methods plus the historical method.

As examples of the utilization of subsequent methods by the antecedent sciences we may cite:

First, the application of the historical method to sciences other than the social sciences, and the utility of this application from the point of view of the progress of inventions.

Second, the physical experiment of Plateau upon the formation of nebulæ. By means of a tube, a drop of oil was introduced into the center of a mixture of water and alcohol contained in a vase. Through the axis of this drop there was passed a spindle, which was given a regular rotary movement. The sphere of oil turned with its axis. It became flattened at the poles and expanded at the equator. From this enlargement there became detached a sort of ring which broke into globules, each of which began to turn around the central mass.

As examples of the utilization of antecedent methods by the subsequent sciences we may cite:

First, the application of the experimental method to physiology and biology.

Second, the application of this same method to sociology, for example, in the private and collective experiments made concerning the influence of a reduction of the hours of work upon productivity.

The retrospective view which we have just taken of the structure and evolution of the social theories and methods which have united in the formation of sociology permits us to observe that it is the simplest and most general sciences with their appropriate methods, consequently the sciences first perfected (the mathematical sciences, mechanics, astronomy), which imparted the first forms and the original direction to sociology. Later, and successively, social conceptions have been under the influence of the physico-chemical sciences, especially in theories of the natural order of societies and of liberal economy. Still later they received the impress of biology; and finally, toward the end of the nineteenth century, and also at the present time, they have been influenced by psycho-physiology.

This subjective evolution and this subjective organization of our social knowledge are parallel with the objective formation

and objective evolution of social phenomena; they are therefore natural. Thus sociology and societies are the true, logical continuation of the antecedent sciences and of the universal order.

Biology and psychology are the natural transition to social science. Biology reveals to us cellular differentiations, cellular associations, that is to say, groupings and combinations of organisms; it reveals to us a physiological division of functions, in relationship with an organic differentiation contributing to the collective life and structure of the whole; it shows to us the division of sexes which imposes, in certain species, at least a momentary union of beings who are forced by nature to complete one another, and also even at times to disappear when once the work of reproduction is realized.

Psychology, apart from the collective organization of all of the organs and groups of organs belonging to the nervous system, reveals to us associations of movements, of emotions, of sentiments, of ideas, of states of consciousness more or less complex, sympathetic phenomena: fears, panics, imitations, etc.

In the case of certain animals, groupings of the collective psychic states are produced by the mere fact of juxtaposition, by the placing together of individuals of the same species or of different species. We see the formation of animal societies, just as we have seen the uniting of cells and groups of cells. Thus, naturally, to the other properties of unorganized, organized, and conscious matter are added the social properties, by a slow evolution which is so unbroken that even psychology seems necessarily to be collective; from which follows the deduction that even society should be a phenomenon of collective psychology. In fact, sociality appears at the summits of biology and psychology, which, by a truly organic filiation, are united by it to the structure of societies.

Thus, social science begins where the domain of biology and psycho-physiology ends, but there is continuity between these two domains.

Another observation results from the history of the organization of social science and as a corollary from the preceding

observation. It is that the progress of sociological evolution leads us to consider social phenomena as less and less immutable, fixed, absolute, and unmodifiable. Biology, and especially psychology, prepare us to recognize, not merely the simultaneous characteristics of social phenomena, but also the successive and variable characteristics; biology has laid the foundation of "social transformism." Order, which was at first conceived by the old writers as immobile both in social science and in biology, was recognized later as an evolutional successive order; psychology, with its phenomena, which are so very mobile although they are subordinated to the nervous systems which have themselves been evolved from the simple cell to the most complex organs, acts in the same manner upon the old conceptions both of organic and of social life. Statics retained its logical and historical precedence over dynamics, but the latter became the characteristic of organic and collective life to such a degree that statics was thrown in the shade by the more recent schools. However, sociology will always remain subordinated to the natural inorganic order, in which constancy and fixity are relatively predominant, especially in the phenomena belonging to the mathematical and physical sciences. On the other hand, the progress of dynamic science will only increase the importance of statics, by showing that evolution itself is a continued equilibration.

If concrete sociology is chiefly concerned with the qualitative laws of particular societies, laws deduced from the historical description of the societies, if therefore it accords more importance to variable conditions—abstract sociology, in its turn, by eliminating the variable conditions, leads us back to the consideration of the constant laws of societies, but with the higher conception that there is a static order in dynamic evolution. In reality, the social order, more than all other orders, is evolutional; and social evolution, as well as all other evolution, is ordered; the difference is only in the intensity of the evolution and the degree of organization.

However, it is necessary never to lose sight of the fact that a sociological law is virtually constant and necessary only so

long as the conditions of the phenomenon studied are constant. This constancy is therefore relative in concrete sociology in proportion as one considers the more special, and therefore the more variable, conditions and relationships. When, in the first two parts of the *Introduction to Sociology*, we touched upon the study of abstract science especially from the point of view of method, and without the rash, and at this time premature, pretention of organizing an integral and perfect sociology, we found ourselves in the presence of a world both considerable and mysterious, on account of its size and because of the complexity of its materials and of their combinations. This world appeared to us unfathomable and hopelessly intricate. From the point of view of mass and magnitude, it extended from the smallest societies to that universal society of which we have a vague idea. The phenomena which were manifested in this mass appeared to be infinite in quantity and indefinable in quality. They were intangled in a medley of discouraging complexity, of extraordinary variety.

General scientific development is confronted historically by the same difficulties that face each of us in his individual education. Social science has advanced in accordance with the laws of the individual mind. It began with purely empirical and superficial observations, with the examination of simple special cases. It has advanced only step by step to positive synthesis, to abstractions. Moreover, it has always begun by seeking, by means of that which it already knows, to explain that which it does not understand as yet, or that which it perhaps may never understand.

It is thus, for example, that the social order was conceived as providential, as resulting from a commandment, from a fiat of a superior, analagous to what was customary in ancient societies in the chase, in war, and in the other successive forms of rudimentary activity. It was only very recently that the social order lost this primitive significance of commandment and was conceived as natural, but invariable, in the same manner as inorganic matter, of which there was already a more exact knowledge. This new theoretical conception corresponded also to practical social

life. For example, toward the end of the eighteenth century, and at the beginning of the nineteenth, the conception prevailed of a natural and spontaneous order of societies, obedient to the invariable laws, which science must be satisfied with knowing, and which politics must free from all artificial hindrance to absolute liberty of action. It is only in later times that the social order has been regarded as naturally variable, that is to say, as a relative, evolving order. This more correct theory will necessarily transform social politics into its image. Beginning with this time, sociology may be considered as scientifically established, that is to say, established in possession of its own domain and its own method.

In sociology, as in every other natural science, we have to study the phenomena which are presented to our investigations as a mass. Therefore, as medical students proceed with an organism submitted to them, or as an infant with a doll which awakens its first curiosity, so in a similar manner, but on a larger and more complex scale, have we, in our past researches, begun by tearing our doll to pieces; we have proceeded to its dissection, to its completest possible analysis. Our first and most general observation has been that every society is a combination of two elements: First, an environment, to which I have given the name land, but which is composed of all the inorganic factors, and also all the organic factors, of nature, with the exception of man. The study of this environment in its relationships with the second element, population, may be made the subject of a special science, *social mesology*. The second element is the *human population*, that is to say, that division of organized beings, those mammiferous animals, belonging to the order of primates, to the family of bimana, which certain determined characteristics constitute a particular species. This second element may be made the subject of another special preparatory science, *anthropology*.

These two elements, land and population, embrace the entire domain of the antecedent sciences: they are the constitutive material whose reciprocal actions and reactions produce the social phenomena, societies.

Here it is appropriate again to point out an almost universal error of sociologists, which consists in considering societies as the result of merely biological and psychic combinations, especially the latter.[1]

Every sociological phenomenon assumes and implies the two elements, land and population, in sociology; these elements are inseparable. Thus, to borrow an example from the simplest and most general social phenomena, the economic, there are among the factors of production, besides labor and capital, the natural agents, earth, water, solar heat; the economic phenomenon of land rent is closely connected with these natural agents. This factor is as constant as the human factor. This blending of the natural agents is universal in sociology; no social phenomenon is purely psychic or ideologic.

In his work upon positive philosophy (Tome, IV, XLIXe Leçon), Auguste Comte, after stating the necessary relationships of *social physics* with the other fundamental branches of positive philosophy, very properly said that *social physics* is hierarchically subordinate to the latter, and he added:

> The positive study of social development necessarily implies the continued correlation of these two indispensable ideas: *humanity which accomplishes the phenomenon* and the constant *ensemble* of exterior influences, the scientific environment properly speaking, which governs this partial, secondary evolution of one of the animal species.

However, this thought of Comte's is only a defective approximation to reality. In the first place, humanity is only a derivative conception; it does not accomplish the social phenomenon; it is itself the highest accomplished social phenomenon, and this phenomenon is realized by the combination and the fusion of the two general, elementary factors, land and population. In no society do we find an agent and a passive recipient, an actor and a theater. The agent is at the same time the recipient; the actor forms an integral part of the theater. For Comte's dualistic conception we substitute, then, a monistic conception. We may observe, however, that Comte's conception is superior in every

[1] Especially M. Tarde, who has very well summarized this false point of view in the *Scuola positiva* of September 15 and 30, 1893, pp. 780 ff.

respect to the conceptions of the biological and psychological schools, as the latter are merely one-sided, being monistic only in appearance.

Here, then, are the irreducible elements of societies; societies are the transformed products of these elements. Thus societies not only continue, but also contain, all nature, and sociology is the true daughter of the other sciences, uniting their hereditary characteristics with its own acquired qualities.

CHAPTER III. THE SOCIAL AGGREGATES.

In sociology, as in the other sciences, we do not generally know the aggregates in their inmost composition, in their simple elements. At first they present themselves to us in the composite, concrete state. Previous to our analysis, the social superorganism appeared to us as a complex whole. It is still so even afterward, but with this enormous difference, that this vast, mysterious body has revealed to us the elements which enter into its nature, the properties which its tissues manifest, the functions, the organs, the groups of organs, the systems which regulate the activity of these properties, and even that related knowledge, especially of descendance and of filiation, which shows how these many parts are devoted to the service of the structure and the life of the *ensemble* of societies. We are able, therefore, to define the social aggregates. In general, following the definition of Littre, an aggregate is "the mass produced by the union of different substances which have become united from the moment of their formation." In the same way, a social aggregate is the mass produced by the union of different substances, land and population, united together from the time of their formation. Any mass of social matter which is united together—here is the first general condition of all social structure; and this matter is indissolubly composed of human units and an environment no longer unconnected and antithetical, but combined and aggregated, forming a unified whole. It is therefore a cardinal principle, the neglect of which vitiates all the sociologies, that man is not sufficient to constitute a society. Society must include a correlative part of the rest of nature.

Union of these two different elements, land and population, into a whole—this is a primary, universal law of every society, the basis of all social statics.

Any social aggregate, however simple it may be, is, then, in itself a combination of different elements implying a constitutional differentiation. It includes a certain extent and quantity of inorganic and organic nature and a certain number of human units. This social aggregate may be partial; that is to say, limited to a group of human beings and lands. It may even go so far as to include the whole of humanity and the planet. Its conditions will be the same in the two cases, with this difference, that, in the first, the social aggregate will be limited either by other social aggregates or by an external territorial environment not yet socialized; that is to say, not yet combined with constitutive human units into an aggregate. The bees do not constitute a society without the hives. It is the nest which is at the basis of every society of insects.

The phenomenon called society is, then, a relationship. It implies a constant, necessary, combination of the following conditions: (*a*) a social mass composed of, first, land; second, popuulation; (*b*) the union of the two different elements of this mass into a whole; (*c*) a certain differentiation of this latter from the other social aggregates, or from the rest of the land, unless the entire planet has been organized into a superior social aggregate, binding together, in the same condition, the particular social aggregates. Wherever these conditions are found united, the phenomenon society appears. Here is the most general static law, the most general law of existence, the primary, fundamental condition of all social structure.

We find here the two permanent factors of every organic equilibrium: (1) a certain internal arrangement in harmony with (2) a certain arrangement of the external environment; an internal arrangement of parts united together, or internal equilibrium; harmony of this arrangement with external environment, external equilibrium; combination of these two equilibriums into a single, complete equilibrium. All the most extended and the most complex social structures will be only special cases of this

simple general structure. All known facts prove that the juxtaposition, in any part whatsoever of space and at any point whatsoever in time, of these two elements, land and population, necessarily and constantly produces a social structure characterized by the preceding conditions. Nothing proves better that societies are formations which are neither exclusively biologic, exclusively psychic, nor yet merely physical and mechanical. The formation and conformation of societies may be explained in an entirely natural manner without implying the intervention of a mysterious theological or metaphysical force; the non-formation or the different conformation of societies would be miraculous and incomprehensible under the conditions which we know. Sociology has also this advantage over the other natural sciences, of being able to show, either historically or by observation of the present, social forms in process of differentiation, and therefore reduced to the simplest, most general conditions. Without taking into account prehistoric populations, Australia, Africa, Asia, America, and even the lower strata of certain of our European populations, present specimens of this rudimentary social existence, resulting from the single fact of the meeting of a certain number of human beings in a definite environment, and of their social fusion with this environment.

The point of view of the mesological school and that of the anthropological school, in which I include the psychological branch, are equally true, but they are only in a state of uniting and merging into a broader interpretation. In sociology, man and the environment, the actor and the theater, the subject and the object, the agent and the recipient, are only one; they are the indissoluble parts of a single aggregate; their dissociation implies the dissolution, the death, of the social structure.

We have already stated that the inorganic as well as the organic structures prepare us for the appearance of societary structures. Molecular aggregates are also masses of atoms united together. Organized beings are associations of cells. The same is true of the nervous systems, from which arise our states of consciousness, our combinations of desires, emotions, sentiments, and ideas. In the same way the concourse of indi-

viduals is formed by the environment. It is composed, not only of individuals, but of individuals and the environment. Society is a superior form of the whole of nature, a necessary form of conservation and adaptation. The solitary tree dies in the same climate in which the forest endures and enlarges its extent, but the tree and the forest are inseparable from the earth.

A second constant necessary law of every social aggregate is that the appearance of the phenomenon called society involves the spontaneous production of the entire series of phenomena or properties that belong to the social matter: the economic, genetic, æsthetic, scientific, ethical, juridic, and political properties. All societies, even the most rudimentary, even those limited by the most special aim, manifest, by the mere fact of their formation as aggregates, these seven classes of properties. This statement is incontestable with respect to the first two properties. Nowhere, neither in prehistoric peoples nor in inferior populations, living or extinct, do we see verified the hypothesis of the human individual living exclusively by his isolated efforts, and reproducing his kind without at least intermittent sexual relations. We likewise observe on every hand certain physico-psychical manifestations in connection with the successess obtained, or the failures sustained, in the military, economic, or genetic life; a certain tendency to manifest joys and sorrows, and even to regulate them; to embellish either the habitation and the instruments of labor and warfare, or the human person itself; everywhere the relationships with the internal and external environment give rise to certain beliefs—beliefs which are at least empirical, whether true or false, and which are soon unconsciously and unintentionally systematized. These beliefs assist more or less in the guidance of the members of the group, and become fixed in collective customs which involve approbation or blame, and, under certain circumstances, a support or a repression, which is also collective. Everywhere, in fact, the whole of the aggregate submits to a general direction, conscious or not, organized or diffused, which was itself produced only by the most general internal and external necessities. So it is with those bands of wolves which are guided like a blind force through the

steppes with an irresistible, although blind, uniformity and cohesiveness.

This law, that every society implies the spontaneous and simultaneous production of the whole series of social phenomena, is only apparently contradictory to the law of the filiation of the same phenomena, which was set forth in Part I, and to that of the filiation of functions and organs set forth in Part II, of *L'introduction à la sociologie*. In fact the constant, necessary coexistence in every aggregate of all the social characteristics is, in rudimentary societies, a confused, homogeneous, coexistence; that is to say, the superior phenomena, and especially their organs, are not yet differentiated, and will be differentiated only in succession. Thus the æsthetic, intellectual, moral, juridic, and political activities of rudimentary societies are manifested only as they are involved in the economic and genetic structure and life. This is all the more true as each of the primary social properties gives spontaneous birth, in its own special domain, to the entire series of subsequent properties. In this way, there is a sexual, artistic, scientific, moral, juridic, and even political, activity which is purely economic. Whatever may be the form assumed in time and space by the social aggregates, all, without exception, include the entire series of social properties, whether these aggregates are amorphous hordes, tribes, clans, families, cities, nations, or confederations of states; whether the aggregate is the vast human society or the smallest special society formed contractually according to the provisions of civil or commercial law; whether it is a professional syndicate or humanity. There is no contradiction between the law of primitive and persistent homogeneity and the law of successive differentiation. The constancy and the necessity of all the social properties in every aggregate, however rudimentary it may be, are, on the contrary, the explanation harmonizing the one law with the other.

Every fragment of social matter is, then, a complete social aggregate, so long as this fragment is not reduced to a single human unit, or to a portion of land without human units. It is complete because, from the mere fact of the juxtaposition of the

two constitutive factors, and of the actions, reactions, and combinations which are the consequence of this juxtaposition, it forms a social substance, an aggregate. However, as we have already indicated, this idea of the social aggregate, such as it is, is not yet sufficient to permit us to advance by it alone to the conception of *social structure*, of social statics, of equilibrium. Up to this point, we know only the social mass composed of different parts and endowed with a certain number of properties. In order to advance to the comprehension of the idea of structure, there is needed the supplementary notion of a certain arrangement of the constitutive parts of the aggregate. This arrangement must be such that the social mass can hold itself in equilibrium, not merely in a state of repose, which is only an abstraction, but also in a state of movement, which is the other inseparable aspect of life.

The simplest, the most general arrangement for every social aggregate is that which results from a differentiation between its mass, composed of the elements which we know, and the external environment. We temporarily neglect the latter in order that we may consider the internal arrangement of the parts in relationship to the structure and the service of the whole. A substance may be called organized when it is composed of simple elements more or less numerous, and united by special combination and reciprocal dissolution. This is the character of the simplest, most elementary organic order. However, in general, each anatomical element possesses also another characteristic of organic order, a characteristic that is found only in living bodies; this is the possession of a structure, of a function. Structure implies, then, a correlated arrangement, with mediate or immediate continuity, of the particular organs, groups of organs, and systems constitutive of the general structure. Matter called organic is in reality *organized* only when there is structure, that is to say, a determined juxtaposition of matter organically differentiated.

Likewise in sociology the mass or aggregate may be considered as superorganic whenever it is composed of inorganic, organic, and psychic factors combined, and therefore necessarily

manifesting the seven groups or classes of social properties in such a manner that these factors and properties are united among themselves by means of their special combination and reciprocal dissolution. Further, each social aggregate has another organic characteristic—a characteristic which it has in common with living bodies—namely, the possession of a structure, a special arrangement adapted to the general use; hence, also a correlated order, with mediate and immediate continuity of the particular organs or institutions which unite in the structure of the *ensemble* of the societies.

In fact, the amorphous social aggregate—that is to say, a social aggregate without structure—does not exist. Every society, large or small, the simplest that can be found, has at least that general structure of the whole which consists in the formation of a mass of which the factors are multiple, and of which the elements and properties, derived from the combination of these factors, are arranged and united into a whole, which is at least partly distinct from the environment that surrounds and unites the factors in life and in death. We shall see later that another organic characteristic of every society consists in its being separated from others and from the external environment by a boundary.

The simplest, most general structure of societies may, then, be represented as an aggregate composed of heterogeneous factors, land and population, functioning in a homogeneous manner, and organized merely to this extent, that the many parts are directly or indirectly united to each other and to the whole, and are contained within limits.

If the last condition is disregarded, the social aggregate, considered solely from the point of view of the mass, may then be defined from the static point of view, viz., every combination of land and population whose parts are united together into a structure of the whole, the dissolution of the parts involving the dissolution of the structure and *vice versa;* the same being true in regard to their transformation. The simplest structure thus constituted internally in a homogeneous fashion maintains itself in equilibrium, first, by its peculiar structure; second, by

the relationships of its structure to the external environment. There is, then, both an internal and an external equilibration. When the external environment is likewise composed of social aggregates, there arises, from the very fact of their mutual equilibration, a composite social aggregate which is subject in its turn to similar conditions of equilibrium. From the mere juxtaposition of two or more societies which, as we may suppose, are closed to each other, there result, in every case, intersocial forms and reciprocal actions and reactions analogous to those which are manifested in every social aggregate by the seven classes of phenomena. So true is this that, in order that the entire series of phenomena may be produced as in a chemical laboratory, it is sufficient merely to place the constitutive elements of societies together.

A structure reduced to its simplest, most general expression, that is to say, a structure as homogeneous as a social aggregate can be, evidently remains in equilibrium only when confronted by the simplest internal and external conditions. If new circumstances arise—for example, either a scarcity of game, fish, and natural fruits or an abundance of the same—such a structure is quickly disposed either to go to pieces or to develop. It is necessary in every case that it adapt itself to the new conditions. This is true with respect to relations to external conditions whether they are social or not.

Every social aggregate is thus, so long as it exists, a state, *status* in the broadest sense of this word; that is to say, a structure held in equilibrium. This equilibrium is necessary and constant, although mobile and variable. It is a living equilibrium. This is a social law of the highest generality.

We have just seen how this social equilibrium comes about in its simplest form. It results when a social mass, which is limited by boundaries of greater or less extent, and all of whose internal parts are arranged in mutual equilibrium in a structure of the whole, maintains itself in equilibrium with respect to its environment. The precise object of social statics is the determination of the conditions of this equilibrium. All the antecedent sciences, mathematics, mechanics, astronomy, physics,

chemistry, biology, and psychology, confront the same problem. In sociology, however, the problem is more complicated than in the other sciences. In every case equilibrium results from a certain internal arrangement which is in harmony with external conditions. For example, take an instantaneous view of each of the consecutive positions of a runner. At each moment his body is in equilibrium. At each moment it is in a static condition. At each moment, and with each movement, it is in a state of repose. Even his fall is an inferior equilibrium, a return to equilibrium which has been disturbed by a maladroit adaptation of the internal parts to the external conditions. Likewise in every apparent state of repose his structure is in the dynamic state. Social equilibrium, like biologic statics, is always an unstable equilibrium, always changing; changing because of variations of the environment, or because of the action of the aggregate upon the environment corresponding continually to variations of the structure of the aggregate; also because of variations of the aggregate corresponding to variations of the different social environments.

By virtue of the laws of continuity of the mass, and of correlation of all its parts—laws which we shall explain later—every variation in any one of the parts corresponds to a variation of the whole. The variation of the whole may, moreover, precede, accompany, or follow variation in any one of the parts, but the phenomenon is unavoidable and constant. Finally, when social statics is brought to its simplest conditions, it may be reduced to equations of forces, in the same way as mechanical statics.

Statistics, because it notes the frequency, intensity, and duration of the properties of the social forces, is the natural preparation for statics and its natural instrument. By means of statistics we are able not only to determine the abstract, qualitative conditions of social equilibrium, but also the concrete, quantitative conditions, so that we may measure them exactly. For example, when we learn by means of statistics that the nourishment of the laboring or productive force in the social aggregate, the Belgian nation, is less than the physiological expendi-

ture, we find that this mal-equilibrium is counterbalanced by a wearing out of the tissues, a drain upon the working force, and that this deplorable, regressive equilibration reacts upon the whole social structure, that is to say, upon the reciprocal situation of each of the component parts, affecting all the individuals as well as all material wealth and society in general.

Then, so far, the characteristics recognized in every aggregate as a whole are: a combination of different elements, of properties which are different, but universal, and in this sense homogeneous; continuity; the union of all the parts to each other; their union or correlation with the whole; constant equilibration.

Every society, however simple or complicated it may be, involves at least an organization of this nature. Every society is a superorganism because it is produced by several factors combined, whose combination gives rise to properties of an original character, at least partially different from the properties of the constitutive factors.

According to Herbert Spencer, the character of every social structure will be determined in all particulars by the nature of the component units. He brings to the support of this principle examples borrowed from physics, chemistry, and biology. Thus the begonia, as a plant, is the true reproduction of a single one of its leaves. A crystal, whatever may be its mass, is similar to the little crystals which compose it. This is true, but a society is not the same thing as a zoölogical human being. A vast society composed of many special societies will be the reproduction of the latter on a large scale, but not a reproduction of human units, since, at least according to our view, the human units are not the only factor of society. In fact, the principle of Spencer cannot be applied to cases in which the body considered is the product of a combination of different factors. The product of such a combination is always different in part from each of the component factors.

According to Spencer, social science has for its subject the relations of the units to the aggregates, or, to express the thought in a more precise, concrete way, the relationships of the

individual and the state. This point of view is incomplete. It neglects the inorganic and organic factors which enter into the texture of societies. It creates an antinomy which really does not exist between one of the constitutive elements of society and society itself. It does not take into consideration the characteristics which distinguish societies from individuals, and especially that societies, by the mere fact of their aggregation, are endowed with properties which are possessed neither by individuals nor even by simple collections of individuals. We have noted the principal of these distinctive characteristics, contractualism. Herbert Spencer has therefore not escaped the reefs where Auguste Comte himself was stranded. The former is not successful in proving the legitimacy of the organization of sociology. In fact, very logically from his inexact point of view, namely, the addition of units of the same nature, he is able to discover only the quantitative differences between the individual and society. And, while calling society a superorganism, he nevertheless places himself in contradiction to the very definition of organism given above, viz., a substance may be called organized when it is composed of more or less numerous simple elements, belonging to at least three distinct groups or classes, and united by special combination and reciprocal dissolution. A begonia leaf will reproduce the begonia. A large crystal will be composed of little similar crystals. But ten, one hundred, or more human units are by themselves alone incapable of forming a society, without forming among themselves a combination into which there also necessarily enter inorganic, organic, and psychic elements.

Every social aggregate, as a whole, may be increased or diminished: (*a*) by the increase or diminution of the human units which compose it; (*b*) by the increase or diminution of its mesological elements; (*c*) by the increase or diminution of these two factors combined, that is to say, by the increase or reduction of the social mass itself, of society.

Reduction of these conditions may even result in the suppression of the aggregate. This is the case with Jews, the American Indians, etc. They no longer form a special society.

Their human units and their environment have been absorbed by superior aggregates. Increase or diminution of the social mass is not absolutely of itself progress or regression; but each is a condition which is generally favorable or unfavorable to progress or regression. In zoölogical organisms we see, for example, at the two extremes as regards mass, the ant and the elephant. Individuals and groups of one of these species are almost as intelligent and advanced in civilization as individuals and groups of the other species. The ant and the bee are more intelligent and more advanced than the wolf and the hippopotamus.

Societies which are small in mass, such as ancient Greece, may be superior to vast social aggregates, such as Persia. However, it is necessary to take into consideration that in certain directions these little societies extend beyond their political limits; their activity stops there only in appearance; in reality they extend beyond, and their economic structure, religious structure, moral structure, etc., frequently embrace a world. Such at least was the Greek world.

A large mass, however, offers this potentiality, that, all other conditions being equal, it is necessarily exposed to a very large number of variations. But this is also a factor that may be as favorable to social progress as to social regression, that is to say, it is a factor favorable to a new equilibration, which may be superior or inferior. For example, if the larger aggregate does not succeed in becoming adapted organically to these variations, it will be exposed to dismemberment because of lack of co-ordination. In the place of a co-ordinated organic differentiation, it will present an unco-ordinated differentiation, a dislocation, an inferior state.

Increase of the mass, and also the differentiation of the mass which this increase favors, are not sufficient, then, to produce social progress. A third condition is requisite. It is necessary that the differentiated parts be co-ordinated with each other and with the whole. In this way only will the increase and the differentiation of the aggregate establish a new equilibrium, a state superior to the preceding states.

George Simmel also very correctly expresses the principle that "the sociological structure of a group is essentially modified by the number of the individuals that are united in it," in such a manner that, on the one hand, "certain forms which are necessary or possible from the contents or conditions of life can come to realization only before or after a certain numerical extension of the elements," and from the positive point of view "that other forms are promoted directly through definite and purely quantitative modifications of the group."[1] Thus, according to Simmel, the past and contemporaneous communistic forms have been possible only in relatively restricted circles, and have always failed in the extended groups. Although, in my opinion, true socialistic forms appear at the present time in the large capitalistic societies, and even in world-wide relations—an important phenomenon which has escaped the observation of Simmel—his principle is relatively correct, and we ourselves have indicated that quantitative development is generally a factor in variations, in qualitative differentiations. However, Simmel, like Herbert Spencer, takes into consideration only the human units in the texture of societies, and not the other equally essential factor, from which results the inorganic, organic, and psychic combination which is indispensable to every social form. From the quantitative point of view, this other factor has likewise influence upon the qualitative social structure.

CHAPTER IV. THE SOCIAL LIMITS.

Auguste Comte devotes the seventh and last chapter of the second volume of the *Système de politique positive* or *Traité de sociologie instituant la religion de l'humanité*, in which he sets forth *social statics* or *the abstract theory of human order*, to *the positive theory of the general limits of variation characteristic of the human order*.

This problem of the limits of social variations is one whose preliminary solution is indispensable to a clear distinction between social statics and social dynamics; it is the frontier line where statics and dynamics meet and become intermingled.

[1] "The Number of Members as Determining the Sociological Form of the Group," AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, July, 1902.

Auguste Comte understood this very well. Accordingly, on account of the importance of the problem, he has devoted the last chapter of his *Statics* to its study, as a transition to dynamics. His successors, absorbed in unilateral points of view, seem to have completely lost sight of the question. This is true of the representatives of both the biological and the psychological schools of sociology; and yet, guided by biology and psychology, sciences in which this problem is one of the fundamental questions, they ought to see *a priori* that the same problem presents itself, under special conditions, to sociology.

For other reasons than those which led Auguste Comte to end his *Statics* with the study of the limits of variation, we believe that we should make this subject the first problem of the general structure of societies, after that of the social aggregate considered as a mass, with which we have just been engaged. We consider it at this point for reasons of methodology. In fact, in order to form a correct idea of a superorganism, such as the social body, in a static state, it is necessary, in the first place—while passing from the simplest cases relating to the constitutive factors and, consequently, first of all, to inorganic nature, and advancing gradually to the more complicated and more special cases relating to biological organisms with their biopsychic derivations, and finally to social superorganisms—to determine what are the general and special conditions of equilibrium of each of these natural states or aggregates, and, above all, what are the conditions which at any moment limit and determine their mass and their forms. We have already indicated certain general conditions of their internal equilibrium from the point of view of the mass. It is now necessary to complete these ideas by bringing to light the relationships which result from these internal and external conditions, and to show what are the constant, necessary limits within which this equilibrium may oscillate or vary. We shall see that this study of the limits of variation in general will lead us to the philosophical interpretation of the more special case of the social limits of variation, and of the most particular case of all, the limits of variation of the so-called political boundaries of societies. May

the reader who does not cast this article aside pardon me for the unavoidable imperfection of this attempt, an imperfection which is inevitable because of the newness and difficulty of the undertaking. Others will smooth and enlarge the way which I have thought necessary to open to the researches of sociology.

The equilibrium of any aggregate is never absolute. It is a relative equilibrium, resulting from certain relationships among the elements of the internal structure and from certain relationships between these elements and the external environment. The structure and the life of a society are a more or less complete harmony of the elements of the society with the whole, and of this whole with the external world. The point is to explain how societies maintain themselves as structures, in a state of equilibrium of all their parts, either in the presence of other societies or merely in the presence of their external environment, which is itself not social, although likely to become so. Thus the sea and the desert, which at first may be isolating external environments, may be transformed into internal or external social environments as soon as they become thoroughfares and are integrated into a social combination by fusion with the human factor. What are the natural limits of the structure of societies considered in their *ensemble*, and what are the equally natural limits of the many organs, groups of organs, and systems of groups which are united together in this structure of the whole?

Auguste Comte, following the method (chiefly subjective and deductive) adopted in the *système de politique positive*, approached the theory of the general limits of variation characteristic of the *human order* directly, without a preliminary study of special sociological limits. The general law of the latter can, however, be only the conclusion and the expression of those special conditions relating to the economic, genetic, æsthetic, scientific, moral, juridic, and political order. On the other hand, we shall persist in the course followed up to this time of proceeding from the particular to the general, from the simple to the complex, from the concrete to the abstract. We go further: according to us, the problem of sociological limits is comprehensible and

solvable only after a preliminary view of the same questions in the inorganic and organic order, both concrete and abstract.

Besides, the conception of Auguste Comte (still more that of Quetelet) is also too largely mechanical and physical; and precisely for this reason it will be well to accustom ourselves to the truly natural conception of social statics by the study, directly from the point of view of the limits of variability, of the organic forms of which the societies are a continuation and a development, and in which statics assumes the special and more complicated form of structure. As for Herbert Spencer, in consequence of a natural and legitimate reaction against the old conceptions, he has been dominated too exclusively by the evolutionary aspect of societies and things in general, and seems to have completely neglected this fundamental aspect of the social equilibrium, this primary condition, this *sine qua non* of every organization.

We do not pretend, however, to develop a general philosophy of the structure of societies, nor even a theory of the limits of social variation. We even believe it impossible to succeed in an attempt of this character, in the present state of our knowledge, and with our imperfect instruments of investigation. Knowing all this, we shall dwell principally upon the order to be followed in these studies. It is method which will especially engage our attention. Only secondarily, as in the first two parts of our *Introduction à la sociologie*, shall we permit ourselves to state general, abstract conclusions. Even at this time sociology has a primary desideratum to realize, namely, a recognition of *what are the principal problems to be solved by it.* This object is far from realization. The best proof that this is the case is the almost complete neglect of the fundamental problem which we shall now undertake, as far as possible, to elucidate.

SECTION I. MATHEMATICAL LIMITS.

All phenomena are at first presented to our consciousness in their simplest and most general aspect, as more or less numerous, as occupying a space more or less extended, as simultaneous in duration or successive in time. In the field of

consciousness, the object is distinguished from the subject by the primary sensation of size or extent, which arrests our attention, and, by this resistance, at the same time traces relationships, limits, and a distinction between the *me* and the *not-me*. From the mathematical point of view, the simultaneous or successive order of the appearance of natural phenomena, whether physical, vital, psychic, or social, is subject to laws which the theory of probabilities makes known to us. The basis of this mathematical theory is that the quantitative variations in the appearance or disappearance of phenomena are limited by the conditions or chances which are favorable or unfavorable to the production of the phenomena. Thus, if six hundred balls, of which four hundred are white and two hundred black, are placed at random in a ballot box, the law of the appearance of the balls will be as four is to six or as two is to three. It is apparent that the variations in this case are limited by the very law of probabilities.

When the chances are limited and always the same, the problem is easy. The mathematical probability is estimated by dividing the number of chances favorable to an event by the total number of chances. Thus, in the example given above, the probability of the appearance of a white ball is $\frac{400}{600}$, or $\frac{2}{3}$; that is to say, the chances are two divided by three that a white ball will come out. The variations will be so much the less frequent as they differ more from this norm, from this mathematical limit.

The problem becomes more difficult when the task is to investigate what are the chances of the reappearance of a periodical phenomenon which has been observed many times in succession. Then the probability is great in proportion as the number of times that the event has been observed is increased and as our previsions extend a short distance into the future. With these conditions, in order to calculate the chances of the reappearance of the phenomenon, the number of observations increased by unity is divided by the same number increased by two units. If, for example, we have observed for ten successive days the periodical rising of the sun, the chances are eleven

divided by twelve that we shall see it rise again the eleventh day. If the periodical return of this phenomenon has been observed one thousand times, the probability will be represented by $\frac{1001}{1002}$. It is apparent, therefore, that after centuries of repeated performance the probability must be equivalent to a certainty and that the contrary event would be considered miraculous.

The difficulty increases and becomes enormous when we have to deal with complex facts, and especially with social facts. By themselves, the seven classes of social phenomena, considered as distinct groups without subdivisions, give rise to 127 combinations of classes. It is apparent, therefore, that the relationships which may be produced by the phenomena included in these classes are so nearly innumerable that they cannot be exactly calculated, although we can say that the possible variations of these relations are not unlimited. Nevertheless, from the mathematical point of view, whatever may be the character of the observations, the results observed do not fall indiscriminately on the two sides of an average, but in determined order, which is that of the scale of possibilities. The nature of this scale is determined by the number of the observations. The more numerous the latter, the more nearly they approach the average, and the relatively fewer variations or errors will they contain. If, for example, I measure the height of a mountain, and if my first estimates vary between nine hundred and eleven hundred meters, the more frequently I repeat my measurements the larger will be the number of the estimates that border upon the average of one thousand meters and the less numerous will be those which deviate from it.

In arithmetic as well as in geometry the field of observation and of variation is limited. One can form an idea of a magnitude only by comparing it with another known, limited magnitude, unity. Numbers are, then, the relationships between this known unit and a magnitude to be known. "Every number,' said Newton, "is the relationship of a magnitude to unity." Arithmetic is, then, the science of the *measurement* of magnitudes. Measure means limit; unity, which serves as the stand-

ard, is limited; the magnitude sought is equally so. In the same way, geometry is the science of the measurement of extent. For example, a straight line is defined as the shortest distance between two points. This definition indicates a constant, necessary relationship between two points which serve as limits. There are, then, mathematical limits in the estimate of all natural phenomena. As we are unable to form a correct idea of infinite space, or of infinite numerical quantities, without at the same time using finite measures and quantities, all observable phenomena are, from the mathematical point of view, conditioned and limited. All may be reduced to the calculation of probabilities. This amounts to saying that they have an average which constitutes their normal equilibrium, an equilibrium whose variations are limited in the sense that they decrease in proportion as they depart from this average. *From the mathematical point of view, and as far as phenomena can be exactly calculated and measured*, Fourier, Laplace, and Quetelet were right: all things, including social phenomena, can be reduced to averages.

When we apply the calculation of probabilities and the theory of averages to social facts, in order to reveal the *social order*, we must not, however, lose sight of the fact that these probabilities, these averages, can be applied only to homogeneous things, and not to heterogeneous phenomena. Now, the social structure is formed of unlike elements. In sociology, therefore, the theory of averages and of probabilities can be applied only to the categories of similar facts. It is inapplicable to the organic structure of either special societies or society as a whole; that is to say, to combinations of heterogeneous elements in organized wholes. Except from the point of view of number and extension, these organic combinations elude statistics and every mathematical theory.

Nevertheless, by co-ordinating the averages of each class of social phenomena in definite limits of space and time, we may obtain statistics summing up, at a fixed time and for a given territory, the elementary statics of a particular civilization. However, this statics, based upon statistics, will be insufficient to explain structure. Structure involves the higher idea of a

qualitative arrangement of organs which are united to each other for the use of a whole. It is necessary to add that the averages may vary widely in different epochs and civilizations. The average man, even from the point of height, does not exist unless the average is taken of one population. When the average is taken of all the heights at a given time and at a definite age, the larger number will not correspond to this average. In sociology, the constant, and especially the variable, conditions are so numerous and complex that they largely escape from the calculation of probabilities and the theory of averages.

It is somewhat interesting to note that Gumplowicz, while making a criticism of Quetelet—a criticism which was in part justified—really fell into a similar error. In *La lutte des races* he wrote:

> When Süssmilch, in 1742, imagined "*a divine order in the vicissitudes of mankind*," the statisticians began to observe the regularity of the movements of masses. However, in their observations, they took as a unity the first mass of population, *politically bounded*, which presented itself to their minds: the inhabitants of a city or of a state. These are not natural social units. Here is certainly the principal reason why the statisticians have not succeeded, in spite of their researches, in discovering universal laws. It is true that, for some time, statistics has manifested a tendency to specialize its observations, that is to say, to seek after the natural elements of these political bodies with a view to subjecting them to examination. It is because of this tendency that there has been a departure from political statistics to what is called *ethnographical statistics* (Wappaüs, Czörnig, Adolf Ficker), Quetelet did not contribute to this progress. Giving his attention only to *society*, a vague and nebulous notion, he arrives at the *average man*. This *average man* is a result of calculation, but of nothing else. In fact, it is not upon a society realistically considered that Quetelet founds his observations, but upon political bodies, such as cities and states. He is thus able to arrive only at chimerical laws governing the *average man*. These are not laws. Modern *ethnographic* statistics itself is only transitory. It prepares the way for a statistics which will take for its subject also the true ethnic or social units, and will succeed in this way in the establishment of true laws of the life and movement of the masses (an end which can be attained only in this way).

Unhappily, the author recognizes that his ethnic unity is not an idea of natural science, but is only a *historical idea*. Consequently, the criticism he makes upon Quetelet for looking only at states rebounds upon himself. In reality, states, as well as

races, are historical and natural formations. The author states that "at the present time races, in the sense that natural science attaches to this word, no longer exist," but "one may very well designate by the name of race *those ethnic and even heterogeneous social groups and communities*," and he specifies by adding that the race "is a *product of the historical process* which is, moreover, for it also a natural process." But, then, is it not in the same condition as states, and what is this unit which must serve as a measure, and which is composed of heterogeneous elements?

If, then, we reject the mathematico-statistical theory of Quetelet in part, that is to say, so far as it is inapplicable to the organic forms of societies, it is for more essential reasons than those indicated by Gumplowicz, reasons which involve the condemnation of the latter's own doctrine.[1] It is nevertheless true that all facts considered in themselves from the mathematical point of view have natural limits of variation, from the standpoint of both number and of extent, precisely because every number is limited, every extent is fixed and circumscribed. The simplest formula of the limits of variation and of equilibrium is, then, a mathematical formula.

SECTION II. MECHANICAL LIMITS.

As we have already seen, the idea of force, like that of number and of extent, is a relative and limited idea. It supposes at least the existence of two bodies more or less extended, whether atoms or worlds. From this simple coexistence of two bodies there naturally arises a relationship which manifests itself through a movement, through an equilibrium. Equilibration as used here necessarily denotes every movement which tends to produce or to destroy an equilibrium. Equilibrium must not be confused with the state of inertia. In every equilibrium there is movement. Only a relative immobility can exist between two bodies when their force is arrested. There is not an absence of movement, but neutralized movement. Such is the state of rest produced by the fall of a body to the surface of the earth.

Mechanics is the measure of forces. It gives us directly the

[1] For a discussion of this subject, see my observations in the work in preparation upon the static theories of Quetelet, Comte, and Spencer.

idea of statics, of a state of equilibrium. In fact, mechanical statics shows us the conditions of equilibrium of any system whatever. It is natural enough that economists, political theorists, and sociologists have attempted to reduce the scientific explanation of societies to purely mechanical laws; likewise, that others have tried to reduce it to purely mathematical laws. This historical process is logical, but these explanatious, precisely because of their too general and too abstract character, go outside of the sociological domain, and are insufficient. They are comprised more properly within the subject of general philosophy. They can and must be used by general philosophy, but not by the special philosophy of the social sciences.

Nevertheless, it is correct to include under the denomination of forces, not only the *mechanical* properties, but also the *organic* and *superorganic* properties of matter. In order to examine the problem of social equilibrium, it is necessary, first, to have the idea of mechanical equilibrium as it presents itself in inorganic matter; then, to pass to organic matter; finally, to pass to superorganic matter.

It is to be remarked that the transition from one of the lower of these three different forms under which matter presents itself to the succeeding higher form is effected in an uninterrupted manner, by insensible degrees, and not by abrupt leaps. In a word, it is an evolutionary passage from the one to the other. It follows that, in the lowest forms of organisms, equilibration is still *preponderantly* effected among forces which are chiefly mechanical.

Let us recall that mechanics rests upon three fundamental principles or properties of matter, principles which are demonstrable by experimental observation, and which are involved in every industrial application of mechanics. These principles are: first, *the law of inertia;* second, that of *the independence of the effects of forces;* third, that *action and reaction are equal.*

The first is sufficiently known; as to the second, it expresses that the effect of a force upon a body is always the same, whatever may be the velocity of the body, and whatever may be the other forces which impel it. If the body changes, the effect

varies accordingly. This principle is applicable not only to the purely mechanical forces, but also to the properties of inorganic, organic, and superorganic bodies, in so far as these properties result in the modification of the state of repose or of movement of the elementary parts. The sociologist, while studying social statics and dynamics, must always take into account that *every force* applied to a body always produces three different effects:

First, a certain increase of the total velocity.

Second, a certain total deviation.

Third, an instantaneous increase of velocity, or acceleration.

In sociology, as well as in mechanics and physics and elsewhere, matter and force are abstract concepts of properties which alone are known to us. The essence of force and matter is confused with their effects. Through the latter alone, force and matter exist for us. It is by the effects alone that we are able to measure them, to compare them from the point of view of the third effect, acceleration. If different forces are necessary in order to produce the same acceleration in the movement of different bodies, the conclusion will be that these bodies offer an unequal resistance. Mass may then be considered as the measure of the resistance to the movement. As to the law *action and reaction are equal*, it implies that in nature no force exists in isolation. For every force whatever there always corresponds another force which is equal to it, and which has an opposite effect.

SECTION III. ASTRONOMICAL LIMITS.

The astronomical bodies have limited structures, limited movements, and influences which are correspondingly limited. Our globe is far from being homogeneous. Its mass is differentiated into parts whose frontiers are quite distinct. Its center is in a melted state. A solid envelope formed of superposed layers follows. This superficial crust, which is of relatively slight thickness, since it equals scarcely a thousandth of the terrestrial diameter, is the inclosed field upon which all organic beings vegetate and live. This limiting envelope is the result of relationships between the inorganic terrestrial aggregate and the external factors, astronomical, atmospheric, climatic, etc. The

actual earth is a globe, having a radius of about 1,600 leagues, situated 37,000,000 of leagues from the sun, around which it revolves in 365 days. Its axis is inclined 67° to the plane of the ecliptic.

These form-limits of the earth result from relationships, past and present, between the internal mass in the course of its evolution and the external conditions, among which, and under the influence of which, these forms have been realized. Among the external forces which have contributed to limit the earth, and therefore to give it its general form, it is necessary to point out especially the other planets of the solar system. The limitation of the structure and movements of the solar system itself depends upon a vaster system. Moreover, since the discovery of Neptune, the frontiers of the solar system, becoming better known, extend more than one thousand millions of leagues. The movements, like the forms of the earth and the planets, are limited movements. All the planets move around the solar mass, executing at the same time rotary movements upon their own axes. All travel their eliptical orbits according to a general law of proportionality of the areas of portions of the elipse traveled over successively by the straight line which joins a planet to the sun, to the time employed in the traveling. The earth is a spheroid surrounded by a mass of air. This atmosphere is its real external covering, a covering which likewise is limited by the nature of its own internal composition, in relationship with the terrestrial mass and by the nature of bodies exterior to the atmosphere. Each of the many geological strata, in its turn, is limited by its internal constitution in relationship with the external strata. The earth and the celestial bodies in general are, then, formations limited in their structure and their movement in consequence of the reciprocal action of external forces upon central masses; their equilibration results from this reciprocal action.

Upon the structure and the equilibrated movement of astronomical bodies there are dependent other special structures and movements which are likewise equilibrated. For example, the structure and the movement of the earth determine the distribu-

tion of the climates in five zones: a torrid, comprised between the tropics; two frigid, limited by the polar circles; and two temperate zones, contained between the tropics and the polar circles. The structure and the movement of the earth also divide the year into four seasons. All these general limitations have in their turn relationships with the structure and the life of organized beings, including those organized into societies.

SECTION IV. PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL LIMITS.

Nothing seems to limit the dimensions of inorganic compounds. They are, however, formed of particles. Thus, although water has no texture or visible structure, it is nevertheless formed of distinct molecules. There exists between these molecules a resistance which separates them. This resistance arises from their thermic state, for when one heats water or makes it cold it passes into vapor or becomes ice; that is to say, its molecules acquire less or more cohesion. All unorganized bodies may take definite forms and augment their volume by the addition of similar parts. Each crystallizable substance has its characteristic crystalline forms. It never deviates from certain clearly defined geometrical forms, whatever may be its mass. Enlargement is always effected by adding to the exterior of the body similar parts which previously existed apart from it. Crystals, the most perfect inorganic bodies, are composed exclusively of a homogeneous substance. All are limited by plane surfaces which break following straight lines and constant, measurable angles.

As examples of the law of physical limitation, we may cite in crystallography:

First, *the law of symmetry:* When a crystal presents upon one of its elements (angles or edges) a certain modification, all the other elements crystallographically similar are modified at the same time in the same way.

Second, *the law of derivation:* If a modifying face intercepts upon the edges of a crystal of the dimensions x, y, and z, every other face placed upon the same element will intercept upon these edges according to dimensions x', y', and z', which wil[1]

satisfy the law that: the ratio $\frac{x}{x'}$ is in simple relationship with $\frac{y}{y'}$ and $\frac{z}{z'}$, so that $\frac{x}{x'} = m\frac{y}{y'} = n\frac{z}{z'}$, m and n being whole numbers or simple fractions like 1, 2, . . . ½, ⅓.

Whence results this form, these numerical limits? They are the product of two factors: first, the internal formative force inherent in the physical and chemical constitution of the matter itself; second, the external formative force which is the expression of the influence of the surrounding matter. The concurrence of these two forces, their reciprocal relations, determine the form and the volume of inorganic bodies, their composition and their decomposition, their actions and their reactions. The equilibration of these forces is the consequence of the relationship which exists between the structure of the bodies thus limited and the environment.

Physics and chemistry show us in a general way that the solid, liquid, and gaseous substances which compose the terrestrial globe are not indiscriminately mingled: the rocks, the liquids, the gases occupy definite, limited spaces. They show a certain order in their static disposition; this order and these limits are the conditions of their equilibrium.

Thus, just as our solar system gravitates around an unknown center, and just as in our system the planets gravitate around the sun, we also see all the bodies upon the earth equilibrated about its center by gravitation, and all the molecules of inorganic aggregates equilibrated differently among themselves, according to their different conditions, under the name of molecular attraction. In the same way, also, all the chemical modifications are the result of molecular equilibrations determined and limited by reciprocal relationships. Thus, the general law of limitation appears to us as inseparable from the very conception of aggregate or mass.

Chemistry, by showing us atomical and molecular equilibrations of greater and greater complexity, prepares us for the consideration of a new aspect of statics. The law of definite proportions, and that of multiple proportions, are examples of chemical limits. Indeed, it will remain with us to see whether

this law of limitation extends to the organic, psychic, and social world. In the first place, chemistry shows us especially that, in proportion as the combinations becoms more complex, they become more and more susceptible to modification by physical influences and by the actions and reactions of the atoms and molecules among themselves. Every new combination formed by the intrusion of atoms or of molecules into the environment of an existing aggregate must necessarily modify the equilibration of the aggregate, in its structure and in its movements, and give rise to a different equilibration. In general, the simple bodies are the most stable; for the most part, they resist all reagents. Carbon (diamond) is extremely stable; the compounds are less stable; the implex compounds are still less so. Experience demonstrates the increasing instability of compound bodies. This characteristic is manifested with a maximum of intensity in those organized bodies whose states of equilibrium are so varied and so variable that chemistry has not yet succeeded in determining the nature of many of the products of the higher combinations out of which life arises.

SECTION V. BIOLOGICAL LIMITS.

Organic matter is limited.

Its fundamental property, its characteristic force, is a constant tendency to a more and more complete adaptation to all the forces of the environment. In the lower stages, this natural tendency is favored by the division of the matter into portions with very small surfaces. Such division, augmenting the *whole boundary surface*, extends the field of activity of the matter, inasmuch as the vital energy is first exercised in a quasi-general manner on the *external surface*. Consequently life—that is to say, the sum of all these activities—augments when the organic matter is subdivided into very small particles. However, these considerations do not appear applicable to the higher forms of matter.

From the morphological point of view, the sphere has the inclosing surface which limits the maximum volume. This principle may be placed in relationship with two other theorems. According to the first, as stated in the capillary theory of

Laplace, every liquid withdrawn from the capillary forces exercises upon itself, by virtue of its cohesion, a normal pressure on the free surface, a pressure which is equivalent to a constant quantity augmented by the product of the average curvature of the surface, at the point considered, by a constant factor which depends upon the nature of the liquid.

$$P = K + \frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{1}{5} + \frac{1}{5}\right).$$

The second theorem, stated in the memoir of Z. Plateau upon the phenomena which result from the withdrawal of a free liquid mass from the influence of gravitation, shows us that the mass thus left to itself assumes the form of a sphere, which then constitutes a form of equilibrium. In fact, in a sphere, since the curvature is the same on all sides, the pressure which is mentioned in the theorem of Laplace is exercised on all sides, and the mass is in equilibrium.

The sphere is, then, a state of equilibrium between certain internal forces and other external forces. Applying the principle that a spherical surface limits the maximum volume, and the two theorems of Laplace and Plateau to inferior organisms, we ascertain, in the first place, that the conditions required for the application of these principles are to be found in organisms. According to Häckel, organisms in general are largely composed of water; the body of a man contains 70 per cent. This large proportion of water is especially remarkable in the case of the jelley-fish, which, according to the same author, contains 99 per cent. One may, then, without sensible error, liken such an organism to a liquid mass. Moreover, these inferior organisms floating in the waters of the ocean are removed from the influence of gravity. The principle of the maximum volume in a limited surface, and the two theorems of Laplace and Plateau, are, then, applicable to the inferior organisms. That of the maximum volume is in direct correlation with the natural tendency of matter to store the most life possible within the least surface. We may conclude that the surface limiting the elementary organic matter is clearly the result of an equilibration between internal forces and the most general forces of the environment.

If, now, in consequence of accidents, or in pursuance of their natural tendency, certain inferior organisms, overstepping their limit of energy, assume a form deviating from the spherical form, and consequently approaching the cylindrical form, they will be immediately subdivided into several spheres. For another theorem demonstrated by Plateau is this: A liquid cylinder, withdrawn from the action of gravitation, becomes unstable and subdivides into several spheres, as soon as its length exceeds the circumference of its cross-section. This theorem may explain, in part, from the mechanical point of view, the reproduction of inferior species by simple division. This occurrence would be first produced accidentally and would be repeated because of its utility.

The preceding shows us the natural relationship which unites the laws of inorganic equilibrium to those of organic equilibrium. However, the latter presents some special characteristics which it is advisable to elucidate, and which in their turn prepare us for the interpretation of social statics.

Vegetables and animals are composed of the same elements that enter into the composition of inorganic matter, but these elements are assembled in combinations which are not found in inorganic matter. There is an essential substance, composed of water and proteid substances, fat, carbohydrates, and minerals, which enters into the texture of all plants and animals *in life*. This substance is protoplasm. Protoplasm is a juxtaposition of divers proteid substances (albuminoids). In order that protoplasm may have life, it is necessary that it be intact and absorb water. While nothing limits the dimensions of inorganic combinations, such as crystals, every protoplasmic mass, as soon as it attains certain dimensions, divides itself spontaneously into several distinct masses equivalent to the mass from which they originated. Protoplasm exists, then, only in the form of individuals having a limited size. This is why all the living beings are necessarily composed of cells or of a society of cells.

In contrast with inorganic bodies, living plants grow by adding to the substances which constitute them similar sub-

stances which do not come exclusively from without. These latter substances are, on the contrary, manufactured in the body of the plant by the aid of more simple materials borrowed from nature. This is a new point of view which is destined to throw light on the sociological problem. The growth of the plant consists in the addition of a definite structure, as in the case of the crystal, but the plant grows by interior addition. One finds neither in the soil, nor in the water, nor in the air the compounds characteristic of the mass of the plant: albumen, gluten, starch, cellulose, and fatty matter. All the crude inorganic materials in them are furnished, however, by the atmosphere and by the soil: oxygen, nitrogen, carbonic acid, ammonia and water, argil and silica, lime, iron, potash, phosphorus, sulphur, etc. The plant divides all this primary material into different portions, in order to assimilate them, and to reunite them into new combinations at the interior of its structure-manufactory, where the new molecules distribute themselves among the old ones.

This is not all. In contrast with minerals, plants continue their development until a portion of their substance is detached in the form of seed or germ, and thus they reproduce their species. The same is true of the living animal. It is necessary, however, to note that most of the substances which the animal assimilates are provided directly by other animals and by plants. The animal also detaches a part of its substance, the egg, which gives birth to a similar animal.

The form of every animal and of every plant is, then, the product of the same relationships that we have indicated for the crystals. It results from the equilibration between two factors, the one internal, the other external. There is only this difference: the equilibration is more complex. The internal factor adapts itself spontaneously to the more special conditions, from which results life.

Consequently, it is easy to understand that, in the inferior forms of life, the individuals are not distinguished from the species, any more than the crystals are. They have no individuality. Thus, in the kingdom of protista, intermediate between the vegetable kingdom and the animal kingdom, and including

especially the monera and the rhizopods, the salient character of conformation, according to Häckel, is

> the invariably totally inferior development of their individuality. Numbers of protesta are, during their life, simple plastids, individuals of a primary order. Others, by combining together, form colonies of plastids. But even these individuals, although somewhat superior, remain for the most part at a very inferior degree of development. The inhabitants of these communities of plastids invariably resemble each other very much; with them there is only a very slight division of labor; consequently, their social organism is as incapable of elevated functions as that of the savages of New Holland. Besides, the union of the plastids is ordinarily very loose, and each of them always retains in a large measure its personal independence.

We observe that lack of individuality corresponds to a great personal independence, and that, with all living beings, social progress can, therefore, naturally be conceived as coincident with the development of individuality parallel to increasing solidarity. In spite of appearances to the contrary, individuality and solidarity are not contradictory, but the latter is the condition, the support, of the former.

At first sight it seems that the limits of morphological variations in the organic world are less precise than in the inorganic world. In contrast with crystals, the animal and vegetable forms appear to exclude all geometrical determination. They are ordinarily limited by curved surfaces intersecting in curved lines and at variable angles. Even from the point of view of geometrical lines, however, the radiolaria and many other protista are not different from crystals. Their forms may likewise be reduced to definite mathematical forms, limited by constant, measurable surfaces and angles. There are even absolutely amorphous organisms, like the monera, the amœba, which change their forms at each instant. Their forms are as indefinite as those of amorphous inorganisms, uncrystallized rocks, precipitates, etc., whose structure is nevertheless determined by the most general laws of mechanics. In general, however, every organic structure is limited. Every structure, in its double aspect of mass-limit, is in a constant equilibration with the environment which furnishes the materials that enter into its composition and support its activity. There is this difference, that in every vegetable or animal organ-

ism this variable equilibration is the result of an internal elaboration, which continually modifies both the materials borrowed from the environment and the structure, as well as the functioning resulting from the superior combinations produced by this assimilation and this elaboration. Every organism is not only limited in its structure at any period whatever of its growth, but even this evolution is limited:

> First, by their very perfection, the organisms come to be no longer susceptible to change in the presence of new conditions; for example, the horse, having now only a toe. His species would perish, if he were able to subsist only by a new modification of the feet.
>
> Secondly, at every epoch, there has been on the surface of the globe a category of predominant organisms, very perfect and not without descendants. Nevertheless the aristocracy of the subsequent epoch never springs from the preceding aristocracy, but always from unfinished types, from characters which are still simple, and which have retained a structure susceptible of varied adaptations.[1]

Later, while studying the social types, we shall see that the essential variations of these types are likewise limited in such a manner that it is always possible to reduce them to a few characteristic types. We shall show that this conclusion, which presents important analogies with the *theory of limited variability* set forth by Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire in his *Histoire naturelle générale des règnes organiques*, must be based upon the fact that, the social material being limited, the many combinations which may arise, although incalculable in the present state of our knowledge, are also necessarily limited. This is a new explanation of the *law of the apparent return to the primitive forms*, which must be limited, as in zoölogy, by this other law that evolution is not reversible, although this latter law may be far from being so rigorous in sociology as in zoölogy. Finally, our theory of the limits of social variation is totally different from the theory of form-limits of A. Loria and other sociologists.

The primary form resulting from this continual equilibration of organized matter is the consequence of this rudimentary general necessity. It manifests itself by the appearance at the sur-

[1] A. Lameere, *Le transformisme.*

face of the organic mass of a covering or membrane more or less distinct from this mass. This is the first and fundamental differentiation of every organism. The succeeding differentiation is the formation of a nucleus in the little mass of protoplasm.

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[*To be continued.*]

A STUDY OF SOUTHERN COTTON-MILL COMMUNITIES.

CHILD LABOR. THE OPERATIVES IN GENERAL.

THE strenuous bitterness with which a majority of the cotton manufacturers in Georgia have for several years fought the passage of a statute prohibiting the employment of children under twelve years of age in factories, mines, and similar places of labor in this state is scarcely to be taken as a trustworthy gauge of the sentiment of southern employers at large.

It is true that up to the present time only four southern states have stood in line with the twenty-two representatives of other sections as having legislated in this direction. But it is only fair to bear in mind that the necessity for such enactment did not arise in this section so early by several generations as in the manufacturing East or the mining West. Twenty years ago there were in all the cotton states only 667,000 spindles, which converted but a meager fraction of this region's great staple into yarn. That number has since been multiplied more than ten times, making approximately 7,000,000 spindles now in operation here. The growth of the industry has been so phenomenal that legislation along related lines has failed to keep pace with it.

Yet one who studies closely certain sociological and industrial phases of the situation must feel convinced that, despite the recent defeat of the child-labor bill before the Georgia legislature, child labor itself is destined to prove but a temporary expedient in the southern factories. Not only is the sentiment of the people at large quite as much against it, after less than a score of years' trial, as was the sentiment of the New England states when more than one generation had fairly grown up in their mills, but there are also practical agencies militating against the system and proving very powerful in co-operation with moral and civic considerations.

The Labor Commission of North Carolina has issued an official report, in which it is set forth that, while in 1895 there were 6,046 children employed in the factories of that state, there were in 1899 only 3,308, of which number 1,694 were boys and 1,614 girls. During the four years in which this decrease of 50 per cent. in child labor was taking place there was an increase of 50 per cent. in the number of women and 100 per cent. in the number of men similarly employed, to meet an increase of nearly 40 per cent. in the number of spindles. Were bureaus of labor already established in each of the cotton states, it is reasonably certain that reports of kindred significance would now be issuing from them; for the situation in one of these states is much the situation in all the others.

The restriction of child labor by law is looked to as an early probability in North Carolina, but that has had nothing to do with the remarkable decline shown in the commissioner's figures. Nor are we such Utopians as to attribute the whole of this gratifying result to the strong aversion exhibited by some of the most influential manufactories, as notably the Erwin Mills at Durham and the Caraleigh at Raleigh, to that which is the most cruel form of slavery. Other active causes have been at work; economic considerations are potent factors here as elsewhere.

Manufacturers in this part of the country, as in Massachusetts or Illinois, are learning the lesson that it is a false economy, with expensive practical as well as ethical results, which prompts the employment of the low-priced labor of children. Delicate machinery operated at high speed demands more intelligent and steadfast attention, to secure the best results, than untaught and usually careless childhood can give it. The direct loss thus involved counts heavily in the course of a year, and comes to be weighed comparatively as the adult labor of a section grows more skilful and satisfactory; nor are clear-headed mill men slow to discover that such loss, estimated closely, is by no means compensated for by the low scale of wages to the child operative.

With all these considerations before him, one must arrive at the satisfactory conclusion that child labor in the factories of our

country is a rapidly vanishing evil. From such a conclusion it is not unnatural to desire to pass on to a study of the homes and the family life of the mill operatives throughout the new manufacturing South; and to the student of sociological problems a few weeks or months spent in the factory towns will prove rich in results.

Having visited a score or these interesting communities in different cotton states, I find myself still drawn back to them by haunting suggestions of unexplored phases in the social life, domestic order, industry, education, or moral codes of their people. It is a many-sided matter that we touch when we discuss the homes and the home-living of the world's toilers. Nor will conscience be slow to protest against any hasty judgments concerning a life into which we come only as an exotic element.

I find points of distinct difference between the factory operatives of the South and those of any other section of our own country, or even Europe.

In the first place, there are no urban instincts in these southern mill communities. Whatever virtues they lack, at least they have not the vices of cities. The good and the evil in them are still such as belong to a strictly rural people. But no one must expect after another decade and a half to find the same thing true; for with the passing of the present generation this unique characteristic must of necessity be largely lost. Gregariousness of living is potent to efface such a mark even when deeply stamped.

It may be asked: What are the indications of this quality which, for lack of a better word, is named "rusticity"? The signs are many and easy to read. No observant person can miss the plain evidence even in his first day with the mill people. He walks past the cottages row on row, and sees prince's feather and bachelor's button growing in the tiny yards, patchwork quilts sunning from the windows, and strings of red pepper festooned on the back porch. The boys are quite often chewing tobacco, but they are not smoking cigarettes. Often, alas! the girls dip snuff, but they do not lace in their waists nor attempt handkerchief flirtations. The women are given to quiet, and a

profound reserve usually marks their social intercourse. The festive gatherings in the "amusement halls" on Saturday nights are either stiff parties or genuine country dances. The "barbecue" is common on a general holiday, and the "all-day singing" of a Sunday still remains the acme of enjoyment, affording the perfect blending of sociality and devotion.

One might go on indefinitely with such signs. But since this matter will be encountered again when we arrive at the discussion of education and social life among the operatives, we leave it without attempting to adduce other convincing proofs of their rural proclivities.

A second quality differentiating our people from the northern factory communities of today is what may well be called their unmodified Americanism. Up to the present time there is an entire absence of the foreign element of population among them, and the effect of such absence is very marked. Not only do better manners prevail in this people sprung from our own soil, but better morals, greater social purity, less turbulence and lawlessness. Observance of law is easier, more natural, even to illiterate Americans, than to other nations, because law has typified to them from childhood the majesty of right, not the tyranny of might.

The finer respect for women which marks American manhood extends also to these toilers. Except among their very lowest, motherhood inspires the regard it meets in other social classes; and, while in many of the mills the number of female employees exceeds that of males, yet in few of the better kind are there any mothers of young children at work.

These considerations lead at once to the questions: Where does such a class of labor come from? What are its antecedents?

The first is easily answered: the operatives have poured into the new factories, not from town or city, but from the country, direct from the cotton fields, we may say, to the mills. It was certainly not an anomalous movement when cotton was bringing 4¾ cents per pound. But with the staple commanding 9 to 10 cents, some reactionary phases must be looked for and provided against.

The antecedents of this class of labor deserve some attention. A great majority of the operatives come from the agricultural class known as tenant farmers; that is, men who farm the land of others, paying as rent a considerable portion of each year's crop. The tenant system was adopted in the South during the period of disorder and chaotic ruin following the Civil War, when our old system of labor was dissolved and no better base remained on which to build anew the fabric of agricultural life. Unfit as it is for a country of such institutions as ours, and the source in itself of very sore evils, the tenant system still had a necessary part in the closing third of a century.

Many of the tenant farmers of the last generation had, indeed, "seen better days." Not a few had been freeholders before the war, although usually of the little farms interspersed here and there among the great plantations of the aristocrats. Many others had been overseers, factors, agents of various sorts. A small proportion came from the class of decayed gentlemen. The rest were made up from those strata usually lumped together in motley fashion as "crackers," or, in South Carolina, "poor buckra."

Such are the antecedents of the mass of operatives in the new mills of the South. Bearing in mind this derivation, it is not difficult to account for many qualities, traits, and habitudes that might otherwise appear anomalous. For example, their extravagance is a characteristic almost without parallel among the toiling classes. But it is simple of explanation. The transition from a dollarless past to a many-dollared present would render any class of untutored human beings extravagant. Through a long generation of tenant-farming, these people scarcely saw a piece of money from Christmas to Christmas. Each year's supplies were either furnished by the owner of the land or bought on credit at a near-by store, to be paid for when cotton was picked. The harvest came, sometimes good, sometimes bad; but, good or bad, it seemed uniformly to take it all to pay the merchant and the landlord. The tenant rarely enjoyed even the sorry pleasure of selling his cotton and paying the hard cash to these creditors; instead, he usually hauled the raw product of

his toil directly to them and then turned apathetically away to begin half-hearted preparations for another year's crop. His wife and children shared his labors, sharing also his empty-handedness.

This went on through the dragging years of the South's agricultural prostration, until the last decade came, with its mills and its revolution, when the moneyless and landless ones drew into the new communities, to try breadwinning under unfamiliar conditions. The mothers and daughters had often worked on the farms, so they did not hesitate at the factory door, except when very young children claimed the care of the former. In most instances, indeed, the women's fingers proved the readiest for the new occupation.

But neither women nor men acquired dexterity without a period of laborious effort such as all workmen must struggle through when, possessed of only the inherited instincts of generations of bucolic ancestors, they set themselves to some form of mechanical labor. That period being done with, a certain amount of skill began to appear in all fairly intelligent operatives, and shortly they found themselves bringing home each Saturday night, or alternate Saturday night, according as pay-day fell, what appeared to many of them an amazing pile of money.

Cases such as the following are multiplied many times over: The father, mother, and six or eight boys and girls (for large families are the rule in this class), ranging from twelve to twenty-odd years of age, are at work in one mill. The adults, if fair weavers, easily average $22 each per month; the younger members of the family are probably spinners and average about $14 each per month. This family, then, that in the old life of the farm thought themselves fortunate, indeed, to handle $100 in cash throughout a year, now bring home something like $175 every month. Is it strange that extravagance seizes upon this metamorphosed household? If the sudden transition from pennilessness to plethoric pocketbooks did not in itself lead straight to spendthrift living, the precedents of their neighbors would speedily teach the trait. So the housewife loads the table with luxuries hitherto unknown, the pretty girl is tempted into all the

caprices of dress that her little Vanity Fair may flaunt, while the father and brother can scarcely tell whither their dollars speed on such swift wings.

Yet this wastefulness, too, is but a phase, destined to gradual elimination in the evolution of the process by which an agricultural people are converted into a manufacturing class. With all their illiteracy, they are not devoid of understanding; and when a certain bewilderment of these early years is past, it will be borne in upon them in countless ways, by their school privileges, their larger experience, their clearer views of the outside world — by their own innate manhood, indeed — that there are far other uses for hard-earned money than to be lavished on mere food and clothing and shelter. Many of them are already opening their eyes to the fact that for an abundance of things to eat and wear they have bartered a certain independence and manliness which are fostered by agricultural pursuits, even the lowliest, and which breed sturdier virtues than they can now transmit to their children. Awakening perceptions such as these will lead to different results: to a rescinding of extravagance always; often to a return to the farm; but far oftener to a steadfast purpose to work straight on where they are, saving every cent possible to educate the coming generation and set their feet in the path that leads to freedom.

How can they save money? clamor those who have been studying the comparative wage-scale of northern and southern factories without acquaintance with the actual conditions of the latter. By reasonable economy, is the answer here as elsewhere. From $20 to $30 per month is paid good weavers throughout this section, while the average spinner draws from $10 to $16; and these are regarded as good living wages in a country where the prices of necessaries range much lower than in the East or the West. Houses are to be heated only about four months of the year, and fuel is cheap, in many places less than $1.50 per cord for wood and $2 to $4 per ton for coal. Clothing costs far less in this warm climate than in a cold one. Farm and garden supplies are bought for what seems to the northern mind an absurdly low price, and dairy products are never high. Besides,

in all the rural mill communities, which are now counted by the score to every one in a city, a garden patch always, and often pasturage for one cow, can be counted on with every cottage.

House rent is not a considerable item. The mill cottages rent by the month on the basis of 60 cents to $1 per room, and they range in size from three to eight rooms, four, however, being the rule. With few exceptions these cottages are fairly comfortable and built with a view to good sanitation. Outside of cities, each one has its ground space where the inmates may grow flowers and vegetables, thus fostering a form of local attachment that is by no means weak.

From this brief survey it may be deduced that, while the one-time tiller of the soil has lost something in becoming a factory operative, he has also gained something. A surer balance between gain and loss may be struck when we have looked well into the subject of education in the new mill communities.

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SANITATION AND SOCIAL PROGRESS.

A NOTED economist complains that in current discussions of social progress "our eyes are turned, not upon hopes and possibilities and positives, but rather upon despair, impossibilities, and negatives." Effectual progress depends upon positive ideas, and would we have our social theories pregnant for good, we must find for them a basis in positive ideas. It is, therefore, important that the social reformer and philosopher turn his eyes to the field of sanitation, where neither the specialist, the philosopher, nor the public has forsaken hopes, denied possibilities, nor abandoned positives. Of the achievements in this field the historian Lecky, writing his *Map of Life* at the very close of the nineteenth century, was able to state: "The triumphs of sanitary reform are perhaps the brightest page in the history of our century." Smallpox has been stamped out of every land where fanaticism or criminal neglect has not stayed the rescuing hand, plague has been put under control, typhoid abolished, diphtheria mastered, consumption explained and controlled, yellow fever driven even from the tropics. Whereas the savage dies at the rate of 60 to 100 in every 1,000, and suffers ravaging epidemics which periodically threaten the very existence of whole races, backward nations, such as Spain and Italy, lose but 30, while city rates in Germany and the United States are reduced to less than 20 in 1,000. The average age has advanced fifteen years in two generations. But not only has life's tenure lengthened, but life has been made more worth the living. Sickness has decreased, air is purer, water cleaner, large classes of men have for the first time known the pleasures of health.

Not all is done, however. Squalor and filth and destitution still abound, and preventable diseases still number their victims by hundreds of thousands. Some cities are backward, some states are skeptical, some classes are obdurate; but what man has done man can do, and we know experimentally that the future may confidently be expected to see the total eradication

of these transmissable diseases, which now levy such heavy contributions upon social vitality. New York has practically stamped out smallpox, Mississippi can do it by applying vaccine. Vienna University can hardly find enough typhoid patients to teach medical students the symptoms of the disease. Why has Philadelphia thousands of cases to spare? Pennsylvania will shortly rescue itself from polluted streams and typhoid havoc, as it has shown England how to stamp out tuberculosis among cattle. Consumption among men can be detected and checked more easily than diphtheria, and state sanatoria dare to point to the time when it will be difficult for medical colleges to find bacilli of tuberculosis for analysis. The limits to sanitary progress are not to be sought in sanitary science, but in social theories; not in the paucity of remedies, but in the unwillingness to justify them theoretically and to pay for their application.

What relation has sanitation to problems of distribution? Does filth disappear or disease recede as a family or a class or a nation increases its monopoly power? Is the standard of life dependent upon health and the means to protect it? Yes, perhaps we are about to argue that the study of sanitary problems will help us better to understand monopoly force; that sanitary conditions offer a criterion of the standard of life; that the health of a class depends upon its share of monopoly returns from industry; that man's hold upon life and vitality is intimately bound up with theories and methods of distribution; that sanitary progress depends upon right theories of taxation; and that the saving of twenty thousand lives a year in Pennsylvania alone waits upon public appreciation of the true nature of monopoly and its earnings. It is certain that the thesis on public sanitation must put in the foreground diagrams showing the various differential and marginal advantages possessed by different factors in production. And this because sanitary science is a phase of social science rather than a branch of chemistry, medicine, or biology.

It is of such sanitary science that the historian speaks when he finds the high-water mark of the past century's achievements in the triumphs of sanitary reform. In England, Ireland, and

Scotland sanitation implies statesmanship. It is state medicine, not laboratory medicine, that has re-housed Britain's poor; it is the application of vaccine lymph and the governmental utilization of antitoxin that have robbed smallpox and diphtheria of their terrors. It is the use, the compulsory use, of tuberculin, and not its discovery, that has purified a meat supply. Lecky had in mind the sanitarian who used his art for the accomplishment of needed structural changes in society—science as handmaid to statecraft.

No American historian would have paid such a tribute to the sanitarian. We are not yet in the habit of connecting sanitation and sociology. Discussion and responsibility are delegated to the physician, who, himself primarily a student of pathology and disease, tends to emphasize pills rather than public welfare. We laymen, on the other side, think, because the physician is the best possible agent, he makes a safe exclusive guardian of society's health. Councils, legislatures, and congresses pass measures and then turn over the execution of the social will to the physician. Deliberative assemblies have come to appoint public-health committees, but these regard their functions as primarily checks upon the vagaries of enthusiasts or perhaps as burdensome honors. Or perhaps, like the chairman of a public-health committee in the Pennsylvania legislature, they choose positions on such committees "because there ain't a d—— thing to do."

The danger in this excessive specialization is apparent, if the fundamental remedies, like the fundamental motives of sanitary science, lie outside the field of medical science and within that of social science. Legislation is futile unless administrative organs are provided to execute the will of the legislature. Executive officers can do little unless supported by the courts. The attitude of the courts depends, not upon the standards of the physicians, and of text-book writers upon bacteriology, but upon the standards and intelligence of the classes from which courts take their cue. The courts will not permanently administer laws which are opposed by those to whom they owe their existence. In the past the court-sustaining classes have not

been those which have technical knowledge of disease, but rather those which know less of germs and symptoms and prophylaxis than of luxuries and the pleasures of conspicuous consumption. The need is, therefore, in America, that the voting classes identify public-health work, not with diseases, which they do not understand, but with the advantages of cleanliness and health, which they can readily understand, because to these is attached a social, even a commercial, value. To that end it is important that we know the historical development of sanitation and its present relation to our theories of consumption and monopoly taxation.

Chronologically there have been seven clearly marked stages in the evolution of what we now call public-health administration. Each state and each city, if left to itself, passes through the same stages in its administration, even where a complete code is legislated, not evolved. To abridge the process is the professed aim of central governments today. But where a complete sanitary code is accepted by a newborn town as a condition to its incorporation, we still have the seven distinct motives represented.

The first period is that of racial tutelage, of pain economy, when the primary lessons of personal hygiene are learned. Through the distribution of plant and animal life, of heat and moisture, primitive man was forced to a nomadic life, and perforce enjoyed pure air, pure water, and pure soil. In his conflict with nature he learned to shun certain plants as poisonous, and to reject discolored and offensive water or meats. But when gregarious man settled in confined limits for definite and prolonged periods, nature could no longer perform the work of scavenger; sanitation must become conscious, and receive the sanction of law. The dead must be buried in Arabia, or embalmed along the Nile, offal removed and buried, lepers banished from camp or town, swine flesh avoided in Palestine, and all flesh eschewed in Buddha's realms. How costly were these lessons of community life we may judge from the stringency of the persisting codes among the Hindoos, or even the Jewish regulations as to intermarriage, kosher, etc. Agassiz was inter-

preting religious history when he said: "A natural law is as sacred as a moral principle." He might have said of this early period of sanitation, "Natural law is a potential moral principle," for then, as now, the unhealthful became the offensive, then the antisocial, finally the immoral. For example, we are at present tending to develop moral standards with reference to expectoration in public places, as we have succeeded in establishing the immorality of drunkenness.

The second stage is that of the introduction of sanitary appliances for the health and comfort of the tribute-taking classes. Carthage has her paved streets. Greece worships Hygeia and idolizes her devotees. Rome has paved streets, public sewers, extensive water-works, gem-bedecked public baths, and furnishes water more freely than any city of modern times, while the superintendency of water-works is allotted only to senators and honored officials. In the twelfth century Paris paves her streets, for the same reason that four centuries later London introduces water—to serve wealth and power. In Rome, Paris, London, as in Boston, Chicago, and Seattle, these first steps are due to another motive than desire to protect either public or private health. These public works, so far as they are due to other than property considerations, are primarily evidences of advancing standards of comfort, or perhaps concessions to a growing æsthetic sensitiveness. Constructed by the few to gratify their taste for cleanliness, ease, or show, the benefits accrue to society without reference to social standing, except that the poor may be permitted only a partial exploitation. In Rome we find the leisure-class motives isolated. To the patrician reveling in the possession of oriental loot, a place was necessary where he might parade the evidences of his prowess. The promenade must not remain unpassable after every shower, wherefore street-paving. The streets were cleaned because dirt and splendor, filthy passages and sweeping gold-braided togas, were incompatible. Compared with the perfumes of the East and the sweetness of costly olive oil, the exhalations from the human body were obnoxious; hence frequent appearance in the public bath became indispensable to social standing. Rome was

flooded with water for the same reason that the broad, wind-swept avenues of our large cities are cleaned three times as often as the narrow, sweltering, disease-breeding streets and alleys. Had we any way to give a silk dress to every workwoman, together with time to display it, we might be sure that the councilmen would demand the immediate renovation and constant sprinkling and sweeping of the narrow streets and alleys and asphalt everywhere.

The third period is that of commercial sanitation. This should have followed directly upon the second, but historically there was a period of two centuries "when Teutonic Europe was sleeping off its great debauch," when civilization was without the fundamental motives to sanitary improvement. The barbarian glutton found more primitive means of comparing his success with that of his neighbors than the promenade, and obtained greater satisfaction from wine and the sword than from oriental finery and clean garments. The ideals of Christian and pagan became direct obstacles to sanitary advancement. In fact, Holy Hieronymus, the monastic corporation, and the feudal lord combined to undo the sanitary progress of centuries of slow adaptation. The ascetic violated all the laws of personal hygiene, the monastery's ideal was inconsistent with public hygiene, and both glorified God by teaching submission to the pestilence. The feudal lord, on his part, thought first of the exigencies of defense, and constructed his castle with a view to herding together hosts of fighting warriors.

Europe made most bitter atonement for this disregard for the laws of health. Ravaging epidemics in the years 550, 1000, 1345–50, 1485, 1528, 1665, A. D., carried away millions, the Black Death alone, 1345–50, having cost China 13,000,000 lives, London 100,000, Venice a like number, Paris 50,000, and the Franciscan Friars of Germany 125,000. Lamprecht says these epidemics "were largely due to filth, but the superstition of the people attributed them to other causes." The repositories of the world's knowledge prevented Christian Europe from learning the lessons which blind followers of instinct, untutored and wild, would have learned from these disasters,

and thus filth became the medium of "dispensations of providence."

But, however welcome these evidences of divine wrath may have been to the zealot, they entailed unsufferable losses upon those classes of society which, in the breaking up of feudal institutions, stepped into the dominant position. I refer to the mercantile interests. By a strange coincidence, the first quarantine and the first street-cleaning in Germany date from the same year, 1348; the former in the foremost maritime city, Venice, the latter in the dominant guild town, Cologne. Thus at the same time began the reaction against the prevailing theory of the providential origin of plagues and the everlasting filth of the mediæval city. A well-defined philosophy soon arose to justify protection to commerce and garments and health. Erasmus voiced this new doctrine when he attributed the Sweating Sickness (1485, 1518) to the uncleanly habits of the English and the defective ventilation of their houses. More's *Utopia* had modern sanitary regulations, including isolation hospitals for transmissable diseases. Quarantine regulations in the Mediterranean preceded More, and by Montesquieu's time "Most countries in Europe have made exceedingly good quarantine regulations"—a policy then being introduced by the new American commercial states.

The fourth period is that of nuisance sanitation, the evolution by the courts of a nuisance law. This could not precede commercial sanitation, for so long as heaven sent disease, objection to noisome sights and odors was based on simple æsthetic motives. When earthly causes were premised, then the latitude of the courts could be greatly extended. Furthermore, it must be remembered that the same social diffentiation which caused the filth theory of disease likewise strengthened the æsthetic and pecuniary motives to cleanliness. "Nuisance" presumes social strata. So long as every householder owns a goat, a pigpen and slop barrel, a stable and a muddy, foul door-yard, there will be no calls upon the courts to declare this capital a public nuisance. When Bracton, therefore, in the fourteenth century, talks of nuisances, he generally means protruding roofs

or piles of rubbish, *i. e.*, obstructions; when Blackstone, in the eighteenth, mentions nuisances, the cateogory has widened to include obnoxious animals, offensive trades, foul watercourses. The fundamental maxim of the nuisance law was then: "So use your own that you will not injure another." To it we have added nothing but definition of injurious acts or things. The multiplication of such acts followed the stratification of society and the division of labor. No differentiation, no nuisance, increasing differentiation, multiplication of nuisances. This is true whether we compare decade with decade, district with district, city with country, or one part of the city with another. In the so-called "slums" nothing short of an impassable or suffocating odor is considered a public nuisance, but in "resident districts" fruit stores, groceries, meat-markets, etc., apply deodorizers and purifiers constantly, and the streets are kept cleared of decomposing substances. The index at any particular time or place is the monopoly power possessed by the classes which live upon or pass over the various districts. As the term "resident district" has come to mean, not the district where the greatest number reside, but where the "best," the moneyed, the leisure classes consume the portion of their wealth devoted to domestic display, so freedom from nuisances follows the line of income, *i. e.*, the line of freedom from competition. If certain streets seem to disprove this statement, investigation will show that they are enjoying cleanliness, not because of demands made by tenants, but because of higher standards exacted by "up-town" people who pass frequently, or perhaps because the "up-town" people fear the result of adjacent uncleanliness.

As the fourth period is marked by precautions against the unæsthetic or noisome, so the fifth stage develops precautions by "those who have" against the hidden dangers incident to neighboring lower standards of life, *i. e.*, against the slum. This stage the older civilization never knew. This type of sanitation could not develop until modern industry erected rookeries, immense factories, and retail establishments, the sweat-shop, creamery, and bakery. As soon as cities were divided into dis-

tricts according to industry and standard of life, it became possible to make inductive studies of health and sickness. Matthew Carey found, in 1794, that yellow fever chose seven-eighths of its victims among the poorer and less cleanly sections then about market and the river. He saw that wealth and culture were not immune because of any inherent or acquired grace, but that heaven, helping those who helped themselves, spared those whose standards of life made it possible to fly from the city into suburbs, or, if within the city, made cleanliness and drives and exercise, prompt expert medical attendance and isolation, possible. These conclusions need no modification because of the recent theory that mosquitos brought that same yellow pest. Boards of health were from Carey's time appointed, not for the sake of those sections that were supposed to cause epidemics, but for the benefit of the merchants, lawyers, women of the world, etc., who suffered discomfort and loss and interruptions, the leading motive of each being economic rather than hygienic. It is significant that the first vital statistics of the time were published by an economist to prove the financial loss entailed by epidemics, and that a great merchant established the first fever hospital and introduced trained nurses. This same simple economic motive has written stringent rules for the control of smallpox, typhoid, diphtheria, scarlet fever, and even consumption in nearly all communities, however small. But because based upon the interest of the few, the motive is intermittent in its action and waits upon crass and dramatic stimuli, hence we are conscious of these health rules only when danger is near and epidemic imminent.

So long as sanitation meant protection for those who had the greatest share in the returns from production, actual rather than potential dangers were treated. No great structural changes were to be expected. Had this leisure-class motive persevered, unaided by the philanthropic and socialistic elements of the last two stages, sanitary science would have stopped at the level of Philadelphia's former lethargy with reference to typhoid. The filtration plant never would have been built by the classes that can afford to buy spring water, nor could it have been delayed

so many years if typhoid had sought its victims chiefly from those classes. Philanthropy, in the sixth stage, taught the average man the value of his life and the possibility of enhancing its value by the expenditure of adequate corporate funds, thus ushering in the last and crowning epoch in the evolution of public sanitation, the socialistic, when the average man votes taxes to improve society's health.

Philanthropic sanitation was a product of the great, bloodless revolution that in England grew out of the terrible premises of the French Revolution. Adam Smith discovered labor to the English press; Ricardo fought the corn laws by discovering laborers; Malthus fixed the genus under an iron law of want; the arch-agitator Brougham argued the responsibility of Parliament—then the favored classes—for the betterment of labor's condition. Dickens and Reade were concrete and painted horrible pictures of London and England, their schools and prisons. Kingsley and the romance school prophesied a bright future when capital and labor should be one in motive and interest. The Poor Law Commission of 1832 furnished Carlyle with statistical material for soul-stirring impeachments of "the cold, dead, infinite injustice" of the existing methods of distribution. The Commission on the State of Health in Large Towns reported in 1842 that the English language lacked usable words to picture the filthy condition of the great towns, and urged parliamentary interference on behalf of the masses. The movement was aided by the spectacle of logicians like James Stuart Mill fluttering about and protesting man's inherent right to be filthy and sick and despised and self-loathing. In the words of Spencer, the only one of these individualists who has lived to see, without repenting, the folly of their opposition to sanitary regulations: "Bad drainage, overflowing cesspools, festering graveyards, impure water, and filth and humidity of low lodging-houses are effective means of eliminating the less fit." State altruism was challenged, too, by the chronic political decrier of centralization, who as late as 1848 opposed the Public Health Act because it was "un-English and unconstitutional," "savoring of Cromwellism," "like a Russian ukase," and "calculated to deprive

local authorities of the independent action [or indifference] which was the glory of our Anglo-Saxon institutions, and like rickety children place them in the go-cart of central government." In the meantime private philanthropy had led the way and had constructed hospitals, model tenements, schools, and had educated the masses, who now demanded as rights what was originally proposed as charity. For fifty years England has acted upon the double principle that the boulevard owes to the alley protection against disease and unsanitary conditions, and that it is the right of both to demand protection against each other and themselves. But both principles are based upon the theory that there is an unearned increment upon which society has claims, that there is an unpaid increment which is due the so-called poor, and that sanitary administration offers a very direct and most efficacious means of reducing the inequality.

Socialistic sanitation is therefore necessarily constructive. The term is used instead of "democratic sanitation," because the former suggests activity, endeavor, construction, application of public funds to remedy social wrongs or deficiencies; while the latter might mean no more than common indifference. We know it in America as the power that condemns rookeries; restricts builders; regulates hours of labor and the age of laborers; builds hospitals, public baths and lodging-houses; sets aside great areas for parks and playgrounds; establishes sanatoria for consumptives; inspects factories and mines; defines dangerous trades, and prescribes territorial limits to those that pollute stream or air; compels vaccination; certifies physicians, dentists, druggists, barbers; quarantines the sick on land and sea—separating mother and child, or condemning property, if need be; rejects immigrants; enters lodging-houses, even dwellings, to determine their sanitary condition; prohibits the adulteration of foods and penalizes the sale, or offer for sale, of impure foods for man and beast; presumes to name certain fuel as unfit; spends millions for water-works, sewage farms, and the support of health departments. No one community has carried out a consistent and thorough program, but no community has failed to accept the principle that the public has the right and the duty

to use public funds to remove and to prevent disease or conditions that generate disease. We may differ in our theories of disease or in our belief as to the exact time and place where public funds shall be used, but we are of one mind that private wealth, private ignorance, private comfort, must be of secondary importance when and where public health is at stake. The theory is of the seventh stage—socialistic; the administration may be in the first—personal; second and first—personal and comfort; first to third—personal, comfort, commercial; first to fourth—personal, comfort, commercial, nuisance; first to fifth—personal, comfort, commercial, nuisance, anti-slum; first to sixth—personal, comfort, commercial, nuisance, anti-slum, philanthropic; or a combination of all with the motives of the last—socialistic. Emphasis will vary among and within states, but the variations in ideal are infinitely less than those in achievement. Such variations as there are will be found to follow industrial variations and those in social theories. In classifying the situation and the tendency in any particular community, the seven stages of sanitary development ought to be of service.

This brings us to the statement that the limits to sanitary progress are to be sought, not in sanitary science, but in social theories—that sanitary progress depends upon right theories of taxation. A complete health program presumes either a different distribution of our present appropriations or else a great increase in those appropriations. The divers obstacles to the former immediately suggest themselves; retrenchment is impracticable, even were it desirable. We must increase our revenues. To propose to levy upon wages, rents, interest, or earned profits would defeat the program at the outset. We must suggest a tax that will bring benefits without accompanying burdens, for we have not yet educated the majority of voters to a proper dollar-and-cent valuation of their own health and that of their dependents. If we cannot educate the voters to see that there is taxation which confers benefits without imposing burdens, we cannot carry out a complete sanitary program. If our economists cannot demonstrate to the simplest, candid mind that there is such a thing as unearned increment on both capital and labor,

we cannot disabuse that mind of the traditional belief that taxation means burden and sacrifice. Finally, if we cannot prove that monopolies, whether within or without so-called trusts, offer a practical means of taking social earnings for social good—without depriving any man of his deserts—we must abandon hope of protecting society adequately from present and future insanitary conditions.

To conclude, let us reinforce the statement that sanitary administration offers a very direct and most efficacious means of reducing the inequalities that even the most conservative capitalist will concede to be incident to our present system of distribution. The meanest wage-earner has already come to associate his health with his capital; his lodge, his creditors, and his insurance company are emphasizing that relation. None is so mean as not to wish a higher standard of life—nothing is easier to demonstrate than that wide and clean streets, playgrounds, hospitals, public baths, food, tenement, and factory inspection, help to raise his minimum standard with no sacrifice by himself. In no other field have conservative thinkers and communities taken such advanced ground; conversely, no other field offers so little theoretical opposition or so little prejudice. No other field of administration can demonstrate so quickly and so readily—on the platform or by actual tests—that there is taxation which benefits (without burdening) the majority. Finally, we here shift the emphasis in our discussions of principles of law from abstractions which only confuse without interesting the majority, or from dollars that serve to divide thinkers along artificial lines, to mankind and its truest betterment—to the real problems of social progress.

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THE REFORMATION OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS IN ILLINOIS.

THREE methods of dealing with crime have been tried, viz., the retributive, the reformatory, and the preventive. For ages the first mentioned was dominant in all countries. The general opinion was that the criminal should be made to suffer as he had made others suffer—he should reap what he had sown. It was a sort of *quid pro quo* method of punishment. The criminal was repaid in his own coin.

The idea also prevailed that society must be protected, and by shutting the criminal up in prison this was, of course, accomplished, for the time being at least, and by inflicting severe punishment upon him it was supposed a wholesome terror would be inspired in the minds of others, which would prevent them from committing crime. But experience gradually demonstrated the inadequacy of this method of dealing with the criminal. While he was incarcerated society was, indeed, protected from his onslaughts; but he usually came out of prison a worse and more dangerous man than he was when he went in, and others were not so terrorized as to prevent them from committing crime. In short, the retributive theory of punishment —"an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth"—overlooked the fact that crime is a product of definite causes (poverty, ignorance, weakness of will, etc.), which must be removed before the man would cease to commit crime. When this fact was clearly recognized the reformatory method was adopted. The Elmira Reformatory of New York was one of the first institutions to apply this method, and a number of other institutions have followed its example.

This theory is based on a recognition of the fact that the criminal is a victim or product of heredity and environment, and his inherited defects must be eradicated, his natural tendencies to crime must be checked; in a word, he must be *educated*, manually, mentally, and morally; he must be given the means of earning

a livelihood honestly, and his surroundings or environment must be so improved that his temptations will not be greater than an average human being can bear. In our reformatories, therefore, the inmates receive at least the elements of an English education, which they usually lack when they enter there; and they are also taught a trade; and then they are paroled and placed in new and better surroundings, where they have a chance to become good citizens.

The results of this method of dealing with criminals have been far more satisfactory than were the results of the old method. But penologists were finally forced to see that even the reformatory method was not perfect, and now they are advocating prevention as the best method of eradicating crime.

When a man has become a "hardened criminal," it is well-nigh impossible to reform him. When a youth has pursued a course of crime for years, it is very difficult to reform him, although our reformatories have accomplished and are accomplishing remarkable results. But if we take the boy who has inherited a predisposition to crime, or a weak will, or an unstable nervous system, and is placed in unfavorable surroundings, and by education and a change of environment strengthen his will, train his conscience, eradicate his criminal tendencies, and "give him a chance," he is far more apt to grow up to be a decent and law-abiding citizen. Institutions have been, and are being, founded to apply this theory, and it is the object of these articles to show what Illinois has done and is doing along these lines.

A few years ago Illinois was in the rear of the progressive states, but now she is well up toward the front. Her methods of dealing with criminals, juvenile and older offenders alike, and her schools and reformatories, are representative; they show what has been done in other states, as well as in this state, and as such they are of general interest.

In this article we will consider the work of the two reform schools and the reformatory which Illinois has had; and in another article we will consider the schools for dependents, delinquents, and truants.

I. THE CHICAGO REFORM SCHOOL.

This was the first reform school founded in Illinois. It was established in 1855 under an ordinance of the city of Chicago, and was located five miles south of the (then) city on the lake-shore, in what is now Hyde Park. It received delinquents, dependents, and truants. It was, of course, organized on the "congregate plan." Its discipline was parental in its nature, the law of kindness being the fundamental rule. The superintendent often received the punishment due to some offending inmate. The school was classified, and a child upon entering was placed in the middle grade, so that he might rise or fall according to his merits or demerits. Pupil government was introduced and a police system was established among the boys, which worked quite satisfactorily. But the school was a prison, as the superintendent himself admitted. It had bars and bolts, a high inclosure, and cells. Fortunately, in 1856 the buildings were destroyed by fire, and the boys had to be housed temporarily in an old packing-house. The management was forced to allow more liberty to the boys than had hitherto been granted, and the result was that very few even attempted to escape, and most of these few returned voluntarily to the school. When, therefore, the school was rebuilt, its plan of construction was entirely changed.

Most of the boys were committed by the police courts of the city for one year only, an evil which the superintendent at once recognized and protested against, urging that bad habits of long standing could not be rooted out in a year's time, and insisting that the boy should be committed during his minority.

The boys attended school from 7 to 9 A. M., and from 5 to 7 P. M. The rest of the time they spent in manual labor in the shops or the garden. The value of manual training and trade instruction in reform work was at once demonstrated and most heartily indorsed by the board of managers and the superintendent.

As already intimated, when the school was rebuilt, in 1856, "the cottage plan" was partially adopted, "a family building" to accommodate forty boys being erected. The results were so

satisfactory that the superintendent continued to urge the erection of other cottages, so that the smaller and more innocent boys might be separated from the older and more vicious.

The boys were employed in shoemaking, tailoring, knitting, carpentry, gardening, and all sorts of housework. The "ticket of leave" was adopted, with excellent results. These tickets were renewed each month, where the boy was doing well, and the necessity of this periodical renewal of his parole served as an incentive to good conduct. The per capita cost for the year 1862 was $99.31, which included all expenditures for the 181 boys in the school. More family buildings were gradually erected, and the "confidential system" was continued. In 1861 the legislature passed a law authorizing the mayor of Chicago to appoint annually a commissioner before whom boys between the ages of six and seventeen should be brought, when accused of petty offenses; and he often discharged them on probation. This change in the method of commitment proved very beneficial to the boy and to the school. But in 1867 the law was again changed and the duty of commitment was assigned to the judges of the superior or circuit courts of Chicago.

The board of guardians was given the power to bind out boys, to grant "tickets of leave," and to discharge boys for cause, but the boys while on parole were subject to the control of the guardians. The school continued to do good work until 1871. During its existence it cared for 1,284 children, about 70 per cent. of whom we are justified in concluding were reformed at a cost of about $343 each.

In 1870 the supreme court of Illinois declared the acts of 1863 and 1867, under which the school had been organized, unconstitutional, because they did not provide for the trial of the child by a jury, but gave to a commissioner or a judge the power of commitment. This decision assumed that the school was a prison, and that the inmates were criminals—an allegation strenuously denied by its defenders. The court went to extremes in upholding the rights of parents over their children, and a later decision of the same court practically nullified this opinion.

As the city had never purchased the land upon which the

school was erected, a committee of the board of supervisors of Cook county, in 1871, advised the county commissioners to sell the land, paying the city $50,000 for the improvements, and this was agreed to; but "the great fire" of that year destroyed most of the school buildings, and the school authorities immediately obtained permission from the legislature to transfer the few remaining pupils to the new State Reform School at Pontiac. This was done, and the Chicago Reform School, after having performed a substantial service to this city, ceased to exist.

II. THE STATE REFORM SCHOOL.

In 1867 the Illinois legislature passed an act for the reformation of boys between the ages of eight and eighteen years; and in 1869 the law was re-enacted, more time for the erection of the reform school being allowed. The object of the act was "the discipline, education, employment, and reformation of juvenile offenders and vagrants." Acting under this law, the governor appointed a board of trustees, who proceeded at once to purchase a tract of 276 acres of excellent land at Pontiac, in Livingston county, about ninety-two miles south of Chicago. Buildings were erected of sufficient capacity to accommodate 125 pupils; but the number increased so rapidly that more buildings were needed a year later. Mr. George W. Perkins, the first superintendent, was soon succeeded by Dr. John D. Scouller, who continued as superintendent until 1891. The "family plan" was adopted, and separate buildings, accommodating from forty to fifty boys each, were gradually erected.

A high fence was built around the school in order to restrain the most vicious boys, but the superintendent later advocated its removal and the granting of greater liberty to the boys, in spite of the fact that as many as twenty boys had escaped in one year.

A law of 1873 provided that boys between the ages of ten and sixteen, guilty of an offense which, if committed by an adult, would be punishable by imprisonment in a jail or penitentiary, should be sent to the reform school for a term not less than one year nor more than five years. This definite limitation by law

of the term of confinement proved to be disastrous, as the courts often committed the worst boys for only one year; and the superintendent and trustees later urged that the law should be so amended that the boys might be kept in the school, if necessary, until they were twenty-one years of age; but their recommendation was not adopted. The same act also abolished the "ticket of leave" system, which had hitherto produced such good results, but it contained "a good time" clause by which a boy might earn and be credited with time as follows: each month in the first year, five days; each month in the second year, six days; each month in third year, seven days; each month in fourth year, eight days; and each month in fifth year, nine days. Whenever an inmate was degraded for misconduct or violation of the rules, he lost five days of his "good time" for each offense.

The boys were employed at various trades—shoemaking, brickmaking, and cane-seating of chairs. Some of this work was done under the abominable contract system, which, in 1874, was sanctioned and authorized by law, and was not abolished until 1886, when the constitutional amendment prohibiting it was passed, and the state account system was adopted.

As to results accomplished by the school, the trustees in their report for 1882 say:

> During the eleven years of the school's existence we have received over twelve hundred (1,200) boys, and discharged nearly a thousand (1,000). Some of the boys who were discharged eight or nine years ago are now men with families, respected and honorable members of society. We are positive that many of them, had it not been for the Reform School, would today have been lawbreakers and criminals, preying upon society.

During the twenty years of its existence the State Reform School received 2,305 boys, and it seems reasonable to conclude that 75 per cent. of those discharged did well.

The tables of statistics given in the reports are incomplete, and do not enable us to form positive conclusions, but of 793 boys honorably discharged, 554, or about 70 per cent., are reported as doing well, while 123 lapsed, and 198 were lost sight of. Assuming that some of these did well, we seem justified in

concluding that about 75 per cent. of those discharged became law-abiding citizens. The trustees and superintendent claim that they followed the career of the boys for years after they left the school, and base their report upon reliable information. We may, therefore, place considerable confidence in the conclusion drawn.

III. THE ILLINOIS STATE REFORMATORY.

In 1890 it was determined to convert the reform school into a reformatory similar to the New York Reformatory. A committee had been appointed by the legislature the year before to visit the eastern and other prisons and reformatories and report on their construction, organization, and discipline. This committee made its report to the legislature of 1891. The Elmira institution and system were fully described, and the construction of a similar reformatory was advocated. As early as 1886 the state board of charities, which had the supervision of the reform school, had declared that the school was not based upon the law of guardianship, according to which the state stands in *loco parentis* to dependent and delinquent children, but upon the stern principle of retribution for offenses committed against the criminal law. It was also pointed out that commitments to this school were for a definite term of years, and that parole or conditional liberation of imates was not allowed. The act of 1871, converting the reform school into a reformatory, sought to remedy some of these defects. It provided that the inmates should be divided into two classes, the first to include males between ten and sixteen years of age, the second to include males between sixteen and twenty-one years of age. A boy of the first class who should commit an offense which, if committed by an adult, would be punishable by confinement in a jail or penitentiary, should be sentenced to the reformatory for not less than one year nor longer than the maximum term of confinement provided by law for such a crime.

The boy might be sent to jail, at the discretion of the court. No one who had been guilty of a capital offense or had served a term in the penitentiary might be committed to the reformatory. The law reads:

Every sentence shall be a general sentence to imprisonment in the Illinois State Reformatory, and the courts of this state imposing such sentence shall not fix or limit the duration thereof. The term of such imprisonment of any person so convicted and sentenced shall be terminated by the board of managers of the reformatory, as authorized by this act; but such imprisonment shall not exceed the maximum term provided by law for the crime for which the prisoner was convicted and sentenced.

The board of managers was also authorized to parole the inmates when honorable and useful employment for at least six months could be obtained for them and their conduct justified it. Such paroled prisoners remained in the legal custody of the board, and were liable upon the violation of their parole to be retaken and returned to the reformatory. When the conduct of any prisoner who has served on parole for at least six months is such as to satisfy the superintendent that he will remain at liberty without violating the law, he must so certify to the board of managers, who, after a careful consideration of the case and upon being satisfied that the prisoner may be safely discharged, must send his record to the judge of the court that sentenced him, recommending his final discharge, and the judge must discharge him.

The board of managers, appointed under this act, reported in December, 1891, that, upon taking charge of the reformatory, they found the buildings in need of reparation and many changes necessary.

The open-dormitory system had been in use in the reform school, but this was now abolished, and cells $7 \times 8 \times 8$ feet were substituted in its place. The shoe-shop, which had not proved very remunerative, was closed and a broom factory established, and other trades were gradually introduced. The old lockstep, which had been in vogue, was abolished, and the military system established, with good results. The inmates were organized into four schools and placed under teachers, who gave instruction in the ordinary English branches a certain portion of each day. The farm and garden were brought under cultivation and yielded large returns.

In 1895 Major R. W. McClaughry, warden of the Illinois penitentiary, became superintendent of the reformatory. He

classified the inmates into three grades, and when a boy was committed to the reformatory he was placed in the second grade, so that he might rise or fall according to his merits or demerits. The marking system was adopted, and if a boy made a "perfect record" (*i. e.*, three marks a month for good conduct, three for labor, and three for study) for six consecutive months, he was promoted to the first grade, and six months of similar record in the first grade placed him in the "parole grade," when he was given a hearing by the managers with a view to his parole. In school work 75 per cent. was reckoned a perfect record.

If while in the second or neutral grade the inmate persists in behaving badly, he falls, in time, to the third or penal grade, in which he dons the red garb of disgrace, marches in lockstep, is deprived of coffee at meals, of light in the evening in his cell, and of the privilege of visiting or receiving letters or visits from friends. But to all in this grade is offered the inducement to climb out of it into a higher grade.

In 1894 eight large schools, divided into four sections, were organized, and as the number of inmates increased more schools were organized, until now they number sixteen, with an attendance of over eight hundred pupils. Instruction in all the essential branches of an English education is given by competent teachers, who must hold a first-grade teacher's certificate, and must have been successful teachers elsewhere before coming to the reformatory. All inmates are required to attend school half a day, unless they have already passed the grade established for those who are eligible to parole. During the winter months the junior portion of the smaller boys spend six hours a day in the schoolroom, and in the summer months three hours. During the latter period they are employed a part of the time in light work in the garden or on the farm.

If anyone doubts that ignorance is one of the chief causes of crime, his doubt may be removed by reading the records of our reformatories. Thus we are informed that of 989 boys committed to the Illinois Reformatory, of whom 208 were between ten and sixteen years of age, and 781 between sixteen and twenty-one years of age, only 11 had attended high schools; 198 had been in the common schools, and 780 had received little, if any,

education. Ninety per cent. of those who had attended school confessed themselves to have been chronic truants. But while the inmates of our reformatories are largely ignorant of books, it is their lack of skill in a trade or some useful vocation which seems to be the chief cause of their downfall. Hence great emphasis is laid upon industrial training in the Illinois reformatory, as in other similar institutions. Instruction is given in carpentry, brick and stone masonry, plastering, painting, paper-hanging, tinwork, glazing, plumbing, gardening, electrical engineering, blacksmithing, shoemaking, tailoring, laundry work, stone- and granite-cutting, printing, bookbinding, cabinet work, music, photography, knitting, chairmaking, bookkeeping, and domestic service. "So skilled do many of the inmates become," we are told, "that it may be truthfully said that they could build a workshop or residence from foundation to roof, and paint it in good style, with but little outside assistance, and that of a supervisory character." The result is that the vast majority of "the graduates of Pontiac" earn an honest living after leaving the reformatory, and those who fall are without excuse, unless, indeed, "innate depravity" be considered an excuse for committing crime.

On October 1, 1900, there were 1,275 inmates in the reformatory, and they were organized into four battalions, each 300 strong, to whom military instruction and drill are given by competent officers. Workshops, cell-houses, and other buildings have been erected during the last decade, until this reformatory is now as well equipped as perhaps any similar institution in the country — save in one particular. As already stated, about two hundred small boys, between ten and sixteen years of age, are incarcerated with the older inmates. It is true that they are kept separate from the older boys — have separate schools, dining-rooms, playgrounds, and dormitories — and are not under as strict discipline as are the others. But the reformatory authorities admit that these young boys ought not to be confined in the same inclosure with the older and more vicious prisoners, and they have been asking for money for some time to erect cottages for the small boys outside the reformatory walls. But a still more serious objection to committing these small boys to

the reformatory is that they must be convicted of a felony, and thus legally stamped as "criminals," before they can be sent to this institution. Hence the best sentiment of the state is opposed to sending young boys to Pontiac at all, and other institutions have been provided or are being provided for them.

It is claimed that the discipline of the reformatory is mild, but firm, and there is no reason to doubt that this is true; at least it is true in the vast majority of cases. No doubt stern measures have to be adopted in certain cases, where an inmate proves to be wholly irresponsive to kindly influences. Such cases are found in all institutions (even in churches!), and rose-water treatment is not effective. Several newspaper attacks have recently been made upon the Pontiac Reformatory, but these attacks were based chiefly on the statements of a few discharged inmates, who, it appeared, had been very unmanageable while in the reformatory. The rules of discipline are certainly humane and reasonable in character, and the board of managers and superintendent and other officers of the reformatory are among the most enlightened and humane reformers in the state. Until recently the board of managers had the power to transfer prisoners who might prove to be incorrigible to the state penitentiary, but a recent decision of the supreme court has declared this feature of the law unconstitutional, null, and void.

What percentage of those who pass through the reformatory are reformed? Between 1891 and 1900 it received 5,316 inmates; 3,328 have been paroled; 624 have been returned for further treatment; 94 were transferred to the penitentiary; the sentences of 526 expired; 30 were pardoned, 53 died, 78 escaped, and 40 were released on a writ of *habeas corpus*—these latter being released in 1899 and 1900, since the juvenile-court law of 1899 went into effect. Making all due allowance for relapses, we seem justified in concluding that at least the vast majority of those who were paroled and some of those who served out their terms, or were pardoned, became law-abiding citizens; and, if so, the work of the reformatory must be considered a success.

T. H. MacQueary.

Chicago Parental School.

ARISTOPHANES AS A STUDENT OF SOCIETY.

THE fact that Aristophanes is a most important witness to the social and economic conditions prevailing in Athens in the latter part of the fifth century B. C. is generally recognized, even when his testimony has not been critically studied. The interest of the dramatist in social and economic problems, his tentative studies and theories along these lines, the testimony of his writings to the fact that many of the problems which a little later engaged the attention of Plato were commonly discussed in Athens a generation before Plato began to handle them—these matters have not been so generally either studied or recognized. In the present paper I have endeavored to collect some of the data on these lines and to classify them for further investigation. I shall speak first of Aristophanes's treatment of the motives of social activity and the fundamental postulates of society; secondly, of his analysis of the family and the state; and, thirdly, of his discussion of property and related economic questions.

I. THE ELEMENTS OF SOCIAL LIFE.

The theory of society which may be traced in the work of Aristophanes starts with the fact that economic needs—the need of food, of clothing, and of shelter—are at the basis of society. In perhaps the earliest of Greek dreams of the systematic reorganization of society on a communistic basis, in the *Ecclesiazousæ* of Aristophanes, these needs are to be supplied by the state itself. After land, money, and other property have been turned over to the women in control of the state, then *they* will care for its citizens; "everyone will have everything—bread, fish, cakes, clothing, wine, crowns," and women (605). Under ordinary circumstances, however, a man must earn the money to supply these needs, and thus they serve as the stimulus which gives rise to all the different arts and trades. "All arts and devices among men were discovered by reason of you [Wealth]; for one of us sits at the shoemaker's bench, another is a

blacksmith, another a carpenter, another gets gold from you and fashions it, another is a thief and a burglar, by Zeus, another cards wool, another tans leather," etc.; and all by reason of wealth.[1] In the defense which poverty offers it is set forth clearly that it is the need of money to meet the fundamental necessities of life which makes men work; "if Wealth were to distribute himself equally, no man would trouble himself about skill in the arts or practical wisdom; and after these were gone, who would want to carry on the different arts, provided he could live in idleness neglecting them?"[2] So then, the argument runs, poverty is a benefit both to the individual in that it makes him work, and to society in that it causes the production of much to satisfy human needs and in so doing binds society together. Conversely, the satisfaction of all needs by means of wealth breeds gout and inactivity and crime.[3] Even the religious side of social life, from the materialistic standpoint set forth by the poet, depends ultimately on physical needs and the desire for money to satisfy these needs. Men no longer sacrifice to the gods when they have money to buy what they want, so that the priest who had shared these sacrifices complains bitterly that the presence of Plutus among men has taken away his livelihood;[4] men no longer sacrifice to the gods, but to the birds, when it is the birds who look after the crops and cause human activities to prosper.[5]

The general thesis of the *Acharnians* is that war should cease because it interferes with natural pleasures. The war had seriously interfered with agriculture; it had limited the variety of food at Athens, nor could men get enough food of any kind; it had prevented the simple joys of the rural Dionysia; it broke up the new family by carrying off the bridegroom to serve as a soldier. In Megara there was famine such that the citizen brought his daughters to sell them in the market of Dicæopolis; in this case, also, hunger is a fundamental reason for commercial activity.

Again the *Lysistrata* is an absurd and obscene presentation of

[1] *Plut.*, 160 f.; *cf.* 188 f., 533.
[2] *Ibid.*, 510 f.
[3] *Ibid.*, 560 f.
[4] *Ibid.*, 133, 1114 f.
[5] *Av.*, 1058 f.

the fact that appetite and passion are fundamental factors in social life; in that it interferes with these, war is to be brought to an end. Finally the same motives which are behind normal social life are noted as causes of crime, so that under the system of communism proposed in the *Ecclesiazousæ* crime will cease;[1] moreover, the same distribution of wealth which would check commercial activity would also check crime.[2]

Imitation as a factor in social life is recognized by the poet. In Athens, and in the parody of Athens in the *Birds*, men are subject to crazes of imitation:

> In the time before
> There was a Spartan mania, and people went
> Stalking about the streets, with Spartan staves,
> With their long hair, unwashed and slovenly,
> Like so many Socrates's; but, of late,
> Birds are the fashion — Birds are all in all —
> Their modes of life are grown to be mere copies
> Of the birds' habits; rising with the lark,
> Scratching and scrabbling suits and informations;
> Picking and pecking upon points of law;
> Brooding and hatching evidence.[3]

An example of this trait in the Athenian appears in the *Ecclesiazousæ* (787). Before yielding to the demands of the new communism, the citizen waits to see whether others propose to obey the law before he obeys it and turns in his property.

Aristophanes clearly recognizes that habit and tradition are conservative forces which lend stability to society. The birds lack stability of manner and persistence of purpose,[4] a feature of the bird-city in which the Athenians could not but see reflected a lack of their own.[5] One advantage in the new rule of the women proposed in the *Ecclesiazousæ* is to be that love of the good old ways which marks women (215), while men are always ready to try some new thing (584 f.). Strepsiades in the opening of the *Clouds* laments that slaves are no longer under the control of masters, because the old social conditions are dis-

[1] *Eccl.*, 698 f., 670.

[2] *Plut.*, 165 and 565 f.

[3] *Av.*, 1280; FRERE'S translation.

[4] *Ibid.*, 165.

[5] *Cf. Eccl.*, 813 f.

turbed by war. In the discussion between the two *logoi* the value of conservative custom in giving permanence to society is clearly set forth; in fact, this might be treated as the main thesis of the *Clouds*.

That the love of excitement was a potent factor in Athenian life is quite generally recognized. The popularity of the law courts, which was due in a measure to this love of excitement, is a theme of which Aristophanes never tires.[1] It is treated at greatest length in the *Wasps*, in which Philocleon is represented as fairly crazy on the subject; at the end of the play, however, it appears that the craze can be overcome. After the "homœopathic" treatment of a mimic court, an appeal to appetite and to the Athenian fondness for display quite wins over the old man.

The ethical postulates at the basis of society are not passed over without recognition. In the *Clouds* Strepsiades is most anxious to discover a means of repudiating his debts.[2] In spite of warnings, he places first himself, then his son, under the tutelage of Socrates in order to learn how to make "the worse appear the better reason;" he succeeds in shaking off two of his creditors, but he is soon taught that the weapon he is using may be turned against himself. In the end the man most inclined to protest against the demands of social justice learns his own dependence on it. The result of the dramatic action is emphasized in the discussion; in particular, the argument of the two *logoi* bring out the poet's conception of the value of education and religion as ethical forces which underlie anything that deserves the name of society. In the *Birds* the effort of two Athenians to escape social and political obligations meets with the most fantastic success. It was not the aim of the *Clouds* to preach the value of justice, but rather to hit off the characteristic traits of the sophist in such a way as to amuse the audience; so it was not the aim of the *Birds* to demonstrate that a man can escape from the demands of society or that he cannot escape them; the aim was to amuse the audience by an extravagant picture of the results which took place when a man attempted

[1] *Cf. Eccl.*, 450, 560, 585. [2] *Nub.*, 444 f., 1142 f.

to escape these demands. The extravagance of the poet is indication enough that he knew the futility of such efforts as were made by Euelpides and Peithetærus.

II. THE FAMILY AND THE STATE.

The family is treated by Aristophanes from three points of view. First, as to the relation of husband and wife, the poet sees their mutual dependence and makes this fact the central feature of the *Lysistrata*. In the parabasis of the *Thesmophoriazousæ* (786 f.) the attitude of husbands toward their wives, the way they speak ill of their wives while at the same time they guard these "plagues" as most precious, is cleverly described:

> They're always abusing the women,
> As a terrible plague to men:
> They say we're the root of all evil,
> And repeat it again and again. . . . .
> And pray, then, why do you marry us,
> If we're all the plagues you say?
> And why do you take such care of us,
> And keep us so safe at home,
> And are never easy a moment,
> If ever we chance to roam?
> When you ought to be thanking heaven
> That your plague is out of the way.[1]

Finally in the *Clouds* the fact that Strepsiades has taken a wife from a higher social station than his own is one of the factors that complicate the plot. Their tastes differ at every point; she involves her husband in the debts from which he is trying to escape, and she wants to bring up their son as a member of the class in society from which she came.

Secondly, Aristophanes points out that the home is the woman's sphere, and that she wins credit by proper management of it. His women complain that the dramas of Euripides had made the Athenians very suspicious of their wives.[2] If one were to take the representation of the women by comedy as the criterion, he would regard the opinion attributed to Euripides as only too well founded; Aristophanes, however, is consciously

[1] Collin's translation. [2] *Thesm.*, 385, 419; *Batr.*, 980.

assuming the privileges of a satirist; he feels not the slightest hesitation in making use of Euripides's devices, even when he is holding up Euripides himself to ridicule. There must be irony in the proposal to turn over the management of the state to women because they managed their households so well;[1] perhaps the poet thought that households were no better managed than the scheme of government which the women tried to institute. That women were easily led by passion (as in their attempt to get even with Euripides), that they were inclined to be visionary, that they found amusement in cheating their husbands in small matters,[2] no doubt the poet would hold; it is very evident also that he can count on amusing his audience by treating the failings of women; still, if I read these comedies rightly, the ability of women in general to manage a home well was not discredited either by the poet or by his audience.

Thirdly, the relation of father and son is frequently treated in these plays. In the *Clouds* Pheidippides is brought up from childhood to feel that he is superior to his father. He treats his father's suggestions somewhat cavalierly; having the support of his mother and her aristocratic connections, he is not much moved by his father's threat to turn him out of the house; but by bribes, persuasions, and threats Strepsiades finally gains his point. It is only as the result of the new sophistic teaching that the respect of the son entirely disappears, so that he justifies himself in beating his father. In the *Ecclesiazousæ* (635 f.) one of the great objections to the communistic family is that fathers will not know their sons; to this Aristophanes replies, as Plato replied later, that all the young will reverence the older as fathers so much the more because the older will combine to enforce their rights. In the *Birds* (1351) the man who wants to treat his father as birds are said to treat their parents is advised to go and fight the Thracians instead. The plot of the *Wasps* turns on the difficulties which no doubt often did arise when the father was old and unreasonable; here and in the *Clouds* we have the Greek justification for this treatment of sons by parents, in that each man has his turn as father.

[1] *Eccl.*, 211. [2] *Thesm.*, 812.

Much as Aristophanes has to say about contemporary politics, with its wholesale briberies,[1] its wheedling of the sovereign people,[2] and the misconduct of those intrusted with power,[3] he says but little about the functions of the state, or the principle on which the state is based. So strong are democratic tendencies at Athens that, if one asks a fish-dealer for some kind of fish which he does not happen to have on hand, he may be answered that it savors of tyranny to be so particular about one's food.[4] One of the most convincing arguments against the administration at Athens which had been carrying on the Peloponnesian war was the charge of unfairness in the distribution of duties and privileges by the state.[5] This jealous watch over the rights of each member of the community shows what democracy meant for the Athenians of Aristophanes's day, viz., that the rights of the individual were quite as important as the authority of the community. Closely connected with this sentiment is the fundamental principle of Athenian politics, the principle that the origin and legitimacy of government depend on the will of the people. So fully was this principle recognized that we need hardly be surprised to find that Aristophanes and his audience do not seem to have given critical consideration to the question of the state. This principle finds a good illustration in the ease with which the new communistic constitution of the *Ecclesiazousæ* was proposed and set in operation. Such a change seemed quite natural for the Athenians of that day, because it was in line both with political practice[6] and with the political philosophy of the day. It was only necessary for the women to give themselves a little practice in debate, and to steal away from their husbands dressed up as men—scenes which furnish free scope for the poet's fun; then they can pack the assembly and put through the constitution which turns over the government of the state to the women.

In the arguments adduced in favor of the new plan, both before the assembly and later in private discussion, there is

[1] *Pax*, 645; *Plut.*, 170 f.

[2] *Achar.*, 639 f.; *Equit.*, *pass.*

[3] *Cf.* the report of the embassies, *Achar.*, 65 f.

[4] *Vesp.*, 493 f.; *Cf. Pax*, 640.

[5] *Achar.*, 609 f.

[6] *Cf. Ibid.*, 632.

some attempt to analyze the different functions of the state.[1] The army will be in the hands of wives and mothers who will see that life is not thrown away recklessly and that the hardships of the soldiers are not too great. The women claim some skill in financial administration; as they have managed the household in spite of interference by their husbands,[2] so they will take into their hands the property of all the citizens and use the revenues to supply the needs of all. The administration of justice will be directly in the hands of the executive power, so as to dispense with litigation. Further, it will be unnecessary to punish crime, for the causes of crime are to be removed, while the control of the necessaries of life will make the authority of the new government absolute.

From this account it appears that the essential difference between the family and the state is overlooked, not perhaps by Aristophanes so much as by the philosophers whose conceptions he holds up to ridicule. Financial, judicial, and military activity are recognized as functions of the state, while all three are subordinated to the direct effort to meet the individual economic needs of the citizens. Communism is held up to ridicule and is brought to a speedy end; the recognition of the economic basis of the state, and some crude analysis of the functions of the state represent the condition of political science as understood by the poet.

III. PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC QUESTIONS.

The scheme of communism, the inauguration and failure of which constitute the plot of the *Ecclesiazousæ*, is interesting from the economic as well as from the political side. Such schemes inevitably come up for discussion when the distribution of wealth in a state theoretically democratic becomes very unequal. Moreover, certain practices at Athens would serve as a natural starting-point for the theory. The gifts of corn to the people,[3] and the practice of bribing the people into good humor ridiculed in the *Knights* (where the assembly turns first

[1] *Cf.* especially *Eccl.*, 232 f., 452 f., 560 f.

[2] *Eccl.*, 211; *Thesm.*, 419, 812; *Batr.*, 982; *Lysist.*, 495.

[3] *Vesp.*, 715 f.

to the man who announces cheap sardines, then to the man who proposes a large public sacrifice in honor of so toward an event),[1] might easily give rise to the belief that the state could supply all the wants of the poor, if only it chose to do it. It should be noted, further, that nothing is said of communism in the opening of the play. Misrule and inequality of property are the evils which the women set out to correct. At first the suggestion is made that the state might fittingly provide for the wants of the poor.[2] Only when the rule of the women is actually under way is the more radical proposition broached. Starting with the theory of equal rights, the women now propose that all property be vested in the state as such, and that the state supply all the wants of all its citizens. In the scene justifying this proposal[3] it is explained that all work will be done by slaves, that the houses will all be thrown into one, that meals will be served in public, and that marriage, or any permanence in the relations of men and women, will be abolished. The promoters of this scheme recognize that it will do away with the value of money and with all commerce as well as with much crime, and further, that it will remove both the necessity of labor and the incentive to labor. The practice of assigning offices by lot, as though they were gifts which the state might bestow on a few citizens, no doubt made it seem more feasible to propose that the state give meals to all its citizens and assign them places at the table by lot. The presentation of this plan, and that through women disguised as men, formed a fitting subject for comedy; to criticise was no part of the poet's purpose. He does, however, suggest the result—the shipwreck of the whole plan in the failure to adjust satisfactorily the relations between men and women.

The sources of wealth are enumerated in the *Birds* (588 f.) as agriculture, mines, commerce, and buried moneys; in regard to each of these the birds profess to be able to help men more than the gods. Crime offers many opportunities of gaining wealth; when a man becomes suddenly rich, as did Chremylus, it is assumed that he did not gain his wealth honestly.[4] In time

[1] *Eq.*, 649 f. [2] *Eccl.*, 415 f. [3] *Ibid.*, 590 f. [4] *Plut.*, 30, 352 f.

of peace the farm produced almost all that its owner needed. "My farm," says Dicæopolis,

> Never used to cry, "Come buy my charcoal,"
> Nor "Buy my oil," nor "Buy my anything,"
> But gave me what I wanted, freely and fairly,
> Clear of all cost, with never a word of buying.[1]

This ideal independence of the individual farmer had no doubt been realized to a considerable extent before the Peloponnesian war in the case of larger estates; in this connection it is interesting because it sheds light on the conception of commerce as the opportunity of the wealthy to obtain foreign goods, and not as a normal fact in a country's internal life. War had disturbed this normal condition. When successful agriculture became impossible, Athens became dependent on her neighbors for the ordinary supplies of life; the luxuries of Bœotia were often shut out of her market, and at times the import of dried fish and grain was threatened.[2] Commerce was a source of wealth primarily in that successful exports and imports brought in large returns, if they met with no disaster.[3] Retail trade was not recognized as a legitimate source of income, and the references to it explain the reason for this view, viz., success in trade was thought to be due to the trader's success in cheating. The tricks by which the bird seller makes his birds look fat and attractive are described;[4] by cornering the market in the pots used to carry home small fish, Agoracritus proposes to keep the price of fish down,[5] and a little later he is represented as controlling the market in the herbs used as relish with fish;[6] the boldness of the common people in days of political suspicions is also part of the stock in trade of the petty dealer.[7] Such being the conception of retail trade by both seller and buyer, it is not surprising that special police, *agoranomoi*, were appointed to look after the market-place, and that the state expected a good income from the market tax.[8]

[1] *Achar.*, 34 f.; FRERE's translation.

[2] *Pax*, 551, 999 f.; *Eq.*, 805 f.; and the market scenes in the *Acharnians*.

[3] *Av.*, 594 f. [4] *Ibid.*, 1079 f. [5] *Eq.*, 649. [6] *Ibid.*, 676.

[7] *Vesp.*, 493, and the choice of a "sausage seller" in the *Knights* to outwit Cleon at his own game.

[8] *Cf.* the market scenes in the *Achar.*

In one of the simpler of Aristophanes's plays, the *Plutus* ("Wealth"), he gives some data as to the nature of money which are important for the history of economics in Greece. The plot of the play is very simple. Chremylus, disappointed that wickedness, rather than righteous living, brings wealth, consults the oracle at Delphi to learn whether he shall bring up his son to wickedness in order that he may not remain poor. Apollo's answer enables him to find Plutus, who is a blind and rather crusty old fellow. He then proposes to have Plutus cured of his blindness at the shrine of Asclepius. The operation is successful, and thereafter wealth is to be distributed according to merit, while Plutus will naturally be worshipped instead of the gods who had caused his blindness. Only criminals and priests who had shared the sacrifices of the gods object to the change. The analysis of the nature of money appears at various points in the play, but particularly in the protests of Poverty and her plea that she has always benefited man more than Wealth could do. The value of money, we are told, depends on the limited supply of it, for if everyone had all he wanted there would be no incentive to labor, and the rich could purchase nothing with his money.[1] Nothing is said in this play of the function of the state in coining money, but the references to counterfeit money[2] show that the fact was recognized, even though nothing is said of the reasons for it. Again money, the means and measure of exchange, loses its value completely in a communistic state which directly supplies all the needs of its citizens so that they have no occasion to buy anything. Its intrinsic value is of little moment; it is valuable because it secures all objects to meet man's varied needs; it even enables him to gain political power and secures to the general victory in battle.[3] Thus it gains such value that it serves as the motive for all the arts and sciences which supply what men wish to buy.[4] At the same time it is a motive to crime;[5] it is likely to be misused;[6] and it weakens the character of its possessor.[7]

[1] *Plut.*, 510 f. *et passim.*

[2] *E. g.*, in the *Achar.*, 517.

[3] *Plut.*, 145, 170, 184 f., 188 f.

[4] *Ibid.*, 160, 510, 533.

[5] *Ibid.*, 30.

[6] *Ibid.*, 237.

[7] *Ibid.*, 559 f.

The preceding discussion has proved somewhat scattering, because it was necessary to look at one point after another in Aristophanes's picture of life at Athens, and in each instance we have confined ourselves to the theoretical aspect of the question. Social and economic theory is never in the foreground; it must be found, if at all, in allusions, in the standpoint from which social life is treated, and in the manner in which data as to society are marshalled into dramatic scenes. The outcome of the present discussion may be summarized in two points.

First and most important, we have found some light on the state of political and social science in the latter part of the fifth century B. C. It has become clear that social questions were actively discussed in the days of Aristophanes, and that some slight progress was being made toward an analysis of social elements and forces. This discussion was reflected in the work of the poet himself; and, while he never sets himself to discuss social questions in a scientific way, they do often find a place in his work, and then they are treated with great insight and shrewdness. Perhaps it is fair to say that he is more interested in contributing something indirectly to the subjects which occupied the thought and attention of his hearers than in delineating character or in working out complicated plots. It was the political and social and economic conditions of Athens, more than any other one topic, which formed the background of his comedies.

The second point is a corollary of the first. It is universally recognized that the comedies of Aristophanes are the most important source for our knowledge of social life at Athens in the fifth century. Such testimony would be welcome if it came even from a superficial observer, on the one hand, or, on the other hand, from a theorist who presented social facts to prove his own hypotheses. It is doubly welcome from Aristophanes; for, while he is no theorist, he has an insight into the fundamental facts of social life that leads him to present a fair and broad-minded view even of the society he is satirizing.

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THE RUSKIN CO-OPERATIVE COLONY.

THE writer has spent some five months at the Ruskin Co-operative Colony at Ruskin, Tenn. This colony had become known throughout the world as an example, as far as a partial centralization of productive and distributive agencies could make it so, of the socialist's ideal. The colony had some 600 acres of tillable land and 1,000 acres of land almost worthless. They had a sawmill, a printing and publishing establishment, where a weekly paper, expounding socialism, was printed. They made leather suspenders, had a tailoring shop, a cereal coffee manufactory, a general store, a gristmill, a bakery, a tin shop, a blacksmith shop, a laundry, a photograph gallery, a carpenter and joiner shop, a vegetable and flower garden, a kitchen and common dining-room, a hennery, etc. All of these industries were owned by the association. They, as well as the farm, were operated by the members of the association almost entirely. These members received "hour checks" for one-half of the time they worked. The week's work consisted of fifty hours, the remuneration for which was a "twenty-five hour check." Children not full grown, women who were exempt from labor by reason of nursing a child or of being sick, and men who were unable to work also received an allowance in the form of hour checks. These checks were redeemed at the store in goods, or by the treasurer in United States currency on demand, at two cents per "hour." Meals, rent of house room, laundry service, mending of shoes, schools, and medical attention were free to all members and their families, and the mending of clothes and care of rooms were free to all bachelors. Goods were sold to members at the colony store at wholesale rates.

The colony was sold out by a receiver a few years ago. An association was organized to succeed the old one. It has carried on the colony since, at Ruskin, Ga., but not successfully. The colony rapidly disintegrated and is now practically extinct.

It will be of interest to consider the phenomena observed,

which I shall arrange according to De Greef's classification. We shall first consider the

ECONOMIC PHENOMENA.

At the beginning of the last decade a Mr. Wayland, who was publishing a socialistic paper, conceived the idea of starting a co-operative colony. He announced in his paper that, if his subscribers would increase the circulation of the paper to a satisfactory degree, a colony site would be purchased, the printing establishment moved to it, and a colony started. The circulation was increased as desired and a 1,000-acre tract was bought at $2.50 per acre. Perhaps the first mistake was made in the selection of the land, for it was worthless. The farmers in the vicinity have told the writer that they knew the land well, but that it was not worth paying taxes on. Here, therefore, was $2,500 practically thrown away. The printing establishment was duly moved to the land, and set up, and the colony was started. Cheap buildings were erected and the town was soon in operation. They had a common dining-room and lived on good fare. In fact, their living was too expensive for colony pioneers, who ought to save every cent they possibly can for a sinking fund. Here was another mistake. Their only industry at first was the publication of the weekly paper, and they soon decided to start other industries. They engaged in the manufacture of stump pullers, hay presses, wood-sawing machines, and other machines. Patent rights were purchased, patterns and castings made at a distant city and shipped to the colony, where the machines were put together. But the machines, for some reason, would not sell, and all the money and time they had invested were lost. Anyone who has had any experience in the business of starting a manufacturing establishment can readily understand that thousands of dollars were lost in these experiments. They subsequently decided to engage in the manufacture of sash, doors, moldings, etc., and a lot of wood-working machinery worth about $2,000 was shipped to them on trial. They decided not to accept the machinery, and the manufacturer sued. The managers of the colony had included the machinery

in their inventory, and, this fact being ascertained, they lost the suit and were obliged to keep the machinery and pay for it. As the manufacture and sale of sash was impracticable there, owing to the location, etc., all the money paid for the machinery was lost.

The circulation of the paper, owing perhaps to increasing competition, was meanwhile decreasing at a rapid rate, and the colonists found that they would be obliged to raise their own farm produce. After they had gone to the expense of putting a barbed-wire fence around their land, they found that it was worthless, and began to look about for other land. They purchased a tract of land some four miles farther from the railroad. When the neighboring farmers found that the colony was obliged to purchase better land somewhere in the neighborhood, they raised the price of their land. It has been hinted that there was a connivance between some member of the purchasing committee and the sellers, but, whatever the facts may be, they lost another thousand dollars or so by paying a high price for their land. Having obtained the new site, they moved there, but now they were six miles from the nearest railroad station, which was a great disadvantage, for everything had to be hauled over roads that usually followed creek beds and abounded with stones, sand, and gravel, so that only a very small load could be hauled. All they bought from the outside world was necessarily hauled over this rough, bridgeless road and the cost correspondingly increased, while the products of their industries were decreased in value by the cost of this haul. Having settled in the new location, farming was begun. But the southern soil has certain peculiarities which the northern and the western soil has not, and a northern farmer cannot work a southern farm profitably until he understands these peculiarities and is willing to admit that he does not know all about farming. The tools used by the northern farmer cannot all be used by the southern farmer, and as the colony farmer was a northern man, some money was wasted by purchasing implements which were found to be useless in the South. It has been asserted that this loss amounted to as much as $500.

On the farm, wheat, corn, potatoes, etc., were raised, but never enough to supply the wants of the colony, and hence large amounts of money were used to supply the deficiency. This was a leakage, a very serious one. The garden supplied the dining-rooms sparingly with vegetables. Flowers were cultivated and seeds sold to outsiders, but the demand for them was small. There was a large cave on the place in which rhubarb was grown to a very large size during the winter months, but it was claimed that the most accessible market was too distant to dispose of this crop with profit. There was the same drawback to the strawberry crop. There were cows enough to keep the table supplied with milk, but not enough to supply them with butter. This was purchased mainly from the native farmers.

The paper, as I have stated before, had a large circulation at first, and the press used to print it was capable of doing the work. Notwithstanding this, it was exchanged for a cylinder press, at a cost of some $3,500 in cash. Furthermore, the cylinder press was not suitable for book-printing.

At one time the colony undertook to publish reform literature in pamphlet and in book form, but it didn't pay and was stopped. Orders were taken for reform literature, however, and a stock of the most popular works of this kind was carried.

There was not work enough to keep the members profitably employed, yet outside labor was hired to chop wood and logs. Wood was used as fuel, and the sawmill boiler was of an ancient pattern, with poor heat-economizing devices. Consequently much wood was wasted.

The editor of the paper, commenting, in 1901, on these matters, said :

> One year very good celery was grown and stored in the large cave for the winter. It was preserved so well that at the time in the spring when celery is exhausted in the market this celery was at its best. A trial shipment of it was made to a neighboring city, and was sold for a fancy price that showed a fine profit in the business if conducted systematically from year to year. But practical members of the colony were rebuffed by the management for urging this. Fees for membership were coming in and nobody was in want, and fees would always be coming in. An opportunity to profit by laundry work was thrown at their door. The laundry agents of a

neighboring town, Dixon, ten miles distant, learning that the colony had a steam laundry for its own work, sent to Ruskin three times to urge upon them the laundry work that was being sent to a town a hundred miles away. An improvement in the Ruskin laundry of $75 would have enabled them to do this and other work that in time could have afforded them a permanent business of $100 a month clear profit. The management refused to consider the proposal. . . . . An iron molder who had joined the colony showed them that they could buy in the market the best castings for half the price they were paying for inferior ones. This man, supposed to be a partner in the business, was told to grub at his own affairs and not to meddle with the management. . . . . The Ruskin farming was the laughing-stock of the neighborhood. They resented rather than appreciated suggestions offered by successful neighboring farmers who were familiar with the conditions essential to produce a good crop in that part of the country. Work was always going on, after its fashion, and hard work by many, but without the foresight and direction that yields returns. . . . . A worn-out plantation several miles away was rented for $300 for the season [1900]. Extra mules and additional tools were bought. After all summer's work this farm did not come out even with what was expended on it in labor and money, and it was called a total failure. . . . . The crops on the colony land also turned out a total failure. All the farming in this region (southern Georgia) is done by planting in ridges, as a protection against heat and sunbake. Those who were selected to superintend the farming insisted on planting flat, as they had been accustomed to do where they were raised. They refused to imitate their neighbors. One of the farmers of the colony said: "I will plant this way [flat] if I live to be a thousand years old." . . . . The neighbors harvested fair crops.

Other serious mistakes could be mentioned, but enough has been said to show that the management of the colony was a very unwise one, and that this was the direct cause of the failure of the colony.

The publication of the paper had always, until the receiver was appointed, been a source of considerable profit. Just what this profit was no one knew, as the accounting system was defective.

Bath cabinets were manufactured, on which the profit was large, but the demand for them was very small, and they sold not more than one per week. Chewing gum was manufactured, but there was scarcely any demand for it. The tailoring shop made a small profit on its outside trade. Clothing was made for the colonists at cost, saving them a great deal of money.

The sawmill did little or no work for the outside trade. The lumber sawed was used for building purposes. It was therefore not a source of revenue, but a money-saving enterprise, as it enabled the members to get their lumber with no cash outlay except for machinery and oil and some outside labor that was hired to chop logs. The manufacture of cereal coffee was profitable, but the demand for it was very small, and it was therefore only a small source of revenue. Leather suspenders were made by hand, all but the embossing, which was done by a machine. The demand for them was small, and it is doubtful whether they were a source of revenue.

One rather uncommon source of income was from the Fourth of July celebrations, held in the big cave. There was music and dancing and a free barbecue. A large profit was realized from admission tickets and on refreshments sold, great crowds being attracted from the surrounding country.

The steam laundry was sufficiently equipped with machinery for colony purposes. It was in charge of a man, but the other hands were all women. Washing was done there for all the colonists, but the ironing and starching were done at home, each for herself. The clothes and bed linen of bachelors and widowers were, however, ironed and mended for them free of charge. This laundry saved a great deal of labor to the colony. If done individually—each family for itself—the family washing would have consumed one-half day for each family per week, and a woman could not work her required five hours per day for the colony on the day she did her washing. There were present about seventy families at the time of which I write, and possibly fifty women were required to work five hours per day for the colony, the others being, for various reasons, exempt. The labor of fifty women for one day would be 250 hours, which divided by nine to reduce it to the regular working day of others would make about twenty-eight days of labor. The labor required to run the laundry was eight days of nine hours per week by the women, and perhaps three days per week by the manager, which gives a total of eleven days. The colony therefore gained twenty-eight days minus eleven days,

or seventeen days, each week by means of the laundry. Against these seventeen days are to be charged the steam used in running the laundry, depreciation of plant, etc. The steam was furnished from the sawmill boiler, and but little of it was required; and the machinery was obtained cheaply; there was therefore very little to be subtracted from these seventeen days per week—so little that it can be disregarded. Another point to be noted in this connection is that the twenty women who could not work also had their washing done by the colony free of charge, and that expense was saved to them.

The common dining-room was quite a time-saving device. There were four cooks, each of whom worked about seven hours per day, a total of twenty-eight hours. The paring and preparing of vegetables were done by women. Some twelve were employed, averaging about three hours each per day, or thirty-six hours all told. There were some thirty-five waiters, who also washed the dishes. Each worked approximately four hours per day, deducting the time they consumed in eating their meals, or 140 hours per day for all. Two hours of labor were required to sweep the dining-room per day. Two bakers were employed to bake the bread, nine hours per day, or eighteen hours for both. The manager devoted all his time to the work, and this was nine hours per day. Recapitulating, we have:

Paring, etc. - - - - -	36 hours.
Cooking - - - - - -	28 "
Waiting - - - - - - -	140 "
Sweeping - - - - - -	2 "
Baking - - - - - - -	18 "
Managing - - - - - -	9 "
Total - - - - - -	233 "

Let us compare this with the work the women would be required to do if each family did its own cooking. The work of purchasing, preparing, cooking and serving food, washing dishes, sweeping the dining-room and kitchen, baking, etc., in each family would be something like nine hours per day on the average. Nine hours per day for seventy families would be 630

hours. Subtracting from 630 hours the 233 hours required in the common dining-room, we have 397 hours, almost 400, saved each day by the co-operative method. This is equal to a saving of 63½ per cent., and to the work of forty-four persons working nine hours per day.

There was a small cash income from the blacksmithy, as work was done for outsiders. The machine shop sometimes did a little work for neighboring mills for cash. The doctor earned some money from professional visits to outsiders, which was turned over to the colony. No charge was made to colonists for the doctor's services. There is said to be some advantage in having a colony doctor, as he has no incentive to keep his patients sick for the sake of fees. His interest lies in getting them well as quickly as possible. The photograph gallery did considerable custom work for cash. Colonists got rates reduced to cost, and paid in colony scrip or in cash, as they preferred. The store did considerable business, but the greater part of its sales were for hour checks, and no profit was made on these sales. Another part of its business was barter with the neighboring farmers for butter and eggs. This produce was all consumed by the colony, and the bartering at the store was therefore only a cheaper way of buying this produce. This was a profit, but not a cash profit. It encouraged the bad habit of consuming admission fees, for the goods bartered away had been paid for in cash which had usually been obtained from the sale of stock. A third portion was sold for cash to outsiders and to members. On that which was sold to members no profit was made, but sales to outsiders yielded a profit. These outsiders were southern farmers, a class of people with a low standard of living; hence these cash sales were small, and the store could not be called a money-making enterprise. Its chief utility lay in providing goods to members at wholesale rates.

The farming, as was said before, was badly managed, and it would therefore be unfair to compare it with farming under the competitive system, which is well managed. The merits or demerits of co-operation could not be determined in that way.

GENETIC PHENOMENA.

Families lived separately, as in other villages. The mother was not required to work for three months before and one year after confinement.

Marriage ceremonies were performed in the ordinary way. Sometimes they were performed in public, on the stage. One peculiar ceremony was that performed at the marriage of two prominent members. The contracting parties first read a statement saying, among other things, that they would live together so long as love should last between them, and no longer. They were then married in the legal way by a justice, who took no notice of the preliminary remarks that the pair had made. The matter was taken up by some reporters, who called it a free-love marriage, ignoring the fact that a legal ceremony had been performed. A few of the earliest members were free lovers in theory, but no one has ever charged them as far as I am aware with being such in practice.

There was some scattering criticism on the fertility of one or two families who had children nearly every year. It was supposed by some that, if the parents had been obliged to find support for their children under the competitive system, they would have been more prudent. I am inclined to doubt this, however, and do not think that the socialistic principle of providing for the children of all had any noticeable tendency to increase the population.

There was a more marked disposition among the younger people to get married than there is outside of colonies of this sort. Young women were scarcer than eligible men, and all the former got married or had opportunities to marry as soon as they were marriageable. The reason for this was, perhaps, that there was security of employment and of a livelihood, and hence no worry about the future on the part of the members. The advent of a family caused no apprehensions, for the colony issued to the father colony scrip for the maintenance of the children. The absence of worry in the colony, until the receiver was appointed, was really remarkable, and was commented on by many visitors. It was the doctor's opinion that it was very

conducive to good health, and tended to lengthen life. Sexual selection was not governed by economic considerations, as in ordinary society. There were no opportunities to make fortunes, and one person's economic prospect was as good as another's. Sexual selection was therefore governed by personal affinity, looks, etc., and not by money considerations.

The criticism has been made that sufficient provisions were not made for the care of children old enough to run about while the mother was at work. During the school months they were all at school, but through the vacations the mother could not look after them while she was at work, and it was thought by some that the children degenerated somewhat for this reason; others, again, held a different opinion.

EDUCATIONAL PHENOMENA.

The smaller children received kindergarten training, and as they grew older they attended school. The school year at the colony was ten months long, but the state paid the teacher for only five months. This salary was turned over to the colony, which furnished a teacher. Several members also gave instruction after working hours in French, elocution, gymnastics, and a few other branches. There was a foreman of recreation who superintended the theatricals given every two weeks. Music lessons were also given. The Progress League, composed of the children, gave an entertainment every two weeks. Instructive experiments in chemistry were occasionally made at these entertainments. The foundation of a college building was laid, but it was never carried farther. There was a public library containing one or two thousand volumes. It was open evenings, and books were loaned to members. It was well patronized. There was a brass band of some fifteen or sixteen pieces, which gave concerts at regular intervals.

ARTISTIC PHENOMENA.

Art was not very prominent, but it was more in evidence than it would have been in a competitive village. One of the colonists spent nearly a year in painting a drop curtain for the stage; and also painted a portrait of Ruskin. He had classes in

drawing at times. A manual-training school was talked of for the future. Men who worked at trades were, as a rule, not afraid to show anyone how to do the work. This is quite a contrast with the competitive system, in which it is sometimes very hard to learn a trade, because skilled laborers are afraid that they may educate someone who will afterward displace them.

PHENOMENA PERTAINING TO BELIEFS.

There was, first of all, a deeply rooted belief in the efficacy of the principles of socialism. Some of the members even valued the theories of socialistic authorities above practice. Contradictory as it may seem, there were a few socialists with a decided leaning toward anarchy; who would have abolished all rules and regulations, and depended upon established custom and the sense of right of the members to carry on the colony, if they had been able to do so. Their optimism blinded them so that they could not see the disastrous results in store for the colony.

The religious belief of the colony was like Jacob's coat. Nearly all the chief religions of civilized races were represented. Protestantism, however, was more in evidence than any other cult. There were a number of freethinkers. "Mental Science" had quite a following, and was reported to be responsible for the death of one member. This man was a student of the "science" and also wished to learn the art of swimming. He was told by one of the leading "scientists" that if he firmly made up his mind that he was able to swim, he would find that he had no difficulty in swimming. One morning, soon after this, he was missing, and his body found in a deep place in the creek. It is reported that another "scientist," when she caught a bedbug, would place it on the porch, headed toward the gate, and say: "Now, you go away, and don't you ever come back again." It is not reported that her plan was efficacious.

MORAL PHENOMENA.

The ethical views of some of the leaders were somewhat hazy. A number of people were induced to join the colony by the printed statement of the officials that the net assets were over

$94,000. As has been seen, there was a variety of industries, and no ordinary person could form an approximately correct estimate of the values of the various assets, so the statement was accepted as true. It may be of interest to see how this large estimate was obtained. For a particular purpose an estimate was once asked for of the value of the sawmill machinery, etc. When obtained, it was found to be only one-third of the last annual inventory. When the foreman was asked to explain the discrepancy, he said that he had been instructed by the officials not to make the inventory lower than that of the preceding year. A lot of catalogues and two old directories, one of Chicago and one of St. Louis, were inventoried at $65. Nearly all, if not all, the buildings were inventoried at from two to five times their value; and the buildings which were bought on the farms, and should therefore not have been inventoried at all, since the farms were inventoried at their purchase price, or higher, were put in at a high figure. The gristmill appeared a third time in the inventory with the mill machinery. These and other facts lead me to believe that the net assets were not more than one-third or one-fourth of the value given to them in the annual statement. Another statement which went the rounds of the press was that the colony was rated A 1 by Bradstreet. The fact is that in 1899 it was rated merely C by Bradstreet.

So many things had been given to the colonists by well-meaning friends outside the colony that they had become a little pauperized. There was a feeling that, if they needed anything, they had only to express their wants in their paper and some good friend of the colony would send it to them. They were undeceived, however, when a receiver was appointed, and their appeals for aid, through the paper and by letters, were practically unanswered.

JUDICIAL PHENOMENA.

The colony had a constitution which could be amended by a vote of the members. A board of thirteen directors legislated for the colony, but their actions were at all times subject to a referendum vote, if demanded. Colonists also had the privilege

of the initiative, and sometimes availed themselves of it. There was an executive committee of three, of which the president was chairman, which directed the daily work of the colony and carried out the orders of the board of directors. The secretary looked after the correspondence and orders, and performed the usual duties of that office. There was a treasurer, who, strange to say, was not required to give bonds.

POLITICAL PHENOMENA.

There was a political ring composed of some five or six members. This ring had succeeded in ousting another ring in or about 1897. The latter retaliated by injunctions of various kinds, and they and their adherents became known as "injunctionists." I do not mean to say that this was the sole reason that injunctions were applied for, but it was one of the reasons. The object of the ring was mainly to secure offices and easy positions. I do not know whether there were any who made a profit out of their office, but one of them was suspected of such dishonesty. The ring had apparently not gotten to the point where money is used to influence voters in various ways. Liquor could not easily be used for this purpose, for none was allowed to be sold there.

If the writer may judge from his limited observations, he would say that the worst thing a co-operative colony has to contend with is lack of ability among its members to manage its affairs. M. Godin led his employees into co-operation gradually, so that they learned one step at a time, and that is perhaps the only way to start a co-operative colony successfully. Mr. Wayland, the founder of the Coming Nation and of the Ruskin Colony, had put himself under obligations to turn the whole thing, paper and all, over to the colonists, and he could not control them after that. He became discouraged with them and left the colony. If he could have controlled affairs until the colonists had learned business principles and acquired habits of economy, things would perhaps have gone differently. The Oneida Community also had to face a crisis, some time after they had begun to co-operate, when they found that they had

lost some $40,000. However, there was such religious discipline there, and the leaders had such good sense, that they were enabled to institute a system of rigid economy in the colony which put them on their feet once more. There was no religious discipline at Ruskin, but an economic control would, I think, have answered the purpose.

Another serious evil that colonies have to contend with is the political ring. This will spring up in favorable soil, and it has a tendency to put incompetent men into office, who can do the colony serious injury.

The successful co-operative village furnishes more opportunities for economy, culture, and amusement than any other village of its size. It creates neither beggars nor tramps, but, recognizing its duty toward dependents and defectives, it supports them in a rational way. It gives security of employment and of a livelihood. The intelligent and strong help those who are not so fortunate. It is in many respects like a large family, and tends to restore some of the good features of mediæval family life. It is, therefore, a subject worthy of further experiment by intelligent and successful business people.

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ON LIFE-SATISFACTION.

THE purpose of this article is to discuss and prove the following proposition: *The degree of life-satisfaction of separate individuals or of whole societies is measured, not by the absolute quantity of goods possessed, but by the rapidity with which this quantity is increasing.* In other words, the feeling of satisfaction or of self-contentment is a result or a function, not of the quantity of goods, but of the rapidity with which the quantity varies from time to time. Mathematically, this proposition may be expressed thus: Let the curve *PQRST* in the accompanying diagram represent the aggregate quantity of goods—material, moral, and intellectual—possessed at any given time by an individual, a human society, or a nation. This curve, which we may call the "progress curve," generally has an aspect like that shown in the diagram:



An organism or a society develops first very slowly and then with increasing rapidity; hence the corresponding part, *PQ*, of the curve (early civilization) rises slantingly. In youth

the process of self-improvement goes on in the most active manner, but when the organism begins to mature, the speed decreases; this is represented by the portion QRS of the "progress curve," rising first rapidly, then more slowly. Finally the organism becomes tired, and decadence is the result; this is illustrated by the last part, ST, of the figure, showing diminishing ordinates. It seems to me—and this is precisely my contention—that an individual or a society feels *most contented, most satisfied*, not at the point S of the curve, but at the point R (*i. e.*, at the point of the greatest inclination of the curve), notwithstanding the fact that the quantity of goods enjoyed at S is perhaps twice as large as that at R. I make this assertion because at R the quantity of goods increases most rapidly in a given time. The individual at this period is sanguine and full of hope; every day brings something new into his life; he is conscious of the fruits of his labor.

At S the contrary is the case. The absolute quantity of goods possessed is here comparatively large; but this quantity is immovable; every day brings the same thing; the entire work of the organism is expended uselessly at some point, just as in a bad machine friction and internal resistances impede the movement—in spite of its labors, it does not go forward. Thus it is clear that life-contentment must be smaller here than at R. Moreover, I assert that even at PQ, where the *absolute quantity* of goods is very small, there is more satisfaction than at S, because there is still some progress at PQ, while there is none at S.

In short, my thought may be expressed mathematically as follows: *The degree of life-satisfaction of an individual or a society is independent of the ordinate of the "progress curve," but is a function of the angle which the tangent to this curve forms with the axle of the abscissæ;* or

$$S = f\left(\frac{dG}{dt}\right),$$

where S is the degree of life-satisfaction, G the quantity of goods possessed, and t the time.[1] The truth of this statement is

[1] For those unfamiliar with mathematical analysis it may be observed that the

proved as well by history as by our observations of ourselves and our surroundings. The historical examples of Greece and Rome are familiar to all. A generally hopeful state of mind existed there precisely at the epoch of the most intensive elaboration of different problems or of the most extensive growth of territory, and not at the period when inventions and discoveries had already been made or territories acquired; in other words, not at the time when the people could enjoy the goods already acquired; on the contrary, just at this epoch a feeling of discontent and pessimism prevailed.

It is interesting to note that nations instinctively feel this. It is always at a definite stage of progress that regrets commence about a pastoral life, about a past golden age, etc. All this is only a reminiscence of times when progress was more rapid and when every day brought something new into life.

Similarly individuals like to remember their youth, although they were then, no doubt, less intellectual and probably poorer than at a later age. But their "progress curve" formed a large angle with the abscissæ axle, the quantity of goods they possessed increased very rapidly, and this overcame all. One learns in his youth that the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the two other sides of the triangle; he learns wonderful laws of the movement of celestial bodies, beautiful chemical formulas, the principle of evolution of living creatures. A youth feels for the first time the emotions of love; for the first time he tries to say "yes" and "no" in his own business affairs, insignificant though they be. But all this passes quickly in a few years.

Later the individual learns more about the laws of nature. He is now able to love better women than before, to accomplish more important and more difficult tasks. But, in spite of this, there is at this stage no such intensity of life; the curve ascends slowly, and there is thus less contentment than before. Every-

symbol $\frac{dG}{dt}$ signifies the relative increase of the quantity G with the time t; the symbol f means function or dependence; so that the above formula can be expressed in words as follows: The degree of life-satisfaction (S) is depending (f) upon the relative growth of the goods possessed (dG) with the time (dt).

one likewise knows from his own vocation that, after the first self-evident improvements have been made, the following ones are not so easy; the work progresses slowly and does not bring the same satisfaction as before.

The example of a person making money may be quoted as a further proof of my proposition. A merchant experiences a higher degree of satisfaction the better his business is going; *i. e.*, the more interest he is making on his capital. Suppose he received 20 per cent. on his capital five years ago, and is receiving only 5 per cent. this year. He was undoubtedly more cheerful five years ago than he is today, although his capital, *absolutely speaking*, is considerably greater now than then. But he is enjoying, not the capital itself, but the rapidity of its growth; and that is a case under my proposition.

Of course, such a general sociological law is very rarely met with, in reality, in its pure aspect. Many other causes and factors are constantly interfering, all together composing, in their complexity, what we call "life." Religion is one of these important factors. It changes considerably the aspect of the "progress curve," in that it planes it. Were it allowable to compare a man or a human society to a machine, religion might be likened, in some respects, to the fly wheel preventing the machine from going either too fast or too slowly. Thus when progress tends to become too rapid, religion will prevent this by its conservatism. But coming, through this very struggle, in contact with progress, religion itself thus takes a step forward. A fly wheel, however, sometimes absorbs a part of the useful work of the machine itself. The church put under its ban the men who asserted that the earth is round; but today this is being taught even in parochial schools and seminaries, and bad marks are given to pupils who do not know the proofs of the earth's roundness.

Conversely, when an individual or a human society becomes tired, progress begins to slacken, and apathy and pessimism result. Here the church steps in to console by its dogmas and by promises of other joys than those obtainable in this life; or to convince the sufferer that worldly pleasures are not worth

seeking. In this way religion has helped many individuals and nations to overcome periods of depression in their lives, and prevented their "progress curve" from falling too low. While thus religion, as a fly wheel, by its opposition, takes much joy away from progress, it returns it later, in the form of stored energy, to joyless people.

If my proposition be true, the following consequences must be drawn:

1. If you wish to give pleasure to someone—to a people, a group of persons, a friend, or even to yourself—*always try to do it in the shortest possible time*. Otherwise, if you do it slowly or step by step, the result will be imperceptible. It is better to increase the ordinate of the "progress curve" little and quickly than much and slowly.

2. Notwithstanding the immense progress to be expected in the future, humanity will never be very happy, or, more precisely, *its happiness will never be commensurate with the reached results*, because, to be satisfied, it constantly requires new progress, and because every new step tends to make people more exacting.

If, by some miracle, we were transported a hundred years forward, we should undoubtedly be extremely happy, because a great step would have been taken in a short time, corresponding to a large angle on the "progress curve." But it does by no means follow that people in reality will be very happy after a hundred years. They will have obtained the large quantity of goods in their possession by a long route; the curve will be a slanting one, and the degree of happiness felt will probably be as moderate as our own—perhaps even smaller.

Thus our theorem explains the apparent paradox that, notwithstanding the progress of culture, humanity has not become perceptibly happier. People constantly complain, constantly seek for something better, as they have sought for it in ancient Egypt, in Rome, in the Middle Ages—everywhere and always. The whole paradox is based on a wrong standard of happiness. It is taken for granted that the aggregate amount of goods possessed by a people, and not the rapidity of its increase, constitutes the measure for its happiness.

Let us therefore be calm and not be jealous of posterity. Probably our descendants will fly over the ocean in airships in half an hour; they will possibly and probably make their bread directly from clay; but it is very doubtful whether they will be happier than ourselves. Yet it will be admitted that the final goal of all our activities is happiness; and if this is not attained, what is the good of all the screws and machinery?

3. The third consequence is the most important, because, rightly applied, it reconciles us with life. It may be stated as follows: *It lies within the power of each individual, as of each people, to increase his happiness on earth, independently of the quantity of goods possessed.* It is enough for that purpose to lead an active life, ever to see and attain new results; in short, *to increase the angle of the "progress curve."* Precisely here lies the greatest wisdom of our Creator. It would be a great injustice if our happiness were dependent upon the absolute quantity of goods possessed. Were such the case, those born later would have far better chances for happiness than those born earlier; and it might be said, paraphrasing the well-known sentence of Mephisto in *Faust:* "Weh Dir, dass Du ein *Grossvater* bist!"

Thus in reality the possibility for happiness is given to everyone as a result of his own efforts, independently of the epoch or the place in which he lives. This has been understood by the great moralists of all ages. "The kingdom of God is within you," said Jesus. Socrates taught this truth by his life and his writings; the same was done by Seneca; in our own day it is expounded by Tolstoi.

Perhaps the life of one man means nothing in the world-economy; perhaps he is only a cellule, a link in a great chain, of some great purpose unknown to us, but for which humanity exists. This all may be. But God has given the same possibility for happiness to the cellules, whether living earlier or later; the same possibility for reaching our little final purpose —our personal happiness; the same possibility to all men of all times and all nations. And this possibility is given to us by the property of our nature that *our happiness depends principally on the surplus of goods which we possess, not on their absolute quantity.*

WLADIMIR KARAPETOFF.

WILKINSBURG, PA.

ASSOCIATIONS FOR HELPING THE BLIND.[1]

THE blind enjoy the compassion of their fellow-men perhaps more than many others that are suffering under the difficulties of life, likely because people consider a blind man a person much more unfortunate than other sufferers. Still this consideration was also the reason why the blind have been thought for such a long time unable to do any work, destined to gain their livelihood by beggary, because it is not much more than a hundred years since the first institution for teaching the blind was established at Paris. But in this short period of a century what great success has been attained! Blind children are not only able now to enjoy the same education as full-sighted ones, but in some countries they are even obliged to visit an institution in order to get the same education as their seeing brethren. It is true, writing and reading is rather a modern invention for the blind, and their books are still expensive, and therefore small in number; but by copying out what they cannot get printed for want of demand, by gathering these copied books into libraries in order to enable a greater number of them to read these books, they have not only been able to acquire a higher education, but the number of those that attend a university, and even pass examinations, increases from year to year.

About a year ago, a small international union was formed under the name "Association des aveugles étudiants," the object of which is not only to establish a scientific library for blind students, but still more to assist each other and to help also the poor among the blind, not only to study, but to get a position after leaving their studies, so that a blind student may no longer be an object of surprise, but that the number of those who have become useful members of society may increase. In these endeavors America is by no means marching behind the European nations.

[1] The author of this article is a blind gentleman in Leipzig, who has won a good position as a teacher of modern languages.

It is true, the number of those that have acquired a position in which they can earn what they want for life through what they have studied in science is small; but we are still in the beginning of this movement. A few years ago a blind man was hardly able to visit a university and pass an examination. The general want of confidence is perhaps the greatest obstacle that a blind man meets, and it is difficult to persuade our friends that they do us a much greater favor by giving us occupation, even for small pay, than by giving us presents.

It will be a good while before even a poor blind man may earn through his mental work, in which he must not be inferior to full-sighted people, just as much as they; and till then it must be our endeavor to render those happy that are forced to gain their livelihood by manual occupation, in which we cannot deny they are a good deal inferior to their seeing brethren.

What is the state of these unfortunate people now, and how are they to be assisted? Most blind people are much less independent than others. In early childhood their kind mothers will guard them from the rough approach of other boys. Then they are shut out from life by their education in an institution where they learn some trade. When they leave school, in which everything was arranged according to their state, shall we then expect them to be able to meet all the difficulties of life to which they are entire strangers? The real education for life through experience, which any other child has in the house of its parents without learning it, is still to come. In what way can a blind man earn his livelihood? Those who are not studying may do it in two different ways—either by music or tuning pianos, or by the practice of a trade. In music they are much less inferior to seeing people than in a trade. Their talent is mostly at least as good as that of a common musician, and their diligence often greater. They have musical notes which they can read with their fingers, and though the number of those that are playing in an orchestra is still small, as organists, music teachers, and even pianists they are performing their work well. But the state of the poor working blind man, and still more of the girls among them, is much less agreeable.

The trades they learn are mostly caning chairs, making brushes, baskets, ropes, paper sacks, and some similar articles in which a man with full sight can earn but very little. Besides, a seeing workman can add to his work many things to make it appear nicer, which will increase its price. Also selling and getting new orders is more difficult for a blind man as long as he must work alone.

Saxony is an industrial country. It has many great manufactories, and large parts of the country are inhabited chiefly by weavers and people that have only a small income. In such districts the number of blind people is not small, and, what is still more serious, they are very likely to become beggars. Not seldom they are even engaged by their own families, which are poor and of a low education, to live in this manner, which, no doubt, will bring them a little better income than making brushes or baskets. They do not mind that in this way they will fall entirely into immorality, and what they learned in the institution of Dresden may be lost in a few years. Such cases must be prevented, and, in order to prevent them, it is the first duty of the inspector at Dresden to find out whether it would be wise to send the pupil back to his people after leaving the institution. Then he must take care to find out what may be the most successful trade for him; and this he begins already while he is in school. After he has completed his studies, he remains in one of the large workshops of the institution, to complete learning his trade, because he must know it well enough to perform it without any master. This aim he has attained when he is eighteen or twenty years old, and then he is sent either to his family or to some other place which the inspector considers fit for him. How can he get on there? This question is more difficult to answer than many think. Most of them lack in their lives one of the most important periods of a seeing workman, the period when he was a journeyman. He has learned his trade as well as a blind man can, but he hardly knows anything of business life. Thus arranging a business himself is almost impossible. Even when kind friends would do it for him, he hardly understands how to meet his clients. Although

he may have a benefactor who understands business, he must remain a workman laboring separated from others. There are, to be sure, several who have a business which they themselves can carry on, and which is flourishing, and who are married and able to gain means for their families; but these belong mostly to those happier people who have a brother or a cousin with whom they may live, and who will teach them business life. Still, though working alone, the blind tradesman is never left alone. The institution of Dresden will take care of him throughout his life. When it cannot allow him to return to his family, or if he has no father or mother to live with, it will find a suitable place for him, where he may spend his days for a moderate sum. That is usually a simple family which will not make him a present, but which will also not earn a great deal through him. Not seldom it is a blind man who has a shop himself. There are even some colonies of blind people working together. The institution will buy materials for them. It will advertise their work, try to find connections with manufacturers for them, and, if they cannot sell all their work, it will do it for them. None of them receive regular assistance, but most of them get now and then financial help.

The blind workman is at a disadvantage working alone. Measuring and other processes which a man who can see does not need, will take him a good deal of time, and still his work very often is not quite what is expected. Besides, the making of baskets, brushes, ropes, paper sacks, stockings, or similar things are occupations which are pretty low paid even to seeing people. Thus it is easily understood that the income of the blind tradesman must be rather low.

The blind people of the working classes are rather modest, and not much is needed to make them happy—just a family of which they are considered a member, and which takes from them the chief difficulties of their trade and of their lives. There have been institutions for them, in which they were well cared for, but a man does not like to live only in order to eat and drink, but he wishes to have his share in the life of his fellow-men. Excluded from life and living as a monk, he feels fully his dependence; he feels how unhappy a blind person is.

Saxony has been the place where this excellent idea has not only been fully grasped, but where the inspector and the teachers of the central institution made it their duty to organize a real system. It is true, what the Germans pay for their poor people, even for their blind, is much less than what the Americans do; but the advantage of the German method is that it is much more centralized. They must consider: How can we arrange best with the little we have at our disposal? And besides, when all is in the hands of one great committee that can give commands, they have the power to carry out their decisions. And everything they arrange is done in a more centralized manner than if done by separated committees, and thus the small sum the Germans dispose of can often do just as much good as the greater gifts of America.

It is not an easy task to form a connection between all the blind tradesmen of one kingdom and their superintendent. These blind people have not very high education, and thus often do not risk stating their demands, and the less modest ones request things which one would call superfluous. But also on this side a very ingenious arrangement has been made. Each blind tradesman has his guardian, who is usually a rich gentleman—a manufacturer or merchant who is not too proud to care continually for one or more blind persons. Whenever they have a request for an expensive tool, a new coat which they cannot pay for themselves, they tell their guardian, who, after examining the request, will write a word to the institution and is sure that the want will be met. The father-like friendship of a wealthy and well-educated gentleman will keep them from mingling with bad society; and this happy arrangement costs nothing at all.

We hardly need to add that the institution at Dresden is anxious to spread more and more among the public the knowledge of what the blind can do, by lectures, exhibitions of their work, and articles in the papers. In other German countries this system is more or less completely introduced, and these ideas are spreading outside of Germany. Committees consisting of benevolent seeing people and better-educated blind ones

have been founded in these later years to assist the institutions in their work by taking part of the work on their own shoulders, and the formation of societies of the blind themselves is very useful. Helpful arrangements can be established, as libraries, reading-circles, and concerts.

And how is the state of the poor among the American blind people? This question will doubtless rise in the minds of those of our readers who have a heart for their fellow-men who are suffering under the difficulties of fate. Their education is by no means inferior to that of the Germans, because a good number of blind teachers are employed in the blind schools (in Germany very few). And where there is a lack of educated people there is also a want of means for educating themselves and others. Besides, music can much easier be taught to them than in Germany, because those of the German blind pupils that cannot learn enough to become teachers or organists are in great danger as to their morality, as evening parties, in which they might play the piano, are hardly ever arranged without drinking beer slowly during the whole of the evening. This danger does not exist for the American blind musicians, whose number is therefore much larger. The American blind girls are also much more than anywhere else occupied in the household.

The compassion for the blind is by no means less in America than in Germany; we are also sure that their energy in getting on is not inferior to that of others. But they are more isolated than the Germans. To find a family for each of them where they would not be considered as poor blind people, but as members of that family, to get a homelike place for them, would be a very thankful work for such a committee. As soon as such a committee is arranged, a good many things may be done for them which are rather difficult today. Libraries that enable them to complete their studies, connection between manufacturers or associations and the working blind people, even assisting the musicians, tuners, and typewriters in finding places, would then be much easier.

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THE NEW WOMAN IN JAPAN.

We desire at the outset to disclaim any intention of using the term "new woman" in a jocose or satirical way. It is not our purpose to refer at all to such a creature as that called "new woman" in the Occident; for it has not yet appeared to any great extent among the Japanese. It may be true, in some cases, that the modernized Japanese woman is "without gentleness or refinement," and may be called a "parody of a man" or a "sickening sort of person." But, as the *Jiji Shimpo* explains, "the process of the new woman's evolution may be disfigured by some accident;" and "the new woman stands out with objectionable salience because her environment is so colorless."

Nor do we intend to treat even of the true and noble new woman, of whom Miss Ume Tsuda may conveniently be taken as a type, and who, having experienced the higher and better life, is striving to assist in the uplift of her sisters. We wish in this instance to consider, not the new woman in the concrete, in the flesh, but the abstract, legal new woman that has been created by the new Civil Code of Japan. In looking through the translation of that document by Mr. Gubbins, we have been deeply impressed with the possibilities which lie before the women of new Japan through the rights and privileges vouchsafed to them under that Code.

It is unnecessary to go much into detail on the somewhat trite subject of woman's position under the old régime in Japan. It should, however, be constantly kept in mind that in the most ancient times women were highly esteemed, and even "used to play an important part on the political stage." In Shinto the central object of adoration is the sun, which is worshiped as a goddess. There have been seated on the imperial throne of Japan eight empresses, one of whom is famous for her martial valor and military exploits. It was when Buddhism became powerful that Hindoo and Chinese conceptions of woman's position molded public opinion and thus eventually changed the

manners, customs, and laws of Japan so as to relegate woman to an abnormally inferior position. As only one striking example out of many possible illustrations of the relative positions of man and woman, we note that, in the case of the death of the husband, the law prescribed mourning garments for thirteen months and abstinence from impurity for fifty days; but, in the case of the death of the wife, mourning garments for three months and abstinence for twenty days were sufficient.

Mr. Gubbins in the introduction to Part II of his translation of the Civil Code, writes as follows:

> The legal position of women in Japan before the commencement of modern legislative reform is well illustrated by the fact that offenses came under different categories according to their commission by the wife against the husband, or by the husband against the wife, and by the curious anomaly that, while the husband stood in the first degree of relationship to his wife, the latter stood to him only in the second.[1] The disabilities under which a woman formerly labored shut her out from the exercise of almost all rights. She could not inherit or own property in her own name, she could not become the head of a family, she could not adopt, and she could not be the guardian of her child. The maxim, *mulier est finis familiae*, was as true in Japan as in Rome, though its observance may have been less strict, owing to the greater frequency of adoption.
>
> In no respect has modern progress in Japan made greater strides than in the improvement of the position of women. Though she still labors under certain disabilities, a woman can now become the head of a family and exercise authority as such; she can inherit and own property and manage it herself; she can exercise parental authority; if single, or a widow, she can adopt; she is one of the parties[2] to adoption effected by her husband, and her consent in addition to that of her husband is necessary to the adoption of her child by another person; she can act as guardian or curator; and she has a voice in family councils.

Moreover, although it is true that for the performance of certain acts (Art. 14) a wife must obtain her husband's permission, and that a wife's acts may be annulled by her husband (Art. 120), yet it is explicitly stated that "a wife who has been permitted to engage in one or more businesses possesses in regard thereto the capacity of an independent person."

[1] Since 1882 they have been upon the same basis.

[2] These are composed of a large circle of relatives, and exercise autocratic influence in most important questions.

But let us look a little more particularly into the provisions relating to marriage, divorce, etc. The marriageable age is seventeen full years for men and fifteen full years for women. Marriage takes effect when notice of the fact is given to a registrar, by both parties with two witnesses. From this it will appear that the ceremony is a "purely social function, having no connection whatsoever with law beyond the somewhat remote contingency of its being adducible as evidence of a marriage having taken place." And here is where some Japanese Christians make an unfortunate and sometimes serious mistake, in thinking that the ceremony by a minister of the gospel is sufficient and registration is a matter of convenience. *Without registration a marriage is not legal.*

The right of marriage is not free, except to the head of a family.[1] All other persons, whatever their ages, can marry only with the consent of the head of his or her family. Men under thirty and women under twenty-five cannot marry without the consent of the parents; and minors in some cases must obtain the consent of the guardian or even of a family council.

In Art. 790 it is stipulated that "a husband and wife are mutually bound to support one another." A husband manages the property of his wife, unless he is unable to do so, when she manages it herself. "With regard to daily household matters, a wife is regarded as her husband's agent."

There are two ways of effecting divorce: either by arrangement, which is effected in a similar way to marriage—that is, by simply having the registration of marriage canceled—or by judicial divorce, which may be granted on several grounds specified in the Code. But divorce by arrangement cannot be effected by persons under twenty-five years of age without consent of the person or persons by whose consent marriage was effected. And if the persons who effect this kind of divorce fail to determine who is to have the custody of the children, they belong to the father; but "in cases where the father leaves the family owing to divorce, the custody of the children belongs

[1] The word "family" is here and hereafter used in a technical sense, peculiar to Japan, of a group of the same surname. In old Japan the family was the social unit.

to the mother," evidently because she remains in the family. In other words, children are chattels of the family.

The grounds on which judicial divorce is granted include bigamy, adultery on the part of the wife, the husband's receiving a criminal sentence for an offense against morality, cruel treatment or grave insult such as to render living together unbearable, desertion with evil intent, cruel treatment or gross insult of or by lineal ascendants.

The new Civil Code indirectly sanctions concubinage by stipulating (in Art. 827) that "an illegitimate child may be recognized by the father or mother" by giving notice to a registrar. Such a child is called *shoshi*, but is not legitimized. It is, however, stipulated (in Art 728) that between a wife and a *shoshi* "the same relationship as that between parent and child is established." That seems clearly enough to mean that a wife must accept a concubine's child as if it were her own, in case the father "recognizes" it. This would appear to be little, if any, advance over the old régime, where "the wife of the father," as she was technically called, frequently had to accept as her own child that of a concubine.

Mr. Gubbins makes the following explanation of *shoshi:*

> This term illustrates the transitionary phase through which Japanese law is passing. Japanese dictionaries define *shoshi* as the child of a concubine, and this, so long as concubinage was sanctioned by law, and the question of legitimacy never arose, was the accepted meaning of the term. The law of Japan, which, in the course of its development on western lines, has come to accept the principle of legitimacy, and to admit of the legitimization of children by the subsequent marriage of their parents, now recognizes an intermediate stage between legitimacy and illegitimacy.

Such is the general outline of the legal status of woman according to the new Civil Code. It will undoubtedly be most interesting to watch the gradual evolution of a new woman in Japan as the outcome of this legislation. It remains to be seen how far the social status of woman will be improved. It is not at all likely that her actual position will be immediately advanced in any great degree. It is probable that custom will continue, for a while at least, to wield a mightier influence than the Code; and that, as Mr. Gubbins remarks, "the present transitional con-

dition of Japanese society may favor a rule being honored more in the breach than in the observance." But it will probably not be long before here and there certain women will claim the rights accorded by law and will find a corresponding improvement in their social condition; and thus the general position of the Japanese woman will gradually be advanced.

Since writing the above, we have had the pleasure of reading the revised and illustrated edition of Miss Alice M. Bacon's *Japanese Girls and Women*, and cannot refrain from making some references to it along the line of this article. In that excellent book, which is a sure and safe authority on matters pertaining to the female half of Japan, the author traces very clearly the progress that has been made in the condition of woman, and shows how "better laws, broader education for the women, [and] a change in public opinion" are still necessary. And she affirms that "we can feel pretty sure that, when the people have become used to these [recent] changes [of the new Civil Code], other and more binding laws will be enacted, for the drift of enlightened public opinion seems to be in favor of securing better and more firmly established homes."

It is, moreover, worth our while to make even a lengthy quotation, as follows:

The woman question in Japan is at the present moment a matter of much consideration: There seems to be an uneasy feeling in the minds of even the more conservative men that some change in the status of women is inevitable, if the nation wishes to keep the pace it has set for itself. The Japanese women of the past and of the present are exactly suited to the position accorded them in society, and any attempt to alter them without changing their status only results in making square pegs for round holes. If the pegs hereafter are to be cut square, the holes must be enlarged and squared to fit them. The Japanese woman stands in no need of alteration unless her place in life is somehow enlarged, nor, on the other hand, can she fill a larger place without additional training. The men of new Japan, to whom the opinions and customs of the western world are becoming daily more familiar, while they shrink aghast, in many cases, at the thought that their women may ever become like the forward, self-assertive, half-masculine women of the West, show a growing tendency to dissatisfaction with the smallness and narrowness of the lives of their wives and daughters — a growing belief that better-

educated women would make better homes, and that the ideal home of Europe and America is the product of a more advanced civilization than that of Japan. Reluctantly in many cases, but still almost universally, it is admitted that in the interest of the homes, and for the sake of future generations, something must be done to carry the women forward into a position more in harmony with what the nation is reaching for in other directions. This desire shows itself in individual efforts to improve by more advanced education daughters of exceptional promise, and in general efforts for the improvement of the condition of women.

And Miss Bacon, like all careful observers, is able to appreciate what Christianity has done and is doing for the elevation of Japanese women, and ready to acknowledge that Christian thought and public opinion expedite legislation.

ERNEST W. CLEMENT.

TOKYO, JAPAN.

REVIEWS.

Die Frauenfrage: ihre geschichtliche Entwicklung und wirtschaftliche Seite. Von LILY BRAUN. Leipzig, 1901. Pp. xii + 557.

IT is somewhat remarkable how frequently the subjects which are most discussed receive the least serious study. Of this fact perhaps the most striking example is afforded by the fiery arguments ranging around the position of women. There must be many thousands of articles dealing with this matter to be found in the magazines of the last sixty years; there are not a few partisan books. But of genuine study, of patient thought and investigation, there is hardly a trace. To take the earliest book on the subject, Mary Wollstonecraft's work is the wail of a woman suffering under the restrictions imposed on her sex; it is not a consideration of the questions how these restrictions arose, to what extent they are justified by fact, and what effect might be expected from their abolition. John Stuart Mill's famous pamphlet, *The Subjection of Women*, is a mere one-sided and rhetorical outburst, composed under the immediate influence of Mrs. Taylor. Mrs. Stetson's clever little book is rather the brilliant suggestion of a new hypothesis than its careful working out through the actual study of fact. In short, all the books on this subject have been composed under the auspices of the abstract and destructive liberalism of the beginning of the last century, of that individualism which believed so fervently in the prescience and power of "nature" that it expected the happiest results from the mere abolition of all artificial regulations. The rise of the new economics, which bases its conclusions rather on historical study and on patient investigation of existing conditions than on abstract reasoning, has resulted in the description of many economic institutions. It has produced monographs on mediæval craft guilds, on trade unions, on the organization of modern business, on the growth of trusts. But, save incidentally, no economist of this school has condescended to investigate the economic aspects of the position of women. There is, indeed, Bebel's work, but it is too much permeated by the doctrines of the German Social Democracy to be accepted as an outcome of serious research into the actual facts.

But the book before us is of quite another stamp. True, we dis-

cover in the last chapter that the author is in sympathy with the views of the Social Democrats. But each page bears the impress of careful and independent thought, and of thorough study of all available material, coupled with very considerable ability in the employment of statistics. This is by far the most impartial and the most far-sighted work on the position of women which has yet seen the light, and presents some new and interesting views to the reader. Its full title is *Die Frauenfrage: ihre geschichtliche Entwicklung und wirtschaftliche Seite*, and we are told in the preface that it is to be followed by another volume dealing with women's civil and public rights, and discussing the ethical and psychological aspects of the question. The present work is devoted entirely to the economic side. It begins with a section giving a brief historical summary of women's position prior to the nineteenth century. Frau Braun points out how the older histories, dealing almost exclusively with wars and politics, took naturally very little notice of the work of women, and it was not until the proletariat, freed from slavery and serfdom, and awakened into some measure of self-consciousness, aroused interest in the study of economic history, that any attention at all was devoted to the position of women.

There are two assumptions here, both of which demand justification. The first is that the study of economic history was first stimulated by the growing interest in the demands and discontent of the working classes of Germany. On this point the reviewer cannot speak; but the assumption certainly seems to hold true of England. The two earliest investigators of English economic history were Arnold Toynbec and Thorold Rogers, and their attention was certainly first directed to the matter by active interest in the condition of the working class of their own days. The second assumption is one which Frau Braun's later chapters show to be only partially justified; namely, that the agitation for an improvement in the position of women is closely connected with the argument for an improvement in the position of the manual workers.

Beginning with the period of the *Mutterrecht*, the author shows how at every stage it was economic conditions, the methods of producing and distributing wealth, that decided the position of women. In the period when food was won by hunting, the man had no use for the services of the woman beyond mere sexual enjoyment, nor for the children. The mother therefore possessed full rights over the child; mother and child at this period were the germ of the future civilization. But with the oncoming of the agricultural period, woman lost

her freedom and passed into the child-bearing chattel to be bought from her father in exchange for arms or cattle. For under this more settled form of life her services were useful in many ways, and the possessor of cattle and lands desired a lawful son to be his heir. Therefore the tie of marriage originated in no lofty ethical motive, but arose, like slavery and at the same period, for economic causes. The discussion next briefly touches the status of women in the oriental nations, in Greece and in Rome. And here Frau Braun's writing is less clear and impressive than usual. She seems for once to be working with secondary material and to have little first-hand acquaintance with the subject which she treats.

Her description of the Middle Ages, on the other hand, gives distinct evidence of original investigation. She discusses with much skill the relation between Christianity and the position of women; showing that at first Christianity aimed no more at emancipating the woman than at freeing the slave, and that indeed the fathers of the church and the canon law treated the woman as an unclean temptress, and therefore rightly subordinate to the man. But in two ways this attitude was modified: First, by the influence of the German views of women. The *Wehrgeld* of a murdered woman was twice that of a murdered man, "because" says Frau Braun, "they honored the mother in every woman." In the second place, the sight of many holy women living useful and even learned lives in the cloisters increased public opinion of women's powers and capabilities. The chapter specially devoted to the economic position of women in the Middle Ages is unusually interesting. It shows that the concentration of many workers in one establishment is not an invention of the industrial Revolution, as people so often assume, and it traces the close connection between the waxing and waning of prostitution and the economic prosperity of the independent woman worker. Another well-written chapter deals with the women of the French and American Revolutions. A short account is given of Mercy Otis Warren and Abigail Smith Adams, *Die ersten Vorkämpferinnen der Gleichberechtigung des weiblichen Geschlechts;* and there follows a somewhat detailed narrative of the work and writings of Olympe de Gouges, and of the woman's movement during the French Revolution — a movement, it may be noticed, which greatly influenced Mary Wollstonecraft, and so through her the world of educated English-speaking women.

But while this sketch of historical and economic development is well done, by far the most interesting part of the book is that which

deals more in detail, and with a fuller employment of economic discussion, with the woman's movement in the nineteenth century. This falls into two divisions: the first describes the fight of the middle-class woman for employment, *Der Kampf um Arbeit in der bürgerlichen Frauenwelt;* the second discusses the allied, but in some respects divergent, movement among the working-class women — *Die Arbeiterinnen.*

The first question taken up is the reform in education, and Frau Braun shows how this comes about from the need of earning a livelihood. The changed economic conditions of the beginning of the last century, the break-up of the domestic industry, the disappearance of the semi-patriarchal family of earlier times, also the absorption of men by the great wars of the period, left many solitary or widowed women face to face with the necessity of providing for their own wants. For the women of the working classes, the first steps were easy. The growth of machine industry demanded more and ever more cheap labor. The women of the middle class, on the other hand, found this path blocked alike by their lack of general education and special training, as well as by their definite exclusion from those fields of work wherein their fathers and brothers gained their incomes. Accordingly, the one cry of the middle-class woman is for equality with men, equality of opportunity, equality of education, equality of political rights. Frau Braun traces the progress of women's education in the various civilized countries of the world, noting at the same time the different professional careers open to them. In both these matters America leads the world; but, says Frau Braun, "one must take into consideration that not merely the greater generosity or the deeper comprehension of the American man for the strivings of the feminine sex is the cause of this, but to a much greater extent the fact that the United States looked back upon only a short period of economic development, and that there was no thought of an overcrowding of professional careers which would inevitably have called forth the opposition of men." One is tempted to conjecture that the present movement against coeducation is due to the fact that this overcrowding of the professions has now begun to appear, and that therefore American men are instinctively endeavoring to check the nascent competition of women in these spheres.

The author next proceeds to discuss the compelling motives of the middle-class women's movement. She gives some useful statistics showing the proportion of women to men in the different countries

and population-classes of the world, and discusses the causes why marriages in the professional classes take place now at a later age than formerly. She considers the question of the number of women engaged in industry and the proportion of occupied married women.

Another chapter treats some more general questions in connection with the labor of professional women. The author evidently firmly believes in women's intellectual power and holds that many of their physical disabilities have been exaggerated. She thinks also that when once the first ardor of revolution, with its inevitable tendency to mannishness, has passed by, women who work need lose none of their proper grace and charm — a view which is certainly borne out by facts. It is quite remarkable how the younger generation of professional women differ in this respect from the older. If a teacher or doctor is dressed without taste or tidiness, if her manners are rude or brusque, it is ten chances to one that she is well over forty, and so must have been among the pioneers of the women's movement. Frau Braun also discusses at this point, solely with reference to the professional woman, the difficult question of the extent to which her economic activity may interfere with home life and the proper care of children. We gather that, provided the work of housekeeping can be taken off her shoulders, Frau Braun thinks that a professional career is not impossible for a childless woman, or one whose children no longer need her constant attention, though apparently even in this case she would, under present circumstances, advise that such a woman should enter on charitable work, on poor-law and school administration, rather than attempt to earn her own living. She treats with great contempt the tales sometimes told of American women, "who as physicians or lawyers have large practice, in addition personally manage their houses, and care for and educate successfully a dozen children." These are "fairy-stories, and only the lecturers of the middle-class women's movement, who are unfortunately so frequently unmarried or childless, would be naïve enough and spread them abroad." But she cherishes the hope that the development of more modern methods of housekeeping, coupled with the co-operative employment of trained nurses and kindergartners for the care of children, may bring about the solution of this difficulty. But it must be admitted that she puts the drawbacks of married women's labor much more forcibly than its possible development under these hypothetical new conditions.

Finally, she discusses the question of the mental caliber of women, and gives utterance to a prophecy that women will in future win

special renown for themselves in the sphere of economics. In England there is evidence to bear out the truth of this belief; in this country, on the other hand, economics seems to be looked on to a marked extent as a masculine field of work.

In turning to the second branch of the nineteenth-century women's movement, we find ourselves in an entirely new atmosphere. Among middle-class women the agitation is entirely for equality with men and for freedom from restriction, and the presence of these restrictions or social prejudices often producing a legal or virtual masculine monopoly of certain branches of work gives rise too often to fierce antagonism to men. Hence the middle-class movement is definitely a woman's movement. Among the manual workers, on the other hand, there is only rarely the question of the right to entrance on a trade. The growth of machinery facilitates the employment of women outside their own home, and the women of the proletariate find no lack of opportunity for work. Unfortunately they bring with them the customs and habit of mind bred by centuries of a lonely and dependent existence. Their standard of life is lower than the man's, and too often their wages are subsidized by their parents, their husbands, or their lovers. Therefore, says Frau Braun, such a woman "seeks to conquer her masculine competitor, not by better work, but by lower demands." Hence she was an easy prey to the exploiting force of modern capitalism, and on page after page Frau Braun paints the low wages, the long hours, the wretched conditions of work found in one woman's industry after another. She gives statistics, which have every appearance of being carefully selected and put together, concerning the numerical proportion of the *Arbeiterinnen* to professional women, the increase in the number of working-women, the proportion of men to women engaged in manual industry, the growth of home work, etc. Among other unexpected facts which appear from these figures, we learn that the employment of working-women is greatly increasing in Austria, and that the proportion of wage-earning women to men is lower in America than in any other of the countries cited, the numbers being:

United States - - -	24.7 per cent.
England - - -	36.7 per cent.
Austria - - - -	54.9 per cent.

For middle-class workers the corresponding figures are:

United States - - -	18.75 per cent.
England - - -	22.33 per cent.
Austria - - - -	12.23 per cent.

The following chapter, the longest in the book, is devoted to an exceedingly interesting and carefully worked out description of the position of women in various branches of industrial life—in the "great industry," in house industry and home work, in trade, in agriculture, in personal and domestic service. The sections on home work and on domestic service are particularly original. Home work, Frau Braun points out, has today little resemblance to its earlier namesake. The growth of home work does not mean a return to the independent producer; it by no means signifies a reversal of the industrial revolution, as charitable ladies among the English aristocracy sometimes imagine. It is rather an unfortunate growth springing from the very stem of factory industry itself. Home work increases because by its means the employer avoids the expense of rent, up-keep, lighting and warming his factory; because among home workers he can find cheaper and more docile labor; because the very irregularity of the labor is to him an advantage, since when employing it he can increase or decrease his staff at will, without having to take into consideration the item of fixed charges. Home work is, indeed, "a bastard child of the great industry which it has produced with its concubine, grinding poverty."

The question of domestic service is very carefully studied, both from its descriptive and statistical side; wages, board, lodging are discussed, and the picture drawn of the maids' rooms in a German household is very unpleasant. But Frau Braun, like many others who have studied this subject, comes to the conclusion that the greatest drawbacks to domestic service are to be found in its still semi-feudal character, in the lack of free time, and in the moral dangers which, by the statistics of prostitution, she shows undoubtedly exist. According to one American reckoning, 47 per cent. of prostitutes had been domestic servants. The remedy, she thinks, is appearing before our eyes, if we would but see it. The gradual removal of much housework from the sphere of the home, as, for example, in the greater employment of steam laundries, is gradually bringing washing, cooking, and cleaning into line with the development of modern industry, and so freeing domestic service from its semi-feudal character. But here, like most other thinkers on the subject, Frau Braun appears to the reviewer too optimistic, when she at the same time believes that the increase of married women's labor is a desirable development. To a large extent the problem of domestic service can be solved as suggested; washing can be transferred to steam laundries; the use of prepared foods in cooking is increasing; the employment of experts

for thorough cleaning will certainly appear before long. But so long as home-life continues—and the love for it is too deeply rooted among the Anglo-Saxon and Germanic races to vanish before even a revolution of our economic conditions—so long will every family require the major part of the time of at least one woman in order to keep its home running smoothly and to foster that atmosphere of rest and recreation necessary if the workers in the outside world are to be properly invigorated for their toil. And this conclusion seems rather to lead to the view of several notable English women economists (*e. g.*, Mrs. Sydney Webb and Miss Clara Collet) who believe that, while it should be our aim to foster independence among unmarried women, and to encourage them in every way possible to earn their own living, the married women should be counseled rather to devote themselves to the task of home-making and of bringing up their children; they should not by accepting a pocket-money wage bring down the wages of the woman who has only her own exertions to depend on. But if this conclusion be adopted, we cannot hope ever to see women's work attain anything like the same level of efficiency as men's, nor again can we expect more than a partial introduction of scientific and up-to-date methods of housekeeping, which depend on a concentration and gradation of labor impossible in the single household.

The remaining chapters are devoted to the working-women's movement (*e. g.*, the enrolment in trade unions and clubs) and to the relation of the middle-class women's movement to the questions of women's labor in the manual working classes; and, finally, there is a chapter on factory and other social legislation and its problems. The author returns again in these chapters to the note which she struck at the beginning of the treatment of women's work in the nineteenth century—the difference in the attitude of the professional and working-class women. The one has to fight for an opportunity to work at all, and therefore her cry is for equality. She distrusts the law, and her attitude toward men is mostly antagonistic. The other finds work in plenty, but she is forced by poverty and lack of power to combine to accept work at wretched prices and under miserable conditions. Therefore to her the law, prescribing by factory legislation the minimum conditions of employment, is not an enemy, but a friend, and she combines more readily when grouped with her masculine fellow-workers (as Frau Brown points out, following Mrs. Sydney Webb, it would rarely be accurate to call them her competitors) than with her own sex.

Therefore the conclusion is reached that it is very unwise for the professional woman to assume hastily that her own experience holds good for her working-class sister, and in particular it appears that the establishment of women's trade unions under the patronage of "ladies" has been a complete failure. The working-woman should rather cultivate solidarity with her own class, by acting, not in opposition to, but in concert with, the men of it. And for the same reason factory legislation is not to be considered, as it frequently is in England, in the same light with the restrictive legislation which now shuts out middle-class women from so many spheres. It is, Frau Brown maintains, in reality a restriction, not on women's labor, but on the power of exploitation of capital — a power which has fewer terrors for the brain-worker, with her higher standard of life, and her "rent" of ability and education. She discusses at some length the question of married women's labor in factories, holding that, save in some few trades, it would be both unwise and impossible to exclude them altogether, since such a course would lead to increase of home work and to concubinage and concealment of marriage. It may be noticed that the latter result is said to have already come about in the post-offices of England and America, as a consequence of the civil-service rule forbidding the employment of married women. She would instead advise stringent regulations concerning work before and after confinement, combined with a generous payment from the sick-insurance fund. In England and America this might be replaced by the provision of lying-in hospitals — a method more in accordance with our traditions. The general sketch of factory legislation is very well done, being both full and readable. It is accompanied by several tables showing the condition of factory legislation and of insurance in the various countries.

In short, this is by far the most thoughtful, thorough, and comprehensive work that has appeared on the subject, and, though we may not always agree with the author, especially when in the last chapters her bias toward Social Democracy becomes evident, her treatment always shows accurate knowledge of the facts and a careful consideration of general principles. Her book is also remarkable because it for the first time sets forth and endeavors to reconcile the different motives and aims which underlie the women's movement in the middle and the working classes, respectively.

MABEL ATKINSON.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE.

The Story of the Mormons, From the Date of Their Origin to the Year 1901. By WILLIAM ALEXANDER LINN. New York: The Macmillan Co. Pp. 637. $4.

THE object of the work, as stated in the preface, is "to present a consecutive history of the Mormons from the day of their origin to the present writing, and as a secular, not as a religious, narrative." The work is a careful research based upon materials derived from both Mormon and non-Mormon sources. Several pages of the preface are devoted to explanatory statements regarding the sources from which the material used has been drawn. Throughout the work the author has indicated, by means of footnotes, the authority for the materials used. An unusually complete table of contents and index render the book a convenient one for reference. It is illustrated with facsimile prints of the Kinderhook plates, the title-page of the first edition of the Mormon Bible, the Book of Abraham, and an altered Kirtland bank-note.

The work is divided into six books, the first of which treats of the origin of the Mormons. The following four books are devoted, respectively, to an account of their migration to and life in Ohio, Missouri, and Illinois, and their final migration to Utah. The last book, which consists of twenty-six chapters, treats of their life in Utah.

In referring to the situation out of which Mormonism arose, the author sees no cause for surprise in its remarkable development as a religious organization. That which seems wonderful to him is "its success in establishing and keeping together in a republic like ours a membership who acknowledge its supreme authority in politics as well as in religion, and who form a distinct organization which does not conceal its purpose to rule over the whole nation." The life of Joseph Smith is traced from his boyhood in Vermont, where he professed to have his father's gift in the use of the divining-rod, to the time when he declares himself a prophet and begins to found a new religion. The author shows that the deciding event in the career of Joseph Smith was a trip to Susquehanna county, Pa., where he obtained the idea of becoming a "gazer," and where he probably first met Sydney Rigdon, whom the author shows to be the "real originator of the whole scheme for a new church." The remainder of Book I is devoted to a history of the Mormon Bible, in which the author shows the various factors that were involved, and the especially prominent part taken by Sydney Rigdon, who is not generally recognized as having anything to do with

the work; and to the organization of the church, the beliefs and doctrines of the Mormons, and their church government.

The four following books, which treat of the Mormons in the period of the migrations, are based largely upon the aims and objects of the leaders as presented in the "Mormon Bible" and the "Doctrine and Covenants." The latter work consists chiefly of the revelations which "directed the organization of the church and its secular movements," and hence is invaluable as a means of determining the methods of the leaders in controlling the people. Although each of these chapters is full of interest, perhaps chap. 6 of Book III, which gives an account of the revelations received at the time of the organization of the Danites, and those chapters in Book IV which treat of the nature of the city government at Nauvoo and the revelation regarding polygamy, will best enable the reader to understand the nature of the objections of the people of Missouri and Illinois to their new neighbors.

The interest which is centered in Joseph Smith up to near the close of the period of their settlement in Illinois, after the death of Smith is transferred to Brigham Young, who maintained an autocratic rule up to the time of his death. The last book, which deals with the history of the Mormons in Utah, is of interest not merely because it gives an accurate account of pioneer life in a region almost cut off from communication with the outside world, but on account of those methods of government, social habits, and modes of thought which differ from those in other parts of the United States, and which seem in some respects to be a reversion to an earlier stage of culture. The closing chapters treat of such questions as the relation of the Mormon people to the federal government, the importance of a federal constitutional amendment forbidding polygamous marriages, and the scope of the Mormon political ambition.

Although the facts presented in many instances are such as would naturally call forth the expression of strong feeling, the author has adhered to his purpose of searching for facts, and has uniformly refrained from drawing conclusions. Only by a faint touch of humor or a pungent remark after presenting the facts which show the methods adopted by the Mormon leaders for obtaining their ends does the author in any way give expression to his own feelings upon the subject.

KATHARINE E. DOPP.

CHICAGO.

Pure Sociology: A Treatise on the Origin and Spontaneous Development of Society. By LESTER F. WARD. New York: The Macmillan Co. Pp. xii+606. $4.

A GROUP of writers will be invited to discuss in this JOURNAL salient features of this work. Meanwhile we record its appearance, and congratulate author, publisher, and the sociologists. A New York daily paper lampooned the book in a column editorial. It was a gratuitous advertisement of the effect which scientific treatment of any subject has on the hobo type of mind. A few days earlier the following was written in a private letter, by an American who has been studying philosophy and sociology in Germany for three or four years, after graduation from college and then from a newspaper office in this country:

> It seems to me that the most important thing is self-knowledge, the knowledge of what you are doing in the world, and why you are doing it. America lacks self-knowledge, it seems to me, in several directions. No nation in the world seems to me so passionately engaged in *doing* as America, and hardly any nation to be doing it so blindly.

Some of us think that the sort of thing which Dr. Ward is doing will pay larger social dividends, in the long run, than any equal investment of energy in any other direction. We shall never know ourselves, individually or socially, till someone finds us out and helps us see ourselves in our processes of coming into being and of completing our being. Such knowledge is too wonderful for most of us at present, but a few minds demand it, and more will learn to swell the demand. It will be a long time before a more important contribution to social self-knowledge appears between the covers of a single book.

A. W. S.

Heredity and Social Progress. By SIMON N. PATTEN. New York: The Macmillan Co. Pp. 214. $1.25.

THERE is poetic justice in Professor Patten's conversion from a most inveterate prosecutor, if not persecutor, of the "biological sociologists," and his appearance, not merely as a sociologist, but as one outbiologizing them all. I humbly confess this essay is beyond my depth. I shall make diligent search for someone to expound it. The vital and the psychical still seem so unlike to me, and both of them are still so mysterious, that putting the two mysteries together in this

familiar fashion raises in my mind more doubts than it settles, not merely about the combination, but about the components. I fear that Professor Patten is not even, as he hopes, on the main line to truth *via* the route recommended by Huxley: (p. vi). "If you can't be right, be dead wrong." To be incomprehensible is neither.

A. W. S.

The Woman Who Toils: Being the Experiences of Two Ladies as Factory Girls. By Mrs. John Van Vorst and Marie Van Vorst. New York: Doubleday, Page & Co. Pp. 303.

This is the book which called out the now famous letter of President Roosevelt on the subject of parenthood. The letter is printed as a preface. It does not appear, by the way, that either of the authors is a mother, but they seem to have willingly posed to point the president's moral, in exchange for his advertising. As records of adventure the chapters are readable, in spite of a tinge of caddishness in keeping the reader reminded that the adventurer was a "lady," able at any moment by a "presto" to spirit herself into another world. One is unable to decide how much of a lark, and how much of serious investigation, was in the enterprise that collected these first-hand observations. It is equally impossible to decide whether this indeterminable state of mind was competent to receive correct impressions of the subjective conditions encountered. The sketches will have to count, therefore, as specimens of amateur social photography. As studies of the view-point of the woman who toils their value is dubious.

A. W. S.

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS.

Pedagogy and Sociology.—I consider as the very foundation of all pedagogical speculation that education is a thing eminently social, judged from its origin and by its function; and that, therefore, pedagogy depends upon sociology more directly than upon any other science. Until recent years teachers have considered education as chiefly individual, and pedagogy, therefore, an immediate corollary of psychology alone. By Kant, Mill, Herbart, and Spencer education had for its object the highest possible realization of the attributes constitutive of the human species in general. There was *one* human nature, the forms and properties of which are determined once for all, and the pedagogical problem was how to engage and employ that nature, thus completely given and latent in the child. The educator had nothing essential to add to the work of nature; he created nothing. His business was to exercise the existing powers of the child lest they atrophy through inaction, be warped in their moral direction, or develop too slowly. Since man was possessed of and furnished with these powers, it followed that a study of man, and of man as an individual, would determine how his development should be directed. The important thing was to know what are his native faculties and what are their characteristics. But the science which describes and explains the individual man is psychology, and it seemed, therefore, that psychology ought to suffice for all the needs of pedagogy.

But, unhappily for such a view, it finds itself at odds with all that history teaches. Different systems of education have always existed and functioned side by side in every society. Education varies from one caste to another; that of the patricians was not that of the plebians, that of the Brahman was not that of the Cudra. Even now education varies with social classes and even with communities; that of the *bourgeois* is not that of the laborer, that of the city is not that of the country. Each profession constitutes a method *sui generis* for bringing out the special powers and aptitudes of the child. In every civilized country there is a tendency more and more to diversify and specialize.

But it is evident that these special schools or systems of education are not organized for individual ends. It is true they develop the special abilities of the individual and in this sense are individual. But it is society, in order to maintain itself, demanding this division of labor and that according to the special abilities of its members, which creates these special schools. It is by society and for society that education is thus diversified. And further, this determining influence of society upon the education is easily demonstrated from history. Each type of people has its own education, peculiar to itself and which can be described under the same name as its moral, political, and religious organization. Consider how at one time education teaches the individual to give himself completely into the hands of the state, and how at another time it is designed to make him the director of his own conduct; education was ascetic in the Middle Ages, liberal at the time of the Renaissance, literary in the seventeenth century, and is scientific in our own time. This is not because men have been mistaken as to the nature and needs of man, but it is because his needs have varied, and these have varied because the social conditions upon which human needs depend do not remain the same.

That education has been directly dependent upon social conditions is easily recognized in history, but somehow we think our system of education to be independent of our social system. But it would be strange if education, after having had during these centuries, and in all known societies, all the characteristics of a social institution, should in our time so completely change its nature. A strange transformation it would be when, at the very moment in which it is thought to have taken place, the most striking fact in the education, not only of France, but of all

Europe, is that it is being put more and more into the hands of the state, is made more and more a social institution. No, our pedagogical ideal is explained by our social structure as truly as was that of the Greeks and Romans by the organization of their states.

Not only is it society that has elevated mankind to the dignity of the model which the educator ought to strive to reproduce, but it is society which fashioned the model and fashioned him according to her own needs. The man that education ought to realize in us is not the man such as nature has made, but such as society wishes he should be. If there exists a hierarchy of our faculties, if to some of them we attribute a sort of precedence, and which we ought therefore to develop more than the others, it is not because that dignity is intrinsic, it is not that nature from all time made them thus, assigned them an eminence of rank; but it is because society has set a high value upon them. This scale of values, this hierarchy of faculties, never remains the same through two successive periods of history. At one time it was courage that held first rank, together with all those faculties that implied the military virtue; now it is thought and reflection; in the future it will perhaps be refinement of tastes and sensibility of art. Thus in the present, as in the past, our pedagogical ideal is, even in details, the work of society. It is society that draws the portrait of the man we ought to be, and in this portrait come to be reflected all the characteristics of the social organization.

Simply for convenience of expression it might be said that in each of us there exist two beings (*êtres*). The one is made up of all the mental states which refer only to ourselves and to incidents of our personal life. This may be called the individual being. The other is a system of ideas, of sentiment, of habits, which acquaint us, not with our own personality, but with the group or the different groups of which we are a part; such are the religious beliefs, the practical and moral beliefs, the national and professional traditions, the collective opinions of all sorts. Their *ensemble* forms the social being. To create this being in each of us — this is the end of education. This social being is not given ready-made in the constitution of primitive man, nor is it a result of spontaneous development. Spontaneously, man was not inclined to submit to a political authority, to respect moral discipline, to sacrifice himself. It was not given to us at birth to be disposed to serve divinities, emblems symbolic of society, to render them a worship, to deny ourselves for their glory. It is society itself which has drawn from its own life those great moral forces coming into contact with which man has learned his own inferiority.

But if sociology is preponderant in determining the end of education, has it the same importance in selecting the means? In choosing means and working out methods, psychology surely claims some consideration. Through psychology of the individual we come to know something of the individual through which are to be realized the ends that society marks out. But when it is remembered that the individual is not completely known until studied also through social psychology, it may still be an unsettled question as to the adequacy of psychology as usually conceived for determining method. We all know with what caution and with what limits, even in choosing methods, the principles of psychology are acted upon or accepted. Again, society, determining the aim, or, better, the aims, of education, must reasonably have something to say as to the means. Historically this has been true. When society was individualistic, whatever in education tended to do violence to the individuality was frowned down. In fact, whenever educational systems have been profoundly changed it has been under the influence of some great social movement felt throughout the group-life. It was not in consequence of some psychological discoveries that the Renaissance opposed new methods to those of the Middle Ages; it was that, in consequence of changes in the structure of European societies, a new conception of man and of his place in the world had taken place. Neither Basedow, nor Pestalozzi, nor Froebel, was a great psychologist. Regard for natural liberty, hatred of all oppression, love for a man, for a child — these express their doctrine, these are the basis of our modern individualism.

Thus, whether we consider the ends of education or the means it employs, they agree with, if they are not determined by, social conditions. It is the collective ideas and sentiments of a people that its educational system expresses. — E DURKHEIM, "Pédagogie et sociologie," in *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, January, 1903.

T. J. R.

The Meaning of Ethnology for Sociology—1. *Province and problems of sociology.*—It is impossible to give a complete definition of sociology yet. Such a definition must have for its foundation the widest and most abstract generalizations from the material with which we deal. However, there is need of a preliminary definition of the science with reference to the more closely related social sciences. Two preliminary considerations should be kept in mind. There is a close relationship of the phenomena treated by political economy and sociology, and a disadvantage has followed by dividing the more abstract principles between the two when the abstract side should have been given over to sociology and used by political economy rather as a method. Again, the historical school of political economy has complicated the problem of the division of labor by incorporating factors which clearly belong to sociology. Instead of recognizing political economy as a division of the more general science of sociology, the representatives of the historical school attempt to expand political economy into a sociology.

I may define sociology as the theory of social phenomena considered from the most general point of view. Its province would include the theory of the composition, forms, functions and the devolopment and abnormalities of human associations. The problems of sociology cannot be taken over by any other science, and their solution is urgently desired from both the theoretical and the practical side.

Six of the chief problems of sociology are as follows: First. the relation of the science to biology and psychology must be better worked out. Man as a social unit must be better known both somatically and psychically. One of its chief interests should be the construction of a theory of the races of men and of the anthropological types. The second problem is the clearing away of the unscientific illusions and constructions, such as the fundamentally false conception of the real equality of all men and their unlimited educability, with the survival of the *contrat social*, and much other rubbish. From the positive side, there must be the creation of a purely empirical foundation for all further sociological study. The third, and most difficult, whose fulfilment is far off, is the working out more completely of the hitherto neglected provinces indicated above. Fourth, a synthesis of all the separate social investigations. Fifth, the searching for the most general laws or regularities in societary life. Sixth, a systematic presentation of the preceding problems.

2. *The meaning of ethnology apart from the theory of evolution.*—We are concerned here only with the sociology of the primitive peoples. I want to remove the preconceived opinion that such a study is of interest chiefly because, according to the evolutionary theory, the primitive peoples give a living repetition of our own early history. If this were not the case at all, they would still be entitled to our most thorough study, merely because they are people, because they form societies of living beings, of men. Sociology is interested in all forms of human association, but here is a very large number of such associations, fairly well described, related in various ways, in all stages of development, though in the most different directions, and living in very unlike situations.

Many of the younger sociological students seem to be lacking in the real scientific interest of desiring to know and explain all the phenomena belonging to their field of work. They seem to regard the study of the primitive peoples as unworthy of their energies. We do not know yet the relations of the various forms and functions of these societies, and how they condition each other. There is a rich and fruitful field here for the sociologist. It is far away from the prejudices of today's complex questions and gives an excellent opportunity for the formation and working out of unprejudiced hypotheses.

3. *The analogy between our early ancestors and the primitive people of today.*—The evolutionary theory is doubtless true. The ancestors of the present civilized peoples, and of the civilized and half-civilized that have passed away, were once uncivilized. Guizot has pointed out the analogy between the early Germans and the Iroquois Indians. Mallery has shown the similarity in customs and beliefs of the North American Indians and the Israelites. Our folklore is a living reality among the present primitive peoples. The work of Post, Kohler, and Dareste shows that the development of law and legal institutions has not been different in principle for the primitive and civilized peoples. The unavoidable conclusion is that we can learn much about our past from the life of the present primitive peoples, and, owing to the

fact that history furnishes us data for only comparatively recent periods in human life, scientific ethnology has an important place in sociology.

4. *Position of the primitive people.*—The chief question under this heading is whether, in general, the primitive peoples possess a similar ability to the ancestors of the present civilized peoples; and, if all the conditions were the same, whether the development of the two would have been essentially the same, or whether they are fundamentally different, and so have followed different lines of development. Taking everything into consideration, it seems highly probable that the innate ability of all living primitive peoples is not of equal value for higher development. However, this difference in endowment does not destroy the value of the comparison between primitive and culture peoples. Certain lines of development are the same, and a more careful and critical study of the primitive peoples promises much for a science of association.

5. *Particular advantages of ethnology.*—The principal advantage that the study of ethnology affords is that it gives us insight into the less complex associative phenomena of people still living. Though the pure primitive type is rapidly vanishing, yet the knowledge of these peoples has increased considerably in recent years. New problems can be presented for study through ethnology, and we are much less dependent upon accidental discoveries of material than in archæology and early history. Not only can the great problems of social and cultural evolution not be solved without the aid of ethnology, but there are also many other questions that depend upon it. I may mention merely the question of the equality or inequality of the human races, and why certain races have not made much progress.

A beginning has been made in the study of the primitive peoples. The colonies of almost all the largest civilized states and of some of the smaller ones afford excellent opportunities for the continuance of the study. This work should be done while it is possible, for these people are fast disappearing. Ethnology is of incomparable value for sociology in all its relations. It ought no longer to be left to the care of a few dilettants or martyrs, but the universities should open their doors to it—and to sociology.—S. R. STEINMETZ, "Die Bedentung der Ethnologie für Soziologie," in *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie*, XXVI. Jahrgang, IV. Heft.

E. M.

Australian Marriage Systems.—The so-called "class system" in Australia presents many various forms, and may occur where descent is reckoned either in the male or female line. But, speaking roughly, the following bars on marriage exist:

1. Each man and woman in a tribe belongs to one of two divisions or "phratries" within the tribe, say Matthuric and Kirarawa. Kirarawa must never marry Kirarawa, but always Matthuric, and *vice versa*.

2. Each man and woman also belongs to a given totem. Under Matthuric, say, six totems are ranged; under Kirarawa six others. Persons of the same totem may never intermarry.

3. Each of the two "primary divisions" is divided into two or more apparently *non-totemic* classes, the members intermarry as in a cross-figure in a reel, and their children take a name which is that of the class of neither father nor mother, the grandchildren returning to the class name of a grandparent.

In explanation of the primary divisions some inquirers say that the names are usually those of animals, and so are totemic; other writers insist that an original commune existed in an undivided condition at first and was then deliberately bisected so that half of its members might never marry with the other half, each half taking an animal name. Why such a deliberate bisection was made has never been explained, nor has an explanation been given of class two, for apparently nothing was gained by this classification, since by the primary division no one might marry within his or her totem-name.

My own provisional theory is as follows:

I do not think that very early man lived in an undivided commune of indefinite but considerable size and that the members intermarried. I think that difficulties of food-supply made a big horde then impossible, and that sexual jealousy, in an age so animal, made promiscuity improbable in a high degree.

I conceive, with Mr. Darwin, that men then lived in small knots, probably under one polygamous male. He would drive away his sons as they approached puberty, and all the females, including his daughters, would be his harem. All such male heads of groups would resent poaching on their game, the area of their food-supply, and their female mates.

Here we have a rude exogamy. No young male may marry in the group. But suppose that senescent or good-humored patriarchs allowed, here and there, young males to bring in female mates captured from without, probably going shares in them at first. Groups in which this was done would extend their area, being stronger, through the young males in war. Such groups would increase in size and in area of food-supply, while the combined young males would confirm their several rights to their captured females. Such groups would need names for all other groups in their radius, and these names would probably be the names of plants and animals. Such names would naturally give rise to speculation, as: "Why are we here Emus, Crows, Hawks, Frogs?" Myths would be invented: "Emu, Crow, Hawk, or Frog is our ancester, or ancestral friend, or we are evolved out of him. Being our friend and more or less sacred, we must not eat him nor touch a woman also of his blood."

Here, under a taboo, are involved exophagy and exogamy, each with a *superstitious sanction*. Now we have *two* marriage prohibitions, if we suppose that children of the Hawk or Crow group keep her group name when she is brought into the Emu group. As daughter of that *local* group, the Hawk woman's daughter is an Emu, and may not marry an Emu man. But as, by female descent, she is a Hawk, the girl may not marry a man of the local group Emu, who is also a Hawk, as son of a Hawk woman in the Emu group. A man, Emu by local group, Hawk by female descent, must catch a woman, Frog, for example, by female descent, Kangaroo by local group. But to get her while local groups are hostile may imply shedding kindred totem blood in battle. In these circumstances two local groups, Emu and Hawk, may make alliance and *connubium*. If they do, each local totem-group now becomes a primary division or phratry, each phratry containing different totem-kins by female descent, as in fact the two-linked intermarrying phratries always do (except among the Amuta). The local totem-taboo, and the taboo of totems by female descent, are both now respected, and a tribe with lawful brides accessible within itself is evolved. There has been no motiveless bisection, no equally motiveless segmentation into new totem-groups, no legislation enforcing exogamy on totem-groups not previously exogamous.

There remain for explanation the classes whose names are not apparently totemic, and whose members do not bequeath the class-name, either on the male or female side, to their children, who revert to grand-maternal or grand-paternal class-names. Of this arrangement, peculiar to Australia, Herr Cunow offers an explanation which seems to have plausible elements. These classes originally conveyed, in a rough way, a prohibition on marriages within the generation. Each name denoted coevals; "the old ones," "the young ones," their names often mean (Cunow). In Australia the young and the old are marked out by degrees of initiation, by duties and services, and by taboos on certain sorts of food. These taboos also applied to marriage. The strong point of Cunow's theory is that the names for the classes do, in many cases, mean "big" and "little," or "young" and "old," a point omitted by Durkheim in criticising the hypothesis. Meanwhile, by this time the tribes perfectly understand and can express real relationships by blood, as understood among themselves, and also, as a rule, object, as we do, to too near consanguineous marriages. This is the result of training in the rules, and of reflection on them.—A. LANG, "Australian Marriage Systems," in *Folk-Lore*, December, 1902.

E. M.

The Sociological Meaning of Alcoholism.—In order to give a correct answer to this problem, it is necessary that there should be agreement as to the method of investigation. I must refer to what Dr. Wlassak has said against the subjective method. I recognize the importance of the objective method, but I believe that introspection can give exact data, although they are not subject to such exact psycho-physiological measurement as Professor Kräpelin's method affords. From the memory the facts can be verified well enough, and where we are dealing with complicated phenomena,

we have, in general, no other method. We may cite here the statement of Helmholtz concerning the effect of alcohol on the complex mental processes and note that he used the subjective method. We cannot explain alcoholism without this psychical method or merely by the objective method. I believe psychological observation will agree with what has been verified by the biologists, pathologists, and psychiatrists. What I have to say will be drawn from the experience of a number of observations of others and from my own experience.

1. In the first place, all who had given thought to this question admitted that in excessive drinking they gained no real satisfaction. One feels that a person deceives himself and others in seeking arguments for the defense and praise of drinking. Professor Meyer has said that all alcoholism rests upon an illusion. It is self-deception. The physical as well as moral indisposition occasioned by intoxication cannot be denied.

2. This psychological judgment of alcoholism gives us the key to the sociological analysis. What is its meaning, considered from the culture-history point of view? I have asked professional men, noted artists, and good psychologists what their motive is for drinking. In short, their answer is that their principal motive is the desire for or pleasure in the Rousseau state of nature. When I call this "practical romanticism" I do not repudiate all romanticism. But I may call attention to the fact that many of the romanticists of this century have desired to vegetate, to lead the life of a plant or an animal. Comte went back to fetichism and attempted to explain the superstitions of civilized men on this basis. There are many defenders of superstition in modern times, and psychologically I consider the defense of the taste for alcohol the artificial employment of a superstition.

a) The modern man, not only the drinker, has a certain fear of clearness, precision, and purity of thought; he fears intellectualism or vigorous thought. Alcoholism, as Kräpelin shows, injures the power of thinking. The drinker desires and has a need of foggy thinking. Alcoholism is therefore culturally and politically unprogressive, conservative, and radically reactionary.

b) One of the defenses of alcoholism is that it gives something artistic, poetic, idealistic. Noted artists have often said to me: "*Ohne Wein gehts nicht!*" I admit that there are great artists who pay homage to wine, and much might be said upon this question, yet with reference to art it must be said that there is a distinction between fantasy and the fantastic. Or to say that in alcohol one finds idealism is a remarkable misuse of the word. To use idealism in this sense is to allude to myths and the mythical.

c) Another argument is that alcoholism increases cordiality, good nature, and sentiment. On the contrary, it does not promote, but rather injures, the emotional life. In alcohol one finds, not sentiment, but sentimentality. Investigations of the relation of alcoholism to crime show that it leads to violence rather than to fineness of feeling. With reference to the sexual life, which Professor Torel treated, I can only say here that alcoholism kills true love.

3. Relation of alcoholism to degeneration. While degeneration is not to be found in alcoholism only, it does furnish one of the threatening factors. The modern man is restless, and in the habitual use of alcohol searches for a new Eldorado. From this optimism he passes to a pessimism that leads to dipsomania and suicide.

4. I came to this congress a skeptic. I had not decided whether moderate drinking or total abstinence was right. I have heard the arguments *pro* and *con*, and they have made a decisive impression upon me. Not that I think the methods of the anti-alcohol advocates are entirely exact, not that I accept all that is attributed to alcoholism. A number of factors must be considered in this relation, such as nicotine, etc. I am inclined to think that certain arguments — as, for example, that alcohol is unnecessary — are not sound. There are many apparently unnecessary factors in civilized life which nevertheless serve some purpose.

The scientific argument for the *tactics* of abstinence — and first of all it is a question of *tactics* — is sound and convincing. I close with the confession that the argument for the *tactics* of abstinence convinces me that a life free from alcohol guarantees a higher conception of life, and therewith a happier and purer tone to life, and finally more beautiful conduct in life.—PROFESSOR DR. T. G. MASARYK, "Die sociologische Bedeutung des Alkoholismus," Sonderabdruck aus den Verhandlungen des VIII. Internationalen Congresses gegen den Alkoholismus, Wien, 1901.

E. M.

What is Religion?—"The first step toward a clear understanding of religion is to distinguish carefully between religion and religions. Religion is the root, the source, the parent of religions. It bears about the same relation to the various religions as a genus to its species. A definition which applies only to one religion is no more a definition of religion than the definition of a particular person is a definition of the *genus homo*."

Theologians and certain ethnologists have defined religion in terms of belief. We may readily admit that belief is an element in religion, as a more or less specific belief is an element in all religions; but when we define religion as a specific belief—for instance, the belief in God, in immortality, or in spiritual beings—we not only recognize an intellectual element, belief, but we make religion synonomous with a particular form of belief. Others, among whom are Professor Ward and Mr. Henry Rutgers Marshall, make restraint an element in religion. This point is well taken, but, judged from its origin and function, religion cannot be correctly defined as a particular form of restraint any more than it can be correctly defined as a particular form of belief. Religion and morality are two genetically distinct phenomena. Morality implies not merely restraint, but social and conventional restraint, and may be based upon public opinion and social conventions as well as upon religious beliefs. A definition of religion in terms of a special form of action or conduct is as erroneous as a definition in terms of belief, and yet we must admit that action, like belief, is an element in religion.

The feeling of impatience which the human mind experiences before the forces of nature, and out of which all religious ideas, however complex, are derived, has been fixed upon by some writers as the essence of, or the essential element in, religion. But such persons do not contend that religion is identical with feeling. In every religious act the whole personality is present. Why, then, should we define religion in terms of feeling, when feeling, like belief and action, is merely an element in religion?

The result of the discussion thus far may be summed up in the following proposition: "Religion manifests itself in belief, feeling, and action, and these three elements are present whether we consider it ethnographically as a social device or psychologically as a phenomenon of the individual consciousness. A correct definition of religion must then depend upon the relation and relative importance of these three elements." Now, the relation in the individual consciousness, and the relative importance of perception, feeling, and the conative impulse, are questions of psychology. It is to this science, and not to theology or ethnology, therefore, that we must look for a final definition of religion. But when we turn to psychology it seems to estop us from identifying religion with the perceptive, the affective, or the conative element, and to demand a form of definition which will include them all. Such a demand may be met, perhaps, by defining religion in terms of desire, or, better, effective desire. But desire for what? Given the perception of a power manifesting itself in the world and a feeling of dependence upon it, an inevitable result will be the desire of the individual to be in right or personally advantageous relations to that power. Conscious religious activity is always in obedience to this desire. We may suggest, then, as a tentative definition of religion, the following: "*Religion is the effective desire to be in right relations to the power manifesting itself in the universe.*"

If the definition here given is approximately correct, it is of tactical advantage to those who argue that religion is a permanent reality. For, though science may attack and destroy particular forms of belief, religion is unassailable; the roots of religion, imbedded in the soil of man's nature, will not be touched, and new beliefs will spring up to take the place of the old. Again, accepting the above definition of religion, we must regard more people as religious than are usually so regarded. Any man who recognizes, and desires to be in right relations to, "an Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed," without claiming to know the ultimate nature of that energy, is religious. It does not follow, however, that *all* men are religious. It is conceivable that the recognition of a mysterious power in the world, apparently outside of ourselves, may not be followed by an effective desire to be in right relations with that power.

"Finally, if religion has been correctly defined, it is not something which has been revealed to one people and withheld from another. It springs up naturally as

an element in the nature of man. It is not dependent upon the accuracy of his thought. It appears in the dawn of intelligence in the savage, who sees God in the clouds and hears him in the wind, and manifests itself in every age and among every people — in the philosopher, who seeks to harmonize his life with what he regards as the eternal and unchanging spirit of the universe, as well as in the saint, who looks upon the Lord as a very present help in time of trouble. Science is its handmaid, winnowing the chaff from the beliefs it has produced. The present demand is for recognition of the stability of religion, and the fearless and unsparing criticism of prevailing theological conceptions."— IRA A. HOWERTH, *International Journal of Ethics*, January, 1903. T. J. R.

Insurance against Enforced Idleness through Workingmen's Syndicates.—The object of a trade union is in part to study the interests of the trade, to discuss the conditions of work, to study the application of labor laws, and to encourage professional education. No small amount of success has been achieved in these directions, but success cannot be complete nor assured so long as the unions do not provide some security against and in case of enforced idleness. It has been said that out-of-work benefits ought to form the base of trades unions. To insure the workman against idleness would serve the interests of industry, would tend to ameliorate the condition of the working class, and would assist in maintaining the social peace.

Among the causes of idleness on the part of workingmen are the new inventions, often operated by a woman or a child; the sudden closing down or the completion of some great undertaking; the change of seasons, making work in some trades impossible; overproduction, political crises, abuse of credit, war, and strikes. Any provision that will help to avoid such unhappy events, and that would mitigate their evils when present, must certainly be worthy the attention of our officials and of the labor unions. Especially should this receive attention when the demoralizing influence of idleness is taken account of.

As means to prevent enforced idleness may be cited especially: (1) the recognition of the right to work, (2) the intensification of production, (3) the development of professional education, (4) charities, and (5) insurance. Of these, insurance is the most practical. It respects the dignity of the workingman; it cultivates his foresight, his saving. The other remedies are based on a social error; but, especially, they have proved ineffective or uneconomical.

Who should provide this insurance? Should it be the state? Some attempts have been made in Germany, in France, and in Switzerland. They failed. Should it be banks? When tried at Hamburg this failed. Fraternal or mutual insurance is the best form. Such an organization facilitates (1) the classification of risks, (2) efficiency of control, (3) the re-employment of those enforcedly idle, and (4) the best equalization of the work. Experience confirms this position.

We would suggest some things necessary to the practical working of an out-of-work-fund organization: (1) Payment from such fund should be only on account of being out of work. The fund should not be used to insure against sickness, accident, old age, or lack of employment caused by the change of seasons. (2) The idleness must not have been provoked by the laborer. If he loses his place on account of bad conduct, laziness, or unjustifiable insubordination, he loses his rights to any indemnity from the out-of-work benefit. But should he be forced to quit work because of an unjust diminution of his wages, or because of continuous vexation by his employer or his fellow-workmen, he would be justly entitled to a share in the benefit fund. Such regulations, instead of encouraging strikes, would be strongly conducive to industrial peace. (3) The indemnity from the out-of-work benefit should be appreciably less than the wages, so as to encourage seeking re-employment; and the premiums paid by any member should be regulated, not only by the amount of the indemnity such member should receive in case of enforced idleness, but also by the coefficient of risk of his being thus thrown out of employment in his trade. (4) The privilege of the indemnity should not be extended until sufficient time should have passed from the time of discharge to allow investigation so as to prevent fraud. (5) A minimum age limit of perhaps sixteen years, and a maximum limit of about fifty years, should be determined upon for members. (6) Transference of membership

from one trade benefit to another should be provided for, and when the change to another trade has become more than merely temporary, the credit for premiums already made should be transferred to the out-of-work benefit fund of the trade to which the worker has gone. (7) There should be gradation of "benefit" groups from local groups with their local treasuries to one central society with its general treasury. (8) The state should give such a workingman's organization legal recognition and standing. This was done in Belgium by the law of March 31, 1898.—M. L'ABBÉ E. VOSSEN, "L'assurance contre le chômage involontaire par les syndicats ouvriers," in *La réforme sociale*, January, 1903. T. J. R.

The Law of Future Specific[1] and Social Efficiency.—One of the most striking, and yet at the same time one of the least observed, facts about specific action is the pre-eminence of the specific as such. The individual is secondary to the species. Instincts, which are characteristically the grand trunk line of transmission and continuity in the lower orders or the zoölogical series, are peculiar and very important in this, that they are always, in their origin and bloom, for the benefit of the *species* to which the animal may belong which possesses the instinct. They are of benefit to the individual only secondarily, in so far as that individual may be of benefit to the species. The instincts of self-preservation and sexual love play subservient rôles in the paramountcy of the species. Duration of life in the individuals of any species is determined by the advantage to the species, and not by that of the individuals.

Individual provision and prevision is increased, corrected, and enlarged in scope by *social* or state provision. Taxation is being remodeled on this basis. Municipal improvements bear the imprint of the paternal. Large projects, such as transisthmian canals, national irrigation, transcontinental railroads, subsidizing a merchant marine, protection of growing industries, all bear witness of the fact that the nations are now doing consciously what formerly they did in more or less haphazard fashion.

Many sociologists manifest their alarm at the decreasing birth rate throughout the world. But when it is remembered that the individual is not so hopelessly isolated as formerly; that he is provided by tradition with the lessons of the past, with a rich store of extra-organic apparatus; that he is supported on all hands by social institutions; when it is considered that civilization in the last analysis is a sum total of adaptations whereby the forces of nature are utilized by man for the greater safety of the species—it may be that the members of the small family may acquire and accomplish more than the family of larger members. In man, art, religion, and science are in the long run, directly or indirectly, means for more certain perpetuation of the species and the more certain welfare of the same.

This universal organic and social process explains many features of great interest in the various fields of human activity. In law we view the gradual surrender of so-called individual rights to the rights of the state, the growth of freedom, etc., the development of the individual in order that the service of the whole may be increased by the strength of the constituent parts, the subordination of individual caprice to collective wisdom as seen in representative gatherings of all kinds, the predominance of self-sacrifice in the great ethical and religious movements of the world, life insurance, city sanitation, and the many acts of public philanthropy.

The beyond-man, as the child of the future, is the goal and sanction of social effort. In securing the greatest happiness or welfare of the greatest number we now see that the "greatest number" refers not so much to the majority now living as to that still greater maiority—the unborn. Society is not composed of those now living; it represents the living as the servants of posterity. And yet we see such writers as Huxley, Spencer, and others so thoroughly saturated with idea of competition, *laissez-faire*, and struggle for existence that they lose sight, very largely, if not wholly, of the great racial struggle for future social efficiency.—ARTHUR ALLIN, "The Law of Future Specific and Social Efficiency," in *Journal of Pedagogy*, December, 1902.

T. J. R.

[1] The term "specific" obviously refers here to *species*.

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SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION.[1]

ORGANIC and superorganic processes are the same in principle, but different in method. Social evolution obeys the same general laws as organic evolution, but the mode of operation in each is so unlike that the general identity is difficult to recognize. So great is this difference that, in discussing the latter, biological terminology may be avoided and only sociological and anthropological terminology employed. The terms "differentiation" and "integration," however, though chiefly used in biological discussions, belong as properly to the other sciences and cannot well be dispensed with.

In the present state of science all considerations of man that involve his origin and development must necessarily start from the biological standpoint. The fundamental truth that man is a species of animal may be taken as established. It is therefore the human species, *Homo sapiens*, with which both the anthropologist and the sociologist have to deal. This species has descended from more remote animal ancestors in the same way that all other species now constituting the fauna of the globe have reached their present state. Whether it be Pithecanthropus or Homosimius that forms the latest link in the chain that leads back to Dryopithecus and earlier true simian forms is the taxonomic problem of the biologist. The anthropologist, and

[1] From the *Annales de l'institut international de sociologie*, Vol. IX (1903), pp. 49–85.

especially the sociologist, are concerned with the genus Homo and with what has taken place since that genus acquired its full standing as such.

Biologists are now practically unanimous in maintaining that every distinct species has developed through descent with modification under conditions that combined to produce that particular form. Such conditions can only exist in a definite and more or less limited territorial area. Each species is thus usually confined to such an area. If it has a wider distribution, the form is correspondingly varied, indicating dispersion subsequent to the time at which it attained its specific character at some one point or limited area. That this was the case with man is as certain as it is with other species. The idea once quite prevalent, even among leading biologists, that the same species could originate at different times and places has disappeared along with the conception of special creation upon which it was based, and the theoteleogical views that formerly prevailed. It is negatived by the admission of a phylogenetic connection with ancestral forms, since, under the infinitely varied conditions by which every new form is produced, the chances are infinity to one against the production of two identical species at different points. So much for the doctrine of polygenism which some anthropologists and sociologists have thought it necessary to revive and call in to explain certain phenomena presented by human races and human society. I shall endeavor to show that no such hypothesis is necessary.

Assuming, then, that man was developed upon some limited area presenting the conditions to the production of just such a being, we may gain a fairly clear conception of the nature of his early history. It must be remembered, however, that there does not now exist any race of men corresponding to the absolutely primitive type. The lowest races known to us are such as have for one reason or another remained for ages in an undeveloped state, but during all these ages they must of necessity have undergone profound modification. Many of them have fluctuated, having once belonged to far more developed types, and subsequently degenerated in adapting themselves to simpler or severer conditions of existence.

SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION.

The fundamental character that distinguishes man from all other species of animals is his greater brain development and consequent increased powers of all kinds. The first mental faculty to tell in his history was memory. In all other animals blood-relationship is almost immediately forgotten. In man it is remembered, and this is the basis of the kinship group which is the natural foundation of society. The primary social cohesion is the consanguineal bond. The horde is at first only a family, and it never becomes anything more than a kinship group. The clan is only a larger kinship group rendered possible by higher mental powers and longer memory. Hordes and primitive clans, like animal cells, are limited in size, but not in growth, and the consequence in the one, as in the other case, is a multiplication by division. New hordes and clans are produced, and as these must each occupy different territorial areas, a process of expansion takes place. If the conditions of existence were everywhere the same, this expansion might take the form of a true circle, pushing out in concentric bands from the original center. But no such uniformity of conditions can be conceived of. The least diversity would suffice to give some trifling impetus to one radius in preference to another, and the form of the figure would begin to be irregular. In the actual state of things at any point on the earth's surface that anyone may please to select, the natural inequalities in the environment would at once produce great irregularities. The multiplying hordes would push out in only a few favored directions, would follow the water currents, string along the shores of seas or lakes, seek the nut-bearing forests and the bays abounding in shellfish, yielding to all the elements that promised an easier and more certain subsistence.

Another equally important mental faculty distinguishing man is cunning and inventive power. By means of this he was able to break over the faunal boundaries that limit the distribution of other species, and to overflow into other regions to which he was not originally adapted. All other species are restricted to special districts and unable to quit them. Every attempt to do so proves

fatal to the individuals that make it. They find themselves in an environment to which they are not adapted and therefore hostile to them, and they quickly succumb to adverse influences. Any species that could successfully overstep its faunal barriers would, according to the now well-understood laws of multiplication, soon overspread the globe. That no species has done this proves the general law of faunal limitation. Man alone acquired this power, and this was the result of his superior resourcefulness, due in turn to his inventive faculty. For however feeble the inventive powers of primitive peoples may appear to the civilized man, they were greatly in excess of those of any other species of animal, and it required only a little exercise of reason to neutralize the most effective influences exerted by the environment in restricting migration. The ability to cope with the remaining fauna, to evade the attacks of predatory species, and to entrap and ensnare animal enemies, was alone almost sufficient for this. The least success in counteracting injurious climatic conditions, such as the most primitive forms of clothing and shelter insure, further conduced to the same end. The acquisition of an omnivorous character, such as belongs to all primitive races, rendered the food-supply certain, even before the introduction of any of the arts by which both the vegetable and animal kingdoms were early made to contribute to man's nourishment and comfort. The invention of the earliest weapons of the chase and the most primitive instruments for tilling the soil disarmed the hostile environment and converted the dangerous forces of nature into means of subsistence for man.

Thus emancipated from the slavery of the environment, this favored species commenced that career of universal expansion which ultimately compassed the entire globe. Although his memory was sufficient to establish the kinship group, this faculty was not sufficient to maintain a connection between the daughter-hordes and the ancestral horde from which they had descended, and a few removes were sufficient to obliterate all traces of relationship. Tradition, which has been aptly called social memory, did not yet exist, and those groups that had wandered farthest from the original center of dispersion were utter strangers to the

mother-group. As they moved out along special and extremely irregular lines, in the manner already described, there were soon produced many such terminal groups, and these were usually remote from each other, often separated by seas or mountain chains.

The period during which this process was going on, however long it may have been, may be called the period of *social differentiation.* In it languages were formed, but, owing to gradual isolation, each group acquired a language of its own. At least the variation that would naturally take place in the language of any group would soon render it practically a different language from that of any of the remoter groups from which it had descended. *A fortiori* would the languages of all the terminal groups be different from one another. It would be the same with customs. The differences of environment would alone accomplish this, but customs naturally tend to vary, and unless there be intercommunication, they rapidly differentiate. The customs as well as the languages of all the different radiating lines would be utterly unlike except in certain fundamentals. When customs and ceremonials at length took the form of cults and religions, these, too, were different, and all the scattered groups ultimately presented the utmost heterogeneity in all their social characteristics. Between them the only points of agreement were biological. They still all belonged to the same genus and the same species, and were all equally men.

We have thus far pictured the scattered hordes as wholly isolated or only feebly joined to their ancestral groups along certain irregular lines by vanishing threads of memory and unorganized tradition. This would grow weaker and weaker as they receded from the primitive cradle, until everywhere on the remoter periphery all social connection would be lost. The different lines would be of very unequal length, and, as a matter of history, some of them reached out to the peopling of distant continents. All the social differences and certain physiological modifications due to differences of climate in the regions occupied, taken together, are what have finally produced the different races of men, and all the differences that exist among human

races may be accounted for as the normal effects of social differentiation.

SOCIAL INTEGRATION.

Social differentiation forms the first chapter in the history of human society. The second chapter treats of social integration, and this is as far as it is proposed to go in this paper along this line. In a comparatively short time (and we are not at all limited in the matter of time) the number of human races was very great. These were all absolutely distinct sociologically, and many of them were wholly different ethnologically. They were alike only in their biological aspects. They were all *human* races. The number of races at a certain stage, viz., at the stage of maximum differentiation, was vastly greater than it is now, and greater than it was at any subsequent stage. This reduction in the number of human races was the result of social integration.

A drainage map of any great continent will show that the large streams that converge in their lower courses are made up of numerous smaller streams higher up, and that these are composed of great numbers of minor tributaries on the high plateaus. Many of these latter, when belonging to one of the great drainage systems, have their ultimate sources close to those belonging to the next adjacent system. Let us imagine two of those moniliform chains of human migration that I have described creeping slowly up two of these great drainage basins, the constrictions between the numerous bead-like links having in most cases so far deepened that all social and racial connection has been repeatedly severed. In both these lines the more remote groups, after reaching the highlands, have further ramified in partial correspondence with the topography, until groups are found in both far up among the ultimate sources of the smaller tributaries. In a tropical or subtropical region, such as that in which the human race could alone have had its origin, these high plateaus must be covered with dense forests. In the pursuit of game and other means of subsistence the more venturesome of these terminal groups could not fail occasionally to cross over the narrow divide that separated the head waters of the two

great drainage systems. We may imagine two members of the two terminal groups that, under these natural conditions, chanced to occupy the opposite adjacent slopes accidentally to meet in the forest. What would be the result? If they should speak to each other, it would be in a language that neither could understand. There would arise in the breasts of both a mingled assemblage of crude savage feelings. Fear, wonder, hate, and rapacity would be among the blended emotions and motives to action. The result of such a first encounter would depend upon too many conditions to admit of prediction. But the repetition of such encounters, and especially the accidental meeting of bands from such different tribes, would lead to consequences that can be readily foreseen. When such encounters became frequent, as they could not fail ultimately to do, nothing could prevent hostility and war. Each group would look upon the other as something utterly foreign and unassimilable. There would be no "consciousness of kind." The possession of the human form might cause the existence of somewhat different sentiments from those aroused by encountering a tiger or a bear, but that there should arise any sentiment of *humanity* or any desire to cultivate closer relationships, is wholly out of the question. The combined effect of all the sentiments excited would be the desire to kill and destroy this new-found beast that could only be conceived as a natural enemy.

The more frequently such races were brought into contact, the more bitter would grow the animosity. The more they learned of each other, the more intense would be the mutual hatred. The first thing to strike each would be the utter dissimilarity, and everything that one race did or possessed that the other did not do or have would intensify the feeling of contempt. When it was found that not only were their languages different, but that their practices, customs, ceremonies, cults, and fetishes were all strange and unknown, the degree of mutual detestation would be without limit.

The period of social differentiation was a prolonged one. It saw the transition in man from a frugivorous to a largely carnivorous animal. The food-supply came to be in large part flesh,

and all animals that could be ensnared or killed were eaten. Here was another large, dangerous, savage animal that must be killed whenever found, for the safety of the group. What more natural than that when captured and killed its flesh should be eaten, as was the practice with other animals! Such was the origin of cannibalism, a practice common to a certain stage in the development of every race of men whose history is known or can be traced back to that stage, and one which persisted in the Aryan race of Europe down to the time of Julius Cæsar. With the rapidly increasing frequency of encounters between races and the growth of a taste for human flesh (which is said to be the most highly flavored of all meats), the different races of men became the mutual game of one another, and man literally preyed upon man. This, of course, soon became a test of the relative strength of different races, and an era of universal warfare naturally supervened. How long this lasted during that great pre-historic antiquity of man can, of course, never be known; but when the curtain at last slowly rose over the world, it revealed a scene which is now commonly denominated the "struggle of races." I do not propose to enter here into a description of this great sociological process. This has been done by others, and I have unavoidably encountered and dealt with it in places where I could do it more justice than I could hope to do here. I shall therefore confine myself to pointing out the rôle that it has played in social integration.

The man-hunting and head-hunting stages have practically passed in the existing races of man, but history has revealed to us the social process that succeeded these and which has brought the world to its present state. The first stage was that of war and the measuring of the military strength of the races of men. This divided mankind into two great classes, the conquering races and the conquered races. Conquest was at first followed by the complete destruction and annihilation of the conquered races. This was succeeded by, first, the enslavement of the comely women of the conquered race, then by that of the soldiery, and finally by that of a large part of the subject race. At still later stages there arose between the conquering or ruling class and

the subject or slave class an intermediate trading or mercantile class, which ultimately resolved itself into a general business or industrial class. Out of these three primary elements, which may be called the ectoderm, endoderm, and mesoderm, respectively, of the social tissues, have been formed what are now known as the "social classes" and the modern social body.

RACE INTEGRATION.

I dismiss this subject, the fundamental theme of sociology, with these few broad strokes, and shall devote the remainder of this paper to a few reflections on what may be regarded as the more especially ethnological aspect of social integration, viz., *race integration.*

Social differentiation, as we have seen, resulted in a practically unlimited number of races, all socially, and most of them ethnically, distinct. Social integration resulted in the amalgamation of these heterogeneous races into larger compound mixed races, and these became true races, greatly reducing the number of human races. The attempt to base any important conclusions, therefore, upon differences of race may be said to have utterly failed. All existing races are completely mixed. Some of the elements of which they are composed seem to be distinct and to point to stocks that were once pure, but could such stocks be anywhere found, they, too, would be equally compound and their elements would point back to earlier stocks. There is, however, no possibility now of finding a stock of which this is not true. Ages anterior to any human records—nay, ages before man had learned to make anything that archæologists recognize as a product of art, this process of race amalgamation had been many times repeated, and the races all inextricably blended. All that we see today and call races are simply a few of these composite groups that succeeded in holding together during a considerable period until certain common characteristics had been more or less definitely fixed. But even these race characters were the result of prior synthesis and are equally composite.

The great race distinctions marked by differences in the color

of the skin and texture of the hair would seem to negative the possibility of a common origin. But a careful study of all the intermediate conditions shows that there are gradations between all such characters. These differences can all be accounted for by long exposure to different climatic conditions, by personal preferences and sexual selections arising therefrom, and by many other influences which are observed to act upon the physiological and biological elements entering into the problem. The one fundamental fact that all races, regardless of color, size, form, or any other differences, are perfectly fertile *inter se*, proves conclusively that the races of men all belong to one animal species, and this, under modern conceptions of the meaning of species, implies common descent and genetic filiation. It is inconceivable that two animal forms should, under the spontaneous formative influences of nature, be molded by the "fortuitous concourse of atoms" into such a condition of external and internal identity that when they should chance to meet through an equally fortuitous conjuncture they would recognize each other as belonging to a common "kind," and, uniting according to the laws of nature, would be able to originate a new race of beings. The mathematical law of probabilities, as well as the observed course of natural events, in every department of knowledge distinctly negatives such a violent assumption and supports the teachings of biology that man is everywhere the same.

But, as has already been remarked, the period of ethnic and social differentiation has now long passed, and that of ethnic and social integration has begun. Indeed, this latter process has been long going on. We are not sufficiently acquainted with any but the white races to be able to describe its effects, but they have doubtless been as marked in the yellow and even in the black races as in the white races. Here it has gone on through a long series of social assimilations until it has evolved a number of great amalgamated nationalities, such as the French, German, Italian, Spanish, Russian, and English peoples, all of which, though demonstrably composed of a great number of heterogeneous racial elements, are now compactly integrated into what may still be called distinct races. For under this view

the term "race" loses all that definiteness with which it was formerly, and is still falsely, clothed, and comes to stand for any group of men who have, from whatever cause, acquired a certain community of characteristics which cement all the members of the group into a compact whole. There are other races in process of formation. There will soon be a distinct American race and an Australian race, a South African race and a South American race.

Some may be willing to admit this much, but still deny that integration is taking place between these so-called white races and the races of a different color. But even here the same law is in operation. Wherever races of different color are thrown together they tend to coalesce. However strenuously the superior races may resist this tendency, they can only diminish to a certain extent the rate at which it proceeds. They can never completely arrest it. It is well known that the Latin races freely combine with all the other races with which they come in contact. The Mexican is now a cross between a Spaniard and an Aztec. The Canadian "half-breeds" already constitute a race of French-Indians. All South and Central America is more or less mixed. The Teutonic races have somewhat successfully resisted the movement, but not wholly. The original Indian tribes of North America that have remained in the territory now occupied by the whites are now all thoroughly mixed. This makes no sensible impression upon the white population on account of their great numerical preponderance, but the Indians have become practically absorbed in the white population. Even in the larger reservations of the United States, wherever a considerable white population has made its way into the midst of the Indians, rapid race mixture is going on. This is exemplified in Indian Territory, where the two races have already become extensively blended.

A curious result has flowed from the law fixing annuities for the Indian population. The Indians are graded according to the amount of Indian blood in the veins of the recipients, and each person has a record showing this. This, on the one hand, puts a premium upon Indian blood, which would seem to work toward keeping the blood as pure as possible. But, on the other

hand, it enhances the money value of Indian wives, and thus leads to the marriage of Indian women by white men. This purely sociological effect was probably not thought of by the framers of the law, and it is a fine illustration of how laws may have social effects not contemplated, but of a far-reaching character.

Great efforts are made to prevent the mixing of the white with the black races, but they are only partially successful. The effect of slavery is always to produce the mixture of the slave-holding and enslaved races. This was scarcely diminished in the United States by the fact that the slaves belonged to a black race, and before slavery was abolished there was a large mulatto population. The abolition of slavery has checked the process, but has not arrested it. The influence of caste, which relegates to the colored race all who have any black blood whatever, has the effect of including in that race many who are to all intents and purposes white, and whose intelligence is nearly equal to that of the white race. These persons also possess the other qualities of the dominant race. They become the leaders of the colored race, and by their influence and example help to lift them up. They are acquiring property which the laws are bound to protect, and in many communities they are the leading citizens. It is only a question of time, though the time may be long, when such facts will shatter the prejudices and break down the barriers of race.

As regards the yellow races, there seems to be less prospect of coalescence. Their enormous numbers keep them to themselves, and their great social dissimilarity from the white races renders contact distasteful. There may be districts in Asia where rapid mixture with Aryan and Semitic elements is taking place, but this is not the case in Europe or America. Still, the Japanese are now in high favor among western races, and should a movement set in in the direction of amalgamation, there would be no race prejudice to overcome. It is otherwise now with the Chinese, but they, too, may one day inhale the western spirit.

Whatever may be the present condition of things, and however great may be the obstacles to race mixture in certain cases,

it is clear to those who contemplate the great future of mankind that race integration will go on until all the races of men shall be blended into one. Not that the lower races will overslaugh the higher ones, or that the latter will be dragged down to the level of the former. The dominant races will always dominate the product, whatever it may be, but the less forceful elements will enter into it as modifiers. They represent qualities that in moderate proportions will improve and enrich the whole. The final great united world-race will be comparable to a composite photograph in which certain strong faces dominate the group, but in which may also be detected the softening influence of faces characterized by those refining moral qualities which reflect the soul rather than the intellect. This final perfected human race will therefore embody all that is great and good in man.

I am happily not alone in this view of the destiny of man. Others have expressed it, but no one more clearly than the eminent anthropologist Professor William H. Holmes, head of the Bureau of American Ethnology and of the Department of Anthropology of the United States National Museum. In his address as president of the Anthropological Society of Washington, delivered on February 11, 1902, entitled "A Sketch of the Origin, Development, and Probable Destiny of the Races of Men," after demonstrating by a series of admirably selected and arranged views of the principal types of mankind, and also of the three great simian types that most closely approach the human form, that man belongs to a single species, and that all human races resemble one another so closely as to constitute a practical unit from a biological point of view, he proceeded to work out the theoretical origin and divergence of the human races. His address contains many ingenious illustrations to this end, but I shall use only one of his figures with his explanation of it, as follows:

I wish now to combine in a single diagram (K) a summary of my conception of the development of the species and the races from the period of specialization of the anthropoids up to the present time. The side lines in this diagram stand for the limits of the world within which the branching tree of the *Hominidæ* (A) springs up. The horizontal lines connecting across mark the periods by means of which we separate the stages of development.

The first period (I) is that which witnesses the specialization of the group of creatures (A) from which man sprang. It may be regarded as corresponding somewhat closely to the Tertiary period as formulated by geologists. We know not the exact number of closely related branches at that time, but it is held that the prospective human stem flourished and rose above the others. In the diagram the collateral branches B, C, D, E, are left undeveloped in order that *Homo* (A) may have a clear field—in order that we may illustrate more clearly the manner in which this group, according to our best interpretation, spread from its natal district and occupied the habitable world.



DIAGRAM K.—Showing origin of the genus *Homo* (A) in Tertiary time, separation into races through isolation in Post-Tertiary time (F, G, H, I), and theoretic blending of all forms in future time.

That the home of the human precursor was, at this stage of his development, restricted in area is assumed on reasonable grounds. The apes and monkeys of today, which are believed to correspond in grade of development to the human stock of the natal period, are not widely distributed, but occupy very restricted areas and such as are particularly suited to their arboreal habits and their rather delicate constitutions. There is no reason to believe that man at a corresponding stage was more hardy, more enterprising, or more widely scattered.

In the diagram, therefore, the stem A is made narrow below, widening upward, thus suggesting expansion of area with increase in numbers, energy, and intelligence. This expansion was, no doubt, very slow, and may or may not have extended to the farthest limits of the land area occupied, but it was prophetic of the greater expansions to be realized in period II. We cannot know in just what part of the world these events took place, just where the prehuman group was transmuted into the human. It may have been in Europe, Asia, Africa, Eurasia, Eurafrica, Lemuria, or America, but this does not matter here. We reach the conclusion that at or near the close of Tertiary time (period I) the change occurred and that upright, self-conscious man took his place permanently in the van of progress. We conceive further that,

about this time, the continents assumed approximately their present dimensions and relations, and that this creature man, breaking over the barriers that formerly hedged him in, was ready to engage in their conquest. The simple, initial, integrate period of his career had now closed, and a period of marvelous expansion supervened (period II).

Spreading gradually into the various continental areas, the incipient human groups, as yet reasonably homogeneous in character, became widely separated. Some were quite completely isolated and went their separate ways, becoming sharply demarcated from the rest. Others less fully isolated continued to intermingle along the margins of the areas occupied, so that gradations of characters occur, and in some cases the resulting hybrid peoples have probably occupied separate areas long enough to become well-established varieties. Three or four groups only became so widely separated and fixed in physical characters that students are agreed to call them separate races, but these comprise the great body of mankind.

The line marking the close of period II stands for the present time, and F, G, H, and I are the races now in evidence. Let us consider what is happening along this line today. The end of the second period—the isolated specializing period—has come for the races, and changes of a momentous kind are being initiated. Man has spread out and occupied the world, and the resulting isolations and partial isolations on continent and island of peoples having meager artificial means of transportation, have brought about, directly or indirectly, the variations called races; but the period of group isolation and consequent race specialization is at an end. In the last few hundred years the sea-going ship and the railway have been invented, and the extremes of the world are no farther apart than were the opposite shores of a good-sized island when, a little while ago, all men went afoot. The period of differentiation is closed forever and the period of universal integration is upon us. We do not see how fast these movements are, but contrasted with the changes of earlier days they are as a hurricane compared with the morning zephyr. The continent of America has changed its inhabitants as in the twinkling of an eye, and Asia, Africa, Australia, and the islands of the Pacific are in the throes of race disintegration. Today each man may go two hundred and forty times around the world in his short lifetime. A single individual may be the parent of progeny in every important land area of the world; and this is only the beginning—the first few hundred years—of a period to which millions must be assigned. Then how shall we project the lines of the diagram into the future? There can be but one answer.

Very briefly we may outline the inevitable course of human history. In period III the races will fade out and disappear as the combined result of miscegenation and the blotting out of the weaker branches. The world will be filled to overflowing with a generalized race in which the dominating blood will be that of the race that today has the strongest claim physically and intellectually to take possession of all the resources of the land and the sea.

Blood and culture will be cosmopolitan. Man, occupying every available foot of land on the globe, will be a closer unit than he was on the day far back in period I, when, in a limited area hidden away in the broad expanse of some unidentified continent, the agencies of specialization first shaped up the species.[1]

A SOCIOLOGICAL UTOPIA.

Such a view may seem utopian, but it is only so in the same sense that every great epoch is utopian from the standpoint of those that preceded it. Life and mind are utopian when compared with a condition in which they do not exist, yet this cosmic step has been taken and an organic and psychic world evolved out of a lifeless and mindless world. Any of the highly developed types of life is utopian relatively to the lower types that preceded it: the seed plant to the spore plant, the cup-seeded to the naked-seeded plant, the backboned to the soft or shell-bearing animal, the mammal to the reptile, the lowest man to the highest ape, the civilized man to the savage. It would be utopian for an ape to aspire to manhood or for a troglodyte to picture the civilized state. It is only when we look backward and see how great the strides are that actually have been taken that we acquire a scientific conception of what evolution is capable of accomplishing.

Let us see what are some of the scientific elements in support of the utopia of ultimate universal race integration. This planet is believed to have supported some form of life during a period of something like 72,000,000 years. Half of this period was over before the forms of life that existed acquired sufficient material consistency to leave any recognizable impression in the thousands of feet of rock that was formed in that time, and we have scarcely more than graphite beds to prove that vegetable life in some perishable form existed. Doubtless this primitive flora was the food of equally frail and evanescent animal forms. One-third of the remainder, or 12,000,000 years, comprising the Cambrian and Silurian periods, was passed before vertebrated animals in the form of the oldest fishes and land plants of the spore-bearing types appeared. Another third, or 12,000,000

[1] *American Anthropologist*, N. S., Vol. IV, No. 3 (July–September, 1902), pp. 387–90.

years more, rolled away before the faintest traces of mammalian life presented themselves well up in the New Red Sandstone or Triassic period, and during that and the next or Jurassic period, each of which lasted at least 3,000,000 years, the world was given over to amphibian and reptilian forms and to a cryptogamic and gymnospermous vegetation. It is only in the Cretaceous period succeeding the Jurassic, and occupying another 3,000,000 years, that anything like the now dominant forms of either plants or animals became common. At the close of the Cretaceous all but one twenty-fourth part of the earth's life-history had passed, and as yet there were no four-footed beasts such as make up the chief part of the present fauna of the globe. The Tertiary period was ushered in, estimated likewise at nearly 3,000,000 years, and it was during this comparatively brief space of time that all the great products of nature were evolved. Before it closed all the great families of animals, including the apes, were in existence. Whether man can be numbered among the products of late Tertiary (Pliocene) time is a question now under discussion, but the bulk of the evidence is in the negative. That is to say, it is generally conceded that the creature resembling man that has left relics of either his skeleton or his handiwork in the late Tertiary strata, was not really man, but the ancestor of man—Pithecanthropus, Homosimius, or whatever name may be given to it.

Man properly so called was of later or Quaternary origin. He came into existence somewhere below the terminal moraine, while the several glacial periods were successively chasing the arctic plants and animals from their north temperate homes and stranding them on the mountain tops of Europe. The duration of this period is variously estimated by geologists. Few place it higher than 500,000 years, and the consensus of opinion seems to vary from 200,000 to 300,000 years. It is therefore tolerably safe to say that the entire human period cannot exceed 300,000 years. But during at least seven-eighths of this period man was scarcely more than an animal. This was the period of social differentiation described at the beginning of this article. In it man overspread the globe, and he divided up into a multitude of

races, but he achieved nothing. Human history at the most extreme calculation does not go back more than 25,000 years. This is also probably as far as archæologists can safely trace man's works, but it is only a span in the age of the earth. Forty such periods go into 1,000,000 years. It requires 120 of them to make a Tertiary period, and it is scarcely more than one three-thousandth part of the whole term of organic life. But of the real life-history of man less than half of this period can be counted, while practically all human achievement comes within one-fourth of it. Man is but a speck on the surface of the ocean of time as reckoned by geology.

Professor Haeckel in his *Welträthsel* happily characterizes this large view of the time-relations of organic life and of man as the "cosmological perspective," and illustrates it by looking upon the entire period of life on the earth as one great day (*Schöpfungs-Tag*), which is capable of being subdivided into the twenty-four hours of a solar day, the relative lengths of the several geological periods being expressed in hours, minutes, and seconds. One of his students worked out this conception and arrived at the startling result that the historic period, which he placed at 6,000 years, has occupied only five seconds of the creation day!

Haeckel estimates the age of the earth at 100,000,000 years, which is much longer than the estimate accepted by me in the above discussion, viz., 72,000,000, but this latter is even better adapted to the illustration given than was his because a multiple of twenty-four, and the results are still sufficiently striking. I have, however, thought that this might be made still more clear by projecting it upon a dial, and I have constructed one on this numerical basis. In this scheme 3,000,000 years represent one hour, 50,000 one minute, and 833⅓ one second. If we make the human period 300,000 years, man has existed six minutes of the cosmic day. If we make it 200,000, he has existed four minutes. If we allow the extreme length of 25,000 years for the historic period, it will represent thirty seconds. If we restrict it with Haeckel to 6,000 years, it occupies seven and one-fifth seconds. All of which is calculated both to teach humility and to inspire hope.

The following are the geological periods, expressed in years in the first column and in hours, minutes, and seconds of the creation day in the next three columns. The dial based on these figures follows:

Geologic Periods	Years	Hours	Minutes	Seconds
Archean	18,000,000	6	..	..
Algonkian	18,000,000	6	..	..
Cambrian	6,000,000	2	..	..
Silurian	6,000,000	2	..	..
Devonian	6,000,000	2	..	..
Carboniferous	6,000,000	2	..	..
Triassic	3,000,000	1	..	..
Jurassic	3,000,000	1	..	..
Cretaceous	3,000,000	1	..	..
Tertiary	2,675,000	..	53	30
Quaternary	300,000	..	6	..
Historic period	25,000	..	..	30
Total age of the earth	72,000,000	24	..	..
Age of written language	6,000			$7\frac{1}{5}$

But what is the bearing of all this upon the problem of race integration? Let us see. The period of differentiation could scarcely have been less than 150,000 years. That of integration is probably less than 50,000 years. In other words, social integration has only just begun. It must increase in rapidity with the increase of population. This rate will slowly diminish with density and increasing intelligence, but ultimately the whole world must become filled with men. Races will mingle more and more, and the more they mingle the more they will fuse. Slow as this process now seems to be, it is rapid compared with former periods, and it will become still more rapid.

But someone may say that it will require a long time to bring about the final racial unity of all mankind. True, but the question how long? is not the one under discussion. Time is relative. A million years is a short time compared with the age of the earth. Yet we can scarcely conceive of a million years—five hundred Christian eras! But the world is not going to come to an end in that time. Man is here. What is there to prevent his remaining here? This question gives rise to a train of others.

In the first place we are told that science points to the decline

of the planet; that the sun is radiating its heat; that the conditions of organic existence are destined to deteriorate; that slowly but surely the capacity of the earth for sustaining life will diminish; and that man, almost without knowing it, will display



DIAL·OF·THE·COSMIC·DAY
~ AGE·OF·THE·EARTH

less and less vigor until he grows imbecile and at last disappears along with all organic life, leaving the earth a dead star, comparable to our moon. This is all probably true, but let us see what practical interest it has for us.

It is mainly a question of temperature. No one will deny that during the historic period the temperature of the earth,

though varying greatly in the different zones, has been upon the whole highly favorable to life in general. There is no reason to suppose that it was less so during the whole of Quaternary time, notwithstanding the occurrence in the northern hemisphere of several glacial periods. The Pliocene period that preceded this was perhaps more favorable to life than the early Quaternary, being more equable. The remainder of the Tertiary (Miocene and Eocene) was much warmer, so that vegetation now found at temperate latitudes grew above the arctic circle. Palms were common in the present temperate zone, and animal life was at its high tide. As we go back from the Tertiary through the Cretaceous to the Jurassic, we find evidence that the temperatures generally prevailing were too high to be favorable to the highest development of either plants or animals. We reach at last an almost exclusively coniferous and cycadean flora and a chiefly reptilian and amphibian fauna. When we reach the coal measures, the evidence all points to the existence of a very high temperature over the whole surface of the earth. There was very little difference between that of the equator and that of the poles. The same class of plants grew in Brazil and on Bear Island near Spitzbergen. It is altogether probable that the sun never shone upon the surface of the earth, but that from the almost seething waters there rose a vast atmosphere of vapor through which no ray of sunshine could ever penetrate.

We need not go farther back. It is obvious that none of the higher life of the present could have existed under these conditions. Aside from the necessity of vast periods of time to evolve these higher forms, the world was not ready for them until near the time when they appeared in late Mesozoic and Tertiary time. In a word, instead of there being a decline of life or a deterioration in the conditions necessary to the highest forms of organic existence, there has been a constant improvement in those conditions from the earliest geologic time to the present, and there is nothing to indicate that the optimum conditions have yet been reached. There is every probability that the habitability of the globe is still increasing and will continue

to increase for countless ages. Should it at last reach its maximum, the duration of that golden age would be at least a million years, and it would probably be several million years before any decline would be perceptible. There is no reason to think that the period during which the conditions of vital existence will continue as favorable as they now are and have been since the beginning of Tertiary time will be less than that during which such conditions have now prevailed. That period, according to the estimates of the best-qualified authorities, is not less than three million years. All speculations, therefore, as to the ultimate decline of the planet, however scientifically sound, are purely theoretical and have no practical value whatever. So far as any practical interests are concerned, the world will *always* be what it is today.

A final objection remains to be met. We are told that all things have their rise, maturity, and decay, and that man cannot form an exception to this universal law. The bugbear of decadence now stares us in the face, and Nietzsches and Nordaus are sounding the warning note. First we are told that man in his egocentric myopia is exhausting the natural resources of the earth, destroying the forests, drying up the springs and rivers, and converting the green and smiling landscape into a desert of dry sand. The decline and fall of all the great empires of the past is another favorite theme, and the prediction is confidently made that the present leading nations are following the same path and must ultimately come to naught.

It is not easy to answer all this in a few words. So far, however, as concerns the exhaustion of natural resources, while the fact cannot be denied, still it requires but a glance at the history of the nineteenth century to perceive that man with the help of science has really increased the resources of nature a hundred fold and immeasurably enhanced the conditions of existence and enjoyment.

That nations rise, flourish, and decline is also true, but thus far at least no nation has gone down without another and greater rising at some other spot and carrying civilization forward beyond the point reached by the decadent race. The fall of empires is

little more than the transplanting of civilization. It is social reproduction, and the universal condition to reproduction is decay. Social evolution is in this respect identical with organic evolution. The great types of animals and plants, as shown by their geological history, have similarly had their rise, culmination, and decline. But out of them have arisen new and more vigorous types that have successively carried forward the work of structural development until the present floras and faunas of the globe are far higher than those of any past epoch. Pteridophytes succeeded thallophytes, spermatophytes succeeded lepidophytes, angiosperms succeeded gymnosperms, and dicotyledons at last crowned the series of vegetal dynasties. Vertebrates succeeded trilobites and molluscs, amphibians succeeded fishes, reptiles succeeded batrachians, birds and mammals succeeded reptiles. Finally the higher mammals succeeded the lower, and man came last to crown the animal series. It is true that the lower types did not become extinct, but in almost every case, both in the vegetable and in the animal kingdom, the leading form of each type perished, and only the less specialized forms have come down to us. Witness among plants, the Lepidodendron, Sigillaria, and Calamites of the Carboniferous, the Bennettitean cycads of the Mesozoic; and among animals, the trilobites, the ganoid fishes, the dinosaurs, and the mammoth.

To maintain that because human races decline and degenerate the human species must also do so, is the same as to maintain that because many types of vegetation and of animal life have become extinct all plants and all animals must ultimately do so. The logic is unsound, and there is nothing to prove that not only life but also man may not continue indefinitely.

From any such standpoint as that from which we are now viewing the races of men the world appears to be in an infantile state. Europe and North America, where the highest civilization is found, form much less than half the globe, and the population of those areas is proportionally still less. By far the greater part of the earth has scarcely been touched with the spirit of science. That this influence is destined to spread over the whole earth is scarcely open to doubt. But the scientific

achievements of the most advanced races, great as they may seem when compared with pre-scientific ages, are really trifling when looked at from the standpoint of possibilities.

Everyone has seen a map of the surface of the planet Mars with its wonderful canals. Schiaparelli was perfectly right in saying that they indicate the action of intelligent beings. The chief objection to this view is the gigantic scale on which these works are projected. It is said that man has never undertaken anything so colossal. The comparatively trifling task of cutting a channel large enough for ships to pass through the narrow Isthmus of Panama has well-nigh baffled his powers. What can be thought of a scheme of making a whole continent a network of great rivers many miles in width? Without pretending to any knowledge of areography, and without expressing any opinion as to the nature of the Martian canals, I will merely use this as an illustration of the possibilities of an intelligent being occupying a planet for a sufficiently prolonged period. If these canals really represent gigantic engineering operations, their magnitude is no obstacle to our understanding them. Mars, from his position in the solar system, is many million years older than the earth. Assuming that he has had an approximately parallel experience with that of the earth, his Tertiary period began ages earlier than ours. If the intelligent being, whatever its physical form, was developed there at the same relative date as man, that being has been in existence millions of years longer than man. The age of race differentiation need not have been longer than that of man. All the rest of that vast period has been passed in race integration and whatever followed this. We may suppose that an era of science was evolved there as here and at approximately the same stage in the history of the species. But that era has lasted thousands of times as long as has ours. Man has only just begun the conquest of nature. We may suppose that in Mars the conquest of nature is complete, and that every law and every force of nature has been discovered and utilized. Under such conditions there would seem to be scarcely any limit to the power of the being possessing this knowledge to transform the planet and adapt it to its needs.

The lesson is that man may also do this. With any considerable part of the time that the supposed inhabitants of Mars have had, man can scarcely fail to reach a stage at which he will become absolute master of his physical environment, and at which the operations which he now performs will seem like the work of ants. Just as he has now learned that in union is strength, and that the way of safety, success, and achievement lies through association, so he will then have learned that this is as true of races as of individuals, and that the union, association, and complete fusion of all races into one great homogeneous race—the race of man—is the final step in social evolution.[1]

LESTER F. WARD.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

[1] This article was finished in its present form on September 19, 1902. On the 20th the following item appeared in many of the newspapers of the country:

"THE INHABITANTS OF MARS.

"In his recent expressions as to the habitability of the planet Mars, Professor Hough, of Northwestern University, has the weight of authority with him, though many astronomers will question seriously his bold declaration that the planet is actually inhabited with sentient beings of a high type. The whole tendency of recent investigation has been to strengthen the view that Mars both in its atmosphere and in its chemical character is fitted to support animal life.

"The point of interest in Professor Hough's announcement is the declaration that, as the law of evolution has resulted in the development of a sentient race on earth, that law, operating in the case of the Martians, must have produced there a race now greatly superior to the people of earth in intellectual development. Mars, Venus, and Mercury, he reasons, are old planets, and presumably habitable. Mars, being very much older than the earth, and having solidified and cooled long before the earth was fit for animal habitation, the process of evolution there presumably began much earlier. Judging from the published excerpts from Professor Hough's report, he is ready to believe that the Martians have advanced to a stage of cultivation and intelligence which is hardly conceivable to the minds of earthly races."

Struck by the coincidence both in the date and in the idea expressed, but wishing to be sure of its authenticity, I immediately wrote to Professor James, president of Northwestern University, who kindly turned my letter over to Professor Hough. In due course of mail I received a letter from him to the effect that what he had to say as to the habitability of other planets had not yet been put in shape for publication, and that the newspaper report was simply dictated to the reporter.

SHORTENING THE COLLEGE COURSE: THE SOCIAL POINT OF VIEW.

EVERYONE at all familiar with the history of modern education knows that during the past four or five centuries all progressive peoples have been steadily strengthening and enriching their systems of public instruction. To provide a more extended and a better training for all children has been the aim constantly before enlightened statesmen and ruling bodies. One cannot fail to be impressed with the vigor of this movement, if he will compare what is being done today in America, or England, or France, or Germany with the best that was done anywhere in the world, even as late as in the time of John Locke, who has told us much of the ideals and practices of his age. Then a boy was thought to be well equipped for life if he received eight or ten years of tuition in the classics; and only the favored few, the élite, who had leisure, were expected to have such an elaborate schooling as this. But now in most of the great nations every child is given the privilege of, and is even required to pursue, a long course of training at public expense. In our own country and in some others it is not only the common or elementary school that is free to all children; but anyone who chooses and is qualified therefor may spend four years more in the high school as a ward of the public, and many in every community avail themselves of this opportunity. And this is not all; among us nearly every commonwealth maintains its university, which is practically free to the youths of the state who have mastered what is presented in the schools below; and here they may remain at least a half-dozen years, if they wish and have the ability to take advantage of the opportunities offered them.

The ambition everywhere, these later years, has been to lengthen the school period for all children. Public sentiment has approved every effort that has been made to achieve this end. The cry has come from all quarters: "Keep the boy at school." Parents have sacrificed their own comforts that they might

give their offspring a "better schooling than they had themselves;" communities have sacrificed present advantage that the rising generation might be more broadly and thoroughly disciplined than the one passing off the stage. Theorists have taught that the well-being of any nation is in the long run always dependent upon the breadth and depth of its educational régime, and lawmakers have written upon the statute-books provisions which are designed to compel indifferent or hostile men, if there are any, to put themselves into line with this tremendous upward tendency in every department of educational activity. Statesmen everywhere have indorsed the sentiments of Lord Brougham: "The schoolmaster is abroad, and I trust to him, armed with his primer, against the soldier in full military array."

In recent times there has been heard above the general acclamation hardly a voice raised in opposition to the multiplication of school advantages and the extension of the educational period for all persons. But just now there are some indications of disaffection which are quite threatening. A few people occupying high positions in the councils of the nation have discovered that it is possible to carry the educational business too far. It has been pointed out that in Germany, for instance, the thing has been overdone, and there have been produced already a good many learned paupers, doctors of philosophy who have to beg for bread. The universities are charged with having spoiled many good carpenters and mechanics and clerks; and some think the presence of this large body of men whose wits have been sharpened, but who are putting them to no good use, and who are restless and dissatisfied, is a source of danger to the empire. One distinguished German educator recently expressed grave doubts respecting the wisdom of the United States accepting the Carnegie and other gifts, because of the danger of our getting on our hands a lot of overeducated men who could not be utilized to advantage in the social organism.

Among us it is being said that boys do not get into practical work early enough. Our grandfathers set up for themselves at twenty-one, but the young men of today are working over their

books as late as twenty-five, and in some cases they are studying even at thirty. Statisticians have shown that the age of graduation from college into professional or business positions is being raised constantly as the years go by. The courses in all grades of schools are being made harder from decade to decade; the examinations for entrance to college are growing stiffer all the time; the requirements for entering upon one's life-work are made more exacting each year; and as a result many young men are not beginning to help themselves until the race is half run. And as a corrective it is urged that we cut down the college course at least by one-fourth; and it is even suggested that we grant the bachelor's degree at the completion of two years of study. This will enable boys to get into business earlier; if they engage in mercantile pursuits, or if they desire to prepare themselves for the professions, they can in any event save a couple of years by this arrangement. This plan in a moderate form has already been in operation in a few of the universities for some time, for there may be finished in six years the regular college course and a professional course, which together required seven years for completion heretofore, thus practically shortening the scholastic period by one year.

It should be emphasized that the considerations urged in favor of curtailing the educational period are strictly practical, perhaps one might say financial, and they take account only of the affairs of the individual and ignore the needs of the society of which he is a member. It is represented that boys do not become self-supporting early enough; but, so far as I have been able to ascertain, no one has shown, or has even thought it necessary to show, that from the standpoint of the community there is a demand for more men in the professions or in business, which could be supplied if young men would only get started earlier. If one may place any faith in popular belief, there is an overcrowded condition in every profession now; law and medicine and teaching and engineering and commerce have all the men, such as they are, that can be employed, so that there is, as a matter of fact, no call for boys to get under way

younger than is the custom at present, so that the ship of state may be kept sailing on.

Those who assert that young men of today dally too long in schools before taking up the burdens of real life are determined in their views, not by any present public need of their services, not by any bad social condition, but simply by their feeling (which we all possess to a greater or less degree) that as soon as a boy comes of age he ought to shift for himself. And the age at which he is assumed to arrive at his majority has been passed down unchanged from remote times. Many of us do not consider that the period of immaturity may be continually lengthening, due alike to transformations in the social organism and to gradual modifications in human nature itself. It has never occurred to some persons that it is exceedingly arbitrary to say on just what day a boy attains that development of mind and body which should fit him to live a perfectly independent life. The neurologists are telling us today that the brain goes on developing until the age of thirty-three at any rate, and it would be more rational from one point of view to make the latter rather than the earlier age the age of majority.

Few seem fully to appreciate a point to which John Fiske called attention some years ago, and which others have exploited at some length since, that the long period of unripeness in the individual of the human species has been one of the primary factors in the advancement of mankind. The chick comes of age very soon after birth. Before the expiration of its fourth or fifth month of terrestrial experience it has achieved the summit of its evolution; it can earn its own living by this time, and look out for itself generally without assistance from its parents. The same is true in principle of the colt and calf and kitten and puppy. But the human child is compelled to mewl in its nurse's arms for many long months; and for many long years he requires the constant care and protection of his elders. As Mr. Russell has said:

> It is written that he is born like the wild ass's colt; but this overstates the fact in his favor, for the wild ass's colt is greatly his superior at birth. And

not only does man thus begin life at the very bottom of the ladder, but he "crawls to maturity" at a slower pace by far than any of the animal species. Long before he reaches manhood most of the brute contemporaries and playmates of his infant years will have had their day and declined into decrepitude or died of old age.

And, again, every student of anthropology knows that the period of immaturity or plasticity has been continually lengthening even in the human species. The individual attains manhood at an earlier age among primitive than among highly developed peoples. An Indian child of ten is better able to care for himself than a white child of that age, who has been reared under the protection and in the seclusion of the schools, and who has thus been spared the necessity of taking his own part in the struggle for existence. Says Chamberlain:

Among the Athka Aleuts the boy is an independent hunter at ten and may marry; the boy of the Bismarck Archipelago, who goes out with his father very early, knows as much as he does by his tenth or twelfth year; in Tahiti the ease with which food can be obtained allows children to become practically free from paternal control, and by their eighth year to set up a sort of group-life by themselves; among the Khevsurs of the Caucasus children early begin to fight, and "by their eighth or tenth year may and do speak their word in public;" and many more examples from all over the world might be cited.

But if one will compare a child of civilization and a child of savagery at fifteen, again at twenty, and still again at thirty, he will appreciate that the relative immaturity, and helplessness perhaps, in the younger years of the child of civilization is essential for his later superiority.

Any community where most of the children are required to provide for themselves at a tender age cannot expect to progress rapidly or to attain a high position in the scale of civilization, for the reason that the new generations are not plastic and educable long enough to adapt themselves to an increasingly complex social environment; they could not assimilate elaborate achievements of their predecessors, even if these were made. If the race of Indians now on the boards could in a day develop a degree of culture equal to our own, but if their young continued to ripen as early as they now do, the accomplishments of

the present age would be largely lost, because their successors would have neither time nor adaptability to master them, and so to conserve and perpetuate them. When the child hastens with too fleet a foot toward maturity, it means that he must adjust himself to some low sphere of thought and conduct. All complex and intricate things in intellect or achievement elaborated in the later stages of development he cannot appropriate.

Children on the streets of our great cities, who are condemned to shift for a livelihood before they have entered their 'teens, reach the dead line betimes, and consequently their growth ceases when those under more favorable circumstances are still pushing forward, and possessing themselves of ever higher and more complex products of civilization. Of course, I am not speaking of the exceptional case of the genius, who usually manifests his superiority very early in life, as Sully, Galton, and others have shown; but even the genius, whether musician, or painter, or poet, or scholar, or scientist, or philosopher, has a prolonged development. He does not get his set until late in his career, and in some cases his plasticity (which means his power of adaptation to new conditions) lasts until the very end.

One who is moving onward constantly in his development does not contract any system of mechanical habits concerned with some form of bread-winning, and this is a necessary condition for continual growth. But the case is quite different with one who has to do all for himself in the fight for life. Just as soon as the mind and body get organized for accomplishing certain definite ends which are required for self-preservation, just then the energies of the whole being tend to expand themselves in the support of these activities, and the acquisition of other and higher modes of action is exceedingly difficult. The individual may become able to do these simple things well enough, but he jeopardizes his chances of ever being able to handle himself in more complicated situations. The street gamin, living in his simple but precarious way, becomes adept in the ways of the street shortly after he emerges from the cradle, but he is apt not to get beyond this point ever. While

his mate in the school keeps forging ahead, this little unfortunate soon comes to a dead stop, because untoward conditions force him to solve the practical problems of existence too early, and he lives out his days in the circle of ideas and feelings and volitions which are appropriate to his more or less primitive environment. If every child born in America during the next quarter of a century should receive such a training as do the street arabs on Clark street, in Chicago, our civilization would revert to the stage of semi-barbarism through which it passed ages ago.

The principle I wish to impress is that the stability and constant advancement of the race require a continual lengthening of the plastic age, so that each new generation may master all that has been accomplished by those who have gone before. We have pushed beyond the Indian in the development of culture because, for one reason, our youth remain in the acquisitive condition for a longer period, and our social regulations happily are such that we gladly protect them in their immaturity. In this way all that comes into the possession of the race at any age is acquired by the age following. And as our people have become more intelligent, as knowledge and skill have accumulated, that is to say, as our race has evolved, the period of plasticity in our youth has been lengthening at a corresponding rate. Just as soon as the extending of this period of acquisition ceases, just then will the development of our people be arrested; the one thing conditions the other. You cannot have a race pushing ahead uninterruptedly, while the new generations assume the functions of maturity as early as the preceding ones.

A study of the evolution of races will show, I think, that those only are leading in the march of civilization which do not require their youths to enter into the bread-and-butter relation with their environments until they have mastered all that has been achieved in the different fields in which they are to labor. This must be the guiding principle in every progressive community—one generation must care for the next until the new one has made itself master of all the intellectual and moral and motor attainments that the older one possesses. Each genera-

tion will make additions on its own account, to the sum of the accomplishments which it inherits, and will care for its successor until it has gained the whole; and so the plan works on and progress is made.

Now, no one will maintain that the sophomore in our colleges, as he exists among us, masters anywhere near all the achievements of the race in any field; and if we go to turning him out into practical life with this equipment, we shall soon get to the end of our rope. Suppose he spends three years more in the study of some profession—law, or medicine, or engineering—will this give him time to reach the summit of human evolution in any direction? Can the physician acquire all that is known about his science, and gain all the skill in applying it to concrete cases that anyone possesses, in five years' application beyond the high school? There ought to be no particular difficulty in finding a true answer to this question. Take the testimony of those whose business it is to supply society with doctors of medicine; what do they say? They declare that, on the whole, young men, even college graduates, do not know enough when they get hold of them, and they cannot keep them under educational influences long enough for them thoroughly to acquire even the fundamental principles of medicine. Every important medical school desires its students to have the equivalent of at least a four-year college course before they knock at its doors for admission. And then, of course, after they get in, since every year sees important developments in the field of medicine, there is demanded a continually lengthening period of probation. The more that becomes known about the human body, and the way to treat it to keep it in health, and to restore it to this condition when it becomes diseased, the longer it will take the individual to acquire this knowledge. And if provision is not made for extending the learning period, it needs no unusual insight to discern the outcome in the long run. A youth who is permitted to discharge the function of physician in any community before he has possessed himself of the knowledge and skill that his predecessors developed strikes the welfare of that community a death-blow; and if this practice should continue, it would be only

a matter of time when by retrogressive movement the stage of civilization represented by the witch-doctor and sorceress would be reached.

If it should be said, as it is being said in some quarters now, that a boy will by his own effort keep moving onward after he separates himself from all educational agencies, it may be answered that both theory and practice disprove the proposition, as it applies to the majority of persons at any rate. Of course, physicians, like the members of many other professions, appreciate the necessity of keeping up with the times, and so they have their organizations for mutual helpfulness through discussion and stimulation; but yet everyone knows old doctors who are tampering with the human body today, who are administering drugs according to the custom of a century ago, and they are supremely ignorant of all that modern science has accomplished; and, what is worse, they are hostile to all the new-fangled ways. It is this state of affairs which led Holmes to say: "I firmly believe that if the whole *materia medica* could be sunk to the bottom of the sea, it would be all the better for mankind, and all the worse for the fishes." Shakespeare, too, advised man to "throw physic to the dogs" and have none of it. The more or less general suspicion of the ordinary doctor, as able to heal disease, is indicated in a line from one of the old poets:

> See one physician like a tiller plies,
> The patient lingers, and by inches dies;
> But two physicians, like a pair of oars,
> Waft him more swiftly to the Stygian shores.

One not infrequently comes across a doctor who seems to be little more than a modern version of the wizard or conjurer. It is impossible for men of this stamp to continually readjust themselves to changing views and practices incident to progress, and so they ridicule the whole thing. When one gets a bread-and-butter relation to a situation, he quickly settles into the method of reacting upon it with which he begins, and which brings him a measure of success, and then he goes on doing the same thing over and over again. This is what makes it so imperative that he should not take the crucial step until he can summon for his

guidance all the help, all the light, all the wisdom, that can be obtained from any source. There is no other way by which we may conserve what has already been accomplished, and which will enable us to keep on subjugating, so to speak, ever larger domains of our environments, moral, intellectual, and physical.

Doubtless much can be accomplished in the direction of economy in our educational methods by cutting out work which is of relatively little value. To require of one who aspires to the practice of medicine long years of study of a dead language, for instance, is of doubtful expediency, to say the least. The problem of the comparative worth of the various branches of instruction is far from being satisfactorily solved yet, but still it seems highly probable that there are in our curricula today subjects that, while of considerable account in themselves for certain people, are nevertheless not worth the time and energy which are spent upon them by the great body of students. But even if all such comparatively worthless stuff should be banished from the schools, there would still remain enough, and more than enough, bearing directly upon the work of the physician, for instance, and which he gets but a taste of now as things go, to occupy him probably for a longer period than he at present gives to his preparation, not to speak of shortening this period. An engineer, in order to understand the modern engine in all its complexity, realizes that he must trace its evolution from its simplest beginnings to its present stage of development; and how much more essential it is that the physician, in order to comprehend this well-nigh infinitely complicated machine, the human body, should trace its evolution throughout ancestral history, seeking to discover how the whole has been elaborated, and what function has been assigned to each part! Is it too much to say that no youth should be allowed to hang out his shingle until he has mastered all that is known regarding the general plan and the details of construction of the human organism, until, as Voltaire urged, "having studied nature from his youth, he knows the properties of the human body, the diseases which assail it, and the remedies which will benefit it"? But there are men practicing among us who

are quite uninformed upon this subject, and who are unable in consequence to understand much that is being revealed by modern research respecting the causation of disease; and, true to the instincts of mankind, they oppose what they cannot comprehend, and so advance is impeded.

Again, it is well known today to students of the matter that the mind exerts a profound influence upon all vital function, and it seems that no one should be permitted to meddle with a man's health until he has been made thoroughly acquainted with whatever is well established regarding the relationships existing between mind and body. One of the old Roman philosophers had some sort of conception of the function of the physician treating the mind as well as the body. "Medicus nihil aliud est quam animi consolatio," he says—"A physician does nothing more than console the mind." Cicero says frequently that when the mind is in a disturbed condition, health cannot exist. But what proportion of the physicians now in service have any exact knowledge, so that they can use it advantageously, of the constitution of the human mind, and how it affects vital processes in its varied states and functionings? If a law could be enacted requiring that every youth before he would be decorated with the badge of physician should, in addition to what is now commonly required of him, first master all that is known respecting the evolution of the human body and the influence of thought and feeling upon vital function, who can estimate to what extent society would be benefited by this one act?

And then the physician must be more than a physician in the strict and narrow sense; he cannot confine himself solely to treating the bodies of men; as a great force in the social organism, he ought to understand how society is constructed, and what conditions are essential for its health and prosperity. And especially ought he to have developed in him strong ethical and social impulses, so that he will give himself graciously and unstintedly to the service of his fellows—a matter which Plato made most prominent in his ideal republic. A highly trained man charged with the conduct of such momentous affairs, but whose motives and incentives are all self-centered, is likely often

to be an enemy of, rather than a friend to, his kind. Still once more, a physician has leisure time that must be spent in some manner, and how shall he dispose of it? In riotous living, as many do, in the saloon and gambling den? Or shall he turn rather to the music hall and the art gallery and the library? This is a very real and vital problem, as it relates to the welfare of society, though I know it is not commonly so regarded; and it is affected by the demand for shortening the period of education. Through music, art, and literature man has sought to express his ideals and make them permanent; and whatever has lived for long ages must have been found valuable. It must have developed a higher, a better, a more social kind of life; in brief, it must have been a means of adjusting men more happily to one another.

And the physician as a servant of society needs to be exposed to the inspiring and elevating influences of all the highest ideals the race has developed. If his interests center around the saloon and the gambling table, he really becomes a barrier to social progress. But anyone who has been brought much in contact with those who are supposed to be masters of the healing art knows that a goodly proportion of them feel more at home in the bar-room than in the library; they love to look upon the flowing bowl rather than upon some great painting. It is this condition of affairs which leads one to declare emphatically that physicians as a body need to get a training somewhere that will give them familiarity with, and strong interests in, the aspirations and ideals of the race as expressed in its literature and art and music.

And what has thus been said in mere outline of the education of the physician applies in principle to the training of every professional man. It is commonly heard in these times that the development of society is impeded because of the army of half-baked lawyers that prey upon it. Conditions were not much better in Shakespeare's time, probably, for he says in *Henry VIII.*: "The first thing we do let's kill all the lawyers." Burton in his *Anatomy of Melancholy* says he thinks lawyers will "plead their

clients' causes hereafter, some of them in hell." It is likely that if there were only one-third as many legal practitioners, but these had studied deeply into the evolution and constitution of human society, and had become acquainted with the principal events, with their causes and effects in the history of the race; and if they had also had developed in them social good-will in the place of selfish greed, society would be far better off than it is among us today. Think of a youth still in the pin-feather stage attempting to adjust the relations of men out of sorts with one another in such a complex social mechanism as our own! He has had but four or five years of study beyond the high school, and in this time he has had to possess himself of the principles and the technique of his trade; not to speak of all else he needs to make him a friend instead of an enemy of society. Is the law such a simple thing that it can be mastered in this brief space? Or is it not essential that one whose function it is to conserve the social organism and cause justice to prevail everywhere should study deeply into the nature and history of society, and the impulses which regulate the human heart?

It seems scarcely necessary to say that every pettifogger is a menace to the community in which he lives; he is a relic of a simple and crude social organization. If all those in our country who interpret and apply the laws should not rise above mere pettifoggers, we should drop back in the scale of civilization many centuries. Of course, society appreciates this in a way, and it has established regulations to protect itself against quackery and pettifoggery. But society is never aggressive in this matter; it does not act until it is evident that action is absolutely imperative. There is never any danger of people moving too rapidly in the direction of increasing the requirements for those who would fill the offices and professions in the community.

Looking at the matter from this point of view, one cannot fail to reach the conclusion that it is most inopportune to urge the shortening of the college course at this point in our evolution, and especially in our own country. Rather, every effort

ought to be made to lengthen and to strengthen it; to increase, instead of diminish, the requirements of the physician and the lawyer and the teacher, and above all the politician and the statesman. The doctrine that all young men ought to feel the harness as soon as they pass the twenty-one-year mark is a relic from primitive times; no one today can have faith in it who studies the altered conditions of society, and the factors which contribute to its stability and continuous development. In the place of talk about curtailing the period of training, we should be hearing more about the duty and opportunity of individuals and commonwealths to contribute to the maintenance of men of talent as long as they will continue in study, in the effort to possess themselves of all the race knows and can do in given fields, and make additions thereto. What a warning it ought to be to us to learn, as we seem to be learning today, that there were ancient civilizations whose culture and arts exceeded our own, but they have perished from the earth altogether for long ages, and the secrets of many of their accomplishments are lost forever! Cut short the time which our youth now spend in study, and instead of leading the way in the onward movement of civilization, we shall inevitably begin to retrace our steps, and we must ultimately swell the ranks of decadent nations.

Happily, though, there is no imminent danger; private citizens and states alike are constantly lending greater aid to young men and women who have the ability and courage to push on and reach the summit of racial achievement, and it is in this great movement that we must place our faith and hope for the future. And we ought to do all in our power to encourage this tendency; we ought to exalt this and not the other thing. Nothing could be more gratifying to a well-wisher of our nation than to see how our great state universities are meeting their responsibilities in this respect. They not only furnish free tuition for all the gifted youths within their respective domains who have an inclination to engage in mental pursuits; but they are, in addition, gradually establishing fellowships whereby "lads o' pairts" are relieved for several years from the neces-

sity of earning their daily bread by practical labor, so that they may keep on pushing upward in the attempt to reach the pinnacle of human achievement. We ought not in this day and age of the world to be complaining about the expense of giving a few choice men a little food and clothing while they are trying to master for their own generation what the generations before have accomplished. Woe be to our civilization the moment it concludes, and acts upon its conclusion, that men are now studying too long, and that they ought to begin earning their living earlier! Our universities get a chance at but an infinitesimal part of humanity anyway—just a handful of persons who, speaking generally, have the power to deal with complex things of an intellectual character. These need to be encouraged to keep on in their course; the natural tendency is to stop, for the road is steep and rocky. We need not fear that too many people will follow the difficult path; the chief source of danger is in the likelihood that too few of them will have strength and courage enough to scale the heights.

Of course, if they should all give their whole time to Hebrew, or Greek, or metaphysics, or philology, they would soon be a drug in the market; and this may account for the situation in Germany. But we need have no fear of such a catastrophe here. Science in all its ramifications, and history in its relation to present problems of government, and medicine and law and commerce and engineering—in brief, everything that concerns the progress of mankind—is too much in fashion in the universities of our country to admit of the development of a class of learned paupers. It is true, without doubt, that a man may become possessed of vast learning and not employ it for the good of his kind; but, taking the thing as a whole, the educated man in all times and places has served the community that begot him. If his service in the sum has not been as great as it should be, and if in individual cases nothing at all has been given, the defect must be due to the method of the teacher, who has either taught useless stuff, or who, while filling the heads of his students, has forgotten their hearts. He has left the springs of conduct untouched; he has not fired them

with the thoughts and aspirations of the race which are embodied in its literature and institutions and art. But this defect suggests the need of more, not less, education; it requires for correction a longer, rather than a shorter, period of training; it makes it imperative to add to the college course instead of subtracting from it.

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MOOT POINTS IN SOCIOLOGY.

I. THE SCOPE AND TASK OF SOCIOLOGY.

So THE subject-matter of sociology is the social aggregate! But what is meant by the social aggregate? Where does it begin, where end? Is it humanity, the race, the nation, the community, the class, or the voluntary association? "Study the social organism," they bid us, but nowhere do we perceive a social body complete in itself, with head and members, periphery and viscera. We see extending everywhere a web of human beings, woven now close, now loose; binding men together sometimes with many threads, sometimes with few; uniting them at times directly, oftener indirectly, through other men, or through centers of attachment such as common interests, ideals, or institutions. Where in this continuous tissue shall we find a social cadaver to dissect?

In another quarter it is held that sociology is concerned only with the action of human groups on one another—social phenomena—and the influence of the group on its individual members—psycho-social phenomena. According to Gumplowicz and Bauer, not social wholes, but the hundred interlacing groups into which men combine, are the proper subject of study. This, no doubt, is an enticing conception, for it excuses us from showing how groups form and how a group-type or a group-will arises out of the play of mind on mind. It is not clear, however, that the sociologist may ignore the genesis of the group any more than the biologist may ignore the genesis of the organism. Then, too, quite aside from the group, there are man-to-man relations, which are well worth studying. How the social mystery begins to clear when we have made out such typical relations as those between model and imitator, apostle and disciple, leader and follower, or between two dissentients, two consentients, two competitors, or two persons with common interests! Yet such a couple is not a group any more than a

binary star is a solar system, or a molecule of two atoms a body.

Most helpful is Simmel's notion that the true matter of sociology is not the groups themselves, but the *modes* or *forms* of association into groups. In bodies the most diverse—a church or a guild, a trust or an art league—may be found identical modes of union. Despite their infinite variety of purpose, the groupings of men reduce to a few principles of association. Among such "forms" are equality, superiority and subordination, division of labor, imitation and opposition, secrecy, and hierarchy. To work out the various relations in which associates may stand to one another, and to discover what happens to groups in consequence of the more or less of each relation, is the task of the sociologist.

Nevertheless, I prefer to consider this attractive area, not the domain of sociology, but only one of its provinces, viz., that of *social morphology*. The partialness of a conception which focuses our gaze on the human interactions themselves is well brought out by comparing it with another conception which rivets attention on the results or products of these interactions. For Dr. Ward the subject-matter of sociology consists in *human achievement*. How do languages, sciences, and arts come into being? How does the coral reef of civilization rise? This is certainly one of the most fascinating and practical of studies, but, as Dr. Ward distinctly states, it does not cover all the ground. I should place his superb book, as (say) Vol. III, in a complete treatise on sociology. For how can you draw a firm line between those modes of human interaction which yield a permanent product, and those which leave behind them no lasting result? Mobs and panics, public opinion and social suggestion, are certainly worthy of study, albeit they contribute nothing to the sum of human achievement.

A widening circle of thinkers make sociology equivalent to *the science of association*. They would have it deal with the conditions, motives, modes, phases, and products of association, whether animal or human. Here is, indeed, a virgin field to till, and to it we all gladly retire when our neighbors stigmatize us

as poachers and claim-jumpers. But who contents himself with this territory? Professor Giddings so conceives sociology, yet he tells us a few pages farther on that it is concerned with "the constant elements in history." All sociologists are keen in their ambition to find out the springs of human progress, to lay bare the prime causes of social transformations, to trace the influence of environment on the character of population, and to correlate the various phenomena of social life. Yet none of these properly belong among the problems of association.

Social psychology, social morphology, social mechanics—all of them are, it seems to me, but convenient segments of a science, the subject-matter of which is *social phenomena*. I say "phenomena" in preference even to "activities," because it embraces beliefs and feelings as well as actions.

"But," it will be urged, "what phenomena *are* social? People yawn, sleep, mope, plan. Is this sort of thing *social* just because they are neighbors? The solitary ape behaves in the same way." This query cannot be better answered than in the words of Tarde: "What a man does without having learned from the example of another person, walking, crying, eating, mating, is purely vital; while walking with a certain step, singing a song, preferring at table one's national dishes and partaking of them in a well-bred way, courting a woman after the manner of the time, are social."

If the social is not the vital, neither is it the individual psychic. So we might add as supplement to Tarde: "When one fears the dark, delights in color, craves a mate, or draws an inference from his own observations, that is merely *psychic*. But when one dreads heresy, delights in 'good form,' craves the feminine type of his time, or embraces the dogmas of his people, that is *social*."

But we cannot go with Tarde when he says: "The social is the imitated." Psychologists recognize that one idea calls up another in virtue of contrast as well as in virtue of resemblance. Likewise a person's behavior may be determined in way of opposition as well as in way of imitation. "Contrary" children are controlled by telling them just the opposite of what you wish

them to do. Likewise non-conformists in going out of their way to flout conventions pay involuntary homage to the influence of society. Foemen, competitors, and disputants so determine one another that it is impossible to gauge them without invoking the external factor. "Social," then, are all phenomena which we cannot explain without bringing in the action of man on man.

If at first blush this calls for a "science of things human," let us remember that sociology is not bound to attend to phenomena that do not manifest themselves on a considerable scale. The individual case—David and Jonathan, Lear and his daughters—challenges only the artist. Let a case recur often enough to present a type of personal relations, let many lives receive the same standard or ideal from without, and there is room for the generalizer.

Practically one would not go far wrong in saying that *sociology deals with the development, maintenance, and disappearance of social planes, classes, and groups, and of the structures, institutions, and cultures they produce.* By *planes* I mean particular uniformities in belief and practice created by association. *Classes* are uniformities in character or mind which arise in consequence of social life. A more protracted play of the socializing forces creates *groups*, which are classes, the members of which, having become conscious of one another, draw together and so generate a group-will which reacts upon the individual wills.

In the rag-carpet times of our grandmothers each housewife got her warp from the store, but provided the woof from her own rag-bag. Now the woof of each human being's life is supplied by that which is individual to him; his heredity, temperament, situation, history. But the warp is supplied from without, sometimes from a very slender stock, allowing little range of selection. Whence and how commonplace people get the knowledge, convictions, tastes, and standards that constitute the warp of their lives is explained by *social psychology*—and although some regard it as the top story of psychology, I prefer to make it the lower story of sociology.

The running of boundary lines acceptable to the biologist and

the psychologist is not the worst of our task. There remains the harder problem of coming to terms with the special social sciences, such as economics, jurisprudence, and politics.

Sociology, as I have described it, does not meekly sidle in among the established sciences dealing with the various aspects of social life. It does not content itself with clearing and tilling some neglected tract. It has, indeed, reclaimed certain stretches of wilderness and made them its own. With this modest rôle, however, it is not satisfied. It aspires to nothing less than the suzerainty of the special social sciences. It expects them to surrender their autonomy and become dependencies, nay even provinces, of sociology. The claim is bold, and we may be sure the workers in long-cultivated fields will resist such pretensions, unless there are the best of reasons for founding a single comprehensive science of social phenomena.

Such a reason is certainly not furnished by "the unity of the social aggregate." As we have seen, there is no well-defined social aggregate. The nation is the nearest to it, but the actual distinctness and oneness of the nation is a historical incident due to past wars. Every step in the peaceful assimilation of peoples brings us nearer the time when the globe will be enmeshed in an unending plexus of interpenetrating free associations, no one of which will arrogate to itself the title of "society."

Nor is a good reason furnished by that constant reciprocal action between *socii* which is expressed in the "social organism" concept. As division of labor, exchange, and competition, these interactions have long formed part of the stock in trade of economics. As communication, they are the staple of linguistics. As party activity and civic co-operation, they have been set forth by the science of politics. Wherefore, then, a new science to teach that "no man liveth unto himself"?

Some would justify a unitary treatment of society by making one species of social phenomena the cause of all the rest. However varied the aspects of social life, if there is but one causal center, one fountain head of change, there can be but one science. To Loria's eye all the non-economic factors running through the

social system — such as law, politics, and morality — derive from underlying economic conditions. The desire for wealth is the sole architect of ethical standards, legal norms, and the constitution of the state. As Loria takes the economic régime, so Vico and Fustel de Coulanges and Mr. Kidd take religion, Condorcet, Buckle, and Du Bois Reymond take science, as the *primum mobile* of the social world. All this, however, reads into human events a unity and simplicity that is not really there. There is more than one desire operating in society. The endeavor to reduce all kinds of social facts to a single cause is vain.

An adequate ground for creating an inclusive science lies in none of the foregoing considerations. Let us, then, attack the problem from another side. Let us consider under what conditions the established social sciences might vindicate the sacredness of their ancient boundaries and successfully withstand any scheme of merger into a more general science.

Suppose that the desires that constitute the springs of human action and the causes of social phenomena resolved into certain basic cravings, each distinct from the others in its object, and each stimulating men to a particular mode of activity in order to satisfy it. Suppose, furthermore, these specific desires never crossed or modified one another and were intractable to the unifying control of any world-view or ideal of life. Suppose, finally, that each craving, or set of cravings, operating on a large scale, generated in society certain appropriate dogmas, creeds, activities, and institutions, which remained separate from and unmixed with the collective manifestations of other cravings. Religious phenomena would then be unalloyed by ethical or political considerations. The forms of the family would be unaffected by industrial changes. The fine arts would run their course heedless of revolutions in the sphere of ideas.

Under these conditions there might exist for each set of cravings at work in social life an independent body of knowledge. The craving for wealth would mark out a sphere for economics. The sex and parental cravings would do the same for genetics or the science of the family. The lust for power would define politics. The sentiment of the wronged would fix the scope of juris-

prudence. The craving for communion with the Unseen would bound the field of the science of religion. The attraction of like for like would make possible the science of association. There would be as many social sciences as there were facets to human nature, and if any bond drew them together into a larger synthesis, it would be supplied by psychology and not by a general sociology.

The mere statement of the requirements to be fulfilled in order to assure the sovereignty and equality of the special social sciences is a sufficient answer to such claims. Each is not the exclusive field of action of certain impulses. So far as specific cravings exist, they react upon and modify one another, they lie under the empery of the accepted world-view or ideal of life, they are trimmed and adjusted to fit into a plan of life. Moreover, turning from the sphere of mind to that of society, we do not find one species of activities or institutions answering to the religious man, another to the political man, a third to the ethical man, or a fourth to the sociable man. The method of abstracting from human nature all its propensities save one in order to get that one propensity operating, as it were, *in vacuo* received its quietus when economists gave up speculating about "the economic man."

Although there are several facets to human nature, although each aspect of social life has in some sort a psychological basis of its own, still, the deeper we penetrate into the causes of human affairs, the more impressed are we with the cross-relations between social phenomena of different orders, and the more evident is the consensus that unites facts the most diverse in character. "Every culture form," says Grosse, "is, as it were, an organism, in which all parts and functions stand in the closest interdependence." Much of our progress in the knowledge of society consists in establishing correlations, tracing subterranean actions and reactions between remote institutions. Reputations have been made by exposing the hidden link that unites slavery with cotton culture, caste with conquest, manhood suffrage with free land, the patriarchal family with pastoralism, the multiplication of wants with the rise of a leisure class.

In early philosophy each feature of social life is referred directly to human nature. The idea of auxiliary phenomenon or by-product is wanting. War is ascribed to the bad passions of men, and not to the pressure of population. Theological beliefs flow from religious intuitions. Worship arises from universal instincts. The ethical code is a deliverance of individual consciences. The actual form of the family is derived from the "natures" of men and women and children. The law objectifies the moral consciousness of mankind. In this vein Aristotle traces slavery to the natures of the born inferior and the born superior. Montesquieu makes despotism rest on fear, monarchy on honor, and a republic on virtue. Adam Smith traces the division of labor to a propensity "to truck, barter, or exchange one thing for another." Carlyle sees in dignities of rank a product of the hero-worship in human nature.

On the other hand, the more we delve beneath the surface, the more we discover sympathetic connections between things. The fuller our knowledge, the more impressed we are with the relativity of each class of social phenomena to other classes. Society no longer falls apart into neat segments like a peeled orange. State, law, religion, art, morals, industry, instead of presenting so many parallel streams of development, are studied rather as different aspects of *one social evolution.*

We see that standards of conduct are in intimate relation with beliefs, that laws are correlated with moral standards, that both reflect economic necessities, and that these, in turn, depend on the forwardness of the arts or on the relation of population to land. The state is explained, not out of human nature, but in connection with ethnic heterogeneity, militant activities, or economic inequalities. The development of religion is shown to follow step by step the development of relations within the social group. Thus a disturbance in one department of social life awakens echoes and reverberations clear around the circle. It is a perception of this truth which leads Ingram, the historian of political economy, to declare: "No rational theory of the economic organs and functions of society can be constructed if they are considered as isolated from the rest." "A separate

economic science" he deems "an impossibility as representing only one portion of a complex organism all whose parts and their actions are a constant relation of correspondence and reciprocal modification."

The antiquated systems, reasoning from metaphysical assumptions or from supposed properties of human nature, are sterile. The disciples of the abstract political economy, the unhistorical jurisprudence, the *a priori* ethics, and the speculative politics make no headway because they shut their eyes to the interdependence of dissimilar facts. In each field of social inquiry the laurels are going to those investigators who look over into other fields, who correlate the form of government with humble geographical, military, or industrial facts, religious progress with family or tribal development, moral crises with changes in consumption or in the constitution of classes.

The certainty that profounder research will reveal still closer relations of this sort is the ground of our faith in the future of sociology. We know we can afford to bide our time. We do not expect to win by preaching. In the long run the nature of things will prevail. Vested interests in learning will yield to the logic of facts. So far as social life is one, there will be one master science of social life. If not today, then tomorrow, if not by this generation, then by the next, the necessity for sociology will be fully recognized. There is a vacant chair among the great sciences, and sooner or later that chair will be filled.

Assuming the vassal and dependent character of the social sciences has been made clear beyond the shadow of a doubt, we next take up the question: "Are these sciences to become mere branches of sociology, or will they retain a measure of their old distinctness and individuality?"

It may be they will stand to sociology as the special to the general. This is how the theory of agriculture, transportation, or commerce stands to economics. Administration and comparative legislation are special in respect to political science, just as histology and embryology are special with reference to biology. Now a social science will be merely special sociology

in two cases: (1) if the phenomena it treats of flow from the same desires that cause other kinds of social phenomena, or (2) if they are produced by individual desires, special in character, but so socialized and fused that they amount to a social need and the satisfying of them amounts to the discharge of a social function. Apply now these tests to the principal social sciences.

Take the *science of religion.* Will it shrink to a mere chapter in sociology? By no means. It might if faith were nothing but an incident of speculative thought or of social discipline. If pious beliefs were an outgrowth of collective thought and never of personal experience, if in worship men sought benefits rather than obeyed impulses, we might treat religious phenomena as a mere division of social phenomena. But religion has a private as well as a public aspect. It is not all a matter of social psychology; still less is it a matter of social institution. Nor is it a side issue to something larger, a by-product of sex-feeling or conscience or economic calculation. It has a tap-root, and this tap-root is that strange invasion from the sub-conscious self which is variously known as ecstasy, rhapsody, divine afflatus, or *gnosis.* Experience of this kind generates religious convictions. The yearning to taste or renew this "communion" leads men to pious exercises. Let these individual phenomena occur on a large scale and you have cults, creeds, and churches standing out in bold relief on the face of society. The actual sweep of a religion is, of course, due in large measure to self-seeking, propitiatory motives, and to its maintenance as a prop of social order. Thereby it falls under the surveillance of the group-interest and comes to sympathize with the changes in other departments of social life. Religion is, in fact, a growth springing from the soil of human nature, but taking its shape and hue from a social medium. The science of religion is for this reason under a dual dependence, owing allegiance to psychology no less than to sociology. It is this situation Mill has in mind when he says: "The different kinds of social facts are in the main dependent, immediately and in the first resort, upon different kinds of causes, and therefore not only may with advantage, but must be, studied apart."

The relation of *ethics* to sociology bristles with difficulties. In the first place, ethics aspires not only to explain phenomena, but to appraise them. It differentiates ends. It values actions. It assumes the rôle of a normative science, whereas sociology does not venture beyond the causes and laws of the phenomena it considers. But there is an ethics that aims to understand, not to appraise, and it is this ethics alone which is on a footing with sociology.

Again, ethics may undertake to explain *actions*, or it may limit itself to those actions which affect other persons, *i.e.*, *conduct*. Usually it has ignored what are termed "indifferent actions" and addressed itself to classifying and explaining the feelings, choices, and judgments of men in respect to modes of conduct. It is, of course, only in this sense that ethics can be accounted a social science.

Now, is this "science of conduct" a semi-sovereign member of a federal empire or only a province in a unitary state? The answer depends upon the relative importance in ethical phenomena of special and general factors.

As regards *choices*, men are brought to take a socially safe line of conduct by all manner of sanctions, suggestions, standards, ideals, and valuations imposed from without. With all this social control there co-operate, however, two specific impulses—sympathy and the sense of justice. These are other-regarding, it is true, but they do not seem to have their origin in the influence of man on man. The one has its roots in instinct, the other is an off-shoot from early mental growth.

Still more marked is the private factor in the *judgments* that men in their capacity of disinterested spectators pass upon the conduct of other men. If these judgments were always grounded on social utility, if they invariably encouraged safe actions, and discouraged unsafe actions, they would amount to a self-preserving instinct in society. They would be *functional*, just as courts and reform schools are functional. Collective judgments as to good and bad would be, in effect, *institutions*—strong, upright pillars of society.

But, in point of fact, people do not praise or blame altogether

as *socii*. The moral judgments, imperatives, and ideals they emit, although in the main telic, do betray considerable admixture of crude sentiment. The general reprobation of vice, idleness, waste, sacrilege, or impiety does not voice concern for the corporate welfare. It merely voices common, private sentiments. Of some of our judgments—abhorrence of the unnatural, for instance—the roots run far down into our ancient, pre-social instincts.

At a moment when ethicians, weary of juggling conscience, innate ideas of right and wrong, the Ten Commandments, and what-not out of the individual mind, are coming to perceive the social bases of morality, one would not lay a straw in their way. Yet it is well to recognize that, after all is said, ethics is more than a mere wing of sociology. Some of the piers that support it rest in biology, some in individual psychology, some in social psychology, and some in social morphology.

Politics, like ethics, has the double task of explaining what *is* and determining what *ought to be*. In so far as it aims to arrive at principles for the guidance of political action, it is more like an *art* than a *science*, but it may be termed a normative science. Still, it is possible to regard matters of government as phenomena, and to study them with a view to ascertaining the causes and laws of their occurrence. Political science of this ætiological sort will stand in some close relation to sociology. Whether it will stand to it as part to whole or as special to general, depends, as in the preceding cases, on the specificity of the forces and facts it deals with.

Now, government is not the sphere of operation of characteristic forces, but the meeting-place of nearly all the kinds of forces present in social life. "The functions of the state," it has well been remarked, "are coextensive with human interests." This is true only because the more important human desires—greed, vanity, sympathy with the weak, love of truth, passion for homogeneity, craving for justice—make themselves felt in moulding the policy of government. One motive leads to public relief of the poor, another motive inspires state endowment of research, a third impels to the artificial assimilation of the foreign ele-

ments in the population, a fourth dictates the seizure of markets. In fact, almost every species of interest sooner or later records itself in government.

There are, to be sure, two special traits of human nature which come to light in government. The one is *the lust of dominating;* the other, its counterpart, is *the impatience of restraint.* In other words, power is sought for its own sake, and liberty is prized for its own sake. Were these two forces alone implicated in government, political science would have a basis apart from sociology. But who will seriously contend that the "will to power" is now the chief motive tending to enlarge the authority of the state, or that hatred of restraint is the chief counteracting force? In the early stages of social development a state is often the creation of a single energetic will. Says Mr. Bryce of the East: "A military adventurer or the chief of a petty tribe suddenly rises to greatness, becomes the head of an army which attacks all its neighbors, and pursues a career of unbroken conquest till he has founded a mighty empire." With greater social advance, however, there is sure to arise a compact fabric of government and law, which offers successful resistance to the vaulting ambition of the individual. As regards the antagonistic force, Mr. Bryce observes: "The abstract love of liberty has been a comparatively feeble passion." "Rebellions and revolutions are primarily made, not for the sake of freedom, but in order to get rid of some evil which touches men on a more tender place than their pride."

In fact, the political is simply imbedded in the social. Political grouping is not distinct from, but tends to be a resultant of, the linguistic, cultural, religious, and economic groupings of population. Political organization is only a part of social organization. The substance of the state is prestige, time-hallowed relations, habits of co-operation and obedience. The sphere of government becomes an expression of collective need. The will that sets in motion the public organs is not the mere sum of individual wills, but the highly elaborated will of sections, classes, or the nation itself. Government is becoming functional to society, and if political science remains distinct, it will be

because the breadth of the field calls for the specialist, and not because there are natural boundaries marking it off from sociology.

Comparative jurisprudence deals with phenomena which exhibit the working of two special principles of human nature—*the thirst for vengeance* that torments the sufferer of a wrong, and *the desire for fair play* that moves the beholders of a wrong. These formidable impulses were early led into the safe channels of legal redress, in order that society might be spared the evils of feud and retaliatory violence. In time, however, the law-originating impulses became socialized and rationalized. In-wrought with other motives, they come to express the will of the Social Personality. The just settlement of disputes, from a private need, becomes a public function. When we consider the transformation of law by jurisconsults and judges, the enlargement of it by the action of the legislator, and the renovation of it in the name of the principle of social utility, it is plain that jurisprudence cannot hope to be more than a feudatory state in the realm of sociology.

There is no reason why what is known as "the sociology of the family" together with the "population" section of political economy should not have been set apart as *genetics*. The family is certainly distinguished from other social structures by owing its existence to the highly special instincts of *sex-attraction* and *philoprogenitiveness*. These instincts, moreover, being gratified individually, do not call into being joint activities or distinct professions such as we find in the religious or economic spheres. An institution it may be, but the family is not, properly speaking, a social organ.

It is unlikely, however, that we shall see split off a science treating of the social phenomena that center in the reproductive function. One reason is that the sex and family relations, since they are always standardized in law and morals, are, at every moment, in the most intimate sympathy with the reigning culture. Furthermore, all our researches go to magnify the importance of the non-instinctive factors in fixing the duration, size, and internal structure of the family. Not long ago Maine

and Hearn and Fustel de Coulanges brought to light the religious factor. Now it is the economic factor that is exalted. As motive to marriage the attraction of the sexes is reinforced, it appears, by man's desire for a servant and woman's desire for a protector. Children are reared, not from parental love alone, but also because a daughter can be sold for cash, while the son can be kept as a helper, a protector, and an avenger. Grosse therefore hits the bull's eye when he says: "If we wish to grasp a particular social structure—say a form of family organization—in its essence and significance, we must study it in its natural connection with the civilization in which it grows, lives, and works."

As regards *noetics*, by which term we would designate the science that deals with the phenomena that arise from efforts to satisfy the craving for truth, and *æsthetics*, or the science that treats of the phenomena that arise in connection with endeavors to satisfy the craving for the beautiful, there is no doubt that, owing to their close and immediate dependence upon the psychology of the individual mind, they will retain a good deal of independence with respect to sociology. We are, in fact, coming to recognize in inventions and discoveries the first causes of many of the great transformations in society. Even in these branches of inquiry, however, new social factors are coming forward. In tracing the evolution of philosophies, sciences, and the fine arts, more causes and influences are being recognized. Attempts to resume the history of intellectual progress without taking due note of changes in the state of society have shown opinions and movements succeeding one another without meaning or logic. Those who would comprehend intellectual or æsthetic advance must consent to take into consideration such factors as the geographical environment, the prevailing occupations, the plane of comfort, town life, the influence of a leisure class, the attitude of the priesthood, the organization of education, the diffusion of learning, and the degree of honor attaching to intellectual and artistic pursuits.

The piers on which rests *eeonomics*, the greatest of the social sciences and (save linguistics) the most independent, are certain

properties of the external world and certain properties of human nature. The latter are *the desire for wealth*, *the aversion to labor*, and *the reluctance to postpone present gratifications*. The first of these calls into being productive energies, the second and third limit this energy, the one in respect to labor, the other in respect to capital. All three co-operating distribute productive energy among places, seasons, occupations, and enterprises in a way that is termed "economic."

It would be a mistake to regard these subjective foundations of economics as simple traits of human nature. The aversion to labor has in it, indeed, an element of organic repugnance to sustained effort. But it also contains a social factor, namely a conventional disesteem of labor derived from the stigma that a leisure class attaches to the functions of the industrial class.

As to the desire for wealth, it is exceedingly complex. It has a three-fold tap-root in *hunger*, or the craving for food, *want*, or the craving for clothing and shelter, and the *love of bodily ease* which expresses itself in a demand for comfort. Its side roots, moreover, connect it with nearly all the specific desires we have considered in the foregoing pages. The passion for sex spurs a suitor to amass the riches that can win him his bride. The lust of power is a demand for the wealth that procures power. The craving for beauty is a demand for costly artistic products. The religious impulse gives off a demand for the material accessories of worship. Even the most spiritual wants demand leisure for their satisfaction, and wealth is a means to leisure. The acquisitive lust is further whetted by the honor that attaches to profuse consumption and conspicuous waste.

Thus sooner or later all the cravings of human nature put in a requisition for wealth, and the confluence of these tributaries with the main stream of desire rolls down a veritable Nile-flood of greed which beslimes, yet stimulates, nearly every profession and function in society. This generic virtue of wealth it is, which makes it stand for desirability in the abstract, and gives rise to the myth that the lust of acquisition is the sole motive of human endeavor, the direct or remote cause of all social phenomena, the single force that holds together the social frame even

as gravitation holds together the solar system. Though without reason, the economic sociologists are not without excuse.

The social economy that is sequel to the universal pursuit of gain is beautifully law-abiding, and presents a well-defined field for the science of economics. But when economics comes to treat of the consumption of wealth, it becomes vague and quickly loses itself in sociology. The reason is very simple. It is after goods have been produced and distributed that the dissimilar interests that united to spur men to acquisitive effort reappear in all their separateness. The desire for wealth splits up into its components. Most wealth-seekers follow a line of action which is termed "economic." But as wealth-consumers they behave differently. One man spends his surplus for sensual gratifications, another uses it to found a family, a third turns it into objects of beauty, a fourth makes it a votive offering, a fifth employs it to win power, a sixth makes it procure him social consideration. Its actual destination depends upon the age, the race, the stage of culture; in a word, upon *the state of society*. Its salient features—social composition, matrimonial customs, class relations, political habits—must all be taken into account in order to understand the consumption of wealth.

The relation of the trunk of a tree to its branches is, I believe, a fit symbol of the relation of Sociology to the special social sciences. But the tree in question is a banyan tree. Each of the great branches from the main trunk throws down shoots which take root and give it independent support in human nature. In the case of a branch like politics these special stems are slight and decaying. In the case of a branch like economics the direct support they yield is more important than the connection with the main trunk. In every case an independent rootage in unsocialized desire is the fact that entitles a branch of social knowledge to be termed a science, and differentiates it from those branches which, having no source of life other than the main trunk, must be termed departments of special sociology.

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[*To be continued.*]

INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY. III.[1]

PART III. GENERAL STRUCTURE OF SOCIETIES.

CHAPTER IV. THE SOCIAL LIMITS.

SECTION V. BIOLOGICAL LIMITS.—*Continued.*

However, protoplasm itself has a structure. There is an organism having the structure of an amœba, without any membrane other than its geometrical limit, and without a nucleus, but it has the essential elements of a nucleus distributed throughout the protoplasm. After the central mass is separated from the periphery with which it is blended, the organism becomes a cell. Every organism is a cell or a combination of cells. The *ensemble* of the forms of the whole organism is then the product or general total of all the aggregated cells. Thus the forms of elementary organisms are: (1) forms without a membrane and without a nucleus; (2) forms with a nucleus and without a membrane; (3) forms with a nucleus and a membrane. With each step in the progress of organization, the equilibration to the environment becomes more perfect; that is to say, the organism maintains itself by adaptations to more numerous and more special conditions. But, as among plants, this structure, differentiated into a nucleus and a membrane, though it suffices for the unfolding of its life, and for resistance, especially in a passive way, to the environment, is not adequate for more complex, precise, and especially active adaptations. This unicellular state forms the basis of the multicellular; that is to say, for an association of simple homogeneous cells. In the multicellular organisms there is a differentiation into an external and an internal layer. In plants this external and protecting layer is the *epidermis*, the inner and assimilating layer being the *parenchyma;* in the animals, the external sensitive and protecting surface is the *ectoderm*, and the interior and assimilating membrane, or *endoderm*, forms the boundary of the digestive cavity, which does

[1] Translated by Eben Mumford.

not exist in plants. In the higher protozoa the pseudopods of the amœba are represented by cilia, and the ectoderm of the lower invertebrates is generally ciliated in order to assist locomotion, as is the endoderm to promote the movement of food toward the digestive cavity. In the course of evolution the cilia of the ectoderm and of the endoderm have disappeared, and have been replaced by muscular movements.

What is it, then, from the point of view of limits, that distinguishes the superior from the inferior forms? The distinction consists in the increasing differentiation of functions and organs in the whole structure. The result is that the motility of animals augments with increasing complexity and co-ordination of structure. The superior animals move more rapidly and in more directions; they do not have absolutely fixed limits; they search for their prey and avoid their enemies. This difference in motor capacity is related to the difference in the development of their digestive, vascular, and respiratory organs, but principally to their contractile structure, that is to say, their muscular system.

From the point of view of general philosophy, every structural differentiation is the morphological aspect of a differentiation in the internal and external movement, which, constituting the life and equilibration of the structures may fall back to the most general laws of mechanics, although biology supposes special phenomena, which, like those of sociology, call for a particular interpretation and philosophy.

The muscular system is the fundamental structure making possible the expansions and contractions of organisms—in a word, the performance of the movements appropriate to the *milieu*. But without the nervous system the muscles themselves would remain passive; the real generator of motility then, is the nervous system; it transmits the excitations from within and from without, and co-ordinates the movements of more and more special adaptations; it maintains the general equilibrium in the midst of a more and more intense instability; it is the regulator *par excellence* of organic structures. It is, then, only in appearance that organic bodies seem indeterminate in their

structures and movements ; the truth is that, as one ascends the hierarchy of organisms, the more considerable variations are limited as much within as without by the more special and energetic agents of equilibration. The organs of life always determine and limit the structure and life.

However, at the basis of all organic life, under the names of contractility, irritability, sensibility, etc., we will always find motion; and so again, from the point of view of general philosophy, life can be expressed in terms of motion and in the laws of mechanics, themselves capable of being expressed mathematically.

It is only in appearance that the inferior social aggregates seem to have more fixed limits. In reality their movements are few and simple; they are determined strictly by the simple general conditions of their external structure in relation to the most simple and general conditions of the environment, whether they are exclusively physical or both physical and social. A bad harvest, poor fishing, the disappearance of game, sometimes involve migrations, but more often still a partial or even total extinction of the horde, unless the aggregate is capable of undergoing the variations necessary to adapt itself to the new conditions or to modify them. In the latter case there will be formed a favorable variation in structure—an increase of activity or an extension of the agricultural, hunting, or fishing territory; or, indeed, certain classes of individuals will devote themselves to a new kind of work, while the others will continue to drag along in the old occupations. Often the increase will be, as in inorganic matter, by external growth, by addition; ordinarily, however, there will be an incorporation, an assimilation giving place to an elaboration and to an internal development.

It is equally necessary to note that at the origin the external membrane is not very distinct from the *milieu;* it has not become strong as in the more developed stages. But that which characterizes the superior animals is that the internal organization gets the upper hand, where, for example, the shell, as in the carapace of the fish *ganoideus* (sturgeon), gives place to an internal structure, frame, vertebral column, and organs. It is in the

interior of the body that the conditions of stability are formed. Each organ becomes more and more special; each one is limited by its neighbors, and all by the whole structure. The covering ceases to be a defensive barrier or an offensive weapon; it finally becomes one of the most delicate organs of sensibility and of relationship; it accommodates itself everywhere to movements and impressions.

An analogous development may be seen taking place in social structures. That which was a barrier is transformed into means of communication, such as rivers, seas, and oceans. The boundaries, at first apparently little fixed, but in reality very rigid; especially in a general way, become more and more elastic; openings are made; better communications are set up; a general level is established like that between communicating vessels; new relations increase; societies of societies are formed with a new internal structure in relation to a new environment, until in a future of which it is possible to catch a glimpse there may be formed one vast society including all the various particular societies in one supreme internal co-ordination—the largest structure and the most complex equilibration which it is possible for the imagination to conceive. Then the social world may find its equilibration and limits; not only in its internal organization, but also in the limits themselves of the earth and its environment.

This progress takes place in proportion to the development and the differentiation of social functions and of their progressive co-ordination in more developed regulating centers. The problem of boundaries and limits is, then, connected with the development, the differentiation, co-ordination, of economic, genetic, artistic, scientific, moral, and juridic institutions; the political structure, by which the collective will of society is directed through a more or less methodical organization, is the crowning of all the others. When the fundamental institutions are narrow, simple, and authoritative, the boundaries between societies are high, general, and inflexible. So religions are more exclusive than metaphysics, the latter than science and positive morality. Societies protect themselves by offensive and defensive

arms, by natural and artificial barriers, by protection and by free competition, having to protect themselves by the excellence of their external and international organization.

Before studying the philosophy of the social boundaries of the future, and even that of the limitations of modern states, which are very complex structures, it is necessary to take up the philosophy of the natural limitation and equilibration of things and organisms in general; then those of primitive societies, peaceful and warlike. Finally it is necessary to investigate this same constant limitation in the economic field and in all the social functions and organs, including the juridical and political. Here again, as in my former observations, we shall see more and more the social contractual forms, including equally the political contractual forms, separating themselves from the more ancient and crude forms, and limiting the reciprocal relations of the social units and aggregates as well as the societies between them, from the most simple industrial association up to that large universal society of which the relations, intertwined more and more among the various parts, formerly separated by insuperable boundaries, prepare the way for a natural formation.

This constant equilibration which results between the internal structure in relation to the environment seems, in a way, most admirable in the statics of the organisms most developed of all, that is, those constituting the human species, and especially in the psychical organization of the latter. The limits of organic variations become more extended there, all remaining in close dependence upon the whole structure. After this, there will remain for us to observe how masses, both inorganic and organic, are distributed naturally in or on the earth, as masses, in order to be prepared to enter, in a methodical way, upon the study of sociological limits and boundaries which form a special and more complex case of those already given.

SECTION VI. ANTHROPOLOGICAL LIMITS.

The human species belongs to the class of superior vertebrates. The skeleton determines the general form of our bodies. It serves as a point of attachment for the muscles and determines the visceral cavities. We have explained how the struc-

ture of the *ensemble* of organic bodies, including the human body, depends first of all upon their internal constitution and organization. The latter, from the point of view of accommodation to the environment, acquires an increasing importance. But whatever may be the stage of perfection of the internal organization and activity, the structure and function of the human species present constant and necessary relations of equilibration existing between the external and internal environment. Let us see how this equilibrium of movement is produced. When the muscles are contracted they move the bones to which they are attached. The muscles represent the organs of movement—the motor forces. The bones serve as levers. The point of support is furnished by the articulation. The resistance is the bone itself. The working of the bones in the *ensemble* of our structure serves to maintain the equilibrium, to overcome the great resistances, or to impart more or less extended movements, as, for example, the equilibrium given the head by the atlanto-occipitalis articulation. There is a center of gravity of the head. The weight of the latter acts in the sense of a vertical line drawn from the center of gravity. It is the resistance. The point of support is the articulation. The muscles of the neck represent the power. When there is action in order to overcome resistances, the resistance is between the power and the point of support; for example, when one places the total weight of the body on the tiptoes. When one executes movements more or less extended, the power is found between the point of support and the resistance. In all these cases there is no movement executed without a corresponding equilibrium. Photography, at least instantaneous, provides an excellent process for noting the different modes of locomotion, as walking, running, jumping, and flying. In all these movements there is always an equilibrium of the internal structure, that is to say, of all parts of the organism among themselves, and besides an equilibrium of the *ensemble* with the environment. The latter ought never to be lost from view. It is an essential element of the modifications of every equilibrium and its support. When one makes a false movement, the failure is accompanied at the

same time by a new internal equilibration and an application of the laws of general equilibrium as over against the environment. In fact, we maintain an upright position on the earth as a result of an equilibration with the atmospheric environment and the laws of gravity. The human species can be considered as unique because of common anatomical and psychical characters which exist among its numerous varieties, and because of fertile crossings between the most extreme races, and, as distinct from other organic beings, by special characters which differentiate it in a considerable manner. All the variations of structure of the human species are, in reality, narrowly limited. They are themselves the result of internal and external equilibrations, that is to say, of special adaptations of which certain ones are of social origin.

1. *The weight of the human body.*— The variations of the weight of the body are determined by four special conditions: the physical environment, race, temperament, and food. Obesity is everywhere exceptional. In all races and in all environments it depends chiefly upon the hygienic conditions, upon inactivity, and upon excessive or gross and insufficient food. The yellow, white, and black races do not deviate from the average of the human species, except under particular influences. The Arab, gaunt in the desert, becomes corpulent in cities, especially among the idle and parasitic classes. The average weight of the human adult body seems to vary from sixty-six to forty-two kilograms, depending upon the populations.

TABLE OF VARIATIONS IN THE WEIGHT OF THE HUMAN BODY.

300	Belgians (Quetelet)	66.2 kg.
12,740	Bavarians (Bernstein)	65.5
400	French, light infantry (Bernard)	64.9
617	English (A. L. Thompson)	64.8
150	New Zealanders	63.9
34	Nicobarese (Novarra)	62.8
278	Magyars (Bernstein)	60.7
24	Slavs	59.2
356	Roumanians	58.4
50	Hindoos, superior caste (Shortt)	53.2
60	natives of Caucasus	50.0
5	Hindoos, inferior caste	48.7
50	Nilghars, inferior tribes	44.6
39	individuals, inferior tribes of Coromandel	42.7

Quetelet has studied the weight of the human body at different ages from the point of view of his theory of averages. At the same age the male is heavier than the female, except about the age of twelve, when the weight is the same. Woman reaches the maximum of her weight later than man. The weight is greater among boys and girls who do not work in factories. Quetelet takes the average man as the type of both stature and weight. These results hold only in determined aggregates, or between analogous aggregates.

2. *The human stature.*—The human stature is limited in its variations by the environment and by hereditary influence. Heredity tends to maintain its forms or characters, if the conditions of the physical or social environment are not modified. Among the causes of variation, one may note residence in the town or the country, professions, food, climate, sickness. Galton has observed the stature and weight of children attending the public schools in England. Fifty were reared in London, 296 in the country. The stature of the latter exceeded that of the former by 3 centimeters, and the weight of the country children exceeded that of the city children by 3 kilograms.[1]

If weight and size in comparative anatomy have only a secondary value, if the largest animals approach the smallest in adjacent species, it is not entirely true from the point of view of the sociological characters of the human species. The weight and stature of man have the effect of indexes in the social realm. Man approaches the anthropoids in this respect. The chimpanzee is about 1.30 meter; the orangs, depending upon the species, range from 1 to 1.60m.; the gorilla, from 1.40 to 1.75m. The human adult stature varies from 1 to 2 m. In France, the average adult stature is 1.65m. From the table given by Topinard,[2] it is shown that the highest averages belong to the Tchuel-

[1] Concerning the influence of food, DARWIN (*The Descent of Man*, p. 31) says: "When we compare the differences in stature between the Polynesian chiefs and the lower orders within the same islands, or between the inhabitants of the fertile volcanic and low barren coral islands of the same ocean, or again between the Fuegians on the eastern and western shores of their country, where the means of subsistence are very different, it is scarcely possible to avoid the conclusion that better food and greater comfort do influence stature."

[2] *Anthropology*, pp. 253 ff.

ches of Patagonia and to the Polynesians, and the smallest to the Bushmen.

One ought to compare only individuals of the same sex, measuring only those who have reached the age of maturity, a period varying from the age of twenty-three to thirty-three, according to race. In general the most inferior races attain full growth later than the others, and show a smaller difference between the sexes.

300	Belgians,	age	19,	measured	by	Quetelet	1.66 m.
300	"	"	25,	"	"	"	1.67
300	"	"	30,	"	"	"	1.68

The variations of structure in the same group are smaller in proportion as the race is more homogeneous. Here again fusion with civilization reduces the variation. Africa shows the strongest divergence, especially among the Kaffirs and Bushmen.

The statistics on the influence of the environment furnish important information. In Belgium, for the militia and volunteers whose stature was taken for the ages of 19 to 20 in 1888, we have the following tables :

Of 5,426,	854	were from	1.55 m. to 1.60 m.,	or 15.92	per cent.
	1,632	" "	1.60 m. to 1.65 m.,	or 30.08	"
	1,970	" "	1.65 m. to 1.70 m.,	or 36.31	"
	772	" "	1.70 m. to 1.75 m.,	or 14.23	"
	150	" "	1.75 m. to 1.80 m.,	or 2.76	"
	33	" "	1.80 m. to 1.85 m.,	or 0.61	"
	5	" "	1.85 m. to 1.90 m.,	or 0.90	"
				100.00	per cent.

The following are the measurements of 9,067 men of the militia and volunteers over twenty years of age, taken in 1888 :

1,050	were from	1.55 m. to 1.60 m.,	or 12.37	per cent.
2,229	" "	1.60 m. to 1.65 m.,	or 26.25	"
2,625	" "	1.65 m. to 1.70 m.,	or 30.92	"
1,764	" "	1.70 m. to 1.75 m.,	or 20.78	"
644	" "	1.75 m. to 1.80 m.,	or 7.59	"
152	" "	1.80 m. to 1.85 m.,	or 1.79	"
25	" "	1.85 m. to 1.90 m.,	or 0.29	"
1	" "	more than 1.90 m.,	or 0.01	"
			100.00	per cent.

The proportion was:

1890.	1895.	1899.	1900.
12.88	14.91	13.19	13.17
26.03	29.21	27.15	29.52
34.01	32.50	33.85	32.75
20.14	17.76	19.36	18.11
5.91	4.74	5.45	5.43
0.95	0.80	0.90	0.93
0.07	0.08	0.09	0.09
0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00

According to Quetelet[1] the number of the militia coming under this relation of stature in Belgium from 1842 to 1850 was 322,756, the number of whom the stature was taken being 307,462.

51,105 were 1.56 m. and below, or 16.62 per cent.
158,796 " 1.561 m. to 1.669 m. or 51.64 per cent.
94,938 " 1.67 m. to 1.799 m. or 30.88 per cent.
2,619 " 1.80 m. and above, or 0.86 per cent.

The fact that the unit of measure was borrowed in the first place from the stature of man shows in itself that its variations are limited; later the measure was taken from a part of the circumference of the earth.

However, these variations are important; thus, in Belgium the regular militia measuring 1.80 m. and over were in the following proportion:

1842–1850	0.86	per cent.
In 1888	0.70	"
1890	0.92	"
1895	0.96	"
1899	0.99	"
1900	0.90	"

In France, according to Bertillon, there are, from the point of view of stature, two fairly distinct regions separated by a line which extends from Cherbourg to Lake Geneva. To the north of this line the average stature has risen, varying between 1.67 m. and 1.64 m. To the south it is equal to or below the average (1.64 m.). In two provinces of Brittany and in three provinces of the center it falls to 1.62 m. and even 1.61 m. Broca explains

[1] *Anthropométrie*, p. 187.

the difference in stature of these two regions by their ethnic origin. It is, however, certain that other causes exercise an influence. The study of recruiting in Sweden and the Netherlands shows that in these two countries the stature has risen considerably under the influence of prosperity. In Savoy the study of recruiting by occupations (1852–54) has shown that manual laborers, especially those least remunerated, are inferior in stature to those of the liberal professions.

The Italian Bureau of Statistics published, in 1878 and 1882, two reports of the basis of the methods of averages of Quetelet. According to this method, the simple arithmetical average is insufficient. It is necessary to make a series of observations in order to see how many in each 1,000 men belong to each group of statures. If the population studied is homogeneous, the most numerous groups will approach nearest to the average, which represents the normal type of the population. In northeastern France, where he recognizes two distinct types, in the same way as we have seen that there are two types for the whole of France, the purely ethnic explanation seems equally incomplete, and Bertillon adds: "It is not impossible that the coexistence of these two types may be due to the coexistence of two unequally fortunate populations, the one being relatively rich and healthy, the other poor and unhealthy." Perhaps, indeed, these causes are historically mixed and have combined in the production of the observed result.

In Italy the Venetians and Tuscans showed the greatest proportion of high statures; the Calabrians, the Sardinians, and the Basilicatians, the smallest proportion. Race and physical environment certainly are influential, as is shown in Italy by the differences of stature in the regions where the economic and social conditions are identical. But the social conditions are none the less important. According to my theory, the ethnical and Mesological factors are also social. The Italian *enquête* which was taken in regard to the stature in the different occupations is decisive.[1]

In a memoir of the highest interest, published in the *Bulletin*

[1] See *Bulletin de l'Institut international de statistique*, Vol. VII, Part II, pp. 273 ff.

de l'Institut international de statistique[1] Mr. Ch. Roberts concludes that the result of twenty years of anthropometrical researches prove that physical differences depend upon (*a*) race and nationality, (*b*) sex, (*c*) social conditions. In the first table he shows that the difference between the highest and lowest averages of statures in thirty-seven different populations is only 25 centimeters. In a second table, relative to the stature of children from eleven to twelve years, he shows in 2,862 observations that the average stature in England diminishes according as they are found in more or less favorable conditions of growth. While the average stature of children in the public schools of the country is 55.5 inches, this stature decreases in the middle-class schools, still more in the elementary schools of the country and in those of the artisans in the towns; again, in the factories and workshops of the country and in the towns; and it falls to the lowest level in the military asylums, and especially in the industrial schools, the average in the latter being only about 50 inches. The third table shows the relative average stature of adults from twenty to thirty years of age, in the different social conditions of life. While the general average for the population of all classes is about 67.5 inches, this average falls, for example, to 65.92 inches in the sedentary occupations in the factories; and among the tailors it almost equal to that of the sedentary of all classes, which is about 66.16 inches, and scarcely superior to that of the defectives of all classes, 65.65 inches.

A diagram giving the different curves of growth of Belgian and English males shows at every age that the curve is higher for the latter. The difference is greatest between 17 and 18 years. For women the curve of growth is a little inferior to that of men in England up to 12 years; it then exceeds it from 12 to 14, and becomes more and more inferior up to 24. The stature of the children of English soldiers is inferior to that of children in general from 6 to 16 years (diagram 3). According to a table with reference to Australia, drawn up by Dr. F. Norton Manning, girls from 8 to 15 years of age are inferior in stature to boys of the same age, but with very small differences;

[1] Vol. VI, Part I (1892), pp. 13 ff.

from which one can conclude that the conditions of life in Australia are favorable to an equal physical development of the two sexes. A very interesting anthopometric study on the influence of gymnastic training of the American women upon weight and stature proves from all evidence that in both relations the limits of variation are much extended, and that in certain conditions woman is equal to, if she does not excel, those of the average European man.[1] The law seems to be that in proportion as the human species is differentiated from the inferior types by the disappearance of the superior anthropoids and the inferior varieties proper, the type of stature has tended to become fixed and uniform within narrower limits. Moreover, as is shown by Darwin, the widely distributed species are more variable than those comprised within narrow limits. This is the case with the human species, only civilization tends to restrain these limits, while multiplying the number of variations.

3. *Muscular force.*— Animals are distinguished from vegetables chiefly by the development of organs of movement and sensibility. In the human species these functions are developed to a very high degree. Although, from the point of view of muscles, man is inferior to a large number of animals, yet it is necessary to take into consideration that muscular force does not depend solely upon the volume of the muscles, but also upon their quality. The human species, thanks to the progress of knowledge, is able to extend artificially its motor power in a degree to which the limits are not determinable. Here, in the same way as for psychical and finally social activity, is the characteristic sign of humanity. One will observe, moreover, that muscular force and sensibility are the fundamental functions of the relations in life. The variations of muscular force are not solely determined by the environment and by race, but also by education to which the muscles are susceptible.

From the first researches begun by Péron with the dynamometer of Régnier, followed up with the same instrument by Quoy and Gaymard, as well as by the expedition of Novarra, we give

[1] C. J. Enbuske, in *Bulletin international de statistique*, Vol. VIII, Part II (1895), pp. 292.

the following results obtained from adult males of the same race, based upon the power of the hands:

Péron and Quoy, 80 English	66.2 kg.
——— 122 French	58.1
Quoy and Gaymard, 14 Portuguese	54.6
Quoy and Gaymard, 18 Sandwich Islanders	58.3
Péron and Quoy, 74 Timorians	57.7
Quoy and Gaymard, 17 Carolinians	54.2
Péron, 12 Tasmanians	50.6
Péron and Quoy, 47 Australians	49.2
Novarra, 34 Nicobarese	48.4
Péron, Quoy, and Novarra, 52 Chinese	45.9
Novarra, 9 Japanese	44.2[1]

M. A. Thomson, in weight-lifting, in New Zealand showed that 31 natives lifted 166 kg., two hands; 31 English, 191 kg. It should be noted that the English were almost all soldiers or marines, that is to say, selected men, receiving normal rations. In general, the functional development of every organ depends upon the use made of it and its education; this law dominates the purely anthropological condition.

Mr. Ch. Roberts, in the memoir already cited, gives in a diagram curves of weight and muscular force of the two sexes in England. Weight corresponds in direction to that of stature. Up to twelve years of age the curve is smaller for females, then up to the age of sixteen it exceeds that of males, and from that time it becomes more and more inferior to that of males. The muscular force of females from twelve to fifty years of age is always inferior to that of males. The maximum is reached for both at about the age of twenty-eight.

Muscular force also is limited if one considers it in itself. Socially it may be greatly increased, the variations being very large. According to Quetelet and Hutchinson, there is no doubt that there are also variations in the circulation of the blood, the heart-beats, respiration, and voice, according to sex, race, age, etc. However, these variations are always contained within certain limits, whence results their internal and external equilibration.

[1] TOPINARD, *Anthropologie*, pp. 424–6.

From the tables given above relative to the weight, stature, and muscular force of the human body, the conclusion in general is that the most civilized peoples excel the inferior, and in the same way the upper classes excel those less favored. These results seem to be confirmed by other observations. Poor food and residence in cities, especially if these two conditions are combined, can be considered as factors producing disadvantageous variation. Thus Dr. Francis Galton has taken the stature and weight of 805 children, fourteen years of age, attending the public schools, of whom 509 were reared in London and 296 in the country. In stature the latter were 3 cm. more than the former, and in weight 3 kg.

Concerning the muscular system, although it may be excessively variable, since in a group of 36 subjects Wood was able to show 558 modifications, counting only those found on both sides of the body, it is none the less certain that these variations are limited in the human species by the most general conditions of its existence.

4. *Psychical force.*—Before taking up the natural limits of psychical functions, we may give some data relative to the form, capacity, and size of the principal organ of thought. There is information of great precision as to the facial and cerebral angles, the curvature of the skull, and the weight of the brain. According to Broca and Topinard, the most divergent facial angles in the human species are:

Lower Bretons - -	720	Difference
Namaquian negroes - -	560	16

The maximum differences are connected by gradual and imperceptible transitions. On the contrary, between the Namquian negro and the male chimpanzee the difference is from 56° to 38°, or a difference of 18° *without transition.*

It is the same for the relation of the skull to the face. The relation is:

Lower Bretons - - - -	4 : 1
Namaquian - - - - -	4 : 1.25
Chimpanzee - - - -	3 : 1

Between the lower Briton and the Namquian there are

transitions represented in the most diverse degrees by the different varieties of the human population, while between the Namquian and the chimpanzee the difference is absolute and abrupt.

The cerebral angle gives indications of like significance:

Lower Bretons - - - -	159°
Namaquian - - - - -	152°
Chimpanzee - - - - -	116°

Between the two there is a series of transitions. Between the highest human development and the lowest development in monkeys there is a marked discontinuity. The cubage of the cranial capacity varies from 1,600 to about 1,200 c.c. in the human species, falling rapidly to 439 c.c. in the orang-outang, and to 421 c.c. in the chimpanzee. There is no *actual* transition between man and the anthropoid apes, at least in the analogous varieties.

Broca has observed that the average cranial capacity of the Parisians of the twelfth century is inferior to that of the nineteenth century; that the skulls of the nobility of the first epoch are larger than those of the plebeians of the same epoch; that the skulls of the attendants in the hospitals are smaller than those of the students of medicine and pharmacy; that the skulls of the factory workers at Clichy (the work being almost automatic) are smaller than those of carpenters and joiners; that the cranial capacity of males is generally much larger than that of females; etc., etc. Despite this large secondary variability, the extreme oscillations average only about 300 c.c. in the entire human species, and these tend to be reduced as the inferior varieties become extinct or civilized; at the same time, the organ certainly loses its plasticity in the superior varieties as it is perfected and as heredity fixes its structure.

The classification of the following populations can, therefore, be made from the point of view of the average cranial capacity. The cranial capacity of the Pithecanthropus of Java, 900–1,000 c.c., is an intermediary form between the gibbons and the most inferior human race known, the Neanderthal (Mortillet):

Prehistoric skulls of Canstadt	1,200 c.c.
Peruvians	1,234
Oceanic negroes	1,234
Nubians	1,324
Mexicans	1,339
Australians	1,339
Negroes of western Africa	1,347
Lapps	1,440
Tasmanians	1,452
Kanackas	1,470
Irish	1,472
Inhabitants of modern Brussels	1,490
Dutch	1,496
Swedes	1,500
Eskimos	1,539
Guanches	1,554
Modern Parisians	1,558
Basques and Auvergnats	1,598

According to Bertillon, the cubage of the Lapps is explained by the abundance of gross marrow and the small quantity of gray cells. The same is probably true for the Eskimos. It is necessary also to take account of the numerical insufficiency of the measures taken. An exact and complete hierarchical classification based upon such simple data can no longer be satisfactory. It ought to take account, not only of those factors which we have indicated above, but also of other, more qualitative factors, such as the complexity of the cerebral convolutions, the proportion of gray matter, the development of the superior centers, etc.

In this connection it is interesting to note the weight of the brain in relation to the cranial capacity with regard to race and sex:[1]

	Male	Female
English and Scotch	1,427	1,260
French	1,334	1,210
German	1,382	1,209–1,244
Austrians	1,342	1,160
Negroes of Africa	1,238–1,316	1,067–1,232
One negro of the Cape	974	
One Australian		907
One Bushman		872
The gorilla (Huxley and Topinard)	475–567	
The brain of Cuvier	1,830	

[1] TOPINARD, *Anthropologie*, pp. 336, 337.

The average for the age of thirty to forty in the white race, when the brain has reached maturity, is, according to Wagner, 1,410 g. for men and 1,262 for women; according to Huschke, it is 1,424 and 1,272, or a difference of 150 g., while the difference between Austrian and English males is 85 g. However, the cranial capacity and weight of the brain do not have an absolute value. The brain of the elephant may reach 3,000 g.; that of the porpoise is the same. The quality is more important. The facial and cerebral angles, the cerebral material, and the nature of the convolutions are elements affording a more characteristic value; they reflect the structure more exactly, the more or less complete equilibration of the external world, and the social environment. Besides, the individual variations of the weight of the brain depend, not only upon race, but also upon age, sex, stature, severe illness, and degree of intelligence. According to Perchappe and Topinard, the approximate percentage in the variations of the total weight of the brain is determined by each of these factors in the following proportions:

Sex - - - - -	10	per cent.
Age - - - - -	4	"
Stature - - - - -	4	"
Mental disease - - -	4–5	"
Idiocy - - - - -	18	"
Severe illness - - -	10	"
Intelligence - - - -	20	"

As this is in close relation to social statics and dynamics, it shows that the exercise of the intellectual faculties together with the increasing division of labor and of functions, has broken up, more and more, the primitive equality of capacity and weight of the brain between the sexes. The average difference is only about 10 per cent. But among the African negroes this difference is much decreased, the relation of male to female being 1,238: 1,232. Since intellectual development can produce a difference of 20 per cent., the possibility of woman gradually overcoming the difference between her and man no longer seems an insurmountable difficulty, on the condition that the reduction of this difference may be in correlation with social evolution; the latter is a condition *sine qua non.*

5. *Cephalic index.*—The index is the relation of two opposite diameters. Thus to get the cephalic index one measures the maximum anterior-posterior diameter, then the transverse diameter, according to the centesimal relation conforming to the proportion of Broca:

$$\frac{D \text{ transverse maximum}}{D \text{ ant.-post. maximum}} = \frac{x}{100}$$

or

$$\frac{D \text{ transverse maximum} \times 100}{D \text{ ant.-post maximum}} = x \text{ or cephalic index.}$$

The cephalic index gives, for the extreme limits, two human anatomical varieties, represented by the dolichocephalic and the brachycephalic types.

The classification resulting from this seems to indicate that the highest civilizations do not belong to the peoples having the extreme types of cephalic index, but rather to mixed types produced by selection and fusion. Also, almost all civilizations, and especially the highest, do not present homogeneous but rather very heterogeneous types. The latter is an important statement for sociology—a statement of a nature to reduce much of the importance attributed to race. This law is in accord with that announced earlier, that is, that the species having the widest distribution are more variable than those confined within narrow limits (Darwin). The human cephalic variations in this respect are as variable as the muscular variations. Nevertheless these variations can be considered as relatively secondary to the numerous bodily and mental resemblances among the most distinct human races, which, moreover, are themselves more or less mixed.

I. Dolichocephalic Type—Index below 75.

Australians	71.49
Eskimos	71.71 to 73
New Caledonians	71.78
People of Canstadt	72
Hottentots and Bushmen	72.42
Botocudos	73
Negroes of western Africa	73.40
Arabs	74
Kabyles	74.04

II. Type Sub-Dolichocephalic—Index above 75 and up to 77.77.

Ancient Egyptians	75.58
Polynesians	76.36
Spanish Basques	77.62
Fifty-four skulls of Stone Age	75.01
Gauls (Iron Age)	76.93
Guanches	75.73
Inhabitants of Brussels, twelfth to sixteenth century	75 +
Flemings from Limburg	76.75
Anversois	77.17

III. Mesocephalic Type—Index above 77.77 up to 80.

Inhabitants of modern Brussels	77.27
51 East Flemings	77.90
59 Normans of seventeenth century	78
79 Dutch	78.89
27 Slavs (Koperniski)	78.90
51 West Flemings	78.91
61 Walloons (Hainaut)	79.15
76 North Americans	79.25
384 Parisians	79.45
16 Skulls of Orrony (Polished Stone)	79.50

IV. Sub-Brachycephalic Type—Index above 80 and up to 83.33.

Javanese	81
80 Walloons	81
26 Belgian Luxemburgers	81.17
Mongols	81.40
Turks	81.49
Lower Bretons	82.
299,355 Italians (of all regions)	82.7
Alsatians and Lorrainians	82.93
100 South Germans	83

V. Brachycephalic Type—Index above 83.33 and up to 87.

Indo-Chinese	83.51
Finns	83.69
Savoyards	83.63 to 85
Servians and Croatians	84.04
Auvergnats	84.07
Lapps	85.07
Skull of Lelaigneaux	86.91

The comparison between the human species and the anthropoid apes, in this respect, shows that the differences are so great,

that we can conclude after considering all which precedes, and neglecting other relations, that man constitutes a species distinct from the anthropoid apes, laying aside all questions of origin and descent. Man is superior to the anthropoid apes in the proportion of the parts of the body, in the size of the cranial cavity, in weight, in the convolutions of the brain, in quantity of gray matter, and in structure, mass, and quality of thinking material. This superiority is manifested in a palpable manner by definite characteristics excluding all real confusion between the anthropoid apes and man. Man forms a distinct species by reason of appropriate variations and by digression of these from the maximum limits, from the variations of inferior beings. In return the sense cavities are more developed among animals, the orbits, nasal cavities, sinus, masticating apparatus. Although inferior from the muscular point of view, to many animals, man is capable of more complex movements; from the point of view of sensibility and intelligence, he surpasses all. If, anatomically, the anthropoid apes are still nearer man than they are to the ordinary monkeys, for example, from the point of view of the cranial capacity and weight of the brain, there is nevertheless between them and the inferior varieties of humanity a considerable difference of which the intermediary stages have disappeared and nothing has come forth to supply them. Moreover, this difference from the anthropoid apes makes man's progress more rapid. There results a differentiation co-ordinating the skeleton, muscles, viscera, and eyes. This gives man the power of scientific observation, of prevision, and foresight.

The difference between the two species tends to become greater in proportion as the inferior populations disappear, whether by extinction or by fusion with civilization, and, on the other side, as the anthropoids themselves become eliminated.

On the whole, there is a general type, clearly determined and limited, common to all the mammalia; a particular type common to all the primates, comprising the monkey, anthropoid ape, and man; a more special type common to the anthropoid apes and to man; and, finally, a human type anatomically and physiologically determinate and recognizable. This human

structural type is capable of more complex and numerous equilibrations and adaptations than any other mass of inorganic or organic matter of nature. Its motility and thought extend beyond the limits of the earth. This is especially true when we view it not simply as individual, but also in its proper *milieu*, the social, where it takes on its integral aspect of individual-social existence. Then the muscles and brain co-operate in collective efforts of incomparable extent, duration, intensity, and equilibrium.

6. *Centers of association.*—Psychology, at the end of the nineteenth century, has been changed by the application of the experimental method and by a more exact knowledge of the nature of the nervous system. The school of Wundt for method, the works of Ramon y Cajal and Flechsig for the nervous system, have completed the basis of sociology in facilitating, by analogy, the conception of social statics and dynamics. The discoveries of Ramon y Cajal have shown that a nervous structure of which the elements are discontinuous can, however, exercise a continuous action; those of Flechsig, that the association of ideas, generalization, and abstraction have their parallels in the nervous system, and that consequently the philosophical power of the human species, that by which it is distinguished from all other forms, also has its material and physical foundation. This conception is destined to give us a better comprehension of the fact that all social phenomena are at the same time inorganic, organic, and psychic, and that our faculties of perception, generalization, and abstraction find their basis in the substance and organization of the nervous system through which all ideology is connected to inorganic nature through the mediation of organized substance.

After a quarter of a century of patient research, Flechsig, professor of psychiatry at Leipzig, has established the order of appearance of myeline in the nerve fibers by a comparison of the brain of embryos, of the fœtus, and of infants. It results from this that if, at the beginning of the average brain, the resemblance between the nervous system of man and that of the mammalia is considerable, there is no resemblance in the cerebral

membrane, which shows a considerably different development in man, where the zones of association are the centers of intellectual functions.

The essential point of the theory of Flechsig is that, contrary to what was accepted, all the zones of the cerebral cortex are not connected by bundles of fibers to the lower part of the gray matter. The cerebral cortex is divided into (*a*) zones or centers of projection, or sensorial spheres, and (*b*) zones of the membrane, comprising all the parts of the latter with exception of those connected with the fibers of projection, but connected by numerous fibers of association to the sensorial spheres and to one another. The centers of projection are both sensitive and motor. Their extent or limits are determined by the number of fibers they receive and send out in proportion to their surface. There are three zones of association: (1) the large posterior center of association, comprising a part of the lingual convolution, the fusiform convolution, the two parietal convolutions, the lower temporal and anterior part of the occipital lobe; (2) the middle center of association, comprising the *insula de Reil;* (3) the anterior center of association, formed by the anterior part of all the frontal convolutions and then by the convolutions on the orbital surface.

In comparing the results of the researches of Flechsig, it is shown that the zones of association in man correspond to two-thirds of the cortical surface, and the zones of projection to only one-third. As one descends the animal scale, one sees that in the monkey the proportion is the same for each of the parts; then in the mammalia the zones of association diminish more and more until the zones of projection exist almost alone.

The essential character of the zones of association is in not having a direct connection with the lower gray masses that is, in being independent. No impression from the periphery reaches them without the mediation of the centers of projection, and no imitation can emanate from the zones of association without passing by those of projection.

The centers of association receive impressions by the sensorial spheres, focus and compare them, and form the substratum

of our experience, of our science and philosophy. They hold the zones of projection under their control, exercising on them an inhibitory or stimulating action from the point of view of our acts. To them alone belong conscious and especially methodical action.

The large posterior center of association plays perhaps the most important rôle. It is highly developed among intelligent men, but small among defectives. It may be noted that it is inserted between three of the most important sources of impressions: the tactile, auditory, and visual zones. On the contrary, the middle center, *insula de Reil*, is only between the tactile and olfactory sphere. The most scientific and precise impressions are then in relation with the former.

Thus in the constitution and evolution of the human nerve substance we have the substratum of intellectual development. In the prosencephalon the sensitive centripetal fibers are the first to develop the myelines and function. They appear at about the eighth month of the intra-uterine life. When these sensitive fibers have appeared, then the sensations stimulate the centers, and the myeline appears in the fibers of centrifugal projection toward the end of the first month of the extra-uterine life. At this period only the centers of projection have developed the myeline and become active; the acts of the child are still cortical reflexes; the memory of impressions is not yet fixed in the brain. The latter from this point of view resembles animals without centers of association. All the impressions are received singly and are not compared. In the second month the myeline fibers appear and start from the sensorial spheres, going to the zones of association, and at first to the neighboring parts of the zones of projection. Then the memory of impressions is stored up. The child begins to recognize what it feels, sees, etc. Then the fibers of association, penetrating still farther, connect certain different spheres; for example, the auditory sphere with the lower part of the tactile sphere; the child is able to repeat the words heard, without comprehending their meaning. Finally, all the spheres of association being connected, the images can be compared. The child will reason, comprehend,

recall. Still the development of the myeline continues for a long time, perhaps the whole of life, with the practitioner, the *savant*, the philosopher. The intellectual centers become more and more specialized according to work, original aptitude, etc. Conversely, in cases of general paralysis the superficial fibers of association disappear first.

We see a vast field opened by this theory to psychology, and consequently to philosophy in general, and particularly to the philosophy of society. In every case, the result seems to be that the true distinction between the human species and the lower forms resides especially in the development of the associative centers; the latter are the characteristic marks of the human species. Perhaps some time evolution, verified in the relation of animals and of the child to the adult man, can be extended to different populations and can without too much boldness maintain the hypothesis that ontogeny reproduces phylogeny. In such case one could proceed to a really positive classification of the varieties of the human species. That which precedes shows us, however, that the latter is fitted by its nervous organization to realize forms of adaptation and equilibration superior to all the other forms which we have considered. These more special, complex and, at the same time, co-ordinated forms are connected, nevertheless, with the whole of inorganic nature itself and prepare us for a clear comprehension of the diverse social equilibriums.

SECTION VII. PSYCHICAL LIMITS.

From all our preceding observations it follows that all the natural phenomena, without exception, are subjected to conditions and laws which determine their structure. We have recognized these limits of variation, this equilibration, in the nervous system, and especially in its central and superior organ, the brain, when the most complex equilibration of all takes place—that which results in the formation of centers of association which serve as the basis for the highest specialization represented by scientific knowledge, generalization, philosophical, and sociological abstraction. Let us now look at the psychical function itself and investigate whether in this class of phenomena, the

most directly connected with social phenomena, we, as is assumed, meet with the constitutive factors of this notion of limits and boundaries which is the most simple and general expression of the differentiation of all bodies and their equilibrium.

First of all, our knowledge is limited; memory depends upon the brain; the latter has only a definite number, though enormous, of nervous elements, cells, and fibers; thence the constant limitation, though relatively variable, of our acquisition. The gray matter which covers the cerebral hemispheres forms a surface, an inclosed field, of about nineteen square decimeters and an average thickness of two and a half millimeters; this layer can contain about 1,200 million cells and 4,800 million fibers.

Each branch of knowledge, as mathematics, language, music, etc., is necessarily limited by the presence and coexistence of others; despite their common lines, each cerebral localization is naturally limited by its neighbors. Locke, the founder of modern psychology, knew that first of all it was necessary to determine the limits of the human mind. He investigated the origin of our ideas and thus prepared the way for a natural history of their development. He applied the comparative method to this science, studying the intelligence of children and savages; these studies were extended to animal intelligence. The way opened was good, and it finally led to the use of the experimental method from the time when the latter was used in physiology, thus making possible an exact science of psychology.

The material collected permits us now to affirm, with Huxley, that whatever may be the system of organs considered, the comparative study of the modifications in the serial order of the primates leads to the conclusion that the anatomical differences separating man from the gorilla and the chimpanzee are smaller than the differences between the latter and the higher monkeys. From our observations of cerebral anatomy we can say that the primitive peoples are connected with the highest civilized peoples through intermediating varieties by imperceptible transitions, while between the most primitive peoples and the highest simian varieties the difference is enormous and abrupt, with a tendency to an increase of this difference either by the continuous disap-

pearance of the lower human types, by the development of the latter, or by their extinction and by the extinction of the higher simian varieties. If the observation of Agassiz remains in part true, that one cannot see the distinction between the intelligence of a small child and that of a young chimpanzee, we have seen, nevertheless, that, notably in the development of the centers of association, their brains are quite distinct and are differentiated at the departure from the uterine life. The development of the chimpanzee is arrested early, while the child is cerebrally organized by selection and heredity for a career incomparably longer. However, among men the intellectual capacity varies. Primitive peoples cannot count beyond 2, 3, or 5, then follows for them the infinite and unknown. For the superior varieties of the human species these limits are extended; yet the law of limitation remains constant. Our potential psychical ability is limited, just as our muscular force. In his *Système social et des lois qui le regissent*, as well as his *Anthropométrie*, Quetelet has tried to extend the process of measurement of the exact sciences to intellectual phenomena. Contemporary experimental psychology would be unjust in not recognizing these efforts despite their imperfection natural to the epoch in which they were produced.

The tendency to intellectual uniformity is nevertheless continually realized by the disappearance of the less intelligent societies and in each society by the continuous elimination of the less intelligent, or indeed by the development of inferior societies, classes, and individuals. This tendency toward reduction of differences between intellectual attainments and between civilizations proves in itself that the variations of our intellect are limited. Differences exist, indeed, in relation to certain anatomical conditions of the brain and to correlative sociological conditions, but the resemblances between civilized and savage peoples are fundamental and constitute the rule to which progress only limits the exceptions.

Certain linguists have arrived at the conclusion that there is a determinate number of irreducible languages corresponding to isolated and primitive races. These languages also require a particular structure of the throat and vocal organs. The latter

are equally related to the physical environment. These languages also require special training for understanding them, yet these differences, as much morphological as intellectual, are of simple particularities which do not destroy the general anatomical structure nor the fundamental structure, common and universal in intelligence. Also, the laws of the formation and evolution of languages seem necessarily uniform, despite their variations and limited oscillations. What is harmony from the point of view of the musical scale for the auditory nerves of certain races is not for others. But these differences are not absolute; there are laws of the harmony of sounds, then of natural limits, statics, in a word, of all the particular dissonances.

The main point is that the *cercle de la conscience*, as Ribot says, the *Umfang des Bewusstseins*, as the Germans say, remains always a limited circle. Limitation is a constant and necessary condition, a law of thought.

Let us consider magnitudes. I think of a measure, say a meter or centimeter. As I have each idea in turn somewhat well defined, I thereby have a somewhat definite idea of their relation. On the other hand, our capacity to think relations becomes partly ineffective when one of the terms is undefined. In that case the relation eludes representation. This is the basis of the theory of the unknowable—a theory, moreover, as I have elsewhere pointed out, which is false in the absolute sense. In a word, even in this case the relation, which is nothing but a quasi-empty form, still retains a certain quality. If the quantitative measure is not possible, there remains a general qualitative appreciation, vague in its character, of extension, of duration, and of force. But if even this purely qualitative representation of one of the terms of the relationship can no longer be presented to consciousness, there is no longer a relationship, and consequently no knowledge; that is, we can appreciate phenomena in correlation with each other and not otherwise. The law of thought is that it is not able to pass the frontiers of the relative.

"When we try," says Herbert Spencer,[1] "to go beyond the

[1] *Essays Scientific, Political, and Speculative.*

phenomenal manifestations of final reality into this reality, we find it necessary to express it by the aid of symbols which the phenomena furnish us."

But under these conditions the error of Spencer and of all the agnostics has been precisely that of attempting to fix the limits of the known and the unknown, and of specifying absolutely what should be assumed to be unknowable.[1]

Generally, all our sensations are derived from the senses, and through these all our ideas, all our concepts. It follows that all the properties of bodies are known to us as necessarily limited and conditioned as they are in reality. The same is true of the perceptions registered by the special organs of sense which contribute to the formation of our knowledge. The associations of ideas and feelings, also, conform to this same law of limitation which also dominates our largest generalizations and our highest abstractions. Space, time, movement, matter, whether in their largest or smallest dimensions, are inaccessible to our intelligence. We do not know them scientifically except as limited, and they are not otherwise in reality. Our capacity of knowing is a relative capacity to the subject and the object, a limited capacity. Space signifies only the difference of the situation of bodies. Time is their difference of succession. Matter is their difference of combination. Movement is the variety of changes which occur among them. We cannot form an idea of any portion of space or of time without thinking of space and time which is exterior to the same in the case of space and anterior or posterior in the case of time. Time itself serves as the measure of space and space as a measure of time. Space and time, at once finite and infinite, are therefore necessary conditions of our observations and of all our knowledge.

The only limits, finite or infinite, which we can assign to time, space, matter, or force are those of our sensibilities and of our perceptions. Experience parallel with the development of our organs and of our sensibility, has permitted us with the

[1] On the theory of the unknowable see the two chapters devoted by M. A. FOUILLET to the objective and the subjective limits of science, pp. 3–28 in his book, *Le mouvement idealiste;* also my study of *L'inconnaissance dans problèmes de philosophie positive;* Paris: Schleicher frères, 1900.

progress of civilization to extend the domain of our knowledge in the direction both of the finite and of the infinite ; but always by an equilibration which each exerts upon the other. Astronomy, with its telescopes, chemical and spectral analysis and microscopy, unveils to us more and more the excessively great and the excessively small, but we always encounter limits ; that is, the necessity of recognizing bounds of our knowledge, our feelings, and our acts, as well as our abstract notions of space, time, matter, and force. The notion of the infinite, or rather of the indefinite, holds us, therefore, to the constant necessity of the finite, or rather of the conditioned and relative. Our nervous centers themselves are the co-ordinators, the regulators of the functioning of our muscular movements and of our psychical activity. They impose upon them rule, measure, unity. A conception which seems to make us independent of these is thus a perturbation of the nervous centers in their relation to the organs which govern our contact with the environment.

The sense of resistance is the primordial element of consciousness. It is universal and always present. It is manifested by time, space, matter, or force. Even organisms of the lowest order, such as the zoöphyte without nerves, prove this. It is the first impression of the child even before birth. Every animal shows this by the fact that, even if unprovided with special organs, the parts of the body manifest sensation. It is resistance which in the most simple and most general manner suggests to us the notion of relationship, that is to say, of a resemblance or difference between the subject who feels or observes and the objects felt or observed. Accordingly it has been well said that resistance is the woof of the thought which we are always weaving.

In reality every state of consciousness may therefore be reduced to a mechanical action and reaction. The simple muscular sensation is thus the primary, most general sensation. The special senses are developed chronologically after this first sensation for more particular adaptations and adjustments. This muscular sensation is the primary basis of consciousness. In a word, sensation is a resistance from the time that it is trans-

mitted to the formative centers of consciousness and transforms itself into a perception, that is to say, in the establishment of a relationship of coexistence between the muscular sensation itself and that particular state of consciousness which we call volition. In the act of perception this relationship is classified with relationships previously known. This classification once affected, the subject gains more and more, in proportion to the frequency of his experiences and perceptions, special knowledge of muscular combinations of adjustments, and of the degree of energy to be used in each situation where his will is put in motion for the sake of realizing an adaptation. Thus psychism in general runs back to the primal laws of movement which govern matter and force in time and in space. General philosophy receives a monistic interpretation which extends, as we shall see, to social phenomena.

SECTION VIII. RELATIONS AND LIMITS OF PSYCHO-PHYSIOLOGY AND OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY.

The collective life of societies is subjected to laws, not absolutely identical to those of animals, but in part analogous. The first consciousness of a collective life in a society arises through the impression of external resistances from other societies or from physical obstacles impeding its activity and its movements. The reiterated experience of these resistances gradually brings societies to the consciousness that their structure and activity are limited. It teaches them that they must adjust their institutions and actions to external and internal conditions; that is to say, to equilibrate their forms and movements according to the most exact relations possible. Here is one of the primordial psychical origins of the theory of limits. The collective consciousness becomes more or less clear as the voluntary activity of the whole society is limited by the physical and social forces of the environment. Thus the consciousness of that which resists is, either from the individual or social point of view, the point of departure of the consciousness of existence, whether individual or distinctly social, but dependent precisely because distinct. Among individuals this consciousness arises from the intra-uterine life, from muscular tension, and subsequently from pressure exercised in

a part of the body, or in the entire body which resists. In societies it arises from extensive experiences of the group, from pressure exercised in consequence of, and inevitably upon other societies, or even from simple physical obstacles forming a resistance. In relation to this primordial consciousness, it is necessary to attribute the highest importance to two functions: the preservation of the individual and of the species. Every other function is subordinate to these. Each of these functions determines whether the habits of the individual will be solitary or social, or partly solitary and partly social. Sociability can begin to assert itself only when there is produced among the individuals a stronger tendency to co-operate by means of the first favorable variation in the structure and activity through the impression and perception of an external physical and social resistance. This tendency will be increased by the survival of the better-endowed persons and groups, whose actions will be better fitted for the preservation of the species. The strongest and most durable societies will be those which, under these conditions, can best adjust their efforts to their energies, and on the other side resist the external forces. These reciprocal limits are the fundamental psychical factors of the theory of political boundaries. Again, psychical laws, both individual and collective, limit the movements and structure of men and societies, as over against the resistances — the pressure from the outside. Between the pressure and the effort there is established a balance — a limit. Within the societies themselves an analogous phenomenon is accomplished; the *presence* alone of other like individuals in the group produces mental states of sociability by the fact of resistance; that is to say, the limits that one individuality imposes upon another. Individuals are forced to adjust themselves to one another. In a large crowd one is pressed against others and forced to go with the current or remain in one place. From this common life arises a common consciousness. Their origin is undoubtedly due to the sensation and perception of a resistance and of a proportional effort.

Outside the group this perception gives place to the fixation of a boundary; within the group, chiefly to a common effort, to

co-operation, to simultaneous and similar movements, unpremeditated at first, which must not be confounded with imitation, although the latter is partly derived from them. This is the first sociological explanation from the psychical point of view of the phenomena which psychology properly speaking has noted under the designation of sympathetic fears, panics, imitations of actions, gestures, habits, and common pleasures. But it has not led to the more general concept of force and movement. We know also that all these factors of sociability have been rendered still more efficacious by the development of the æsthetic emotions, and especially of the affections which proceed naturally from the relation of the sexes and from the parental relationship, both maternal and paternal. As for imitation, it is explained by the natural collection of individuals and groups which have acquired characteristics advantageous for their preservation and development. In all these cases the consciousness of resistance to the internal or external environment has formed the departure for both individual and collective consciousness. This consciousness, whether obscure or clear, of resistance and effort, gives a collective existence to the first human groups and co-operates with more special and more complex social factors which we will discuss further in the explanation of the philosophy of limits. If, then, limits of some kind, narrow or coincident with our planet itself, are the necessary and constant condition of every social structure, we can assert that besides mathematical, physical, chemical, and biological forces, all of which, as we have seen, are limited, there are also limits among the psychical forces, both individual and social. Social statics is a more special and complex division of universal statics. The latter gives the philosophical explanation and proof of the former.

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[*To be continued.*]

THE PROBLEM OF THE RURAL COMMUNITY, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE RURAL CHURCH.

THERE are many problems confronting the American people today. Some are as complex and as cruel as that propounded to Œdipus by the Sphinx of Thebes. Men with warm hearts and a stern sense of responsibility are struggling with the riddles of the degenerates and dependents, of labor and capital, of the negro in the South, and of the urban community. But no enigma is crying more for solution than is that of the rural community. Says one of the keenest thinkers of our day: "If no new preventive measures are devised, I see no reason why isolation, indigence, ignorance, vice, and degeneration should not increase in the country until we have a rural peasantry, illiterate, immoral, possessing the rights of citizenship, but utterly incapable of performing or comprehending its duties."

The traditional approach to this problem is from the religious side. Indeed, the great majority identify the problem of the rural community with that of the rural church. While I am compelled to follow the beaten path, it seems to me that this identification dwarfs the horizon. The rural church is but one phenomenon of the varied social structure of the rural community. It has a problem and a grave one; but it is only one of the problems which are bound up in the more complex one of the community at large. Even from the religious approach, moreover, one has no right to narrow the religious forces to the four walls of a country church. This is an unscientific assumption. The home, the school, the vocation, the social life are all mighty forces for the molding of men.

Vague and conflicting conceptions of the definition of a rural community give rise to much confusion in the discussion of this problem. It is variously conceived as a mere farming neighborhood, a rural village, everything outside of cities characterized by genuinely urban conditions, *i. e.*, cities of 20,000 population and over. Some of these conceptions are too broad and others

are too narrow. For convenience and mutual understanding, let us define a rural community as one that is characterized by genuinely rural conditions. This would include all farming neighborhoods and, according to the last census, all centers of population up to 4,000 inhabitants.

One must be on his guard, moreover, against the fallacies which are wont to be made in the discussion of this problem, such as *non causa pro causa*, which mistakes conservatism for decadence, crudeness for barrenness; *insufficient data*, which, observing the degeneration of one rural community, make unwarranted generalizations therefrom as to country life as a whole; *false comparison*, which compares rural life with urban life, and deduces disparaging results accordingly; and *non sequitur*, which infers that the problem of the country is the same as that of the city.

In the treatment of this question one must approach it with the broadest possible study and with thoroughly scientific methods. In most of the attempts to solve it from the religious side, the suggestions have been dogmatic and empirical rather than scientific. While I wish also to approach it from the religious side, it will be my endeavor to look upon the problem at the same time as a sociological as well as a religious one, and to study with strictly scientific methods.

The outline of treatment in this paper will be as follows: The rural problem as a community interest; the end of social action to be attained; causal relations and conditions; methods of amelioration; regulative principles; program for reform.

I.

The urban problem is that of a growing congestion, but the rural problem is that of a growing isolation. While the evils connected with the city have long provoked discussion, because they force themselves upon public gaze, the vicissitudes of the country have been somewhat disregarded, because hidden in their solitude. Nevertheless, they are just as threatening, if not more so, because the country is largely the source of that human stream that is constantly flowing to the city. Statistics

show that from 1790 to 1890 the population of the United States in cities of 8,000 or more has risen from one thirty-third to nearly one-third of the whole. The census report for 1900 shows no break. It points out the startling fact that in 1900 there were 5.4 per cent. fewer people in the country than ten years before; and that of the 13,000,000 people added to our population during the decade 73.8 per cent. found homes in urban centers, and only 26.2 per cent. in the rural districts.

The percentage of loss would be much larger, moreover, if the migration to the city were not accompanied by an immigration to the country—a movement which checks the depletion, but which is often as injurious, because it exchanges the native for foreign stock. Consequently, while the New Englander abandons his unremunerative acres and flees to the city, the farmer of the central West rents his isolated farm to the foreign immigrant and moves to town. This tends to the formation of a distinctly peasant class such as is found in Bavaria. It is said that there are several communities in the United States where the English language is never heard.

Such is the situation in the rural communities of the United States today. District after district is being drained to the cities, leaving isolated pools of human beings to grow more stagnant, dank, and noisome. The richest of agricultural states seem to be unable to stem the flood. "For twenty-five years past," said Professor Cooley at the last Michigan Farmers' Institute, "the population in settled rural districts of the northern states has been diminishing. According to the census of 1890, 66 per cent. of area in Illinois diminished, 43 in Iowa, 61 in Ohio, 83 in New York." The fruit of this growing isolation is keenly apparent.

The economic loss is great. Property depreciates in value. Farms are even abandoned. In New Hampshire 1,443 farms with tenantable buildings were at one time deserted. In the last decade the rural population of Vermont decreased 214.8 per cent. As a result, many acres are for sale for one dollar an acre, and scores of farms can be bought for one-fourth what they cost twenty-five years ago. But this depreciation is not

confined to New England. Every state that shows a marked decrease in rural population reveals an accompanying decrease in farm values. This loss, moreover, increases with the farmer who remains. The road deteriorates. The taxes increase. As the roads deteriorate, the farmer is pushed farther and farther back from the village. The value of the farm falls in proportion; the cost of transportation increases, until in some communities, it is said, it costs the farmer as much to haul his produce six miles as he pays the railroad to carry it five hundred.

Moreover, the social, intellectual, and religious life likewise degenerates as the farmer is pushed in time farther back from the village. The church and school have always been prized for their value to inspire a longing for the highest life. It is a great loss for a community when the standards of these institutions fall. But as the migration grows and the roads deteriorate, this inevitably follows. The belief is growing today that the little country schoolhouse offers small opportunity for the farmers' children, and must be abandoned.

The church, not endowed with government support as is the school, suffers still more. Deprived of the best element of the community through removal, separated from the farming community through poor roads, the church rapidly goes to pieces. It is said with authority that there are ninety-five towns in Maine where no religious services are held, and that there are more villages in Illinois without the gospel than in any other state in the Union. Over one-half of Vermont, so purely agricultural and intensely American, never goes to church. Yet the church there spends annually one dollar and a half for every man, woman, and child in the population. Statistics show that people living over two miles from church in fourteen of the states east of the Mississippi river never go to church. This is largely true of the large rural populations in the South and West as well as the North. "During the past thirty years," said Josiah Strong in 1893, "thousands of churches have died from exhaustion in the rural districts of the United States." This is seen especially in the back towns of New England, which have wandered far from the Puritan traditions of their founders and

have locked the doors of many of their churches. "It is a pathetic sight," says an investigator of this section, "to see a church, firm in its aim and ideals, yet gradually decaying because its best blood is going to the cities; but it is more pathetic to see churches that have locked their doors, not because there was no one to attend, but because no one *would* attend." Such churches are growing more numerous every day in communities invaded by foreign immigrants who care more for their European customs than for the Puritan traditions of the church.

So we witness in our rural communities a vast destitution of religion. We hear annually long reports of dead and dying churches; we behold churches barely alive, with no settled pastors; we see churches having settled pastors giving their entire strength in a mere fight for existence, and having no money or energy left for community interests and philanthropy. Thus the conception of the church in the rural districts has come to be something to be kept in existence rather than something to be kept on the increase; something to be ministered unto rather than something to minister; something to be built up out of the community rather than something to build up the community out of it; "a humble pensioner upon the people, hat in hand, begging for support, rather than a divine institution which is to bestow upon men the gift of God in Jesus Christ."

With the redemptive power of the church practically *nil*, her message forgotten and marred, the spiritual condition of the community falls correspondingly lower. The other spiritual forces of the home, school, vocation, and social life lose their incentive to struggle and sacrifice. And with no broad, rich social life, no general intellectual activity, no religious inspiration, no initiative to political self-consciousness and community action, life in the rural districts tends toward idleness, vulgarity, animality, and drunkenness. Such is the problem of the rural community, with its highest factor for good an object for apology and pity.

II.

It is now essential, having stood face to face with the problem demanding solution, to get a clear vision of the end of

proposed social action and endeavor. This can be no mere superficial program of church action along the lines of the traditional ecclesiastical polity. One must dig deep into the roots of human life, and lay bare the laws, desires, and interests that prompt individual and community action. Only upon the basis of the Eternal in human life can one found the superstructure of social and individual action.

It is said that every individual acts always in reference to six ends or desires with which he is naturally endowed. These ends are health, wealth, sociability, knowledge, beauty, and rightness. Upon this basis the sociologist makes two assumptions:

> The life of the individual is a process of achieving the self that is potential in the interests which prompt the desires of health, wealth, knowledge, sociability, beauty, and rightness; society, or human associations, is a continuous process of realizing a larger aggregate and better proportion of health, wealth, knowledge, sociability, beauty, and rightness.

Life in the rural districts today is in a state of growing discontent, because under present conditions it is impossible to satisfy those deep desires of the self and the community. The result is the tide of migration to the urban environment where these interests may be more successfully guaranteed. Denied the means of growth and activity, the weaker ones left behind lose interest in life, and stagnation and degeneration result. The end to be sought, then, in solving the problem of the rural community is a rational program for reform that will enable every individual to achieve his highest self potential in these sixfold desires; and that will help every rural community to realize a larger aggregate and better proportion of these interests in which life, individual and social, finds its only satisfaction.

III.

Having this end of endeavor before us, let us again take up the problem to discover, if possible, its causal conditions and relations, and lay bare the social structure upon which it rests. These causal conditions naturally group themselves about the various interests of social activity.

The cause of the farmers' discontent and migratory tendency is in the main economic. A general depression in agriculture in the past has compelled many of them to abandon their unprofitable pursuits and flee to the city. This depression is due in turn to far-reaching changes in the methods of production and distribution. The prolific development of farm machinery in late years has thrown the rural districts into a financial panic, depriving of labor a large part of every farming community. To add to the depression, a speedy development of transportation on land and water opened great areas of fertile land in the West to the small farmers of the East; and later returned its products to compete with those of the East and of Europe. This discontent was enhanced when the farmers found that the cost of transportation deprived them of their profit, and that it was cheaper to burn their corn than to sell it; while this very facility of transportation, which for the time being wrought such havoc in the agricultural districts, enabled trade and manufactures to concentrate in towns, where life was more attractive through the conveniences of urban life and through its social and cultural opportunities.

But it is only fair to say that the economic factor does not enter so largely into the rural forces that today are driving the agricultural population into the cities. The farmers have readjusted themselves to the disturbing factors. They have turned them to their own profit. Transportation and invention are making the farmers of the day wealthy. Untilled western lands are being opened to the public so gradually that the equanimity of rural life has not been disturbed except in neighboring localities. The great loss in rural and urban Nebraska has been due, doubtless, to the opening of adjacent rich farming lands. The old fear of bonanza farms has been exploded. Experience is proving that intensive farming is more profitable. The last census reports only 41,000 farms containing 1,000 acres and over. Statistics also show that, while the farms of the country are mortgaged for over two billions of dollars, it is not because the farmers are falling behind in their struggle, but because they are anxious to buy farms and to improve them.

The forces that cause individual loss are still, however, at work. Poor roads, contempt of scientific agriculture, lack of business methods, disregard of hygienic laws, low æsthetic and intellectual ideals, decay of social activity and harmony—all these help to depreciate the economic value of individual farming communities.

Another cause of the present condition of rural life is carelessness in regard to the laws of hygiene and sanitation. Here where there is an abundance of sunshine and pure air, and where life should be the richest and the most healthful, it is often the opposite. The congested cities, indeed, are more healthful through strict enforcement of the laws of sanitation. The death-rate of Chicago for the year 1901 is lower than that of several agricultural states. The lack of hospitals, trained nurses, and competent surgeons is keenly felt in the rural districts.

One of the most prevalent causes of rural degeneration is its lack of initiative and of high intellectual ideals. Motor education is very much needed. The average country schoolhouse, with its self-conscious young teacher, knowing nothing of the science of pedagogy, is of very little aid. This low intellectual plane is due to the community, which fails to entertain a sufficiently high and true conception of the public school; and it is also due to the close economic point of view which always seeks to cut down the taxes.

Another, and perhaps a stronger, cause of discontent is the poverty of stimulating social life. Man is by nature a social animal. As he requires air and exercise for the development of his body, he requires social contact for the development of his higher self. Deprived of this, stagnation results. Sociability is one of the strongest factors which is building up the cities. The lack of social life in the country is due to various causes: impassable roads, imprisoning the farmers in their homes; absence of sidewalk and street-lights, discouraging sociability in the villages; poverty of that intellectual life which stimulates social intercourse and fellowship; schisms—social, racial, and religious—disrupting the community already insulated from the world by isolated conditions; absence of those institutions which

promote healthful sociability and fellowship; narrow attitude of the church, engendering division in society by cultivating piety as an isolated thing and by emphasizing creed above character and social welfare.

Another influence, which is not perhaps so potent in disorganizing rural life, yet which blunts and kills its finer qualities, is the ugliness of human habitations in the country. The following testimony of two rural oracles is undoubtedly true:

> Slatternliness in and around the house repels from their homes many youths who otherwise might be bound by the strongest ties to their firesides.
>
> A village which is down at the heels, whose streets are unkempt, whose houses are unsightly, whose citizens are in a condition of chronic slouchiness, cannot hope to attract to it those who would add to its material or moral welfare.

It would seem that a village, with its many church-spires pointing to the sky, would be the center of growing civic and religious life. On the contrary, the ethical and religious condition of the rural community seems to be very low. Idleness, vulgarity, and drunkenness seem to be on the increase, while the churches appear to be gradually dying for lack of community interest. The causes leading to this sad condition are many.

Migration has deprived the church of its best element. Immigration has brought into the farming districts a class of people not friendly to the church of Puritan ideals. Denominationalism has subdivided the small community into organizations too weak to do anything but barely to live; while its fierce strife and contentions have created a feeling of disgust and religious indifference. Irregular and inefficient ministers, narrow in theology and weak in personality, have added to the growing indifference. A lack of means to carry on the work has put the church in a begging attitude, depriving it of its spiritual aggressiveness. The preaching of dogma and the emphasis of creed above character have deprived the church of the sympathy of the people. An undue worship of cherished ecclesiastical traditions compels the use of a polity inefficient and untimely. An illogical application of successful urban methods to rural prob-

lems wastes energy and delays the solution of the problem. A conception of religion which emphasizes its defensive agility instead of its aggressive qualities deprives the church of its inspiration and leadership. An undue exaltation of the clerical office and of the functions of public worship draws away the sense of divine agency and appointment from other offices and functions, and tends to divorce religion from the people, who feel that the clergy is exalted instead of the church, and that the community is sacrificed for the church instead of the church for the community.

A false conception, moreover, of the world-order as "permanently and necessarily corrupt" deprives the church of a large part of its proper influence. This view causes the church to neglect the general interests of society, and makes religion something external, to be gotten by special experience, a system of dogmas to be accepted, and of forms to be regarded, instead of consecrated devotion to the best interests of the community. It brings forth a scheme of redemption simply for the salvation of individuals instead of society. It postpones the hope of eternal life to a place beyond the grave, instead of helping one to enter into it in the everyday life.

Finally, the cause of low ebb of church influence in the rural districts is the failure to study the problem scientifically, and to adapt its program of reform along sociological lines instead of the traditional polity of the apostolic fathers.

IV.

Having traced the causal relations and conditions of the present degeneration of country life, and having uncovered the weaknesses in its social structure, the next step is to present the methods of amelioration actually in use, weigh them, and derive therefrom the regulative principles for a rational program of reform. As the great need of the rural communities seems to be for the socializing of education and culture, and for the "initiative of the resourceful in their social, political, and industrial problem," the present methods of amelioration naturally fall into certain institutional forms of betterment.

One of the methods of amelioration is the rural social settlement. This method has its origin and inspiration in the urban social settlement which has been such a powerful factor in solving the problem of the city. In presenting this method as a solution of the problem of the rural community, John P. Gavit, a well-known worker in settlement circles, says:

> The same needs which welcome the settlement to crowded city quarters prevail in rural villages and scattered populations. There is the same occasion to exemplify higher family and intellectual ideals; the same opportunity to unify a community reft with schisms, social, racial, and religious; the same crying absence of a force to mediate the advantages of education and world-knowledge to those whose ill-paid labor has placed to their credit against society a large account of obligation; the same absence to fill of initiative to social action for the betterment of local and general conditions.

But, as he elsewhere adds:

> The unification of races and tongues and religions in heterogeneous city wards is a simple problem beside the assimilation of the cliques and the theological and the caste feuds in a small village or agricultural community.

It is just here that this method fails, as must all methods that are borrowed from the urban community. The difference of social structure militates against its success. In the city the very friction of congestion helps to unify its races and religions; and the settlement method based upon this social structure is at once practical and effective. In the country, on the contrary, the very separation in its isolation helps to divide its social and religious life; and a settlement awkwardly joined to this social structure would be helpless between "a devil and a deep sea of theological discussion and prejudice." As Mr. Gavit says: "Leadership in such an enterprise would be exhausted early in the siege, and the adaptability of Paul's 'all things to all men' would be tested to the limit." One must ever take into account the independence of the isolated inhabitant of the rural district; and any method of amelioration which tinges the least of the spirit of patronage will die a sure and speedy death. "You may flatter the American farmer, but you cannot patronize him," says the editor of the *Michigan Farmer*. And this is why the rural social settlement can never be a success in ameliorating rural life.

In itself the settlement idea is a good one. It furnishes an

example in urban life of what should be done for rural life. Its noble aim, broad social view, and excellent methods must be kept in mind by one who would ameliorate the growing isolation of the rural community. However, if there is a group of persons, a family, or an individual voluntarily seeking to live where there seems to be great need, there will be found in the rural districts wonderful opportunities, by close study of local conditions, to take the initiative in unifying the social life and in helping it to attain its sixfold interests.

Another method that has just recently been introduced into the rural community is the "institutional church." Like the social settlement, its original home is in the city, where it is successfully combating the problem of congestion. According to the platform of the Open and Institutional Church League, its aim is as follows:

> Inasmuch as Christ came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, the open and institutional church, filled and moved by his spirit of ministering love, seeks to become the center and source of all beneficent and philanthropic effort, and to take the leading part in every movement that has for its end the alleviation of human suffering, the elevation of man, and the betterment of the world. Thus the open and institutional church aims to save all men and all of the man by all means, abolishing so far as possible the distinctions between the religious and the secular, and sanctifying all days and all means to the great end of saving the world for Christ.

It is apparent from this platform that the institutional church is scientifically based on a broad study of world and social conditions and of local conditions and needs. It aims to adapt itself to its environment, fashioning its methods according to the peculiar conditions of the community in which it is situated. There is, however, the same objection to transplanting the institutional church in the country as there is to the social settlement. The social structures of the city and country are vastly different. Their problems are diametrically opposite in nature. It needs great hordes of people to run the machinery of the institutional church as it now exists. It takes great extremes of social life to furnish it inspiration and opportunity. It is fed by the lack of home life which is so characteristic of the city with its teeming tenements, its large restaurant population, and its luxurious hotels thronged with homeless millionaires.

Now, these conditions do not exist in the country. There the people are scattered and isolated. Life has no great extremes of poverty and wealth, ignorance and culture; and while the home life may not be so rich as it should be, it is healthful and stimulating on the whole. Moreover, the great need of society today is not the transference of home functions to the church; it is rather the restoration of those which have been taken from the home already. The important question before the American people today is how the family may be reinforced in its constructive elements. The truth must be emphasized that teaching and religion are permanent functions of the home. If we would make education "intellectual, industrial, and seasoned with character;" if we would make religion an expression of divine fatherhood and brotherhood, we must not delegate the permanent functions of the home entirely to the school and the church. While the conditions of urban life are destructive to the home life, it is not so in the rural districts. And it is the duty of the country church so to arrange its polity that it conserves and intensifies the home as an institution, instead of robbing it of its functions and of separating it into individuals.

The "village improvement society," unlike the other organizations mentioned had its origin and inspiration in a rural community. Originated to satisfy but one of the six interests of human life, the æsthetic, it has now broadened its scope to contain them all. The objects of the American League for Civic Improvement include all the cultural interests, "together with other local needs of home and community." In general, the aim of this society is to promote health by securing better hygienic conditions; to add to the community wealth by bettering all those conditions which cause economic loss; to promote intellectual life through the introduction of lectures, entertainments, reading-circles, libraries, and better school facilities; to promote sociability through the improvement of roads, sidewalks, street-lights; by giving the people interests broad enough and vital enough to enable all cliques and all persons to be interested in the same thing; by fraternizing a community through its very organization, leading all classes irrespective of rank or

sect to work for the common good; to awaken the love of beauty by cultivating flowers, vines, shrubs, and trees, and by banishing from the public gaze all slatternliness and ugliness; to promote the standard of rightness through the improvement of the home, on the basis that "if parents combine to make the circle of the home life beautiful, without and within, they will sow the seeds of truth, honesty, and kindness in the hearts of their children.".

One has but to glance over the wide bibliography of this subject to see how much this society is doing to solve the rural problem. Its success is largely due to the fact that it is scientifically founded on the social structure of a rural town, and that its methods are in harmony with the rural problems of isolation and lack of initiative.

What the village improvement society has been accomplishing for the villages the farmers' organizations have been accomplishing for the farming communities. They, too, have succeeded because they are founded upon the social structure of rural life, and are scientifically adapted to its problem. It takes a unique organization, indeed, to secure the unity and co-operation of a class of people who are made intensely individual by their vocation, ungraciously independent by their isolation, and who are difficult to organize because of poor facilities of communication and transportation. Yet, despite their inborn suspicion of men, their aversion to patronage, their jealousy of leadership, their tenacity for personal views, their looseness in keeping co-operative pledges, the American farmers have actually been organized; and they are now co-operating hand in soul in the Grange and the Farmers' Institute.

The Grange, whose official title is the Patrons of Husbandry, arose in the year 1849. It was organized by its founder, Mr. O. H. Kelley, to meet two needs: to educate the farmer better for his business, and to cultivate a spirit of brotherhood between the North and the South. The following is the "Promulgation of Purpose of the National Grange":

We shall endeavor to advance our cause by laboring to accomplish the following objects: To develop a better and higher manhood and woman-

hood among ourselves. To enhance the comforts and attractions of our homes, and to strengthen our attachments to our pursuits. To foster mutual understanding and co-operation. To maintain inviolate our laws; to emulate each other in labor; to hasten the good time coming. To reduce our expenses, both individual and corporate. To buy less and produce more, in order to make our farms self-sustaining. To diversify our crops, and to crop no more than we can cultivate. To condense the weight of our exports, selling less in the bushel and more on hoof and in fleece. To systematize our work, and to calculate intelligently on probabilities. To discountenance the credit system, the mortgage system, the fashion system, and every other system that tends to prodigality and bankruptcy.

We propose meeting together, talking together, selling together, and in general acting together for common protection and advancement. We shall avoid litigation as much as possible by arbitration in the Grange. We shall constantly strive to secure entire harmony, good-will, vital brotherhood among ourselves, and to make our order perpetual. We shall earnestly strive to suppress personal, local, sectional, and national prejudices, all unhealthful rivalry, all selfish ambition. Faithful adherence to these principles will insure our mental, moral, social, and material advancement.

We shall advance the cause of education among ourselves and our children by all just means in our power. We especially advocate for agricultural schools that practical agriculture, domestic science, and all the arts which adorn the home be taught in the courses of study. We emphasize and assert the oft-repeated truth taught in our organic law, that the Grange is not a political or party organization. No Grange, if true to its obligation, can discuss political and religious questions.

From these quotations one can see how high the aim and how broad the scope of this movement. There is always some difficulty, however, in working out the ideals of an order, and it was so with the Grange. An undue emphasis was put upon the economic function of the order, at the expense of the cultural interests. Many entered it merely for quick financial gain. A kindred organization was founded for political purposes and for combating the so-called monopolies of the railroads. Farmers everywhere were swept into the movement, but as it was based on illogical principles, it soon fell, carrying down the Grange with it. But the Grange quickly recovered, readjusted its activities, and is now more prosperous than ever. Its chief work today is on cultural lines. According to one of its promoters, "it is ambitious to take a place beside the school and the church as one of a trinity of forces that shall mold the life of the farmer

on the broadest possible basis—material, intellectual, social, and ethical."

Perhaps the best way to test an organization is not simply by its ideals, but by what it has accomplished. Not least is the legislation it has won. Among the most important national achievements is the making of the head of the Agricultural Department a cabinet officer; the establishment of an Interstate Commerce Commission; laws favoring pure foods and dairy products; laws preventing the extension of patents on sewing-machines; and the establishment of rural free mail delivery.

The Grange, moreover, is practically driving isolation out of the farming community. The following news item of a Michigan Grange is illuminating:

> Macon Grange has a well-furnished commodious hall, two stories high, containing a dining-hall with tables and dishes for ninety at a sitting. The audience room is carpeted and well supplied with paraphernalia, bunting, etc., warmed with a furnace, and seated with 200 chairs. We have a good choir, a male quartette, and an orchestra; also a dramatic club. There is a maple grove on the lot and 180 feet of sheds where 40 teams may be sheltered. We have also 23 miles of rural free mail delivery, 40 miles of rural telephone which connects the homes of all the members, and is much utilized in committee work.

Again, through the legislation it has secured, through the intensive and intelligent farming it has developed, through its bitter enmity to the credit system, through the establishment of co-operative purchasing, through its mutual fire and life insurance, and through the amelioration of many influences which injure the value of a farm, the Grange has secured great economic benefit to the farmers.

This organization has also done much for education. It has given an impetus to agricultural education and to the study of domestic science. It has created the need now being filled by the Farmers' Institute. The Grange Hall itself is an educational center through its debating clubs, lecture courses, parliamentary societies, and circulating libraries.

The ethical life of the farmer has also been intensified. While avoiding sectarian discussions, it has not neglected to emphasize true religion. "Its ritual is permeated in word and

sentiment by the religious spirit." The church has not been more helpful in conserving family life, for in the Grange the whole family is interested. Every girl and boy over fifteen years may attain full membership. Woman is placed on an equal with man. Every delegate to every state Grange is a dual delegate, man and wife. The spirit of sacrifice and altruism is emphasized in many ways. It has been truly said of the Michigan Grange: "It consists not solely in trying to achieve things for the material benefit of its members, but its greatest power lies in the service it can be to the people of the whole state." This is confirmed by the legislation which it has secured, which does not so much affect the producer as the consumer; by the fact that the Michigan Grange has for six years carried on systematic "fresh-air work," giving two-week vacations every summer to hundreds of poor mothers and children of the congested cities.

But if the Grange had not accomplished anything more than to teach the farmers of America the value of co-operation, it would justify its existence. In this it has been signally successful. The Grange, doubtless, will ever exist and prosper, because it is based on right principles. It successfully combats the problem of isolation. It satisfies the sixfold interests of human life. It avoids the sectarian and political questions which might rift its unity. It includes the entire family.

The "farmers' institute" is indirectly the product of the Grange. As the farmers of the different communities met together to discuss affairs of common interest, it became customary to send to the state agricultural schools for speakers on special topics. So frequent became these summons that the state universities established bureaus for the management of lecture trips, or institutes. Finally the expansion became so great that it became necessary to ask the state legislature for direct appropriations for the maintenance of the lecture bureaus. Wisconsin appropriates annually for this purpose $15,000. Thirteen states are now making appropriations, and in many more organized work is being done under the direction of the state school. Nearly every state in the Union is holding farmers' institutes today. In other words, a university-extension movement has

arisen among the farmers, far outreaching in its influence all other movements.

The primary mission of the institute is the improvement of methods in agricultural work. This is gained through lectures and by practical demonstration wherever possible. For instance, the county institutes in Minnesota are schools, the superintendent and his corps of assistants going together and remaining at each institute through the entire session. But agricultural technique and business methods do not occupy the entire attention of the sessions. To the departments of live stock, dairy, and farming have been added domestic science and home culture. And today, practically all the sixfold interests of social welfare are represented in each county and state meeting of the farmers' institute. This is confirmed by the following subjects, drawn at random from the annual report of the farmers' institutes of Michigan and Illinois.

Wealth: restoration of soil fertility; cash *vs.* credit; woman's share in economics. Health: sanitation in town and country; the importance of bacteria in everyday life; the prevention and restriction of communicable disease. Knowledge: agriculture and the public schools; circulating libraries; the relation of the mother to the country school. Sociability: influence of good roads on farm life; the relation of the farmer's wife to society; art of living with others. Beauty: farm-house architecture; influence of flowers on rural life; the surroundings of the farm-house. Rightness: consecrated parentage; social purity; influence of the country home.

No one can measure the power for good exerted by the farmers' institute on the rural community. A keen observer has said: "Many of the American farmers do not belong to America's laboring people. They take as much scientific interest in their work and do as much serious reading as most city physicians and editors." Prince Kropotin has spoken glowingly of the intellectual superiority of Iowa farmers over those of the old world, shown by the attendance and discussion at farmers' institutes; and Tolstoi, with his keen insight into social conditions, has recommended that the same system be instituted in Russia for the elevation of the Slavic peasant.

With high vision and consecrated service this organization, under the direction of the state agricultural schools, is now attempting to bring together in harmonious action the various forces engaged in the betterment of rural life. The Grange, the farmers' clubs, the school, and the church are asked to co-operate in each county and state institute. This year there was a joint meeting of the Michigan Farmers' Institute and the Michigan Political Science Association; and the theme of the gathering was the unification of the forces engaged in the amelioration of rural life. The inspiration in such a presentation of the forces of life must have been seen in the remarks of Mr. C. D. Smith, one of the leaders of the movement:

> More than one citizen long past middle life and living in an isolated community came to me at the close of the institute, and, almost in tears, expressed his gratitude that there had been revealed to him aspects of his own life that had theretofore been withheld from him.

No presentation of the movements for the amelioration of the rural community would be complete without an account of the Hesperia movement. On the principle that "no organization, no extension movement, university or otherwise, will prove adequate to the social, civic, intellectual, and spiritual life of rural life, since the force that socializes must be in the midst of the community—must be a part of its very life," a movement having its origin in Hesperia, Mich., is on foot to erect a building in every community in which may be developed to a high degree the complete life of the community. This new movement is not intended to supplant any of the other organizations of rural life; it is to be simply a bond to draw them together in closer communion, sympathy, and love for the amelioration of the community life. In this building the different organizations may meet and give free expression to their activities. Here these activities will find united expression in a "big meeting" once a year. The evening sessions will be reserved for speakers of state and national reputation; and the day sessions, for addresses and discussions upon subjects pertaining to home, school, farm, church, and civic life. On Sunday a union service emphasizes the place of the church as a spiritual factor in

rural life. Colonel Francis W. Parker, Dr. Arnold Tompkins, Will Carleton, Hamilton Wright Mabie, Byron King, and others who have addressed this unique Hesperian gathering say that there is nothing equal to it in America for inspiration, social and civic uplift. Yet Hesperia is a village of only 700 inhabitants, and situated twelve miles from a railroad.

V.

Having studied the different methods now in use for the amelioration of rural conditions, and having witnessed the comparative success or failure of these methods, we see that certain organizations attained good results, because they scientifically founded their organization on the social structure of the rural community; their methods were arranged in technique to solve the rural problem of isolation, and were not simply borrowed from urban organizations that had solved the problem of congestion; they satisfied the sixfold interests of individual and social welfare; they secured the interest and co-operation of practically every member of the community, regardless of age, sex, sect, or politics; they strongly organized the community to realize their principles; they prohibited political and sectarian discussions, thus guaranteeing permanence and harmony; they sought the vitalizing and socializing force from the community itself, not entirely from without.

From this analysis we derive the following regulative principle: Any method based upon a scientific analysis of the social structure of the rural community will ameliorate the conditions of such community, if it secures the forceful interest, co-operation, and organization of its members, regardless of age, sex, party, or creed; and if it satisfies the interests of individual and social welfare, viz., health, wealth, sociability, knowledge, beauty, and rightness.

VI.

A rational program for reform, suggested by the failures and successes of the preceding methods and based on the regulative principles of social action derived, must be broad enough in its aim to embrace all classes, ages, sects, and parties of the com-

munity, to include all the six ends of social welfare, and all institutions which help to achieve these ends, assigning to each one its part in producing rural unity and harmony.

Such a method, however, must have some organization back of it to put it into execution. This initiative must come from within the community and not from without. Now the question is: Which one of the rural institutions is best fitted to conceive and initiate a rational program of reform?

"The true integrating force in society is a spiritual force," says Benjamin Kidd. "It is," says Washington Gladden, "the spirit of Jesus Christ in the hearts of men. The precise business of the church is to fill the world with the spirit of unity and brotherhood; to arrest and countervail the divisive and repulsive forces; to promote the unity of the spirit in the bonds of peace; to preach and realize here upon earth a kingdom of heaven, a kingdom of peace and good-will." "The very function of the church," says Graham Taylor, "is to build up the community out of itself, and not to build up itself out of the community." "To unify all forces which make for righteousness and inspire them to realize the highest ideals attainable is the formative function of the church in a community." The church is so situated that it touches both types of rural life, the farming district and the village. It is a permanent organization in society. Cross-bearing is the end of its being and the source of its life. Its chief function, therefore, is to take up the burden of the rural community and bear it in a spirit of love and consecration to generate enthusiastic public spirit; and to conceive and initiate a rational program of reform.

No other rural institutions are situated to undertake this work. They lack either permanence, the spirit of sacrifice, the enkindling personality of a great founder, the breadth of scope, the opportune site, or the enthusiasm and consecration for service.

But has the church a vision of its social functions that it may take the initiative in this movement? It is true that the church at present is far from being a center of rural organization and inspiration. It has no scientific knowledge of its true function. Asleep in its rustic bower, it has not yet awakened to the change

that has taken place in religious activities. It has not yet learned that there is more than one fundamental interest in life. It has lost its own unity, its message of brotherly love, its power to counteract integrating forces—in sectarian malice it has torn asunder the unity of the gospel of Jesus Christ. It draws into its folds but a small fraction of the community. Its chief aim seems to be to build itself up at the expense of the community, rather than to build up the community out of it.

But there is beginning to dawn upon the rural church, here and there, a vision of its social functions. Rip Van Winkle-like, it has awakened from its long sleep to find that it is surrounded by a strange environment. It has discovered that, while in the good old Puritan times it was the center of the community and was its very life, today immigration, strange traditions, and multitudinous sects have swept it to one side, while many other organizations have become centers of community life. It has found that, while formerly life was narrowly individualistic, today it is broadly social; that centralization of power has de-individualized industry, redistributed the people, crowded the cities, drained the country, and transformed civilization; that a mere machine, a steam-engine, has upset the theology and polity of the eternal church.

The rural church is discovering that the great problem of the day is not merely the relation of one man to one God, but rather the relation of man to man; and that therein lies largely the relation of man to God. It is feeling the strong breath of a scientific spirit that is sweeping its dreamy security of authority from beneath its feet, leaving it to struggle for a foothold. A new science called psychology is jarring its peace by destroying its old concept of the soul, demonstrating with cruel logic the interdependence of body, mind, and spirit, and pointing out the fact that if one would save the soul he must save the whole man. Thus awakened, in wonder and dismay the church is going back with tottering steps to the companion of old, the Holy Scriptures, but only to see strange visions and faces. From the old familiar pages the newly discovered social teachings of Jesus stare it in the face. The old vision of a celestial heaven

as the kingdom of God has faded away, and there lies before it "there discovered kingdom of God on earth."

It is not the object of this paper to elaborate a program of reform. This can be worked out only through experience. A great many schemes have been suggested to prevent the present decay of the rural church, such as more music, brief liturgy, stereopticon, sensational methods, religious periodicals, enlarged giving, longer pastorates, proper apparatus, distribution of sermons, varied prayer meetings, blackboards, short sermons, political themes, rural missionaries, a visual service, and ecclesiastical superintendents. But as bulwarks of oak and rock will not check the ebb of the tide while the moon is upheaving the waters with drawing force, so no shortsighted reinforcements of present church methods will check the ebb of church decay so long as the drawing power of centralization is pulling the multitudes into social centers. In broad outline, however, the following would be the program of the church seeking to lead in the amelioration of rural life.

The church must, in the first place, secure unity in social action, if not in belief. This may be secured by a scientific knowledge of man physiologically and psychologically; by a scientific knowledge of society and its movements; by a true vision of the kingdom of God; by the Christ-like desire to sacrifice sectarian ambition for the good of the community. Secondly, the church must elaborate a program of social reform. This may be done by a scientific study of the social structure of the community; by a clear understanding and appreciation of its needs; by a clear vision of the ends of individual and social welfare; by a careful study of the casual conditions and connections; by a survey of the existing methods of amelioration actually in use, and by deriving the underlying principles therefrom.

Finally, this program may be realized by stimulating or instituting all institutions which may help in the working out of this program; *i. e.*, by conserving the home, and developing therein a happy, self-educating, and resourceful life; by promoting the centralization of the rural schools, and by securing the use of

the school buildings for the other activities of the community; by organizing a village improvement society to help attain all the ends of village welfare; by stimulating the organization of a Grange and a farmers' institute to help the more isolated members of the community realize complete living; or, if these organizations already exist, co-operating with them in the federation of all the social forces of the community; by causing the erection, if need be, of a central building in the village as a center of the civic, spiritual, social, and intellectual life of the community, where all of its uplifting elements may meet in closer union, sympathy, and co-operation; by making the church building a center of rural inspiration and regeneration through a clergy competent, confident of God, and consecrated to his service; a church building constructed in harmony with the activities of social and individual welfare; a polity and technique adapted to the needs of the community; a piety cultivated as a social interest, and not as an isolated selfish life; a doctrine interpreted in terms of life; and a salvation, social as well as individual.

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HEBRON, ILL.

OUR ISHMAEL.

You may see him in all our crowded centers of life, this Ishmael of the city desert, this appalling product of modern industrialism, this distorted travesty of childhood—the street boy, newsboy, bootblack, fakir; and in all these guises, convenient scapegoat upon whose defenseless head the undiscriminating policeman daily wreaks the vengeance of outraged society.

Thrust upon the street while yet a mere infant, and made to add his small quota to the family earnings, his pennies sometimes supplement the hard-earned dollars his mother—bending over the washboard, or crawling over office floors—painfully brings to the support of the family in a fatherless, or worse than fatherless, home. Sometimes the shortsighted greed of the Old World peasant sends the toddler to the pavement with the warning that it will not be well for him to return with unsold papers, or lacking their price in his baby hand.

Whatever be the motive that starts the boy upon his industrial career as a sidewalk merchant or mechanic, he usually continues in this primary commercial school until he is of an age and stature to command some more lucrative employment; for after a year or two of this vagrant life it is almost impossible to induce a boy to submit to the restraints of ordinary school life, even when, in rare cases, the opportunity opens for him to exchange the freedom of the street for the confinement and discipline of the schoolroom.

This training of the street produces certain well-marked effects upon those who survive its hardships—effects that lead the child of poor heredity, the degenerate, the weakling, by a clearly traceable path to the reform school, the house of correction, the penitentiary. But upon the boy of stronger fiber, possessed of physical vigor, ingenuity, will-power, and a certain elemental honesty, the effect of this harsh training is not, perhaps, altogether bad, considering the conditions he must meet as he advances in life; it certainly develops courage, persistency,

fertility of resource—traits that make for success in the commercial world of today. You will find little of the primal sweetness of childhood here; all that innocent bloom and fragrance that adorns the homes where children are tenderly cherished is soon trampled under foot and lost, when the blossom is flung into the mire of the street. The virtues and the vices of the street boy are his own, and the most striking characteristic of both is their unchildishness.

In this commercial school of the street the boy is cruelly trained to look sharply after number one; but in the poor home from which he comes he is taught, from the time he can run alone and voice his feeble battlecry upon the cross-ways, his obligation to others, more helpless than himself, if that be possible. For the sick mother, the baby brother, the father, superannuated in middle life by a process that is bringing him to the same goal, he works and denies himself, as a matter of course; and his unfailing zeal in the service of his family is certainly one of his shining virtues, in spite of the fact that it too often shows itself in glibbest mendacity, deftest sleight-of-hand, and a general impudence of cunning before which the mind "indifferent honest" stands bewildered.

Pass apples or cakes about in a crowd of these boys, and the rapidity with which they will disappear will convince you that a goodly number have been crammed into dirty pockets so surreptitiously that it would be impossible for the keenest eye to detect their passage. Subsequent investigation will show that very many of these goodies were taken home to younger brothers or sisters, or some sick or helpless member of the family to whom special consideration was due.

Boys who have apparently no disposition to take things from the club-room for their own use will not hesitate when tempted by an article which is needed at home; thus one little fellow whom I knew, and trusted, with wonderful secrecy and cunning extracted the tacks from a piece of oil cloth, and, when his guilt was brought home to him, confessed that he had taken them for his mother, who needed them to mend a chair. Another abstracted the colored plates from a magazine, to the indignation

of his fellows, and defended himself on the ground that "De baby's sick, ye know; and she likes pictures; dey keeps her from cryin'—see?" The club gave sympathetic consideration to this plea, but finally pronounced that "He didn't need to hook 'em," meaning that, if he had asked, they would, under these circumstances, have been given to him; and I doubt not they would have been. Sly as they are in these transactions "on de side," they are all very boastful of their prowess in legitimate business, and fond of comparing adventures around the club-room fire.

"Once I heard a man on de street say it was war," said a boy shortly after the blowing up of the "Maine." "I was playin' nibs in de alley; but wen I heard dat, I skipped home to get me money. I knew dere'd be a nextra. Me mudder was gone out, but I got de bank where we kept de money. I couldn't open it, but I smashed it wid a stone. Dere was most four dollars in it. I run all de way to de *Journal* office. I was de first. It was a beat—sure. I was out all night, and"—with immense pride—"I made most nine dollars." "What did you do with the money?" I asked. "O, I give it to me mudder; she had to have it for de kids."

"I made five dollars last time 'twas 'lection," said another, a pretty Russian-Jewish boy; "but I got so tired und sleepy. I went into a saloon and lay down by de stove. It was rainin'. I put me hand over me pocket dat had de money in, and went to sleep. But a bloke he moved me hand while I was sleepin', und took de money off me. I found out who he was, und I laid for him all right. One night I hid in de alley by de saloon, und when I see him comin', I up wid a big rock und took him in de back. You ought ter heard him holler!" It was the dreadful fate of this boy to see his mother burned to death in the explosion of a gasoline stove. A neighbor came running to tell me of the tragedy, and I went at once to the poor home. The wail of the orphan reached my ears as I turned into the alley upon which the board shanty fronted; but even while the boy clung to me, and sobbed out his grief and horror, he sought to make interest with me for the disposal of "de kids." He had four sisters, all younger than himself; and these were to be, for the

present at least, distributed among relatives of his mother; all as poor as himself, but all ready, as people of his race ever are, to help those of their own blood. But none of the overworked mothers could undertake "de baby." A place was found for this waif in a babies' home. And the big brother—he was then fourteen—went bravely to work, shouldering a responsibility that might have staggered a grown man. "I got to buy dere close anyways," he explained; "but I had to help before; father's no good."

A year later this boy was seized with typhoid fever, and languished for months in the county hospital. I visited him there and satisfied myself that he had good care. In his delirium he always hailed me with a mysterious, beckoning gesture; and, as I bent over him, invariably confided, in a hoarse whisper, while his hot hands clutched mine: "Dey took away me pants, Miss Law, and dere's fifteen hunder dollars in de pocket. Won't you please und take care of it for me? Dey want to steal me money off me. It's dat nurse dat done it." Night and day he raved of money, of bargains, and "swipes," over which he exulted slyly; or he recounted the things he had bought for "de kids;" or berated them with vivid expletives, for wearing out their shoes so fast. "But I'll git yer some more, sis!" he said once, adding as he turned wearily on his pillow: "You can't wear such thick ones like me, 'cause you're a girl." Some one injudiciously informed him, while he was convalescing, that he had accused the nurse of stealing from him, and he was deeply mortified and very penitent. "I feel so 'shamed," he said, as he sat one afternoon in his chair by the bedside, pushing back his long hair with his skeleton hand; "I feel so 'shamed to think I said dat to de nurse, und she was so good to me, too; but I told her I was sorry."

I have dwelt upon this case because it seems to me to be typical in many ways. I cannot picture this little fellow as a story-book saint. I have shown him exactly as I saw him; as, alas! I see him yet in my daily walks. He is now a tall, lanky youth of seventeen. The pretty boyish face is gone, and I discern more clearly every day the growing image of the low-

class young Jew—smart, cunning, with an inveterate propensity to lie in wait for shady opportunities, and chuckle over them in retrospect. He is still the newsboy, the itinerant street vender, the seeker after "swipes" of every description. He has been placed from time to time in good situations. He is generally liked by his employers, but he will not stay with them; in every case he soon wanders back to the street. He seems to make sufficient money, and he sometimes stops me to recount with pride the efforts he is making in behalf of "de kids," who are fast growing up, and will soon be out in the world for themselves.

It may be said of our Ishmael that he is always a liar, if not from the womb, at least from the doorstep whence he makes his first plunge into the world. He is a fighter, of course; his little fist is always clenched, and he is as noisy and vainglorious in his bullying as the sparrows that share the street with him. Not long since on a crowded street in Milwaukee, my attention was attracted to a writhing tangle of small legs and arms in the gutter beside me. Descending to investigate, I discovered two newsboys administering a "thumping" to a smaller boy, a mere mite, possibly five years old. The mite's pretty yellow curls were all mud-bedabbled, and his tears mingled with gore from his smitten nose as he rose and promptly ran away upon my releasing him. "Very nice boys you are!" I remarked severely, as I set the culprits upon the curbstone, keeping fast hold of their ragged collars as I did so. "Two big boys beating a little one!" "Well, well!" they both eagerly protested at once; "wat does he allers cut in ahead for? De folks buys papers off him 'cause he's little und his hair curls. He ain't no better'n us. We told him to keep on his own beat; but he won't—no! And when a man stops to buy a paper, up he comes a-runnin' und sticks hisself in; und de ladies dey say, 'Oh, wat a prettey boy! Wat lo-ovely curls!' (this in high falsetto voice, and with indescribable affectations of fine ladyism). "We'll pretty him. Dere he goes now." They snatched their collars from my hold, and sped away in pursuit of their interrupted vengeance.

One trait of our boy, that stands in the way of his social

betterment, is his rooted distrust of all endeavor in his behalf. The first task of one who would do him good must be to gain his confidence; and this is no easy matter. The idea that beneath every expression of interest, every offered kindness, lies some deep-laid, sinister scheme to "work him" has been too deeply ingrained by his commercial training to be easily overcome. "Ah, wat yer givin' us?" is the question too often flung at the missionary or the settlement worker who approaches him with benevolent intent. Yet, his confidence once won, his unswerving loyalty may be depended upon; though he will show you his appreciation only in his own wild way.

Of all the means that have been devised for opening the gates of life a little wider before these prematurely aged young faces, these lamentably worldly young eyes, the boys' club has been, I believe, the most productive of lasting impressions for good. The democratic spirit of such an institution, properly conducted, seems well suited to their habits and ways of looking at things. One seeking to help them meets them here on the level of an apparent equality. The attitude of authority is not taken, nor is the note of dictation ever sounded. Thus one sees the boys as they really are, and learns the best ways of coming into personal contact with them individually.

Nor should this level of equality in the club-room be merely apparent. A boys' club should be, like any other, under the control of its members; this is, at least, the ideal which the leader should keep in view; nor is it practically unattainable. The inexperienced worker will be, I venture to say, surprised, at every step in this direction, to discover that very much of the working policy of the club may be safely intrusted to the plain business sense and keen wits of the boys, when once their interest in their club and their ambition for its success have been aroused.

As an illustration of this fact I call to mind an experience in a large newsboys' club with which I have been connected for the past six years. A young lady, rich and generous, came to me one summer, as we were about to close for the season, and expressed a desire to give the boys some kind of an outing as a

climax to the work of the year. She had set her heart on a steamer-ride down our beautiful bay, and far out into Lake Michigan, but had been a little dismayed to find that the steamer, with accompaniments of music and supper, would cost far more than she had expected. "I don't grudge them the money," said the young lady; "but is it wise to spend so much in an afternoon pleasure trip? We need so many things for the club next winter." The question being left to me for decision, I proposed that we submit it to the boys themselves; adding that, if we did so, we must be prepared to abide by their decision. This was done at once. I put the matter fairly before them, with all the arguments for and against, and we awaited their decision. It was not long in coming; some of the smaller boys clamored for the boat-ride, but the older ones were almost unanimous in voting against it. "Don't you spend all that money that way," they said; "we'd rather have it in the club next winter."

This sentiment of joint ownership in the club, of responsibility for its policy, is also the most effective check upon the thievish propensities of its members that can possibly be devised. To seek to circumvent their long-practiced cunning by a strict use of guards, locks, and constant espionage is a futile, as well as an ignoble, policy. It is a descending to the moral level of those whom you seek to uplift. Here, as elsewhere, it will be found that evil cannot be conquered by evil, but that good will conquer by disarming the evil desire.

When a boy has so far conquered the covetousness his hard lot of deprivation has bred into him that he can, night after night, use tools and games which all boys desire to possess, and at the closing hour put them in their places and leave them behind him, he has taken his first lesson, probably, in that social conduct which makes of the individual a good citizen of his community. I speak from personal experience when I assert that this lesson can be successfully taught by instilling the communal instinct into the life of the boys' club.

Again, one must consider the power of suggestion upon the imitative, inquisitive mind of the child. To parade an elaborate system of precautions against stealing before the eyes of boys

who have long made a careful study of possibilities in the way of overcoming these precautions, is to stimulate invention in the same direction; to put the boy who is proud of his ingenuity in foiling policemen and picking locks, upon his mettle. Far better is it to ignore such possibilities entirely; to awaken the boy's interest in other directions; to impress him with the idea that the club and all its furnishings are his, and can be best left intact for his use and that of his comrades.

One of the first things to be done is to win the leaders of "de gang," who always come to the front at once and act as spokesmen for the crowd. To circumvent the bully, and convert him from a jeering enemy to an applauding friend, may prove an arduous task, but it will always be worth while, from every point of view; and to make it apparent to him that you need his countenance and assistance in the conduct of affairs is usually the straight road to that result. You will often find that, under such responsibilities as you can impose upon him, he will after a while forget to snatch and crowd, and show himself assiduous in generosity and untiring in labors for the general good. The bully is by no means sure to prove the worst boy in the club, and will often develop into the most promising.

In these hardy boys, scantily clothed, poorly fed, inured to hardships of heat, cold, and wet, we do not find that sexual precocity of which we hear so much in these days from the teachers and guardians of boys more tenderly reared. Profanity and unclean language, indeed, roll out of the street boy's mouth as they might out of a talking machine into which they had been generously poured; but, in spite of this, he is really rather clean-minded than otherwise, and is noticeably free of those vices which sometimes wreck the boy whose life is far above his in point of privilege.

Here I may recount the significant fact that during my six years' service I encountered but one boy so persistently obscene in his language and conduct that even the janitor of the building where we met demanded his expulsion. He was a bright, rosy, pretty boy of twelve, a visitor from a luxurious home near

by. The German family from which he came was rather noted for indulgence in the use of wines and highly spiced foods. The little Arabs of the club laughed at this boy's obscenities, but passed them by as matters not particularly interesting to them.

The boys' club in our cities supplements, and in some cases takes the place of, the uncomfortable, unwholesome, unhomely home. "Home" for the street boy too often means a crowded room or two into which he may creep, late at night, and with fear and trembling if the day's business has been bad. In such a place he seeks but to crawl unobserved into some corner where, without washing or removing his clothes, he may rest his tired body and lose his troubled young soul for a few hours in the unconsciousness of sleep. Even when his home is fairly clean and comfortable, blessed with motherly love and fatherly care, there is usually so much privation, such stinting of wholesome childish joys, such gnawing anxieties, such grinding, incessant toil, that the boy craves some cheering, brightening, social life outside. The same need that drives his father, after a day of monotonous, uninteresting toil in the factory or the rolling-mill, to the saloon, drives the boy to the club-house; and there the lover of childhood may find him, and find that he will tax all the patience, all the love, that can be brought to bear upon him there.

I have talked with many people on the subject of boys' clubs, and have found that one great barrier to their multiplication is the belief that nothing can be accomplished in them without great expenditure of money. This is, I think, a mistake. We have in this country a few well-known club-houses for boys, reared and equipped with great outlay of money, and also with great care and wisdom, I am sure. Those who are privileged to work with the appliances of gymnasiums, bath-rooms, manual-training rooms, and libraries which these provide, are happy indeed, and should do effective work under such favoring conditions. But these things, desirable and helpful as they are, are not indispensable. Have them if you can—you who feel moved to take a hand in this noblest rescue work; rejoice over them with exceeding great joy, if they come to

you; but if they are unattainable, I beg you to believe that you can do good and great work without them. Go into one of the congested spots in your city where these boys live; hire a room, accessible to the street, and where no one will be disturbed by noise in the evening. Make this room warm and light; this is the first requisite. How many times have I heard the expression fervently uttered by blue lips as the small, shivering lads came running in out of the winter night: "Gee, it's warm! Ain't dis bully?"

Have plenty of cheap, stout tables and chairs. Cover the walls with pictures; the tables with books, magazines, and illustrated papers. These may be second-hand, given by people who have read them and are glad to give them away, if you cannot afford to have new ones. There are many inexpensive games that interest boys; I have found that checkers never palls, but will be taken up, evening after evening, with unfailing zest. Keep a corner where the smaller boys can play "mibs." As soon as you can, put a punching-bag in another corner. Bring as many bright, cultured, and interesting people to meet the boys as you can persuade to come. Nothing will please the boys better, and nothing will do them more good. For yourself, do not be too effusive; do not smile perfunctorily, nor affect anything you do not really feel. Children always detect the sham, and these children resent it openly. Above all things, don't be preachy-preachy; don't point the moral; don't adorn the tale with the too garishly apt personal application. Don't be intrusive in your desire to be helpful; don't plan their games for them, to the minutest detail. Never mind about teaching them anything at first; it is not teaching they need, but socializing—humanizing.

A piano is a most excellent thing to have; and easy to obtain for this purpose in any city. I have found dealers ever willing to contribute—not a Steinway grand perhaps, but an instrument upon which dance music and popular songs may be played sufficiently well. If you are fortunate enough to be able to keep a pretty, gentle young lady on the piano stool three hours at a stretch, be sure the boys will throng around her until you will fear for her life.

It always interested me to note the choice of the boys in the matter of songs. The popular street song of the day has its vogue, of course, and passes; but in our club, there were certain established favorites which were demanded every evening, and never failed to evoke a roof-lifting chorus, that stopped the passers on the sidewalk and made them look inquiringly into our uncurtained windows. One of these was "A Hot Time in the Old Town Tonight." At the first sound of

> When you hear those bells go ting-a-ling,
> All join hands and sweetly we will sing,

the last boy would come running from the farthest corner, crowding his marbles into his pockets as he ran, to join in the favorite chorus. But the song of songs in our club has ever been that lugubrious ditty "The Drummer-Boy's Farewell." If there ever was a time when anxious spectators really feared that the delicate little girl on the piano stool would be crushed between the mass of crowding boys and the front of the instrument, when the inexperienced cast doubtful looks at the cornice and the windows, it was when every voice was lifted in the chorus:

> O break the news to mother; she knows how dear I love her;
> And kiss her dear, sweet face for me—
> For I'm not coming home.

The never-failing popularity of this song could only have been on account of the sentiment it expressed. The music was of the wailing, dragging kind particularly abhorred by the boys. It must have been the picture evoked—of a boy, wounded, lying on the ground, at night, after the great battle; lonely, suffering, and longing for his mother. Of course, nothing would have induced the smallest boy to acknowledge this interest; and if any bystander had been so ill-advised as to seek to improve the occasion by appealing to such sentiment as the song suggested, he would, in all probability, have been greeted by a howl of derision and a request to "come off." I would not have the prospective leader of the boys' club draw the conclusion from this paper that the work is easy, or that appreciable results will quickly follow. You will, dear worker, be an object of deep

suspicion, perhaps for many months. Your least mistake will be greeted with yells of derision. The boys will take what you give them, and stand aloof, with watchful, doubtful eyes. There will seem to be a diabolical conspiracy among them to make all the trouble they possibly can, and the demon of destruction will be let loose. Never mind! This is the test they put you to. If they break the lock on the front door, say nothing; buy another one. If the padlock, which is your next resort, is smashed with a stone, rebuke the dealer who sold it to you, if you choose, but not the boy who broke it, even if you can find him—which you cannot. If a bedlam of disorderly conduct breaks out suddenly and unaccountably some evening, do not expostulate or accuse. It is probably a concerted thing, as deliberately planned as a general would plan a battle. Simply put out the lights, lock the door, and go away, regardless of any amount of expostulation from disappointed and protesting boys. Leave the place dark for a while, and let them speculate on the chances of your ever coming back again. Remember you have no authority; to assume any will be instantly fatal. Remember, too, that these children have been knocked about, wronged, robbed, imposed upon, driven hither and thither by policemen, till all the sweet likeness of childhood has been beaten out of them. Yet they are still children. The childish heart has been cruelly maimed and scarred; it is thick crusted over with that armor of deceit and indifference which is the only protection of the weak; but it is still there. You must find it; and there is but one road to the heart of man.

After a while there will come a blessed lull in hostilities. The tide will turn; they will begin to watch for you, and come running to meet you. Some accident will disclose a passion of gratitude and affection in some little breast, and when it breaks out it will be contagious. Then your heart will swell with happiness. But do not expect too much; there will be no wing-growing yet. The poison of evil, working so long, so persistently, cannot be eradicated in a few months or even years. You may, however, permit yourself a long breath at this point, and you may assure yourself that the worst is over.

I have in mind at this moment a group of youths, ranging in age from seventeen to twenty years, with whom I have been intimately associated for six years. They came to me first as newsboys and bootblacks, but they are now all mechanics, or other artisans, earning each from one to two dollars a day. There are about thirty-five of them. These are the boys who, through all vicissitudes of removal and change, have stuck to the club, until they now feel that they have outgrown it.

For two years they have had a club of their own, self-sustaining, with limited membership, a constitution, and regular business and social meetings. The presiding officer this winter is a good parliamentarian, and the business meetings are, for the most part, conducted with a goodly degree of decorum, though debate is sometimes windy, and we are at all times liable to sudden, and to me perfectly unaccountable, bursts of hilarity that are sadly disconcerting, and seem always to fall like untimely frosts upon my most serious efforts. The members of this club, as I see them at the meetings, are well-looking, well-dressed, stalwart young fellows, bright, alert, and ambitious. I believe them to be the pick of, perhaps, five hundred boys whose acquaintance I have made during the time I have known them. They are certainly promising in many ways, yet even the eye of love cannot blink their defects. The cruel marks of their street-training are still upon them. They, will, I fear, never be quite rubbed out.

The low ideals of a cheap social life, the craving for excitement born of their childish privations and stimulated by the daily grind of monotonous toil—too early thrust upon them—these lay them open to the temptations of the saloon, the dance-hall, and the low vaudeville "show." Alas, that it is so difficult to interest them in amusements more elevating in tendency! Not less deplorable are the low political standards toward which their young eyes are even now turning; for as they approach the age of full citizenship, the heeler and the boss are already getting in their deadly work. Many of them drink moderately, some of them immoderately at times; nearly all are users of tobacco. With them, life is taken so lightly, so recklessly. They are still

so cruel at some moments, so generous at others; so irresponsible at all times. In but one thing, it seems, are they steadfast: their loyalty to their friend and adviser has long been absolutely without a flaw.

That these and others have been greatly helped by their social life in the club it is impossible to doubt; that the result is in every case painfully unsatisfying, lamentably inadequate to the need, every worker must deeply feel.

The boys' club does not and cannot strike at the root of those evils that blight so many young lives in our cities; it is, at best, but a palliative; but it is one sorely needed in many an arid waste of our civilization, wherein our Ishmael yet roams, uncared for; his hand against every man — every man's hand against him.

When the home, the school, and the church are everything to the boy that they should be, he will have no need of the club. Until that day, it has its mission and stands second in importance to none of the great philanthropic schemes that serve, at least, to keep the fire of human love alive in the midst of a cold and materialistic age.

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REVIEWS.

The Social Unrest: Studies in Labor and Socialist Movements. By JOHN GRAHAM BROOKS. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1903. Pp. 394.

FEW investigators in this field have not crossed the path of Mr. Brooks in the cities of America and Europe. A large part of the evidence in this volume has been gleaned from conversations and correspondence, and one is invited to listen to the confidential admissions of labor leaders, socialists, and capitalists in the privacy of closed offices and back parlors.

"Social unrest" arises from justified suspicion. Capitalists complain of the bad conduct and low character of miners and woodcutters, yet import more of the same kind to help break strikes. They decry "paternalism," praise individualism and self-reliance, yet lobby for high tariffs, purchase franchises, corrupt courts, and fatten on privileges. They antagonize labor unions and construct colossal combinations. They admit the abstract right of laboring men to unite, but use all available means to crush them as soon as they become effective. Business uses up men until they are fifty years old and then abandons them, crippled and sick, to the chances of old age. Society devises vast advantages from the introduction of inventions, but throws the cost on those least able to bear it.

Politics and business have already united; the "trust" has compelled the public to look to governments for protection. Free competition without regulation is confessedly a failure, for it digs its own grave.

Social unrest is not entirely new, and it is not confined to trade unions and socialists. The civilized world is in ferment, eager for something new and better. Even the placid waters of the Orient are disturbed by mature commerce and culture. The newspapers irritate and awaken dormant desires. Business men and taxpayers who are enemies of socialism are more ready to welcome governmental interference when they see city councils bought up for private interests, profits concealed, and privileges of a few made a burden upon generations unborn.

All classes are enjoying wealth and comforts impossible to our ancestors, but a sense of justice requires that special favors should not unduly enrich a few. "A man can't die on skim milk, but you don't like to see a few at a side table take all the cream."

The fear of private control of government haunts the thought even of those who a few years ago most bitterly denounced state aid and extension of municipal functions. "There is a growing conviction that private ownership may gather to itself such strength and mastery as to control politics and defeat the very beginnings of democratic government."

The trade-union movement is a part of the general life of democracy. It "rests on the assumption that the production and distribution of wealth, as now managed, ought to be and can be so far changed as to give the laborer more power in deciding the terms under which he works."

In a study of the effects of machinery and the attitude of trade unions toward labor-saving devices, the author shows how antiquated is American law in relation to modern conditions. The doctrine of employers' liability, which was suited to the small shop, is absurd when applied to a complicated mill. "The average business now insures against accidents in some private company, whose skilled lawyer knows every device to beat the injured workman in the courts." It is almost impossible to get a hearing in America for the principle which underlies the German insurance laws and for an imperial experience with those beneficent laws. "Here and there private corporations act honorably toward their injured workmen, but the general mass of crippled life in our country is indemnified, if at all, with a meanness, with a fickleness and uncertainty, that is a reproach to our civilization." No nation has realized such immense benefits from machinery, and no people has so loaded the laboring class with the disadvantages which come with improvements.

The "master passion" of democracy is not for absolute equality and monotony of existence, but for equality of opportunity for man, woman, and child.

If trade unions are defeated, socialism is at the door. Thus said the conservative Professor Clark in his essay on trusts, and our more radical author agrees with him. The hope of wage-workers, when they are not sunk in apathy, is now in the trade unions; but even in these there is a strong and aggressive socialistic membership who actually wish the unions to fail. Whenever a strike is defeated capitalist man-

agers unite with socialists in singing a hymn of thanksgiving—but for opposite reasons. The modern organization of industry and trade multiplies dependents and diminishes the number of managers. This seems to be a clear triumph of those who are fortunate enough or strong enough to hold the reins and drive. But there is another side. Government is the creature of votes. It is true legislators may be bought and administrators may be hired by the long purse, and, for a time, the mob may be dazzled and confused. But power which depends on bribery, ignorance, and fear is on the crumbling edge of an abyss. Modern workingmen will have something to say about their income, their physical surroundings, their hours of toil, their personal treatment. They are willing to concede to the managers the control of capital and machinery, but not of their own persons. If the trade union is ruined, the alternative is the conquest of life through the ballot; that is socialism.

The author shows that even socialism is not so much to be feared if it is properly educated, not by articles and sermons, but by actual share in administration, as in co-operative associations and in municipal business. He looks for a treaty between the fair and honorable men of both parties, as in the joint agreement, in experimental extensions of municipal functions, and in arrangements for greater publicity of corporations, as well as in a toning down of autocratic arrogance of employers and a deepening sense of partnership.

CHARLES R. HENDERSON.

The Negro Artisan. By W. E. B. DuBois. [Atlanta University Publication No. 7.] Atlanta: The Atlanta University Press. Pp. 132. $0.50.

THIS work is the most exhaustive study thus far made of the economic aspects of the negro problem. The particular phases studied are "a study of skilled work and the training of black boys for it."

Speaking of the economics of emancipation, Mr. DuBois draws some very interesting and important conclusions. He points out that after emancipation the negro mechanic, for several years, had a monopoly of the southern labor market. Three occurrences, however, soon disturbed the situation: (*a*) the competition of white mechanics; (*b*) the efforts of the negro for self-protection; (*c*) the new industrial development of the South. "These changes were spread over a number of years, and are not yet complete, but are the real explanation of

certain facts which have hitherto been explained in false and inadequate ways." The negro lost the monopoly of the southern labor field, not through his own carelessness, but because he could not meet the competition of his more skilled white competitor, and on account of the industrial changes in the country. "The negro was especially ignorant in the very lines of mechanical and industrial development in which the South has taken the longest strides in the last thirty years." The fact that the negro almost invariably worked for lower wages than other persons is accounted for on the ground that when white contractors, after emancipation, began to hire him, there was no one, as formerly, to see that he was adequately paid. Again, "as the white mechanics pressed forward, the only refuge of the negro was in lower wages." Further, it was only through lower wages that he secured any share in the new industries. "By that means he was enabled to replace white laborers in many branches, but he thereby increased the enmity of trades unions and labor leaders."

It is maintained that the granting of the suffrage was economically necessary. After emancipation,

> What the negro mechanic needed then was social protection—the protection of law and order, perfectly fair judicial processes, and that personal power which is in the hands of all modern laboring classes in civilized lands, viz., the right of suffrage. . . . . If the whole class of mechanics here, as in the Middle Age, had been without the suffrage and half-free, the negro would have had an equal chance with the white mechanic, and could have afforded to wait. But he saw himself coming more and more into competition with men who had the right to vote, the prestige of race and blood—the negro saw clearly that his industrial rise depended, to an important degree, upon his political power, and he therefore sought that power.

The results of the study are summarized as follows:

> The slavery-trained artisans were for the most part careless and inefficient. Industrial schools are needed. They are costly, although not yet well organized or very efficient, but they have given the negro an ideal of manual toil, and helped to a better understanding between whites and negroes in the South. There are a large number of negro mechanics all over the land, but especially in the South. Some of these are progressive, efficient workmen. . . . . There are signs of lethargy among these artisans, and work is slipping from them in some places; in others they are awakening and seizing the opportunities of the new industrial South. The labor unions, with 1,200,000 members have less than 40,000 negroes, mostly in a few unions, and largely semi-skilled laborers, like miners. Color prejudice keeps the mass of negroes out of many trades. Employers on the whole are satisfied

with negro skilled labor. The employment of negro skilled labor is slowly increasing. The negro evinces considerable mechanical ingenuity.

The present situation is as follows:

The southern laborer and the employer have united to disfranchise the negro and to make a color caste; the northern laborer is striving to make the whites unite with the negroes and maintain wages; the employer threatens that if they do raise labor troubles he will employ negroes. The northern laborer sees here the danger of a disfranchised, degraded, and yet skilled competition, and raises the note of warning.

MONROE N. WORK.

CHICAGO.

Religious Life in America: A Record of Personal Observation. By ERNEST HAMLIN ABBOTT. New York: The Outlook Co., 1902. Pp. 370.

THIS volume records the results of a long tour of observation in the southern, middle, and western states, whose purpose it was to study the phenomena of religious life. The method of securing facts is that of the interviewer, not that of the statistician, and it yields very readable results, starting problems which the statistical method may treat with more fulness and accuracy, if with less vividness.

The author thinks that the South is undergoing a quiet and almost insensible change in the direction of a more liberal theology, and that the negroes give evidence of progress. The West will become politically supreme. Its religious influence is not felt so much in theological conceptions as in practical life and experiments in church methods. "The middle West is no more enterprising in business affairs than it is in religious schemes. Indeed, nowhere else has Christianity been so diversely garbed or so variously vulgarized. At the same time, religion in the middle West is essentially conventional. Its standards are, generally speaking, external rather than intrinsic." The middle West insists on the social bearing of religion. "The pioneer West . . . . may be godless, wicked, sordid—though I do not say that it is—but above all things it is genuine. . . . . What influence it exerts in religion must be in creating and intensifying the hatred of sham and the love of reality and candor."

Everywhere the church is an ethical power, but nowhere lives up to its ideals. Intellectually the ministers who have been educated are frequently held back by laymen "whose mental attitude has been unaffected by modern knowledge, except to be made more obstinately traditional." In the same way the efforts of sympathetic ministers to

gain the confidence of working people and to break down artificial class barriers in the church are hindered by the arrogance of certain conspicuous, if not representative, members.

Movements toward union of churches are not on doctrinal ground, but are inspired by the aims of practical religious activity. The freedom of the church in America is entirely advantageous to religion.

Such are some of the generalizations added to the record of scattered but significant observations. Those who desire to understand the nature and power of religion in our social life will find here material for reflection, and the story is told in a very attractive form.

CHARLES RICHMOND HENDERSON.

Rich and Poor in the New Testament: A Study of the Primitive-Christian Doctrine of Earthly Possessions. By ORELLO CONE. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1902. Pp. 245. $1.50.

THE author seeks to place before us the historical situation and view-point of Jesus and the New Testament writers, to interpret the text historically and grammatically and find what there may be in the spirit of the teachings that is applicable to modern social conditions. Nothing can here be said of his methods of dealing with the record. The results reached are summarized in the closing paragraph: "We must leave it to the students of social science to point out in detail the means of solving the intricate problems that wealth and poverty force upon their attention. Our task has been accomplished if we have succeeded in showing how in a general way the ethical ideals presented in the New Testament may furnish guidance and inspiration in this great task." In the New Testament, then, is no social philosophy nor the outlines of a social system; it belongs to the literature of power, not to the library of science. Those who hope to find in the religious teachings of primitive Christianity an easy substitute for hard thinking have perverted a book of inspiration and hindered true progress in science.

C. R. HENDERSON.

Die Ideale der Humanität. Von PROFESSOR TH. G. MASARYK. Wien: Carl Konigen, 1902. Pp. 48.

THESE essays are based upon popular university extension lectures delivered in Prague, and sketch not only great tendencies of German philosophy, but also their peculiar forms in Bohemia. The author

regards the ideal of humanity as the foundation of all modern movements, and it is expressed in various forms which are here outlined and criticised: socialism and the economic theories of Marx and Engels; individualism, with particular reference to Hirner and Nietzsche and the Anarchists: utilitarianism, pessimism, evolutionism, positivism. In the last lecture the author presents the principles of his own "Modern Ethics of Humanity": religion, in a liberal sense, is the basis of morals; love, as feeling, is the central force in morality, but not love apart from reason; the fact of solidarity gives the rational ground for duty, and duty consists chiefly in habitual devotion to common welfare, not in exceptional acts of martyrdom. What "welfare" includes is not distinctly stated.

C. R. Henderson.

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS.

The Domain of Utilitarian Ethics.—Utilitarian ethics, when understood in the terms by which its principal advocates have undertaken to expound it, has always been open to successful attack from its opponents. The intuitionists have triumphantly urged against it that pleasure is neither the immediate nor the ultimate end of ethical conduct; that the contemplation of pleasure as an object of desire can never arouse the feeling expressed by the word "ought," and that the idea of pleasure is not an essential element in the consciousness of a moral agent when incited to perform a moral act.

Mr. John Morley has called attention to a statement by Aristotle, which should be regarded as the cardinal maxim of personal morals: "The wise man seeks after freedom from pain, not pleasure." This practical rule, although not intended as anything more than a guide to prudent conduct for the benefit of the individual, may nevertheless be so paraphrased as to express the fundamental principle of ethics that "the moral man is he whose actions are directed to the avoidance, prevention, removal, or alleviation of pain whenever and wherever imminent or present, and whether affecting himself or his fellow-men, but wholly irrespective of any pleasure which may thereby be attained or promoted except in the negative sense of relief from painful experience."

The great masters of utilitarianism have not attended to this distinction. Does the production of pleasure come to the same thing in morals as the prevention of pain? The feeling of moral obligation undoubtedly appertains to that form of utility which tends to prevent the happening of pain or evil either to the community in general or to a particular individual; but this surely does not hold true of that other form of utility which tends to produce benefit or happiness of a positive kind.

If the utilitarian theory of morals should be so stated as to make the terms "right" and "wrong" exactly the reverse of each other in meaning and co-extensive in their range of application, its position would be unassailable.

Wrongful acts are universally recognized as comprised in one or the other of two categories. They are either those of direct performance, by which suffering is inflicted or augmented, or those of wilful non-performance, by which the prevention or mitigation of suffering is refused or neglected. In like manner acts which are right, when viewed strictly according to moral standards, are also embraced within two categories corresponding to those of wrongful acts, but diametrically opposite thereto in character. They are, first, acts of abstention from the infliction or augmentation of suffering; and, second, acts of direct endeavor to prevent or mitigate suffering.

Hence it results that negative beneficence is the reverse of positive malevolence, and that positive beneficence is the reverse of negative malevolence. Pain is the invariable and essential subject-matter of both morality and immorality. The one is concerned solely with its elimination or prevention; the other, always with its generation and continuance.

In the domain of morality, the conduct of the moral agent is concerned with two classes of pains; namely, those which may be experienced by himself, and those which may be experienced by others. Each of these classes of pains may be divided into those which are believed to arise from natural causes and those believed to be inflicted by supernatural agencies. Hence, a further division of morality into secular morals and religious morals.

These distinctions will be found helpful in considering the question of moral progress. Among the lowest varieties of the human race, man has the least foresight, the least regard for the welfare of others, and the least fear of natural consequences. His morals, therefore, are concerned with evils which are immediate, which relate chiefly to himself, and which are largely superstitious. On the contrary, civilized

man orders his conduct with reference to the future, to the welfare of his fellow-men, and to the ascertained laws of nature.

Hence, while morality is fundamentally the same for all men — the determination of conduct to avoid, prevent, or alleviate pain — there is concretely very little in common between the morals of savage and civilized man. Ethical progress has been in proportion to the subordination of present interests to future interests, of personal interests to social interests, and of religious interests to secular interests. Moral progress has resulted, not from any change in the fundamental character of the moral sense, but rather from the enlargement of its field of operation. It has always been aroused by consciousness of pain experienced by, or threatened to, self; but the particular conduct resulting from it has ever been determined by the existing constitution of that self.

The conspicuous fact in the history of morals is that what modern philosophy terms altruism has undergone great development with the progress of civilization. There can be no doubt that its essence consists in the emotional impulses of the individual animated by it to ward off evil from his fellows. It is the extension of the feeling which actuates the individual in keeping himself from harm to the broader emotion which prompts him to save others likewise from painful experience.

All systems of ethics recognize that moral conduct involves self-restraint or self-sacrifice, and hence utilitarian ethics which regards the prevention or alleviation of pain as the purpose of morality becomes open to the charge of occupying the paradoxical position that its ultimate object can be attained by creating in the consciousness of the moral agent one painful state in order to destroy or abate another. Such a change is hardly an adequate statement of the facts. Morality in many cases, as in refraining from doing bodily harm to another, or committing theft, has become organic with most civilized people and is not attended by any present sense of sacrifice. In every moral action which has not become organic there must be a conscious choice between evils. Pain is to be avoided always, if possible, but when the harm to be prevented by the moral act is clearly seen by the moral agent to involve greater pain than that which he would suffer in performing such act, then his conscience prompts him to perform it.— GEORGE L. ROBERTS, in *International Journal of Ethics.*

A. B.

Occupation as the Basis of Social Organization.—I. The organization of the people on the basis of trade. The most important aspect of the scheme of the capitalistic economy is probably the fact that the skilled laborer, who possesses the knowledge of the labor first hand, is not interested in the economic outcome of his activity. The manager of the product, who alone has an interest in the economic outcome of it, is no longer a skilled workman, and has no longer the least qualitative relation to the material content of his activity. He develops the abilities of a retailer. The product is readily exchanged in the market. How shall he, then, develop a knowledge of the trade as distinct from the business end? He comes in direct contact with it at most once a year — in the calculation of the accident insurance or in the consultation of the tariff sheets. But no satisfactory organization of the trades engaged in the establishment can be made upon that basis. To the most stupid of our stupid thoughts in this time of prosperity belongs, therefore, this one: the desire to organize a modern state upon the foundation of professional or trade distinctions.

II. Profit-sharing, past and present, compared. The changes can be noted from two distinct points of view: one can compare the condition of affairs one hundred years ago with that which obtains today, and note the differences; or one can consider the changes which the old status has undergone during the hundred years. These distinct modes of viewing the matter bring quite diverse results, and to this is due the fact that in the discussion of the problem the most diverse and frequently opposite opinions have been given, and doubtless, in many cases, rightly.

Time has demonstrated a few things; (1) It is not true that the poor have grown poorer; on the contrary, the poorest are richer today than they were a hundred years ago, whether you consider the poorest one hundred thousand or ten million. (2) It is certainly not true that the moderate incomes — say, between 900 and 3,000 marks — have become fewer, but, on the other hand, more powerful. (3) It is not true that the

number of the rich is continually growing less; on the other hand, it can everywhere be observed that this class is increasing in number.

For "the continually decreasing number of capital magnates" people, this means nothing: statistics are turned and twisted at will. The nearer we come to the breaking up of the capitalistic system of economy, the more the "expropriators" swarm about. The business of expropriation will always grow less.

If now the income statistics has already done enough mischief in preventing general theories of economic development, it is doomed in the eyes of all social moralists. The development of profit-sharing has been pointed to quite as frequently in the praise as in the disparagement of capitalism, and for the last ten years a book has appeared biannually in opposition to the capitalistic system of economy, on the ground of the inequality of the division of property; while this has produced the contradictory statement that the present economic system is the best of all systems, for the support of which proposition the elevation of the lower classes is pointed out.

If it is now, in my opinion, inadmissible and unworthy of science to participate in such pot-house politics as the question whether the world is growing better or worse, then it is quite as dangerous to employ income statistics as weapons in the struggle of opinions.

First: When we want to answer the question whether the influence of profit-sharing upon the economic system has been favorable or unfavorable, we must reply that during the period whose beginning and end we have in mind a change has taken place in the condition of the masses. What, then, do we demand of an economic system — that it support an increased population just as comfortably as it formerly did a smaller one, or that it support with a similar livelihood the population of the beginning of the period? For the nineteenth century this question is, as is apparent, of special significance — a century in which the population of Germany has doubled. I mean that when an economic system brings it about that twice the population of a country is supported, and that more comfortably, with the means of happiness, when it supports thirty million more people without apparently lowering the level of existence, then it is doing a service which is without precedent in history. For me, this fact borders on the marvelous, and when I reflect on the development of the empire at leisure, I understand the bulwark and co-worker, when the capitalistic order of affairs is looked upon as established by God. That a hundred thousand people do not die of hunger in Germany nowadays is worthy of contemplation.

I can imagine that without much trouble one could make a register of the sins of capital, large enough to develop hate and opposition in the hearts of many against this system of economy. It has brought to us "the masses;" it has robbed our lives of the inner rest; it has estranged us to nature; it has deprived us of the joy of our fathers in that it solved the world mathematically, and awoke in us an overvaluation of the things of this life; it has brought the great mass of the people into a slavish relation of dependence upon a small number of *enterpreneurs*. But in return it has rendered a service of a wonderful nature: it has made it possible to support a continually increasing population on the best in the market; it has solved the problem of provisions in quite a masterly way, and better than any economic conception preceding it. If we take the standpoint of pure quantity and pass judgment from it, then capitalism is surrounded with a halo of glory as it writes in glowing words: thirty million more people.

Second: Another thought arises with every attempt to determine the value of an economic system from the figures of income statistics. The numbers, because they determine pure quantity, do not indicate the important elements. For we dare not forget that back of the commensurable numbers stand the incommensurable qualities of subjective satisfaction of needs. We must guard against the error that we can measure the significance of a definite income in different periods by the price of any particular articles of consumption. The periods stand in absolute unrelatedness, for the distinguishing elements are the imponderable and immeasurable circumstances in the application and use of the incomes. The bare numbers are meaningless. We must get behind them. We must get at the nature and worth of an economic culture.— WERNER SOMBART, "Beruf und Besitz," in *Archiv für soziale Gesetzgebung und Statistik*, Vol. XVIII, 1903.

A. D. S.

The Sense of Danger and the Fear of Death.—A sense of danger is, and always has been, a necessity of conscious life. We can trace its beginnings in the most lowly creatures; we can follow its evolution through all the phases of animal consciousness; we can imagine how important a function it fulfilled in the gregarious life of savage men; and now, under a veneer of latter-day culture, we still discover it as one of the most constant and characteristic elements in human consciousness. In all studies of the natural history of consciousness we read of the instinct for life, the strenuous avoidance of injury and death, as fundamental. If we analyze this instinct for life, it is clear that some method of warning, a sensitiveness to danger, is as essential as a method of escape. The fear of death is one of the emotional forms in which we express this instinct. No matter how it may be modified by convictions relative to the life beyond, there is a startled shrinking from the cold, solitary, disintegrating grave; a sudden terror when for the first time the pain of some fatal disease intimates that the end has begun.

If you touch a worm which has wriggled half way out of its bed—after lime has been poured upon turf, for instance—it will immediately retreat; a snail, drowsing lazily in the warm shade, draws in his horns with quick alarm at the slightest touch; untamed reptiles recoil like a mainspring from human contact; birds, scariest perhaps of all the land species, are horrified at the slightest approach to caressing. We may not call the worm anxious-minded; it is simply prepared on the slightest occasion to wriggle. That simple and direct response—protective in its nature—occurs in man also. Most people, if suddenly, though however slightly, touched, when not prepared, recoil—an immediate reflex activity. From so primitive a reaction we might trace the evolution of the elaborate processes which underlie fear.

Let us turn to the natural history of this mode of consciousness as a prelude to some remarks on its teleology—the uses of fear in the spiritual economy. A great many creatures of all species appear to be very timid, and especially those that have not strong weapons of offense. It is obvious that the common house fly is a timid and fugitive creature compared with the audacious and predatory midge. Among reptiles contrast the armed and predatory crocodiles and alligators, the python, the cobra, with the comparatively defenseless and fugitive turtle and tortoise; among birds, the aggressive eagle and hawk, with the defenseless doves and sparrows; among mammals, the carnivora with the herbivora.

Through all nature, then, the fitness by which the species survive is, in some cases, a power of offense associated with a character that includes courage, audacity, ferocity, and in others, the vast majority, a physical defenselessness associated with caution, timidity, constant watchfulness. To the human consciousness, these diversities have descended. There are men and women, not unfitly described as sharks, who are bent upon turning everything and everybody to advantage, who regard every neighbor as fair game. And there are others, who are mostly afraid, who suggest in their suspicion and anxiety the apparent state of mind of the coy and prudish cow.

The qualities which man inherits, and by which he has survived do not rapidly atrophy and disappear. The cerebral structures which were evolved in primitive man, the vital structures, the structures necessary to protect and prolong life, are deeply organized in the seed of the human race, and are to all intents and purposes, everlasting. Some of them, including fear, are dwindling, but they dwindle very slowly.

Yet fear, like other infirmities, has its uses both to the single life and to life in general. A special development of any sort begets a corresponding adaptation in all the world with which it comes into close contact. An improved sense of danger, an increased wariness, reacts at once upon the intelligence and skill to which it is opposed. The more daring the "enterprising burglar" becomes, the more active and intelligent become the police; make new laws—factory acts or joint-stock company acts— and you promptly stimulate the sense of danger of manufacturers and company promoters, their skill in evading the law improves, and you must draw still closer the meshes of your legal net.

But, generally speaking, the capacity for fear in the human mind is absurdly in excess of its utility. As men evolved past that stage when danger to life was constant, fear attached itself to ideas and sentiments; and then its mischievousness began, for there is no end to the possibilities of fear when linked to a vivid imagination. It is at that stage when life became comparatively safe that the by-products of fear

began, and many of them are very fantastic. As death became less likely, the fear of it did not rapidly dwindle, but only very slowly, and it is still dwindling only slowly. As soon as early man made himself safe, he set out to discover new things to be afraid of, new uses for the obsolete emotion. All people have perpetuated the practice, and we today are still engaged in imagining and inventing things which will satisfy our appetite for suspicion and alarm.—DR. GEORGE R. WILSON, A.B., in *Monist*, April, 1903.

Marriage as an Economic Institution.—Roughly and honestly speaking, marriage is a matter of buying and selling. We have grown so squeamish and superfine that we have come to think that marriage treated as a commercial transaction ought to be ranked among the customs of savages. But if we will be honest with ourselves we shall see that these customs have a sound basis of principle which civilized men must appropriate and develop, rather than despise and neglect, if they would make marriage quite satisfactory as an economic institution. Marriage must come to be the result of conviction and of high purpose, rather than of necessity or social convention. Custom and instinct must not be our guides in this matter. We must be cultured enough to make the interests of civilization our interests, and then we shall cease to be animals, even though we lead an earthly life, and shall be capable of great ideals of civic virtue and national zeal without suppressing individuality.

The first large question that thrusts itself upon us when considering marriage as an economical institution is: What does it imply as to the training of young women? Perhaps it is not yet possible to decide whether very advanced intellectual training best fits a woman for home duties. If, however, our nation (England) as a whole were more intellectual, there is little doubt that those women who have gone through a college course would be considered worthy above others to become wives and bring up children, because a university education gives the mind breadth and repose, gives also public spirit, without which home life cannot make for progress. But leaving this ideal alone for the present, let us see how under existing conditions a practical improvement might be made in the education of women. A course of training might be arranged to cover one or two or three years, according to the circumstances of the student, one part of the time being given to housewifery and the rest to learning the theory and practice of education. Schools might be either state or private. Great difficulty would be found in getting sufficient elasticity in course and organization to provide for all classes of students from the richly dowered to the young woman with no appreciable means. The taxpayer, too, might reasonably object to paying the levy to support these less favorably endowed young women who were candidates for homemaking. Great though the difficulty might be, and though the time be far distant, the custom of the father's giving a dowry of a sound training for marriage to every daughter who becomes engaged, and who is therefore destined to undertake the keeping of a home and the education of children, may become as universal and as binding in this country (England) as social opinion makes the giving of a pecuniary dowry in some other nations or the capturing of a bride by force in certain savage tribes. But the difficulties, moral, social, and intellectual, would not be insuperable, and even granting that they will be insuperable for many a long year, surely the ideal of attaching the highest responsibility to parenthood is great enough to warrant the crudest suggestions as to how that ideal is to be realized.

The use of business language in treating of marriage jars on many people. But this is because of a false conception of love, the maker of homes. But we should lose none of the finer and higher qualities which are without money and without price if we treated love as a practical worker making use of earthly tools. We need not suppose that the plainer views of marriage would rob life of much of its poetry, or would bring down an institution which has been the center of romance throughout man's history to the level of the commonplace work-a-day interests which are too familiar to call forth heroic energy or lofty enthusiasm. On the contrary, we should become much more poetical and imaginative, because healthy ideas on the subject would make it possible for men to comply with the conditions of spiritual birth and growth. Marriage is an all-important institution, because in it "the greatest thing in the world"

has its fullest and most characteristic expression. But love is spiritual, not sexual.—M. E. ROBINSON, "Marriage as an Economic Institution," in *International Journal of Ethics*, January, 1903. T. J. R.

Home Economics in Colleges and Universities.—The following statement was unanimously adopted as the sentiment of the Lake Placid Conference on Home Economics:

"The Lake Placid Conference on Home Economics considers that the time has come when subjects related to the home and its interests should have larger recognition in our colleges and universities.

"Recognizing the fact that there is a strong and steadily increasing demand for knowledge of these subjects, believing that their educational possibilities are not inferior to those of other subjects now in the curriculum, and that instruction in these branches promotes in a high degree individual and social efficiency, we earnestly request that the heads of our higher institutions will consider the advisability of introducing such work.

"This may be done either by the establishment of new departments or by the extension of courses already offered.

"History, sociology, and economics deal with fundamental problems of the family and the home. Biology, chemistry, and physics have important applications in the household. This has been already recognized to some extent by leading universities, and their curriculums include such courses as 'the family,' 'the citizen or householder,' 'the evolution of the house,' 'sanitary chemistry,' 'food and nutrition,' 'bacteriology,' besides work in sanitation, physiology, and hygiene.

"The members of this conference believe that an extension of such work where it is already established, and its introduction in other institutions, would contribute to the solution of some of the most important social problems of today."

Submitted by committee on Courses of Study in Colleges.

Can Married Women Exercise the Local Franchise?—In view of the difference of opinion regarding this question, the government sent out circulars requesting answers to the following questions: (1) Can married women, in accordance with the established law, under certain assumptions be regarded as having the right to exercise the local franchise? (2) Can the established legislation concerning the husband's primacy be regarded as an insuperable obstacle to the enjoyment of the political franchise by married women? The outcome of the inquiry brought out two points: first, that the wife, in spite of the limitations put upon her by her position as wife, is still a responsible party; and, second, that the present mode of taxation, according to which husband and wife are taxed as a unit in the husband's name, would seem to debar married women from the exercise of the franchise, which requires a property qualification. On the other hand, it has been suggested that nothing prevents a separate taxation of husband and wife upon the basis of a legal division of the property. On the question of the exercise of the political franchise, the laws of the land recognize only the male franchise. Inasmuch as women are thus excluded, no question about the possession of the franchise can arise. However, so far as primacy in the ability to assume responsibility is concerned, there is from our point of view nothing to hinder her from exercising the political as well as the local franchise.—E. KALLENBERG, in *Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift*, January, 1903.

A. D. S.

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